UC-NRLF 


SB    bl    23b 


iv  fcf^asKj 

-BBS 


LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


COMPLIMENTS 

OF 


GENERAL  GRENVILLE  M.  DODGE 


*5 


MAJOR-GENERAL    GREXVILLE    M.    DODGE 

Commander 

Department  of  the  Missouri 
1865. 


THE 

BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA 


AND 


OTHER  CAMPAIGNS, 
ADDRESSES,  Etc. 


BY 

Major-General  Grenville  M.  Dodge 


COUNCIL    BLUFFS,    IOWA 
THE    MONARCH    PRINTING    COMPANY 

1911 


MAK  21  I91I 
GIFT 


CONTENTS 


Page. 

The   Southwestern   Campaign 9 

Letter  of  General  Dodge  to  his  Father 35 

The  Battle  of  Atlanta 39 

Letter  to  General  Raum 53 

The  Indian  Campaigns  of  1864-65 63 

The  Indian  Campaigns  of  1865-66 79 

Campaign  up  the  Tennessee  River  Valley Ill 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee 129 

The  Campaign  in  the  West 137 

A  Talk  to  Old  Comrades 145 

General    Grant    151 

Use  of  Block-Houses  During  the  Civil  War 159 

An   Incident  of  the   War 165 

Gen.  G.  M.  Dodge  on  the  Water  Cure 173 

Misplaced  Sympathy 177 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


Major-General   Grenville   M.   Dodge Frontispiece 

Major-General   Samuel   R.   Curtis 7 

Sylvanus   Dodge    34 

Sixteenth  Army  Corps  in  the  Battle  of  Atlanta 38 

Monument  on  the  Battlefield  of  Atlanta 52 

Old    Fort   Kearney    62 

James   Bridger,   Guide    78 

Pumpkin  Buttes 94 

Brigadier-General  G.  M.  Dodge  and  Staff 110 

Commanders  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 128 

Major-General  G.  M.  Dodge  and  Staff 136 

Fort    Cottonwood    140 

Where  General  McPherson  Fell 144 

Major-General    George    G.    Meade 150 

Pontoon  Bridge  Across  the  Tennessee  River 158 

To  the  Memory  of  Samuel  Davis 164 

Company  L,   Fifty-First  Iowa  Infantry 172 

Scotts  Bluffs    .  .176 


226166 


.MAJOK-<;I-;M-:KAL  SAMTKL  it.  rnms 

<  '<>iiiin;uii1iT  «>!'  the  Army   of  the  Southwest,   in   the   S]»rin.u-  of    1st'.  1 


THE  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMPAIGN 


The  Southwest  became  prominent  before  the  nation  early  in 
the  war  from  the  doubt  existing  as  to  the  position  of  Missouri, 
which  was  saved  bv  the  energy  and  determination  of  Frank  P. 
Blair  and  Colonel  Nathaniel  Lyon ;  the  latter  first  capturing  Camp 
Jackson,  on  May  10th,  18(51.  He  then,  picking  up  what  force  he 
could  without  waiting  for  them  to  be  disciplined  or  drilled,  inarched 
rapidly  against  the  Missouri  State  troops  under  Price,  who  were 
driven  to  the  southwest  through  Springfield,  where,  being  joined 
by  the  troops  from  Arkansas,  under  Colonel  McCollough,  they  stood 
and  fought  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek.  This  would  have  been  a 
great  victory  for  the  Union  forces  if  Lyon  had  not  divided  his 
forces  at  the  request  of  General  Siegel  and  trusted  the  latter  to 
carry  out  his  plan  of  attack  in  the  rear  while  Lyon  attacked  in 
the  front.  This  General  Siegel  failed  to  do,  leaving  the  field  when 
the  battle  was  half  over,  and  allowing  Lyon  to  light  it  out  alone. 
Even  then,  if  Lyon  had  not  been  killed  at  the  head  of  his  Army 
while  fighting  the  whole  force  of  the  eneni}-,  it  would  have  turned 
out  to  be  a  great  victory  for  the  Union  forces,  and  would  have  held 
that  country.  The  death  of  Lyon  caused  a  return  of  his  troops  to 
Holla  and  Sedalia.  and  opened  up  again  the  whole  of  Missouri  to 
the  Missouri  State  troops  under  General  Price. 

One  of  the  notable  facts  of  this  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek  was 
that  it  was  fought  by  young  officers  who  ranked  only  as  Captains 
and  Lieutenants,  all  of  whom  afterwards  became  distinguished 
officers  in  the  war — Schofield,  Sturgis,  Totten,  DuBois,  and  Sweeny 
and  from  the  fact  that  in  the  first  great  battle  of  the  Southwest 
one  of  the  two  commanders  of  Armies  falling  at  the  head  of  their 
forces  in  battle  was  killed  here — General  Lyon.  The  other  was 
General  McPherson,  who  fell  at  Atlanta. 

Lyon  pursued  the  tactics  of  Grant  by  attacking  the  enemy 
wherever  to  be  found,  and  not  taking  into  consideration  the  dis 
parity  of  forces.  The  excitement  caused  by  Lyon's  campaigns  in- 


10  Tin-:  SorTinvKSTKHN  CAM  1'AKiX. 

duced  the  Government  to  create  the  Western  Department,  and 
assign  to  it  on  July  25th,  1861,  General  John  C.  Fremont  as  its 
commander. 

In  August,  18(51,  I  landed  in  St.  Louis  with  my  Regiment, 
the  Fourth  Iowa  Infantry,  and  soon  after  was  sent  to  Rolla,  Mo., 
which  was  then  the  most  important  outpost,  being  the  nearest  to 
the  enemy's  Army.  Soon  after  I  reached  there  General  Fremont 
commenced  formulating  his  plans  for  the  campaign  in  the  South, 
and  being  the  commander  of  that  outpost  I  was  in  daily  communi 
cation  with  him.  There  was  a  constant  stream  of  reports  coming 
from  the  enemy's  lines  that  seemed  to  give  great  importance  to  their 
strength  and  their  position,  and  I  was  continually  ordered  to  send 
out  scouts  and  troops  to  test  the  information.  I  invariably  found 
it  wrong  and  my  telegrams  will  show  my  opinion  of  those  reports. 

Soon  after  arriving  at  Rolla  T  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
post,  and  had  quite  a  force  under  me,  and  was  ordered  to  prepare 
to  winter  there. 

The  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek  was  fought  on  August  10th,  and 
soon  thereafter  General  Price  formed  his  plan  of  campaign  to  move 
north  into  north  Missouri  and  endeavor  to  hold  it  by  the  recruits 
that  he  could  obtain  there.  With  from  five  to  ten  thousand  men 
of  the  Missouri  State  Guards,  General  Price  moved,  and  as  he 
marched  north  in  September  his  Army  increased  heavily  in  num 
bers  and  enthusiasm.  The  Federal  forces  were  scattered  all  over 
Missouri — some  eighty  thousand  in  all.  At  least  half  of  these  could 
have  been  concentrated  to  operate  against  any  force  of  the  enemy, 
but  they  were  all  protecting  towns,  cities  and  railways  and  endeav 
oring  to  make  Missouri  loyal,  while  Price  concentrated  and  moved 
where  he  pleased,  until,  on  September  21,  1861,  he  captured  Lex 
ington,  with  some  3,000  or  more  prisoners.  The  movement  of  Price 
on  Lexington  and  the  defeat  and  capture  of  our  forces  there,  forced 
Fremont  to  concentrate,  and  he  moved  with  four  Divisions,  making 
an  Army  of  38,000,  on  Springfield,  which  he  reached  October  27th. 
Price  was  then  far  south  of  that  place.  Had  our  forces  been  con 
centrated  to  meet  Price's  Army  we  had  enough  to  defeat  him  :  but 
the  moment  Fremont  commenced  concentrating  his  four  Divisions 
to  act  against  him.  Price  moved  back  as  fast  as  lie  had  advanced, 
and  did  not  slop  until  lie  was  south  of  Springfield  and  near  supports 
in  Arkansas. 


TlIK    SoCTII  WKSTKKN    ( '.\  M  1'A  Hi  X  .  11 

General  McCullough,  in  his  letters  from  Springfield,  Mo., 
August  21th.  says  that  there  were  only  3,000  troops  in  Springfield 
and  all  the  Arkansas  troops  had  left  the  service.  Price's  total  force 
was  about  12,000  men.  and  on  November  7th  he  reached  and  joined 
McCullough  and  suggested  to  General  A.  S.  Johnston  a  campaign 
against  St.  Louis.  olTering  to  raise  in  Missouri  and  Arkansas  a 
force  of  25,000  men  in  such  a  campaign,  and  stated  he  should 
wait  for  Fremont  at  Pineville,  Ark.,  believing  in  that  rugged  coun 
try  he  could  defeat  him. 

While  at  Holla  I  was  ordered  to  send  a  force  to  take  Salem, 
to  the  south  of  me,  and  1  entrusted  the  command  of  the  force  to 
Colonel  Greusel,  of  the  Thirteenth  Illinois  Infantry.  I  issued  to 
him  the  following  instructions: 

If  the  men  who  arc  away  from  home  are  in  the  rebel  Army,  or  if  their 
families  cannot  give  a  good  account  of  them  or  their  whereabouts,  take  their 
property  or  that  portion  of  it  worth  taking ;  also  their  slaves.  Be  sure  that 
they  are  aiding  the  enemy,  then  take  all  they  have  got. 

When  I  wrote  these  instructions  I  had  not  considered  for  a 
moment  what  a  row  the  order  to  take  the  slaves  would  cause.  I 
simply  treated  them  as  other  property.  It  was  written  innocently, 
but  made  a  sensation  1  never  dreamed  of,  and  1  have  often  since 
been  quoted  as  one  of  the  first  to  liberate  and  utilize  the  negro. 

On  the  return  of  Lyoifs  Army  to  Holla  I  was  ordered  by  Gen 
eral  Fremont  to  report  at  his  headquarters  in  St.  Louis.  On  my 
arrival  in  St.  Louis  I  reported  myself  to  his  Adjutant,  who  was 
in  the  basement  of  the  old  home  of  Thomas  A.  Benton,  on  Choutau 
Avenue,  but  was  unable  to  obtain  an  interview  with  the  General. 
I  showed  my  dispatch  to  his  Adjutant-General,  and  waited  there 
two  days.  I  met  any  number  of  stall'  officers,  and  was  handed  about 
from  one  to  another,  never  reaching  or  hearing  from  General  Fre 
mont.  After  remaining  in  Si.  Louis  two  days  I  considered  it  was 
my  duly  to  return  to  my  command,  and  left  a  note  to  the  Adjutant 
stating  that  I  had  waited  there  two  days  for  an  interview  with 
General  Fremont,  and  had  left  for  my  command,  and  that  if 
wanted  would  return  to  St.  Louis  again. 

Evidently  no  communication  was  made  to  Fremont  of  my 
presence  in  the  city  or  of  my  note,  for  soon  after  [  arrived  at  Rolla 
I  received  a  sharp  note  from  him  asking  why  I  had  not  reported 
as  ordered.  I  answered  by  wire  that  I  had  reported,  had  been  unable 
to  see  him,  and  would  report  immediately  again  in  St.  Louis.  I 
was  determined  to  see  him  this  time,  and  I,  therefore,  went  directly 


12  Tin-:  So  rrr  ii  \\KSTKRX  CAM 


to  Colonel  Benton's  house,  and,  taking  a  sealed  envelope  in  my 
hand,  marched  right  up  the  front  steps,  passed  all  the  guards  as 
though  I  belonged  there,  and  went  into  his  room  and  reported 
myself  present.  I  there  learned  from  him  as  much  of  his  plans 
as  he  thought  best  to  give  me  in  regard  to  his  movements,  and 
obtained  from  him  the  information  that  Price's  Army  was  not 
far  from  Rolla,  and  instructions  to  be  on  the  alert.  I  supposed 
that  my  command  at  Rolla  was  to  accompany  his  march  to  Spring 
field,  and  on  my  return  to  Rolla  made  every  preparation  to  do  so, 
but  never  received  the  order.  Everything  in  the  department  was 
absolutely  chaos.  It  was  impossible  to  obtain  provisions,  accouter- 
ments,  equipment,  or  anything  else  upon  a  proper  requisition. 
Everything  seemed  to  require  an  order  from  one  of  General  Fre 
mont's  staff,  and  my  own  Regiment  suffered  a  long  time  before  I 
could  get  for  it  the  necessary  arms,  clothing,  equipment,  etc. 

While  I  was  at  Rolla  the  dispatch  sent  by  the  Government  to 
General  Curtis,  to  be  forwarded  to  Fremont  at  Springfield,  reliev 
ing  him  of  the  command,  was  brought  by  a  staff  officer  to  me  with 
the  request  that  I  should  see  that  the  staff  officer  had  an  escort 
and  went  through  promptly  to  Springfield.  General  Curtis,  who 
was  from  my  own  state,  wrote  me  a  private  note  stating  the  im 
portance  of  pushing  this  staff  officer  through.  President  Lincoln 
sent  the  order  to  General  Curtis  with  this  peculiar  note  : 

Brigadier-General  8.  R.  Curtis:  WASHINGTON,  October  24,  18G1. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  :  —  Herewith  is  a  document,  half  letter,  half  order,  which, 
wishing  you  to  see  but  not  to  make  public,  I  scud  unsealed.  Please  read  it 
and  then  inclose  it  to  the  officer  who  may  be  in  command  of  the  Department 
of  the  West  at  the  time  it  reaches  you.  I  cannot  know  now  whether  Fre 
mont  or  Hunter  will  then  be  in  command.  Yours  truly, 

A.  LINCOLN. 

In  a  few  days  I  received  a  letter  from  General  Hunter,  who 
had  relieved  General  Fremont,  instructing  me  that  thereafter 
everything  in  the  department  must  be  carried  on  in  accordance 
with  the  orders  of  the  War  Department  and  the  Army  Regulations, 
and  I  immediately  saw  a  change  for  the  better.  I  was  soldier 
enough,  although  I  had  not  had  much  experience  then,  to  know  that 
the  methods  being  pursued  under  Fremont  could  bring  nothing 
but  disaster  to  the  service.  Every  order  was  signed  by  somebody 
acting  as  a  General,  a  Colonel,  or  something  else,  while  in  fact 
many  of  them  had  no  rank  whatever,  and  in  looking  over  my  own 
orders  T  do  not  know  why  I  did  not  sign  myself  as  an  Acting  Gen- 


THE  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMPAIGN.  13 

eral,  as  those  who  succeeded  me  did.  Even  after  General  Halleck 
took  command  I  noticed  in  the  orders  of  General  Hunter  that  he 
assigned  persons  to  the  command  of  a  Brigade  as  Acting  Brigadier- 
Generals  instead  of  their  rank  as  Colonel  Commanding,  etc. 

I  remained  at  Eolla  until  the  return  of  the  troops  under 
General  Hunter;  and  finally  those  commanded  by  Siegel,  Asboth 
and  Osterhaus  wore  encamped  at  Holla  outside  of  the  post  and 
were  reporting  directly  to  the  commanding  officer  of  the  depart 
ment,  while  J  as  post  commander  reported  directly  to  the  same 
authority. 

General  Hunter  as  soon  as  he  took  command  wired  the  War 
Department  that  there  was  no  force  of  the  enemy  in  his  neighbor 
hood,  although  orders  had  been  given  by  Fremont  a  day  or  two 
before  to  march  out  and  fight  Price's  Army.  Hunter,  therefore, 
in  accordance  with  his  orders  from  Washington,  abandoned  the 
pursuit,  although  with  the  force  he  had  he  could  have  driven 
Price  and  McCullough  south  of  the  Arkansas  Eiver,  and  probably 
have  avoided  the  later  campaign  that  ended  in  the  Battle  of  Pea 
Eidge.  Hunter  moved  his  forces  back  to  Eolla  and  Sedalia  and 
sent  18,000  of  his  men  to  join  General  Grant  in  the  campaigns  up 
the  Tennessee  Eivor. 

This  force  at  Eolla  was  mostly  Germans,  and  the  change  of 
commanders  from  Fremont  to  Hunter,  and  later  to  Halleck,  was 
unsatisfactory  to  them,  though  one  of  the  officers,  General  Oster- 
haus,  took  no  part  in  the  feeling  and  sentiment  that  seemed  to 
exist  that  for  success  it  was  necessary  to  have  Fremont  or  Siegel 
in  command,  and  my  understanding  was  that  the  force  at  Eolla 
(I ni-ing  the  winter  of  1801-62  was  the  nucleus  of  the  force  that  was 
again  to  march  to  the  Southwest  under  the  orders  of  General  Hal 
leck  and  to  bo  commanded  by  General  Siegel.  General  Halleck, 
when  he  assumed  command  of  the  department,  in  his  letters  to 
the  War  Department  and  his  orders  to  the  troops  showed  plainly 
his  disgust  at  the  condition  of  matters  in  that  department.  He 
wrote  to  the  War  Department: 

One  week's  experience  here  is  sufficient  to  prove  that  everything  is  in 
complete  chaos.  The  most  astounding  orders  and  contracts  for  supplies  of 
all  kinds  have  been  made,  and  large  amounts  purported  to  have  been  re 
ceived,  but  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  they  have  ever  been  properly  issued 
and  they  cannot  now  be  found. 

Of  the  condition  of  the  troops  he  found  in  his  department,  he 
wrote : 


14  THE  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMPAIGN. 

Some  of  these  corps  are  not  only  organized  in  a  way  entirely  contrary 
to  law,  but  are  by  no  means  reliable,  being  mostly  foreigners,  and  officered  in 
many  cases  by  foreign  adventurers,  or  perhaps  refugees  from  justice  ;  and, 
having  been  tampered  with  by  political  partizans  for  political  purposes,  they 
constitute  a  very  dangerous  element  to  society  as  well  as  to  the  Army  itself, 
Wherever  they  go  they  convert  all  Union  men  into  bitter  enemies.  The  men, 
if  properly  officered,  would  make  good  soldiers,  but  with  their  present  officers 
they  are  little  better  than  an  armed  mob. 

They  were  not  paid,  had  not  been  mustered  into  our  service, 
and  the  commissions  emanated  from  General  Fremont.,  not  from 
the  State  or  Government. 

General  Halleck's  plans  evidently  were  to  make  a  campaign 
against  Price  as  soon  as  he  could  organize  the  forces  concentrated 
at  Eolla.  Price's  headquarters  were  at  Springfield,  and  his  north 
erly  line  was  along  the  Osage  Valley.  His  force  was  estimated 
anywhere  from  10,000  to  30,000.  As  outposts  General  Halleck  had 
Rolla,  Jefferson  City,  and  Sedalia.  There  was  located  at  Eolla 
five  or  six  thousand  troops;  at  Sedalia  and  along  that  line  about 
ten  or  twelve  thousand,  under  General  Pope,  including  Jeff  C. 
Da  vis's  Division;  but  these  troops  Halleck  intended  to  send  down 
the  Mississippi  and  up  the  Tennessee. 

General  Pope  in  his  letters  to  General  Halleck  urged  that 
he  be  allowed  to  move  on  Price  and  destroy  his  Army,  which  he 
said  he  could  do  witli  his  force.  Rumors  of  Price's  force  and  their 
movements  were  a  constant  terror  and  excitement  throughout  Mis 
souri.  The  whole  of  northern  Missouri  was  aroused  by  Price's 
proximity,  and  all  the  counties  had  recruiting  officers  from  his 
Army  enrolling  and  sending  it  recruits.  The  numbers  of  these  re 
cruiting  officers  and  their  small  squads  of  recruits  were  magnified 
into  thousands,  and  Price,  when  he  sent  a  thousand  men  to  Lexing 
ton  for  the  purpose  of  holding  that  place  and  recruiting,  brought 
orders  from  Halleck  for  a  movement  of  all  the  troops  to  cut  him  off. 
The  prompt  movement  of  Halleck  kept  him  from  remaining  there 
very  long,  but  he  was  enabled  to  take  about  three  thousand  recruits 
from  there  without  molestation  from  us. 

Price's  campaign  as  planned  for  the  winter  was  to  have  Gen 
eral  McCnllough's  Arkansas  force,  which  was  lying  at  Cross  Tim 
bers,  near  Elkhorn  Tavern,  and  Van  Buren  in  Arkansas,  join  him. 
Price  complained  bitterly  of  his  inability  to  obtain  any  aid  from 
McCullough,  stating  that  if  he  could  obtain  it  he  could  march  into 
northern  Missouri  and  hold  the  State,  and  recruit  there  an  Army 
of  Missourians;  which,  from  my  experience  in  the  State,  I  have 


THE  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMPAIGN.  15 

no  doubt  lie  would  have  done  if  he  could  have  moved  there  and 
held  his  position. 

General  Hal  leek's  plan  evidently  was  to  move  a  body  from 
Rolla  directly  on  Springfield,  with  the  intention  of  striking  and 
defeating  Price  before  Price  could  receive  reinforcements,  but  Hal- 
leek  had  a  great  disinclination  to  move  until  he  had  organized  the 
forces  in  the  State  of  Missouri  into  Brigades  and  Divisions,  had 
them  properly  mustered  and  officered,  and  had  his  staff  departments 
so  arranged  that  they  could  be  depended  upon  to  take  care  of  any 
moving  column.  This  disinclination  of  Halleck  to  move  carried 
us  on  to  the  first  of  January. 

In  December  General  Siegel  was  given  command  of  the  troops 
at  Rolla,  and  Captain  Phil  Sheridan  was  sent  there  as  Quarter 
master  for  that  Army.  His  ability  and  foresight  in  organizing 
the  transportation  of  an  Army,  feeding  it,  and  fitting  it  for  a 
campaign,  was  shown  every  day. 

On  December  2Gth  General  Halleck  assigned  General  S.  E. 
Curtis  to  the  command  of  the  District  of  Southwest  Missouri.  This 
included  the  forces  under  Siegel  at  Rolla,  and  caused  very  severe 
comments  from  them.  From  the  letters  of  Halleck,  written  at  the 
time  and  afterwards,  this  placing  of  Siegel  under  Curtis  was  caused 
by  the  letters  and  opinions — in  fact,  the  denunciations — of  Siegel 
made  by  Captains  Schofield,  Totten,  and  Sturgis,  when  with  Lyon 
in  the  Wilson's  Creek  campaign.  Evidently  Halleck  lost  all  faith 
in  Siegel  as  commander  of  the  Southwestern  Army,  and  therefore 
assigned  Brigadier-General  Samuel  R.  Curtis,  who  had  been  sta 
tioned  at  St.  Louis,  to  the  command.  But  General  Siegel  was  still 
left  in  command  of  two  Divisions  of  the  troops  near  Rolla,  which 
was  a  great  mistake. 

As  soon  as  General  Curtis  assumed  command  General  Halleck 
commenced  urging  him  to  move  to  the  south  on  Springfield,  agree 
ing  to  send  to  him  Colonel  Jeff  C.  Davis's  Division  to  join  him  be 
fore  reaching  Springfield,  which  Division  was  about  5,000  strong, 
;ind  was  with  Pope  on  the  Lamine  River  line.  Curtis  hesitated,  and 
did  not  feel  secure  with  the  forces  he  had,  although  Halleck  did 
not  believe  Price  would  stand  for  a  fight,  or  that  Curtis  would 
need  Jeff  C.  Davis's  Division. 

The  Army  of  the  Southwest,  about  seven  thousand  strong,  was 
organized  at  Rolla,  and  moved  from  there  January  14th,  towards 
Springfield,  halting  at  Lebanon.  From  Lebanon  it  moved  on  to 


16  THE  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMPAIGN. 

Marshfield,  where  Colonel  Jeff  C.  Davis,  with  his  Division,  joined 
it.  Great  preparations  were  made  there  for  the  attack  upon  Price, 
and  we  moved  out  of  Marshfield  prepared  for  battle,  General  Siegel 
commanding  the  First  and  Second  Divisions,  one  under  General 
Osterhaus  and  the  other  under  General  Asboth.  General  Jeff  C. 
Davis,  from  General  Pope's  Army,  commanded  the  Third  Division, 
and  Colonel  Eugene  A.  Carr  the  Fourth  Division,  a  Brigade  of 
which  I  commanded. 

When  within  about  three  miles  of  Springfield  we  received 
orders  to  attack  that  town  the  next  morning,  and  moved  at  mid 
night.  All  the  reports  we  received  were  that  Price  was  in  Spring 
field  ready  for  battle.  I  had  the  extreme  left,  and  put  out  my 
skirmishers  soon  after  midnight,  supposing,  of  course,  that  I  was 
in  front  of  the  enemy,  although  I  had  seen  nothing  of  them.  In 
the  darkness  I  lost  track  of  the  company  of  the  Fourth  Iowa, 
who  were  the  skirmishers  of  my  Brigade,  and  was  greatly  wor 
ried  at  the  fact,  but  at  daylight  I  met  them  on  the  road  mounted 
upon  horses  and  dressed  in  all  kinds  of  costumes.  The  officer  in 
command,  who  was  an  enterprising  one,  had  started  his  skirmish- 
line,  and,  not  meeting  any  enemy,  had  pushed  right  into  Spring 
field,  which  he  found  evacuated  except  for  a  rear  guard  and  a  num 
ber  of  horses.  They  mounted  the  horses  and  rode  back  to  us.  All 
this  time  our  extreme  right,  under  Siegel,  was  using  its  artillery 
upon  the  town,  not  knowing  that  the  enemy  had  gone. 

General  Curtis,  in  his  order  of  battle,  instructed  Captain 
Sheridan  to  line  up  his  transportation  in  the  rear  of  the  line  of 
battle,  so  that  it  could  be  used  as  a  defensive  obstruction  for  the 
troops  to  fall  back  to,  provided  they  met  any  check  or  were  driven 
back.  Captain  Sheridan  looked  on  this  order  as  a  very  singular 
one,  and  says  that  he  could,  in  his  imagination,  if  anything  hap 
pened  our  army,  see  his  transportation  flying  over  that  rough  coun 
try,  knowing  that  his  mule-drivers  would  be  the  first  to  run,  most 
likely  from  a  false  report,  not  even  waiting  for  an  attack.  While 
this  order  at  the  time  caused  no  comment,  it  now,  after  our  long  ex 
perience,  looks  very  ridiculous,  though  not  more  so  than  many  oth 
ers  we  received  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

It  was  not  long  before  we  were  all  on  the  march  through 
and  beyond  Springfield,  Price  and  his  Army  being  in  full  retreat, 
with  a  force,  so  far  as  we  could  learn,  of  about  ten  thousand 
men.  We  followed  him  as  rapidly  as  possible,  he  leaving  a  strong 


THE  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMI»AH;N.  1? 

rear  guard  under  Colonel  Little  to  stop  us  at  every  stream.  Gen 
eral  Siegel  had  urged  upon  General  Curtis  a  detour  by  his  two 
Divisions  to  head  off  Price  or  stop  him,  so  that  he  could  attack  him 
in  front  while  we  attacked  his  rear.  Curtis  had  acceded  to  this.  I 
had  the  advance  following  up  Price,  and  endeavored  to  hold  him, 
while  Siegel  moved  by  another  road,  expecting  to  catch  him  in 
flank  or  get  ahead  of  him. 

I  remember  that  about  noon  of  each  day  at  some  good  de 
fensive  point,  generally  across  a  creek  with  a  wide,  open  valley, 
Price  would  open  out  with  his  artillery  and  cavalry  and  act  as 
though  he  intended  to  give  battle.  Our  cavalry  would  fall  back  to 
give  way  to  our  infantry,  and  we  would  go  into  line,  put  out  our 
skirmishers,  and  lose  half  a  day,  and  as  night  came  on  Price  would 
get  out  without  our  accomplishing  anything.  I  remember  dis 
tinctly  that  my  Regiment  would  go  into  line,  strip  themselves,  and 
throw  down  the  chickens,  potatoes,  apples,  and  other  eatables  they 
had  foraged  and  taken  during  the  day,  and  as  they  would  go  for 
ward  the  troops  in  our  rear  would  come  up  and  gobble  what  they 
had  dropped.  About  the  third  time  the  Regiment  went  into  line 
I  noticed  the  boys  had  left  nothing  but  their  knapsacks,  and  were 
holding  on  to  their  chickens  and  provisions.  One  of  the  boys  saw 
me  looking  at  them,  and  thinking  I  was  going  to  order  them  to 
drop  what  they  had  in  their  hands  or  on  their  backs,  he  appealed 
to  me,  saying,  "Colonel,  we  have  fed  that  damned  Thirty-sixth  Illi 
nois  Infantry  every  day  and  left  ourselves  without  any  supper. 
They  put  up  this  game  that  is  going  on  to  get  our  chickens.  There 
ain't  any  Price  on  that  side  of  the  river,  and  they  can't  fool  us  any 
longer  if  they  do  you." 

At  Cane  Creek,  Flat  Creek,  Sugar  Creek,  etc.,  we  had  pretty 
sharp  skirmishes.  I  soon  discovered  the  plan  of  Price.  It  was 
to  leave  a  strong  rear-guard  and  make  a  great  show  while  his  trains 
and  the  rest  of  his  Army  were  pushing  to  the  South  as  fast  as  pos 
sible;  so  as  soon  as  I  saw  him  stop  I  went  at  him  head-on  with  the 
cavalry  and  infantry,  not  even  waiting  to  deploy  more  than  a 
Regiment.  Price's  men  would  line  the  road  and  get  one  or  two 
volleys  at  us  and  then  slip  off  into  the  woods  before  we  could  deploy 
or  return  their  fire.  They  did  not  get  hurt  much,  but  we  did;  but 
at  the  same  time  it  broke  up  his  game  of  holding  us  back,  and  we 
kept  close  on  to  his  rear.  For  two  or  three  days  we  were  looking 
for  Siegel  to  get  in  ahead  and  chock  Price,  when  to  our  astonish- 


IS  Tin-;  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMPAIGN. 

ment  a  report  came  from  our  rear  that  he  had  turned  his  column 
in  on  our  road  some  eight  mile?  behind  us,  and  there  was  a  gen 
eral  howl  from  the  force  that  had  been  pounding  away  at  Price's 
rear. 

Finally  we  pushed  Price  back  to  Fayetteville,  Ark.,  where  we 
landed  during  the  month  of  February,  and  where  we  were  halted 
by  General  Halleck's  orders,  who  stated  that  he  would  relieve  our 
front  of  the  enemy  by  his  movements  with  the  rest  of  his  forces 
through  Southeast  Missouri,  down  the  Mississippi,  and  up  the  Ten 
nessee. 

While  Price  was  laying  at  Springfield,  in  December,  he  com 
municated  with  the  Confederate  Government,  and  changed  all  his 
Missouri  State  force  as  far  as  practicable  into  Confederate  troops. 
He  also  complained  to  the  Government,  and  to  General  Polk,  who 
commanded  at  Columbus,  Ky.,  of  the  impossibility  of  obtaining  the 
co-operation  of  the  Confederate  forces  west  of  the  Mississippi  River. 
From  the  representations  of  Polk  and  Price,  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment  organized  all  the  country  west  of  the  Mississippi  River  into 
a  department  known  as  the  Trans-Mississippi  District,  and  placed  it 
under  the  command  of  General  Earl  Van  Dorn,  who  assumed  com 
mand  early  in  February,  1862.  As  soon  as  he  assumed  command 
General  Van  Dorn  prepared  to  make  an  aggressive  campaign,  using 
all  his  forces  in  Arkansas  and  those  under  Price,  estimating  that 
they  would  reach  30,000  troops.  His  plan  was  to  move  his  forces 
directly  from  Arkansas  northward,  west  of  Iron  Mountain,  by  way 
of  Salem,  while  Price  moved  from  Springfield  directly  east  and 
joined  his  column  by  way  of  Salem  and  Rolla,  thence  the  combined 
column  to  move  directly  on  St.  Louis,  Van  Dorn  calculating  that 
lie  could  strike  and  capture  St.  Louis  before  Halleck  could  concen 
trate  his  troops  or  obtain  any  knowledge  of  his  movements  that 
would  enable  him  to  defeat  him  before  reaching  St.  Louis.  Van 
Dorn  expected  to  make  this  move  in  February,  and  his  plans  and 
the  energy  with  which  he  executed  them  and  concentrated  his  troops 
shows  him  to  have  been  an  officer  of  ability  and  great  energy. 
General  Halleck's  prompt  movement  of  General  Curtis's  armv 
from  Rolla  southwest  in  January,  thus  driving  Price  out  of  Spring 
field,  compelled  Van  Dorn  to  change  his  plans,  and  instead  of  mov 
ing  towards  St.  Louis  he  moved  his  troops  by  Van  Buren  and  the 
Boston  Mountains,  making  a  junction  with  Price's  force  in  the 
Boston  Mountains  below  Favetteville,  and  while  General  Curtis's 


TIM-:  Sorriiw  KSTKUN   CAM  i'.\i<:\.  19 


Arniv  was  laving  at  Cross  Hollows,  c\  ident  Iv  in  full  security, 
thinking  his  campaign  was  over  and  expect ing  Price  and  Van  Dorn 
to  be  drawn  away  from  his  front  by  the  movement  down  the  Mis 
sissippi.  General  Curtis  was  obliged  to  scatter  his  forces  in  that 
destitute  country  over  a  wide  expanse  so  as  to  obtain  food  and 
forage.  Van  Dorn,  without  our  having  any  knowledge  of  the  fact, 
marched  over  the  Boston  Mountains,  and  it  was  March  3d  before 
General  Curtis  was  aware  that  Van  Dorn  was  almost  in  his  front 
and  on  his  Hank.  The  Tnion  refugees  Hying  before  Van  Corn's 
movement  gave  us  the  first  reliable  notice  of  the  new  combina 
tion  and  the  new  movement.  (Jcneral  Curtis  immediately  sent  out 
orders,  and,  b\  marching  all  night,  during  heavy  snows  and  se 
vere  cold  weather,  was  able  to  concentrate  most  of  his  force  on 
Sugar  Creek,  near  Bentonville.  General  Siegel  and  his  force  did 
not  move  promptly,  as  ordered  by  Curtis,  and  was  almost  cut  off 
before  reaching  Bentonville.  He  had  to  cut  his  way  through  a 
portion  of  Van  Dorn's  Cavalry,  which  he  was  able  to  do  without 
much  loss,  and  our  line  was  formed  on  the  north  side  of  Sugar 
Creek,  facing  to  the  south, — a  strong  position, — expecting  to 
receive  Van  Bern's  attack  on  the  main  telegraph  road  from  Fayette- 
ville  to  Springfield.  We  were  on  a  plateau  with  a  broad  open  val 
ley  in  our  front.  In  the  rear  of  us  was  what  was  known  as  the 
Cross  Timbers,  a  dee])  gorge.  To  the  west  of  us  was  much  open 
ground,  over  which  was  a  road  parallel  to  the  main  road,  passing 
down  what  was  known  as  Little  Cross  Timbers,  and  entering  the 
Springfield  and  Fayetteville  road  about  midway  between  Elkhorn 
Tavern  and  Cassville,  some  four  miles  in  our  rear. 

While  I  was  in  command  at  Rolla  T  had  organized  by  details 
from  the  Twenty-fourth  and  Twenty-fifth  Missouri  Kegiments  a 
Corps  of  scouts  who  lived  in  Northern  Arkansas  and  Southern  Mis 
souri  and  were  thoroughly  acquainted  with  that  country.  During 
the  dav  of  the  6th  of  March,  while  Siegel  was  joining  us  and  we 
were  preparing  for  the  battle,  some  of  these  scouts  came  to  me 
and  told  me  that  Van  Dorn  proposed  to  move  to  our  rear  by  this 
Little  Cross  Timber  road.  About  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  I 
went  to  General  Curtis  and  reported  these  facts  to.  him,  and  also 
told  him  of  this  road  and  of  the  feasibility  of  blockading  it,  sup 
posing,  of  course,  he  would  send  some  of  the  troops  on  his  ex 
treme  right  to  do  it;  but  he  turned  to  me  and  said:  "You  take  a 
portion  of  your  command  and  go  there  and  blockade  the  road." 


20  THE  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMPAIGN. 

It  was  after  dark  before  I  could  reach  the  Little  Cross  Tim 
bers,  as  I  had  to  march  infantry  to  the  place,  which  was  quite  a  dis 
tance  away  from  where  we  were.  I  took  six  companies  of  the 
Fourth  Iowa  Infantry  and  one  company  of  the  Third  Illinois  Cav 
alry  and  marched  to  carry  out  this  order.  In  the  dark  two  of  my 
companies  crossed  the  road  and  got  lost,  while  with  the  other  five 
I  got  into  Cross  Timbers  Hollows  and  spent  about  three  hours 
felling  trees  all  through  the  gorge,  and  only  left  when  my  cavalry 
reported  the  movement  of  Van  Dorn's  Army  coming  down  the 
road.  I  returned  to  my  camp  supposing  my  two  companies  had 
been  cut  off,  but  upon  discovering  that  the  enemy  were  coming 
down  the  road  they  managed  to  get  back  across  it  and  reached  the 
camp. 

I  reported  immediately  to  General  Curtis's  headquarters,  and 
informed  him  that  Van  Dorn's  Army  was  moving  down  that  road 
to  his  rear.  He  did  not  believe  it,  and  thought  that  I  had  mis 
taken  some  of  his  cavalry  for  Van  Dorn's  Army.  There  were  no 
pickets  out  on  our  right  flank,  and  I  so  reported  to  General  Curtis, 
but  evidently  my  report  made  no  impression  upon  him,  and  I 
returned  to  camp. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  March  I  received  a 
request  from  General  Curtis  to  report  at  a  schoolhouse  that  was 
on  the  main  Payetteville  road  a  half  mile  north  of  Sugar  Creek, 
where  I  met  all  the  commanders  of  Divisions,  and,  I  think,  some 
of  the  Brigade  commanders,  and  where  a  council  of  war  was  being 
held  as  to  the  policy  that  was  to  be  pursued.  I  was  so  confident 
that  Van  Dorn  was  in  our  rear  that  when  I  went  to  this  council  I 
took  my  Brigade  and  halted  it  on  the  road  near  where  the  council 
was  to  be  held.  Generals  Siegel,  Asboth,  and  a  majority  of  the 
officers  present,  advised  that  we  should  fall  back  to  Cassville  to 
wards  Springfield,  and  not  give  battle  there,  but  Colonel  Jeff  C. 
Davis  and  myself  protested,  and  I  stated  that  I  believed  a  portion 
of  Van  Dorn's  force  was  then  in  our  rear.  The  rear  of  Curtis's 
Army  was  in  a  great  deal  of  confusion ;  its  trains  were  stretched  out 
on  the  F'ayetteville  road  and  the  ground  that  we  were  upon  was 
wooded  and  not  very  defensible  for  a  battle,  unless  they  attacked 
us  on  the  Sugar  Creek  front, 

While  we  were  in  this  council,  about  8  :30  a.  m.,  scattered  fir 
ing  commenced  in  our  rear  near  the  Elkhorn  Tavern,  and  General 
Curtis  inquired  what  it  was,  and  asked  what  troops  those  were  that 


THE  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMPAIGN. 


out  upon  the  road.  I  answered  that  they  were  mine,  and  he 
ordered  Colonel  Carr  to  immediately  send  me  to  the  Elkhorn  Tav 
ern  and  ascertain  what  the  firing  meant. 

Colonel  Carr  evidently  was  of  the  same  opinion  as  myself, 
and  accompanied  me  as  I  moved  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  Elk- 
horn  Tavern,  where  we  went  without  being  deployed  right  into  bat 
tle  ;  in  fact,  right  into  the  enemy's  skirmishers.  The  fact  is,  the 
first  notice  I  had  that  the  battle  was  on  was  when  a  shell  fell 
among  my  drummers  and  fifers,  who  were  at  the  head  of  my  Regi 
ment,  and  killed  and  demoralized  them,  so  that  we  heard  no  more 
of  drumming  and  fifing  that  day.  I  immediately  deployed  a 
company  of  the  Fourth  Iowa,  which  had  been  thoroughly  drilled 
as  skirmishers,  and  pushed  forward  toward  the  White  Eiver  road, 
seeing  some  teams  of  the  enemy  passing  that  way  with  forage,  and 
I  pushed  down  the  slopes  of  the  Cross  Timber  Hollows  nearly  a 
mile  before  I  developed  the  enemy  in  force. 

The  firing  of  the  artillery  and  the  sharp  skirmish  firing  of  my 
movement  satisfied  Colonel  Carr  that  the  enemy  was  in  force  in 
my  front,  and  he  immediately  sent  back  word  for  his  other  Brigade, 
Commanded  by  Colonel  Vandever,  of  the  Ninth  Iowa  Infantry,  to 
come  to  the  rear,  now  our  front.  They  had  hardly  reached  the  Elk- 
horn  Tavern  and  deployed  into  line  before  Price's  whole  Army 
moved  in  on  us  in  line  of  battle  and  disabled  two  of  our  batteries. 
The  fighting  on  this  front,  with  only  Carr's  two  Brigades  in  line, 
the  strength  of  both  not  exceeding  three  thousand  men,  was  kept  up 
continuously  all  day,  until  dark,  with  varying  success. 

As  soon  as  I  saw,  near  the  middle  of  the  day,  the  formation  of 
the  enemy,  I  knew  that  I  could  not  hold  the  extended  line  we  were 
covering,  and  I  commenced  drawing  in  my  right  and  closing  on 
Vandever  until  I  backed  down  through  an  open  field  that  had  been 
cleared,  and  where  the  logs  had  been  hauled  to  the  lower  edge  of 
the  slope  to  make  a  fence.  Behind  these  logs  I  placed  my 
Brigade  and  fought  all  the  afternoon,  with  the  enemy  sometimes 
around  both  flanks  and  sometimes  in  my  rear. 

Colonel  Vandever  held  his  line  at  the  Elkhorn  Tavern  in  the 
edge  of  thick  timber  on  the  main  Fayetteville  road  until  late  in  the 
afternoon,  fighting  desperately,  when  the  enemy,  taking  advantage 
of  the  timber  as  a  blind,  by  largely  superior  numbers,  drove  him 
back  across  an  open  field  to  a  line  of  woods  in  his  rear  and  in 
my  rear,  which  he  successfully  held.  I  was  not  aware  of  his  move- 


Till-:    SOUTH  WKSTKKN    CA.MPA|<;.\. 


ment  until  the  fire  in  that  direction  slackened,  and  1  sent  out  my 
adjutant,  Lieutenant  James  A.  Williamson  (afterwards  a  Brevet 
Major-General),  who  returned  and  reported  that  the  enemy  were 
in  possession  of  that  field;  in  fact,  he  ran  right  into  them  and  re 
ceived  their  fire,  but  got  back  to  me  safely.  It  was  then  nearly  dark. 
The  fire  on  my  front  had  slackened,  and  my  Brigade  was  almost 
entirely  out  of  ammunition.  1  immediately  ordered  them  to  form 
in  column  and  led  them  right  out  from  the  right,  moving  in  the 
direction  where  Vandevers  Brigade  had  formed  in  its  new  position. 
As  I  moved  out  I  passed  right  in  sight  of  a  column  of  the  Confed 
erate  forces,  who  evidently  had  come  out  of  the  hollow  and  were 
forj) ling  to  again  attack  Vandever.  They  probably  thought  I  was 
a  portion  of  their  force,  for  they  made  no  demonstration  towards 
me,  and  I  passed  right  by  them.  As  I  passed  out  into  the  open  I 
could  see  that  General  Asboth,  who  had  been  brought  there  by 
General  Curtis,  was  forming  to  attack  at  the  Elkhorn  Tavern 
again;  and  I  met  General  Curtis,  who  seemed  astonished  to  find 
me  with  my  force  intact.  He  asked  me  where  I  was  going.  I 
told  him  that  I  was  out  of  ammunition,  and  that  I  was  bringing  out 
my  force  to  form  it  on  the  new  line.  Paying  the  command  a  high 
compliment,  lie  immediately  ordered  me  to  fix  bayonets  and  to 
charge  on  the  enemy  at  the  same  time  that  Asboth  with  his  rein 
forcement  moved  down  the  Fayetteville  road  towards  the  Elkhorn 
Tavern.  I  immediately  did  this,  and  passed  right  back  over  the 
field  where  I  had  been  fighting,  but  found  no  enemy.  They  had 
evidently  left  my  front  at  the  same  time  I  retired,  and  I  returned 
and  went  into  line  on  the  right  of  Yandever's  Brigade,  probably 
500  feet  in  the  rear  of  the  original  line,  and  there  we  laid  all  night 
under  arms. 

Van  Dorn's  plan  of  attack  was  to  throw  the  Arkansas  forces 
under  McCullough  and  Mclntosh  on  Curtis's  right,  facing  the  Lit 
tle  Cross  Hollow  road,  while  at  the  same  time  General  Price  with 
his  force  moved  around  us  by  the  Little  Cross  Timber  road  to  our 
rear  and  attacked  from  the  Cross  Timbers. 

When  passing  through  Little  Cross  Timber  Hollow  Price  struck 
the  timber  blockade,  and,  as  he  shows  in  his  report,  was  held 
there  for  a  long  time  before  he  could  clear  out  the  roads  and  get 
his  forces  and  artillery  through.  This  delaved  his  attack  in  the 
rear  until  nearly  10  o'clock  in  the  morning.  The  two  forces  of 
McCullough  and  Price  were  separated  by  a  high  ridge  bv  the  name 


Tin-:  Sorni  WKSTKKX  CAM  I(AI<;\. 


of  Pea  Kidge,  over  which  it  was  impracticable  for  them  to  con 
nect,  and,  therefore,  the  two  attacks  were  separate  and  not  in  con 
cert. 

General  McCul  lough,  in  attacking  from  the  west,  struck  Gen 
eral  Jeff  C.  Davis's  Division.  Davis  had  a  Division  of  troops  that 
had  been  thoroughly  drilled.  lie  was  a  very  competent  officer  and 
handled  them  with  great  skill,  and  the  attack  of  McCullough  and 
Mclntosh,  though  desperate,  was  without  avail,  both  rebel  com 
manders  being  killed  in  the  attack,  which  took  all  the  fight  out  of 
the  Arkansas  troops  and  made  their  attacks  towards  evening  of 
very  little  effect.  Davis  pursued  them  so  energetically  that  after 
the  death  of  their  commanders  they  straggled  off  towards  Ar 
kansas  and  no  more  fighting  occurred  on  that  flank.- 

General  Sieger's  two  Divisions  had  remained  facing  Sugar 
Creek.  General  Curtis  had  endeavored  to  bring  them  forward,  but 
without  avail.  A  Brigade  of  General  Osterhaus's  Division  aided 
General  Davis  during  the  latter  part  of  the  day, but  the  Brigade  from 
Asboth's  Division  did  not  get  into  line  to  help  Carr  until  nearly 
dark,  although  General  Curtis  went  in  person  for  them.  Colonel 
Carr's  troops  had  been  marching  two  nights  before  the  battle,  and 
on  the  night  of  the  7th  he  asked  General  Curtis  to  relieve  them,  so 
they  could  get  some  sleep.  General  Curtis  promised  they  should 
be  relieved  by  one  of  General  Siegel's  Divisions,  but  they  held  the 
line  all  that  night  right  where  they  were  formed,  and  when  we 
looked  for  our  relief  the  next  morning  we  learned  that  General 
Siegel  and  his  troops  were  nearly  a  mile  in  our  rear,  taking  their 
breakfast. 

The  general  plan  of  General  Curtis's  attack  on  the  morning  of 
the  Stli  was  for  a  combined  movement  on  Price's  Army  by  both 
of  General  Siegel's  Divisions,  and  General  Davis,  who  had  been 
brought  over  to  our  front,  holding  Carr's  Division  in  reserve.  We 
waited  a  long  time  for  General  Siegel  to  get  into  position;  and  in 
fact  before  he  got  into  position  Colonel  Carr  had  been  brought  out 
from  the  reserve  and  placed  on  the  right  of  Davis.  The  enemy 
opened  out  upon  us,  and  my  Brigade  holding  the  right  I  commenced 
swinging  my  line  in  over  the  ground  I  had  fought  over  the  day  be 
fore,  and  discovered  that  the  enemy  were  withdrawing  from  us;  were 
not  standing  and  giving  battle;  and  the  fighting  on  the  morning  of 
the  8th  was  merely  a  fight  of  Price's  rear-guard  to  enable  him  to 
withdraw  bv  the  Huntsville  road,  he  having  received  orders  that 


'I'm:  SormwKSTEKX  CAMPAIGN. 


morning  from  A^an  Dorn  to  do  so,  Van  Dorn  notifying  Price  that 
this  was  necessary,  as  the  Arkansas  troops,  after  the  death  of  McCul- 
lougli  and  Mclntosh,  had  most  of  them  retreated  to  the  south, 
leaving  Price's  Army  the  only  force  intact  in  our  rear,  so  that  he 
now  had  the  difficult  problem  of  getting  away  from  us. 

The  fighting  lasted  but  a  short  time,  mostly  with  artillery, 
and  occasioned  very  little  loss  for  that  day.  We  soon  discovered 
the  rebels  fleeing  over  the  hills  and  down  the  White  River  Road, 
and  being  nearest  to  that  road  I  immediately  started  my  Brigade 
after  them.  I  had  not  proceeded  far  when  I  received  an  order 
from  General  Curtis  to  return  and  hold  the  battle-field.  I  was  a 
good  deal  astonished  at  this,  as  I  could  see  the  enemy  demoralized 
in  my  front,  with  their  baggage-trains  and  their  artillery,  and  I 
had  no  doubt,  (as  I  knew  the  county,  having  had  a  detachment  sta 
tioned  at  Blackburn's  Mills,  at  the  crossing  of  White  River,  supply 
ing  our  Army  with  forage  and  grain  before  the  battle,)  that  I  could 
capture  this  portion  of  the  army  before  it  could  make  a  crossing  of 
White  River. 

When  I  arrived  on  the  battle-field  General  Curtis  told  me  that 
General  Siegel  and  his  Divisions  had  gone  to  the  rear  towards 
Cassville ;  in  fact,  I  myself  heard  him  give  one  of  the  Brigades  that 
was  passing  an  order  to  halt  there,  which  they  did  not  obey,  but 
kept  on.  General  Siegel  wrote  back  advising  Curtis  to  form 
his  new  line  in  the  rear  of  Cross  Timbers,  as  Van  Dorn  might 
return  to  the  fight,  but  Curtis  instructed  Colonel  Carr's  Division 
to  remain  on  the  field  and  hold  it,  which  it  did.  General  Curtis 
afterwards  made  very  severe  complaints  to  General  Halleck  of  the 
actions  of  General  Siegel,  and  in  answer  General  Halleck  wrote 
as  follows: 

I  was  by  no  means  surprised  at  General  Siegel's  conduct  before  the 
battle  of  Pea  Ridge.  It  was  plainly  in  keeping  with  what  he  did  at  Car 
thage  and  Wilson's  Creek.  After  your  expedition  started  I  received  docu 
mentary  proof  from  Captains  Sturgis,  Schofield,  and  Totten,  and  a  number 
of  other  officers,  in  regard  to  his  conduct  on  those  occasions,  which  destroyed 
all  confidence  in  him.  It  was  for  that  reason  that  I  telegraphed  to  you  so 
often  not  to  let  Siegel  separate  from  you.  I  anticipated  that  he  would  try 
to  play  you  a  trick  by  being  absent  at  the  critical  moment.  I  wished  to 
forewarn  you  of  the  snare,  but  I  could  not  then  give  you  my  reasons.  I  am 
glad  you  prevented  his  project  and  saved  your  army.  I  cannot  describe  to 
you  how  much  uneasiness  I  felt  for  you.  You  saved  your  army  and  won  a 
glorious  victory  by  refusing  to  take  his  advice. 

Captain  Kinsman,  of  Company  B,  Fourth  Iowa,  who  was  hold 
ing  Pea  Ridge,  and  witnessed  the  battle-  from  that  point,  and  could 


Tin-:  SOUTHWESTERN  ('A MI- AKIN. 


look  down  upon  Can's  Division,  described  the  battle  in  the  rear  as 
follows : 

At  8:30  o'clock  Colonel  Dodge  opened  the  ball,  and  the  battle  was  soon 
raging  all  along  the  line  with  a  fierceness  and  obstinacy  which  omened  a 
terrific  struggle.  The  weather  was  splendid,  and  the  smoke  instead  of  hang 
ing  murkily  among  1  ho  trees,  rose  rapidly  and  rolled  away  over  the  hills  in 
dense  sulphurous  masses.  The  thunder  of  the  artillery  was  terrific,  and  the 
shot  and  shell  hissed  and  screamed  through  the  air  like  flying  devils,  while 
the  infantry  of  both  armies,  with  their  rifles,  shot-guns,  and  muskets,  kept 
a  perfect  hurricane  of  death  howling  through  the  woods.  The  rebels  fought 
well,  but  generally  fired  too  high,  and  their  batteries,  although  getting  our 
range  accurately,  missed  the  elevation  much  of  the  time.  Their  poor  shoot 
ing  was  our  salvation.  Had  they  done  as  well  as  our  men,  with  the  tre 
mendous  odds  against  us,  they  must  have  annihilated  us.  The  enemy  were 
clear  around  our  right  flank,  enveloping  us,  and  it  looked  as  though  they 
would  capture  Dodge's  Brigade,  when  Colonel  Dodge  took  a  battalion  of 
Colonel  Carr's  regiment,  the  Third  Illinois  cavalry,  and  charged  the  forces 
that  were  turning  our  right  flank  like  a  whirlwind.  Everything  gave  way 
before  them.  Every  man  in  that  battalion  seemed  to  ride  for  his  life,  and 
they  swept  way  around  our  front,  routing  and  demoralizing  that  flank  of 
the  enemy,  and  effectually  freeing  our  rear  and  flank.  Price  told  some  of 
our  boys  of  the  Fourth  Iowa  who  were  captured  on  the  day  of  the  fight  and 
have  since  escaped,  that  we  fought  more  like  devils  than  human  beings.  The 
rebel  colonels  (several  of  them)  inquired  of  our  boys  who  those  black-coated 
fellows  were,  and  who  led  them.  They  said  there  must  have  been  at  least 
3,000  of  them.  When  the  boys  told  them  there  were  less  than  600  of  them, 
the  Colonels  said  they  needn't  tell  them  any  such  stuff  as  that;  that  they 
knew  it  was  a  damned  lie.  But  they  sent  their  compliments  to  Colonel 
Dodge  for  the  bravery  of  himself  and  his  command,  and  well  they  might,  for 
opposed  to  Colonel  Dodge's  Brigade  of  1,050  men,  and  two  guns  of  the  First 
Iowa  Battery,  were  six  regiments  of  Confederate  troops,  a  large  force  of 
Confederate  Missouri  State  troops,  and  eighteen  guns,  and  many  of  these 
Confederate  troops  were  the  men  who  did  the  hard  fighting  at  the  Wilson 
Creek  battle.  All  day,  from  8  :30  in  the  morning  till  5  :30  at  night,  Dodge's 
Brigade  held  its  ground,  dealing  death  into  the  rebel  ranks,  and,  when  dark 
came,  with  ammunition  expended,  the  Fourth  Iowa  walked  away  from  the 
field  in  good  order,  with  the  sullen  savage  tread  of  men  who  might  be  driven 
by  main  strength,  but  could  not  be  conquered.  Although  this  was  one  of 
the  first  battles  of  the  war,  the  Northern  men  showed  their  desperate  fighting 
qualities;  and  on  the  second  day  the  South  met  and  faced  great  slaughter. 

Faycl,  the  correspondent  of  the  Missouri  Democrat.,  gives  this 
account  of  the  part  Colonel  Eugene  A.  Carr's  Fourth  Iowa  Divi 
sion  took  in  the  battle  at  Elk  Horn  Tavern : 

Having  given  an  account  of  the  battle  fought  by  Brigadier-General 
Jeff  C.  Davis's  Division,  which  occurred  the  same  day,  on  our  left.  I  will 
now  attempt  to  give  some  details  of  the  Elk  Horn  Battle — the  latter  having 
commenced  early  in  the  morning.  First  in  order  comes  a  description  of  the 
locality  near  Elk  Horn  Tavern. 

The  house  is  on  the  Fayetteville  and  Springfield  road,  about  four 
miles  north  of  Sugar  Creek,  between  which  two  points  our  camp  was 
pitched,  on  the  elevated  ridge  constituting  the  northern  bank  of  the  creek. 
Leading  north  from  the  tavern,  the  road  drops  into  the  head  of  the  long 
gorge  running  towards  Keetsville  seven  miles,  known  as  the  "Cross  Timbers." 

Into  the  strong  fastness  north  of  the  Tavern  the  enemy  had  obtained 
a  lodgment  from  10,000  to  1  .">.()(»()  strong  in  the  rear  of  our  wing,  on  the 
morning  of  the  7th.  His  stro  gth  consisted  in  part  of  the  following  rebel 


'I' I  IK    Sol  Til  \\  I  >STKi;\    (  '  A  .\|  I'AliiN. 


Divisions.  ;is  \v;is  subsequently  ascertained:  Frost's,  Slack's,  Parson's. 
and  Kains's;  and  the  batteries  of  Ghebor.  Clark  (six  pieces),  E.  McDonald 
(three  pieces),  and  Wade  (four  pieces).  There  was  present  also  one  Regi 
ment  of  Indians,  the  whole  commanded  by  General  Van  Dorn  in  person, 
and  (ieneral  Price,  who  directs  the  Missouri  forces. 

Early  in  the  morning,  while  General  Curtis  was  in  consultation  with 
his  officers  regarding  a  change  of  front,  consequent  on  the  approach  of  the 
enemy  on  the  west  of  us.  news  came  that  the  enemy  were  in  close  vicinity 
to  the  Elk  Horn  Tavern.  The  (Jeneral  then  immediately  ordered  Colonel 
Carr  to  proceed  to  effect  a  dislodgment  of  the  enemy.  The  formidable  num 
bers  present  at  the  time  not  being  known.  Colonel  Carr  directed  Colonel 
Dodge,  with  the  First  Brigade  of  the  Fourth  Division,  to  take  a  position 
near  the  Elkhorn  Tavern,  Colonel  Carr  accompanying  the  expedition  him 
self.  The  point  indicated  was  about  a  mile  and  a  half  distant  from  our 
camp,  the  ground  being  level  and  gradually  ascending,  with  open  fields  on 
either  side  of  the  road,  interspersed  with  an  occasional  belt  of  timber. 

Colonel  Dodge  having  discovered  the  enemy  in  the  timber  to  the  right, 
opened  the  First  Iowa  Battery  on  them,  causing  considerable  execution : 
two  rebels  on  horseback  were  seen  to  fall,  and  the  rest  fled.  The  enemy 
having  fled  to  the  hollow.  Colonel  Dodge  deployed  his  line,  covering  as  much 
ground  as  possible,  the  Thirty-fifth  Illinois  being  on  his  left.  He  sent  for 
ward  a  company  of  skirmishers  from  the  Fourth  Iowa,  who  soon  became 
sharply  engaged  with  the  enemy  and  the  latter  opened  on  us  a  perfect  tor 
nado  of  round  shot,  shell,  and  grape.  The  Thirty-fifth  Illinois  became  en 
gaged,  fighting  with  determined  bravery,  and  about  this  time  Colonel  Smith 
was  wounded  in  the  head  by  a  shell,  which  took  off  a  part  of  his  scalp.  He 
also  received  a  bullet  in  his  shoulder,  and  his  horse  was  shot  under  him.  all 
about  the  same  time.  Just  before  he  was  wounded,  several  ammunition- 
chests  exploded,  one  after  the  other,  wounding  Captain  Jones  and  Lieuten 
ant  Gamble,  who  were  standing  near  Colonel  Carr,  the  latter  making  a 
fortunate  escape.  The  explosion  of  a  caisson  was  terrific. 

There  was  a  short  lull  in  the  storm  of  leaden  hail,  during  which  time 
the  enemy  advanced  up  the  hollow  through  the  brush,  along  the  main  road, 
when  Colonel  Vandever,  who  had  arrived,  ordered  forward  the  infantry.  A 
desperate  conflict  with  small  arms  ensued.  Back  rolled  the  tide  of  battle, 
the  enemy  being  driven  to  the  foot  of  the  hill,  when  he  reopened  the  batter 
ies.  Our  men  fought  like  heroes;  many  fell  covered  with  wounds.  The 
latter,  when  brought  to  the  rear  by  their  comrades,  encouraged  those  who 
were  still  breasting  the  fierce  cannonade,  by  hurrahing  for  the  Union. 

Colonel  Vandever,  in  leading  forward  his  brigade,  had  his  horse  hit 
twice,  and  Colonel  Phelps,  in  the  van  of  his  own  Regiment,  had  three 
horses  shot  under  him.  Major  Geiger.  of  the  same  Regiment,  and  Captain 
Hayden,  of  the  Dubuque  Battery,  had  two  horses  shot  under  them.  Major 
Coyle,  of  the  Ninth  Iowa,  was  wounded  in  the  leg. 

Colonel  Dodge  having  discovered  that  the  enemy  were  preparing  for  a 
general  attack,  changed  his  front  to  the  right,  covering  his  men  with  a  log 
fence,  thus  compelling  the  enemy  to  cross  an  open  field  to  reach  him.  Our 
line  was  formed  and  we  opened  fire  with  one  section  of  a  battery,  the 
other  pieces  having  left  the  field  for  want  of  ammunition.  The  enemy  ad 
vanced  on  our  right,  left,  and  center,  under  cover  of  a  destructive  fire, 
poured  in  on  our  works  under  twelve  pieces  of  artillery.  The  fighting  now 
lasted  over  two  hours,  during  which  time  we  held  our  position  ;  only  one 
Brigade  contending  against  at  least  six  thousand  rebel  infantry  and  a 
heavy  bombardment  from  their  artillery,  the  latter  playing  upon  us  at  short 
range.  Our  men  fought  like  heroes  without  wincing  under  the  galling  fire 
belching  forth  from  behind  trees  and  rocks,  and  much  of  the  time  from  a 
concealed  foe.  At  one  time  we  were  reinforced  by  three  rifled  pieces  from 
a  German  battery,  which  fired  four  rounds,  and  then  was  compelled  to 
withdraw  from  the  field,  being  flanked  by  a  Regiment  of  the  enemy. 


TIM-:  SOUTHWESTERN  ('AMI'.\K;N.  27 


Colonel  Dodge,  in  order  to  discover  the  position  of  the  enemy  on  his 
right,  directed  his  firing  to  cease,  when  a  thousand  rebel  plush  caps  aiid 
black  broad  brims  popped  up  into  view  from  Ihe  bushes,  and,  forming-,  they 
advanced  with  great  conlidence  to  within  one  hundred  feet  of  our  lino.  Our 
men  were  then  ordered  to  pour  in  a  lire  on  the  dastardly  enemy,  taking  good 
aim.  They  were  thrown  into  confusion  by  our  murderous  volley  and  fled. 

Their  places  were  tilled  by  a  fresh  Kogimont,  a  d  Colonel  Dodge,  find 
ing  that  the  enemy  were  outflanking  him  on  the  right  and  that  his  force 
was  too  weak  to  permit  an  extension  of  his  line,  sent  for  and  soon  re 
ceived  a  reinforcement  of  five  companies  of  the  Eighth  Indiana,  which  were 
posted  on  the  right.  The  firing  now  became  terrific.  The  enemy  annoyed 
us  severely  by  placing  a  battery  on  our  left,  which  completely  enfiladed  cm- 
line.  The  Fourth  Iowa  now  getting  short  of  ammunition,  and  the  Thirty- 
fifth  Illinois  having  boon  forced  to  give  way  on  the  left,  it  was  at  this  criti 
cal  time  that  Lieutenanl  Colonel  Challenor  was  ordered  to  rally  his  men, 
who  were  hurled  on  the  enemy,  driving  his  left  back  a  short  distance.  Hav 
ing  advanced  too  far,  the  Lieutenant-Colonel  was  surrounded  and  captured 
with  forty  of  his  men.  Our  ammunition,  as  before  stated,  having  given 
out.  we  fell  back  to  the  open  field,  maintaining  our  lino  of  bailie  in 
splendid  order.  The  enemy  rushed  forward  with  their  batteries  and  entire 
force.  The  Fourth  Iowa  halted,  turned  on  them,  and  chocked  for  a  time 
their  advance  until  the  lasr  round  of  ammunition  was  exhausted.  (Joueral 
Curtis  coming  up  about  this  stage  of  the  action,  was  received  with  a  round 
of  cheers  from  our  boys.  The  (Jonoral  learning  that  the  ammunition  had 
u'iven  out.  ordered  the  Fourth  Iowa  to  lix  bayonets  and  charge  on  the 
enemy.  The  men  did  so  briskly,  across  the  field,  but  found  no  enemy. 

On  Colonel  Yandover's  fro:  t  the  enemy  now  commenced  swarming  up 
the  road  and  along  the  gorge,  and  out  of  the  brush  in  front  of  us.  Our 
troops  fought  them  bravely,  the  officers  exposing  their  persons  in  loading  in 
front  of  their  men:  but  we  were  overwhelmed  at  this  time  by  superior 
numbers.  We  retreated  across  the  field,  but  rallied  again  along  the  fence 
behind  our  original  position.  Upon  retiring  as  above  mentioned,  reinforce 
ments  were  seen  coming  up  under  (Jenoral  Asboth.  In  a  gallant  attempt  to 
resist  the  advancing  column  of  the  enemy.  (Jeneral  Asboth  received  a  severe 
wound  in  the  arm.  After  the  terrible  conflict  of  the  day  our  gallant  troops 
bivouacked  in  front  of  the  enemy,  awaiting  the  reopening  of  the  conflict  in 
the  morning. 

Colonel  Vandever  fought  Little's  Division.  Colonel  Dodge's  Brigade 
contended  in  the  morning  directly  with  Kain's  and  Clark's  Divisions,  both 
immediately  under  the  direction  of  Sterling  Price.  The  latter  had  his  po 
sition  for  some  time  behind  young  Clarke's  battery. 

The  enemy  tired  wagon-nuts,  pieces  of  chain,  marble,  gravel,  and  all 
sorts  of  projectiles.  The  overcoat  worn  by  Colonel  Dodge  was  perfectly 
riddled  by  the  jagged  holes  made  by  those  unusual  missiles. 

Colonel  Dodge,  the  day  after  the  battle,  received  a  letter  from  a  widow 
lady  in  Illinois,  stating  that  she  had  three  sons  in  the  field  fighting  for  the 
Union  ;  that  her  youngest  son.  who  was  in  feeble  health,  was  in  his  Brigade, 
and  she  asked  it  as  a  special  favor  to  her  in  her  loneliness  to  have  him  dis 
charged.  The  young  man  whose  mother  had  such  solicitude  in  his  behalf 
was  named  Preston  (ireen.  and  was  killed  in  the  action  of  the  7th.  near 
Elkhorn.  while  bravely  performing  his  duty. 

During  the  battle.  Colonel  Dodge's  horse  was  shot  under  him.  An 
enlisted  man,  detailed  as  clerk  in  the  Adjutant's  office,  was  acting  as  order 
ly  for  Colonel  Dodge.  When  his  horse  fell,  he  ordered  the  orderly  to  dis 
mount  and  give  him  his  horse.  The  orderly  said.  "You  will  be  killed  if  you 
get  on  another  horse;  this  is  the  third  yon  have  lost.''  But  the  orderly  dis 
mounted  and  stood  where  the  Colonel  had  stood  when  ho  asked  for  the 
horse,  and  at  that  moment  was  instantly  killed  by  a  shot  from  the  enemy. 
After  the  battle,  the  Adjutant.  Lieutenant  Williamson,  found  in  the  order- 


28  Tin-:  SOUTILWKSTKKX 


ly's  desk  a  note  in  which  he  said  he  was  sure  lie  would  be  killed  in  the  bat 
tle,  and  in  which,  also,  he  left  directions  as  to  the  disposal  of  his  effects  and 
whom  to  write  to. 

In  General  Price's  command  there  was  a  Regiment  or  more 
of  Indians  commanded  by  Colonel  Albert  B.  Pike.  They  crawled 
up  through  the  thick  timber  and  attacked  my  extreme  left.  I  saw 
them  and  turned  one  of  the  guns  of  my  battery  on  them,  and  they 
left.  We  saw  no  more  of  them,  but  they  scalped  and  mutilated 
some  of  our  dead.  General  Curtis  entered  a  complaint  to  General 
Price,  who  answered  that  they  were  not  of  his  command,  and  that 
they  had  scalped  some  of  his  dead,  and  he  said  he  did  not  approve 
of  their  being-  upon  the  field.  They  evidently  scalped  many  of  the 
dead.,  no  matter  what  side  the}'  belonged  to. 

The  battle  of  Pea  Ridge  being  one  of  the  first  of  the  war  and 
one  of  unquestioned  victory,  had  a  great  deal  of  attention  called  to 
it,  and  for  months  —  in  fact  for  years,  and,  I  think  even  now  —  was 
considered  to  have  been  won  by  General  Siegel.  The  proper  credit 
was  not  given  to  General  Curtis,  while  the  history  and  records  of 
the  battle  show  that  lie  was  entitled  to  all  of  the  credit,  and  fought 
the  battle  in  opposition  to  Siegel's  views.  A  statement  of  the 
losses  shows  what  commands  fought  the  battle.  The  total  force 
engaged  on  our  side,  according  to  General  Curtis's  report,  was 
10,500  men,  formed  in  four  Divisions,  Sieger's  two  Divisions  being 
the  largest,  the  Third  and  Fourth  Divisions  having  less  than  2,000 
men  each.  The  losses  were  : 

First  Division.*  commanded   by   Osterhaus  ...............  144 

Second  Division,*   commanded  by   Asboth  ................  119 

Third  Division,  commanded  by  Colonel  Jeff  C.  Davis  ......  329 

Fourth  Division,  commanded  by  Colonel  Carr  ............  701 

*Divisions  were  commanded  by  General  Siesel. 

Van  Dorn's  and  Price's  reports  of  the  battle  show  how  great 
their  defeat  was,  and  why  it  was,  and  while  for  some  time  General 
Curtis  called  anxiously  on  Halleck  for  more  reinforcements,  de 
manding  that  the  column  which  was  marching  South  in  Kansas 
be  sent  to  him,  Van  Dorn  and  Price,  from  the  time  they  left  the 
field,  never  stopped  until  they  landed  at  Memphis,  Tenn.,  their 
first  movement  being  towards  Pocahontas,  with  a  view  of  attacking 
Pope  in  the  rear,  who  was  at  New  Madrid.  Finding  ISTew  Madrid 
captured,  they  turned  their  forces  to  Desarc,  and  were  then  trans 
ported  by  boats  to  Memphis.  This  relieved  Missouri  of  any  Con 
federate  force  in  or  near  its  border,  and  General  Halleck  imme- 


THE  SOUTHWESTERN  (' 


diately  gave  General  Curtis  orders  to  move  on  the  flank  of  Van 
Dorn  and  keep  up  with  him,  but  through  that  swampy,  hilly  coun 
try  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  meet  Van  Dorn,  and  Curtis  with 
his  Army  finally  landed  at  Helena,  Ark.,  and  most  of  it  joined 
the  Vicksburg  siege. 

Captain  Phil  Sheridan  was  the  Quartermaster  and  Commis 
sary  of  General  Curtis's  Army.  He  kept  us  in  flour,  meat,  and 
meal,  and  sometimes  had  my  whole  regiment  detailed  in  running 
and  protecting  mills,  driving  cattle,  etc.  He  had  great  difficulty 
in  obtaining  details,  as  at  that  early  day  a  good  many  commanders, 
and  especially  General  Siegel  and  his  officers,  did  not  think  it  the 
duty  of  a  soldier  to  be  detailed  on  anything  but  a  soldier's  duty; 
so  Sheridan  naturally  came  to  me,  as  he  was  my  Quartermaster 
while  I  commanded  the  post  at  Rolla,  and  when  with  the  marching 
column  he  camped  and  tented  with  me.  Sheridan  and  Curtis 
had  considerable  difficulty,  and  Curtis  relieved  him  and  ordered  him 
to  report  to  General  Halleck,  at  St.  Louis.  We  who  knew  Sheri 
dan's  ability,  and  the  necessities  of  our  Army,  did  all  we  could  to 
hold  him  with  us.  He  left  us  just  before  the  Battle  of  Pea  Ridge, 
and  our  Army  saw  a  great  difference  after  he  was  gone.  He  used 
to  say  to  me,  "Dodge,  if  I  could  get  into  the  line  I  believe  I  could 
do  something  •"  and  his  ambition  was  to  get  as  high  a  rank  as  I  then 
had  and  as  large  a  command — a  Colonel  commanding  a  Brigade. 
In  his  memoirs  he  pays  the  Fourth  Iowa  a  great  compliment,  and 
says  they  will  have  a  warm  place  in  his  heart  during  his  life. 

During  the  Battle  of  Pea  Ridge  Sheridan  was  at  Springfield, 
Mo.,  preparing  to  turn  over  his  property  to  the  officer  who  was  to 
relieve  him,  and  he  there  showed  his  soldierly  qualities.  The  dis 
patches  from  Curtis's  army  had  to  be  relayed  at  Springfield.  The 
first  dispatches  after  the  battle  were  sent  all  in  praise  of  General 
Siegel,  and  by  portions  of  his  command,  claiming  he  had  won  the 
battle.  Sheridan,  knowing  this  to  be  untrue,  withheld  the  Siegel 
dispatches  until  the  telegrams  from  General  Curtis  to  General 
Halleck  were  received,  and  sent  them  forward  first,  notwithstand 
ing  the  fact  that  lie  felt  he  had  been  unjustly  treated  by  General 
Curtis. 

This  Army  had  no  water  or  rail  communication.  It  was  300 
miles  from  its  nearest  supply-depot,  and  therefore  it  had  to  live  off 
of  a  country  that  was  sparsely  settled  by  poor  people;  but  Sheri 
dan  showed  that  dominant  combination  of  enterprise  and  energy, 


30  TJI.E  SOUTHWESTERN  ('AMI-AKJN. 

by  running  every  mill  and  using  every  means  of  supply  within 
fifty  miles  of  us,  that  he  developed  so  fully  later  in  the  war.  He 
kept  us  and  our  stock  fairly  well  supplied;  as  1  remember,  there 
were  no  complaints.  When  General  Curtis  concluded  to  relieve  him, 
I  went  with  others  and  endeavored  to  induce  him  to  change  his 
mind.  I  had  had  experience  and  knew  what  it  was  to  have  an  Army 
well  fed  a  long  ways  from  its  base,  and  1  felt  that  if  we  lost  Sheridan 
we  would  suffer,  which  later  proved  to  be  the  case;  but  General 
Curtis  did  not  listen  to  us.  In  fact,  he  was  angry  at  our  appeal, 
and  his  Adjutant,  General  McKinney,  came  to  see  us  afterwards  and 
urged  us  not  to  press  the  matter;  if  we  did,  he  said,  we  might  go  to 
the  rear  with  Sheridan. 

At  the  Battle  of  Pea  Ridge  and  during  the  campaign  we  were 
very  destitute  of  all  hospital  appliances  for  the  care  of  the  wound 
ed,  and  the  ability  and  ingenuity  of  our  medical  staff  in  supplying 
our  wants  was  inestimable.  The  day  after  the  battle,  when  we  had 
all  our  own  wounded  and  so  many  of  the  enemy's  with  us,  Mrs.  Gov 
ernor  Phelps,  the  wife  of  Governor  Phelps,  of  Missouri,  who  com 
manded  the  Twenty-fifth  Missouri  Infantry,  arrived  on  the  field 
with  a  general  supply  of  sanitary  goods,  a  part  of  which  had  been 
sent  to  my  Regiment  from  Philadelphia  by  the  father  and  mother 
of  ('a plain  Ford,  who  was  then  a  Lieutenant  in  Company  B,  Fourth 
Iowa  Infantry.  'These  were  a  great  relief,  as  fully  one-third  of  my 
command  were  killed  and  wounded,  and  were  suffering  for  want  of 
this  class  of  goods.  Mrs.  Phelps  spent  her  time  day  and  night  on 
the  field  aiding  the  surgeons  and  succoring  the  wounded. 

General  Curtis  endeavored  to  send  all  the  wounded  to  the  rear 
who  could  stand  the  trip.  I  was  hauled  250  miles  over  a  rough 
road  in  an  ambulance,  and  if  any  of  yon  have  had  the  same  experi 
ence  you  can  judge  what  I  suffered.  Captain  Burton,  of  my  Regi 
ment,  who  was  severely  wounded  in  the  arm,  sat  on  the  front  seat 
of  that  ambulance  the  whole  distance,  and  never  murmured,  al 
though  he  came  near  losing  his  arm  from  the  exposure.  It  was 
during  this  ambulance  trip,  while  lying  on  my  back,  that  1  re 
ceived  a  telegraphic  dispatch  from  General  Halleck  notifying  me 
of  my  promotion  for  services  in  this  battle.  It  was  thought,  and 
wras  also  stated  in  the  papers,  that  I  could  not  live,  and  I  told  Gen 
eral  Halleck  afterwards  that  they  expected  to  have  the  credit  of 
making  a  Brigadier-General  and  at  the  same  time  to  have  a  vacancy. 


TlIK   SOUTHWESTERN   C/AMPAKJN. 


too,  but  that  on  the  vacancy  I  fooled  them,  for  the  promotion  in 
sured  my  getting  well. 

This  campaign  demonstrated  early  in  the  war  what  could  be 
accomplished  by  a  small  Army  )>()()  miles  away  from  any  rail  or 
water  communication,  in  a  rugged,  mountainous,  sparsely  settled 
country,  marching  in  winter,  and  virtually  subsisting  upon  the 
country.  Xothing  escaped  that  Army  that  was  eatable. 

The  Battle  of  Pea  Ridge  was  fought  by  the  two  Divisions 
commanded  by  Can*  and  Davis,  not  exceeding  6,000  men,  and  it  is 
a  lesson  in  Avar  that  is  very  seldom  appreciated:  that  no  one  can 
tell  what  the  result  of  a  battle  may  be,  and  that  even  where  forces 
are  very  wide  apart  in  numbers  it  is  not  always  the  larger  force 
that  wins.  In  this  battle  Van  Dorn  had  put  twice  as  many  men 
into  the  fight  as  Curtis  did,  and  still  was  defeated.  His  dividing 
his  force  and  attacking  our  Army  at  two  different  points  was  fatal 
to  his  success,  as  General  Curtis  had  the  inside  line  and  could 
move  from  one  part  of  his  command  to  another  within  an  hour, 
while  for  Van  Dorn  to  move  from  one  portion  of  his  Army  to  the 
other  would  have  taken  at  least  half  a  day,  and  therefore  he  was 
whipped  in  detail.  If  he  had  thrown  his  whole  force  upon  Cur- 
tis's  right  flank  at  the  point  where  McCullough  fought  and  was 
overwhelmed  by  Davis's  Division,  there  would  have  been  great 
danger  of  our  Army  being  defeated,  or  at  least  forced  to  the  rear. 

There  was  no  strategy  nor  tactics  in  this  battle;  it  was  simply 
men  standing  up  and  giving  and  taking,  and  the  one  that  stood  the 
longest  won  the  battle.  The  only  strategy  or  tactics  was  the 
movement  of  Van  Dorn  attacking  on  the  right  flank  and  in  the  rear, 
and  these  moves  were  fatal  to  his  success.  Curtis's  Army  fought 
each  man  for  himself.  Every  commander  fought  his  own  part  of 
the  battle  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  and  I  think  the  feeling  of  all 
was  that  unless  they  won  they  would  have  to  go  to  Richmond,  as 
the  enemy  was  in  the  rear,  which  fact  made  us  desperate  in  meeting 
and  defeating  the  continued  attacks  of  the  enemy.  I  sent  for 
reinforcements  once  when  the  enemy  was  clear  around  my  right 
flank  and  in  my  rear,  and  they  sent  me  a  part  of  the  Eighth  In 
diana,  two  companies  of  the  Third  Illinois  Cavalry,  and  a  section  of 
a  battery.  The  battery  fought  ten  minutes  under  a  heavy  fire. 
The  four  companies  of  the  Eighth  Indiana  lined  up  alongside  the 
Fourth  Iowa,  and  stayed  there  fighting  bravely  until  the  end.  The 
Third  Illinois  held  my  right  flank.  The  officer  who  brought  this 


THE  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMPAIGN. 


force  to  me  was  Lieutenant  Shields,  of  my  own  Eegiment,  who  was 
acting  as  aid  on  Colonel  Carr's  staff.  As  he  rode  up  to  me  to  re 
port  the  Eighth  Indiana  lie  halted  alongside  of  me,  and  at  the  same 
instant  both  of  our  horses  fell  dead  without  a  struggle — something 
very  unusual.  I  was  quick,  and  jumped  clear  of  my  horse,  but 
Shields's  horse  fell  upon  him.  I  walked  away,  not  tl linking  of 
Shields;  but  he  called  back  to  me  and  said,  "Colonel,  \ou  are  not 
going  to  leave  me  this  way  are  you?"  and  I  returned  and  helped 
him  from  under  his  horse.  An  examination  of  the  two  horse? 
made  the  next  day,  showed  that  they  must  have  been  killed  by  the 
same  bullet,  which  passed  through  their  necks  at  the  same  place, 
killing  them  instantly. 

A  log  house  was  used  by  us  early  in  the  morning  as  a  temporary 
hospital.  When  my  skirmishers  fell  back  this  log  house  was  left  in 
the  lines  of  the  enemy,  and  Hospital  Steward  Baker,  of  the  Fourth 
Iowa,  was  left  in  charge  of  the  wounded  there.  When  General 
Price  came  up  he  asked  him  who  those  black-coated  devils  were, 
and  when  Baker  told  him  there  were  only  six  hundred  he  did  not 
believe  him.  He  said  no  six  hundred  men  could  stand  such  at 
tacks,  and  paid  the  Brigade  a  very  high  compliment  for  their  fight 
ing,  and  told  Baker  to  give  them  his  compliments. 

I  never  returned  to  this  Army,  but  many  of  the  troops  who 
fought  so  gallantly  fought  afterwards  in  Corps  and  Armies  that  I 
was  connected  with.  My  own  Eegiment  went  into  battle  with  548 
rank  and  file  present.  Company  B  was  on  detailed  service  holding 
Pea  Ridge,  and  had  no  casualties  in  line  of  battle.  My  Eegiment 
was  greatly  reduced  from  sickness  and  men  on  furlough,  but  the 
bravery  and  steadiness  with  which  those  with  me  fought  was  a  sur 
prise  and  a  great  satisfaction  to  me.  One-third  of  them  fell,  and 
not  a  straggler  left  the  field.  I  had  drilled  the  Eegiment  to  most  all 
kinds  of  conditions — in  the  open,  in  the  woods — and  many  com 
plained,  and  thought  I  was  too  severe,  as  many  Regiments  at  the 
posts  where  they  were  stationed  only  had  the  usual  exercises;  but 
after  this,  their  first  battle,  they  saw  what  drilling,  maneuvers,  and 
discipline  meant,  and  they  had  nothing  but  praise  for  the  severe 
drilling  I  had  given  them.  They  never  fell  under  my  command 
again,  but  on  every  field  that  they  fought  they  won  the  praise  of 
their  commanders,  and  General  Grant  ordered  that  they  should 
place  on  their  banners,  "First  at  Chickasaw  Bayou." 


THE  SOUTHWESTERN  CAMPAIGN.  33 

I  have  never  thought  that  General  Curtis  has  received  the 
credit  he  was  entitled  to  for  this  campaign  and  battle.  With  12,000 
men  lie  traversed  Missouri  into  Arkansas,  living  off  the  country, 
and  showing  good  judgment  in  concentrating  to  meet  Van  Dorn 
and  refusing  to  retreat  when  urged  to  do  so  at  the  conference  at  the 
log  schoolhouse  on  the  morning  of  the  7th.  The  night  of  the  7th 
I  know  some  officers  thought  we  ought  to  try  to  cut  ourselves  out  to 
the  East,  Price  being  in  our  rear;  but  Curtis  said  he  would  fight 
where  we  were.  He  then  had  no  knowledge  of  the  condition  of 
the  enemy.  On  the  morning  of  the  8th  he  brought  General  Sieger's 
two  Divisions  into  the  fight  and  concentrated  on  Price,  whose 
fighting  was  simply  to  cover  his  retreat.  General  Curtis  failed  to 
reap  the  full  benefit  of  the  battle  because  Siegel  went  to  Cassville, 
leaving  only  Davis's  and  Carr's  Divisions  on  the  field.  We  who 
took  part  in  this  campaign  appreciate  the  difficulties  and  obstacles 
Curtis  had  to  overcome,  and  how  bravely  and  efficiently  he  com 
manded,  and  we  honor  him  for  it.  So  did  General  Halleck;  but 
the  Government,  for  some  reason,  failed  to  give  him  another 'com 
mand  in  the  field,  though  they  retained  him  in  command  of  de 
partments  to  the  end  of  the  war. 


SYLVANUS  DODGE 
Father  of  Major-General  (J.  M.  Dodge, 


Letter  of  General  Grenville  M.  Dodge  to  his 
Father  on  the  Battle  of  Pea  Ridge 


ST.  Louis,  Mo.,  April  2,  1862. 

DEAR  FATHER:— I  know  there  is  no  one  who  would  like 
to  have  a  word  from  me  more  than  you.  I  write  but  little — am  very 
weak  from  my  wounds ;  do  not  sit  up  much ;  but  I  hope  ere  long  to 
be  all  right  again.  Nothing  now  but  the  battle  will  interest  you. 
It  was  a  terrible  three  days  to  me ;  how  I  got  through  God  only 
knows.  I  got  off  a  sick  bed  to  go  to  the  fight,  and  I  never  got  a 
wink  of  sleep  for  three  days  and  three  nights.  The  engagement 
was  so  long  and  with  UP  so  hot  that  it  did  not  appear  possible  for 
us  to  hold  our  ground.  We  lacked  sadly  in  numbers  and  artillery, 
but  with  good  judgment  and  good  grit  we  made  it  win.  My  officers 
were  very  brave.  Little  Captain  Taylor  would  stand  and  clap  his 
hands  as  the  balls  grew  thick.  Captain  Burton  was  as  cool  as  a 
cucumber,  and  liked  to  have  bled  to  death;  then  the  men,  as  they 
crawled  back  wounded,  would  cheer  me;  cheer  for  the  L'nion ;  and 
always  say,  "Don't  give  up  Colonel,  hang  to  em ;"  and  many  who 
were  too  badly  wounded  to  leave  the  field  stuck  to  their  places, 
sitting  on  the  ground,  loading  and  firing.  I  have  heard  of  Iprave 
acts,  but  such  determined  pluck  I  never  before  dreamed  of.  My 
flag-bearer,  after  having  been  wounded  so  he  could  not  hold  up  the 
colors,  would  not  leave  them.  I  had  to  peremptorily  order  him 
off.  One  time  when  the  enemy  charged  through  my  lines  the  boys 
drove  them  back  in  confusion.  Price  fought  bravely;  his  men  de 
served  a  better  fate,  but  although  two  to  one  they  could  not  gain 
much.  Their  artillery  was  served  splendidly — they  had  great  ad 
vantage  over  us  in  this.  Mine  run  out  of  ammunition  long  before 
night  and  left  me  to  the  mercy  of  their  grape  and  canister.  Had  I 
have  had  my  full  battery  at  night  I  could  have  whipped  them 
badly.  After  the  Fourth  Iowa's  ammunition  gave  out  or  before 
this  all  the  other  Regiments  and  Brigades  had  given  way,  leaving 
me  without  support,  and  when  I  found  my  ammunition  gone  I 

— 35— 


36  LETTEK  TO  8vi.\  VMS  DODGE. 

never  felt  such  a  chilling  in  my  life.  It  is  terrible  right  in  the 
midst  of  a  hot  contest  to  have  your  cartridges  give  out.  We  had 
fired  forty-two  rounds,  and  had  but  a  few  left.  I  saved  them 
and  ceased  firing,  falling  back  to  my  supports.  The  enemy 
charged  me  in  full  force.  I  halted  and  they  came  within  fifty  feet. 
We  opened  on  them  such  a  terrible  fire  they  fled.  General  Curtis 
rode  into  the  field  then  and  asked  me  to  charge.  This  would  have 
blanched  anybody  but  an  Iowa  soldier.  Xo  ammunition  and  to 
charge !  We  fixed  bayonets,  and  as  I  gave  the  order  the  boys 
cheered  and  cheered,  swinging  their  hats  in  every  direction. 
CHARGE  !  and  such  a  yell  as  they  crossed  that  field  with,  you 
never  heard — it  was  unearthly  and  scared  the  rebels  so  bad  they 
never  stopped  to  fire  at  us  or  to  let  us  reach  them.  As  we  marched 
back,  now  dark,  nearly  one-half  the  entire  Army  had  got  on  the 
ground  and  the  black-coats  (Fourth  Iowa)  had  got  their  fame  up. 
The  charge  without  ammunition  took  them  all,  and  as  we  passed 
down  the  line  the  whole  Army  cheered  us.  General  Curtis  com 
plimented  us  on  the  field,  and  what  was  left  of  the  Fourth  Iowa 
held  their  heads  high  that  night,  though  a  gloomy  one  for  those 
who  knew  our  situation.  The  next  morning  it  fell  to  my  lot  to 
open  the  battle  with  my  artillery  again,  and  for  one  hour  we  poured 
it  into  them  hot  and  heavy.  We  opened  with  thirty-two  guns ; 
they  answered  with  as  many,  and  such  a  roar  you  never  heard. 
The  enemy  could  not  stand  it  and  fled.  Our  whole  army  deployed 
in  sight  that  morning  and  it  was  a  grand  sight  with  the  artillery 
playing  in  open  view.  I  had  read  of  such  things,  but  they  were 
beyond  my  conception.  This  closed  the  battle  and  we  breathed  free. 
I  escaped  most  miraculously.  A  shell  burst  right  in  front  of  me, 
and,  tearing  away  my  saddle  holsters  and  taking  off  a  large  piece  of 
my  pants,  never  even  scratched  me.  My  clothes  were  riddled  and 
I  got  a  hit  in  the  side  that  is  serious,  but  did  not  think  of  it  at  the 
time.  Yours,  etc.,  G.  M. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA 

FOUGHT  JULY  22,  1864 


A  PAPER  READ  BEFORE  NEW  YORK  COMMANDERY 
M.  0.  L.  L. 

BY  MAJOR-GENERAL  GRENVILLE  M.  DODGE 

Companions : 

On  the  ITtli  day  of  July,  1SG4,  General  John  B.  Hood  relieved 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  in  command  of  the  Confederate  Army 
in  front  of  Atlanta,  and  on  the  2()th  Hood  opened  an  attack  upon 
Sherman's  right,  commanded  by  General  Thomas.  The  attack  was 
a  failure,  and  resulted  in  a  great  defeat  to  Hood's  Army  and  the 
disarrangement  of  all  his  plans. 

On  the  evening  of  the  21st  of  July,  General  Sheridan's  Army 
had  closed  up  to  within  two  miles  of  Atlanta,  and  on  that  day 
Force's  Brigade  of  Leggett's  Division  of  Blair's  Seventeenth  Army 
Corps  carried  a  prominent  hill,  known  as  Bald  or  Leggett's  Hill, 
that  gave  us  a  clear  view  of  Atlanta,  and  placed  that  city  within 
range  of  our  guns.  It  was  a  strategic  point,  and  unless  the  swing 
of  our  left  was  stopped  it  would  dangerously  interfere  with  Hood's 
communications  towards  the  south.  Hood  fully  appreciated  this, 
and  determined  upon  his  celebrated  attack  in  the  rear  of  General 
Sherman's  Army. 

On  the  22d  of  July,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  occupying 
the  rebel  in  trench  ments,  its  right  resting  very  near  the  Howard 
House,  north  of  the  Augusta  Railroad,  thence  to  Leggett's  Hill, 
which  had  been  carried  by  Force's  assault  on  the  evening  of  the  21st. 
From  this  hill  Giles  A.  Smith's  Division  of  the  Seventeenth  Army 
Corps  stretched  out  southward  on  a  road  that  occupied  this  ridge, 
with  a  weak  flank  in  air.  To  strengthen  this  flank,  by  order  of 
General  McPherson  I  sent  on  the  evening  of  the  21st  one  Brigade 
of  Fuller's  Division,  the  other  being  left  at  Decatur  to  protect  our 

—39— 


THE  BATTLE  OP  ATLANTA. 


parked  trains.  Fuller  camped  his  Brigade  about  half  a  mile  in  the 
rear  of  the  extreme  left  and  at  right  angles  to  Blair's  lines  and  com 
manding  the  open  ground  and  valley  of  the  forks  of  Sugar  Creek, 
a  position  that  proved  very  strong  in  the  battle.  Fuller  did  not  go 
into  line;  simply  bivouacked  ready  to  respond  to  any  call. 

On  the  morning  of  the  22d  of  July,  General  McPherson  called 
at  my  headquarters  and  gave  me  verbal  orders  in  relation  to  the 
movement  of  the  Second  (Sweeney's)  Division  of  my  command, 
the  Sixteenth  Corps,  which  had  been  crowded  out  of  the  line  by 
the  contraction  of  our  lines  as  we  neared  Atlanta,  and  told  me 
that.  I  was  to  take  position  on  the  left  of  the  line  that  Blair  had 
been  instructed  to  occupy  and  intrench  that  morning,  and  cautioned 
me  about  protecting  my  flank  very  strongly.  McPherson  evidently 
thought  that  there  would  be  trouble  on  that  flank,  for  he  rode  out 
to  examine  it  himself. 

I  moved  Sweeney  in  the  rear  of  our  Army,  on  the  road  leading 
from  the  Augusta  Railway  down  the  east  branch  of  Sugar  Creek 
to  near  where  it  forks;  then,  turning  west,  the  road  crosses  the 
west  branch  of  Sugar  Creek  just  back  of  where  Fuller  was  camped, 
and  passed  up  through  a  strip  of  woods  and  through  Blair's  lines 
near  where  his  left  was  refused.  Up  this  road  Sweeney  marched 
until  he  reached  Fuller,  when  he  halted,  waiting  until  the  line  I 
had  selected  on  Blair's  proposed  new  left  could  be  intrenched,  so 
that  at  mid-day,  July  22d,  the  position  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  was  as  follows:  One  Division  of  the  Fifteenth  across  and 
north  of  the  Augusta  Railway  facing  Atlanta;  the  balance  of  the 
Fifteenth  and  all  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  behind  intrenchments 
running  south  of  the  railway  along  a  gentle  ridge  with  a  gentle  slope 
and  clear  valley  facing  Atlanta  in  front,  and  another  clear  valley 
in  the  rear.  The  Sixteenth  Corps  was  resting  on  the  road  described, 
entirely  in  the  rear  of  the  Seventeenth  and  Fifteenth  Corps,  and 
facing  from  Atlanta.  To  the  left  and  left-rear  the  country  was 
heavily  wooded.  The  enemy,  therefore,  was  enabled,  under  cover 
of  the  forest,  to  approach  close  to  the  rear  of  our  lines. 

On  the  night  of  July  21st  Hood  had  transferred  Hardee's 
Corps  and  two  Divisions  of  Wheeler's  Cavalry  to  our  rear,  going 
around  our  left  flank,  Wheeler  attacking  Sprague's  Brigade  of  the 
Sixteenth  Army  Corps  at  Decatur.  where  our  trains  were  parked. 
At  daylight,  Stewart's  and  Cheatham's  Corps  and  the  Georgia 
Militia  were  withdrawn  closer  to  Atlanta,  and  placed  in  a  position 


Til  I!     P>  LTTLE    OF    ATI. ANT  \.  41 


to  attack  simultaneously  with  Hardee,  the  plan  thus  involving  the 
destroying  of  tlio  Army  oi'  tlio  Tennessee  by  attacking-  it  in  rear 
and  front  and  the  capturing  of  all  its  trains  corraled  at  Deeatur. 
Hardee's  was  the  largest  Corps  in  Hood's  Army,  and  according  to 
Hood  there  were  thus  to  move  upon  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
about  40,000  troops. 

Hood's  order  of  attack  was  for  Hardee  to  form  entirely  in  the 
rear  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.,  but  Hardee  claims  that  he  met 
Hood  on  the  night  of  the  21st;  that  he  was  so  late  in  moving  his 
Corps  that  they  changed  the  plan  of  attack  so  that  his  left  was  to 
strike  the  Seventeenth  Corps.  He  was  to  swing  his  right  until  he 
enveloped  and  attacked  the  rear  of  the  Seventeenth  and  Fifteenth 
Corps. 

Hood  stood  in  one  of  the  batteries  of  Atlanta,  where  he  could 
see  Blair's  left  and  the  front  line  of  the  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth 
Corps.  He  says  he  was  astonished  to  see  the  attack  come  on  Blair's 
left  instead  of  his  rear,  and  charges  his  defeat  to  that  fact;  but 
Hardee,  when  he  swung  his  right  and  came  out  in  the  open,  found 
the  Sixteenth  Corps  in  line  in  the  rear  of  our  Army,  and  he  was 
as  much  surprised  to  find  us  there  as  our  Army  was  at  the  sudden 
attack  in  our  rear.  The  driving  back  by  the  Sixteenth  Corps  of 
Hardee's  Corps  made  the  latter  drift  to  the  left  and  against  Blair, 
— not  only  to  Blair's  left,  but  into  his  rear, — so  that  what  Hood 
declares  was  the  cause  of  his  failure  was  not  Hardee's  fault,  as  his 
attacks  on  the  Sixteenth  Corps  were  evidently  determined  and  fierce 
enough  to  relieve  him  from  all  blame  in  that  matter. 

Historians  and  others  who  have  written  of  the  Battle  of  Atlanta 
have  been  misled  by  being  governed  in  their  data  by  the  first  dis 
patches  of  General  Sherman,  who  was  evidently  misinformed,  as 
he  afterwards  corrected  his  dispatches.  He  stated  in  the  first  dis 
patch  that  the  attack  was  at  11  a.  m.,  and  on  Blair's  Corps,  and 
also  that  General  McPherson  was  killed  about  11  a.  m.  The  fact 
is,  Blair  was  not  attacked  until  half  an  hour  after  the  attack  upon 
the  Sixteenth  Corps,  and  McPherson  fell  at  about  2  p.  m.  General 
Sherman  was  at  the  Howard  House,  which  was  miles  away  from  the 
scene  of  Hardee's  attack  in  the  rear,  and  evidently  did  not  at  first 
comprehend  the  terrific  fighting  that  was  in  progress,  and  the  serious 
results  that  would  have  been  effected  had  the  attack  succeeded. 

The  battle  began  within  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  of  12  o'clock 
(noon)  and  lasted  until  midnight,  and  covered  the  ground  from 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA. 


the  Howard  House  along  the  entire  front  of  the  Fifteenth  (Lo 
gan's)  Corps,  the  Seventeenth  (Blair's)  on  the  front  of  the  Six 
teenth  (which  was  formed  in  the  rear  of  the  Army),  and  on  to 
Decatur,  where  Sprague's  Brigade  of  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps 
met  and  defeated  Wheeler's  Cavalry  —  a  distance  of  about  seven 
miles. 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  had  present  on  that  day  at  Atlanta 
and  Decatur  about  26,000  men;  there  were  10,000  in  the  Fifteenth 
Army  Corps,  9,000  in  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  and  7,000  in  the  Sev 
enteenth.  About  21,000  of  these  were  in  line  of  battle.  Three 
Brigades  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  were  absent,  the  Sixteentli  Corps 
having  5,000  men  in  a  single  line  which  received  the  attack  of  the 
four  Divisions  of  Hardee's  Corps,  Hardee's  left,  Cleburn's  Divi 
sion  lapping  the  extreme  left  of  Blair  and  joining  Cheatham's 
Corps  which  attacked  Blair  from  the  Atlanta  front  ;  and,  according 
to  Hood,  they  were  joined  by  the  Georgia  Militia  under  General 
Smith.  Extending  down  the  line  in  front  of  the  Armies  of  the  Ohio 
and  the  Cumberland,  Stewart's  Corps  occupied  the  works  and  held 
the  lines  in  front  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  The  Sixteenth 
Army  Corps  fought  in  the  open  ground  ;  the  Fifteenth  and  Seven 
teenth  behind  intrenchments. 

Where  I  stood  just  at  the  rear  of  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps, 
I  could  see  the  entire  line  of  that  corps,  and  could  look  up  and  see 
the  enemy's  entire  front  as  they  emerged  from  the  woods,  and  I 
quickly  saw  that  both  of  my  flanks  were  overlapped  by  the  enemy. 
Knowing  General  McPherson  was  some  two  miles  away,  I  sent  a 
staff  officer  to  General  Giles  A.  Smith,  requesting  him  to  refuse  his 
left  and  protect  the  gap  between  the  Seventeenth  Corps  and  my 
right,  which  he  sent  word  he  would  do.  Later,  as  the  battle  prog 
ressed,  and  I  saw  no  movement  on  the  part  of  General  Smith,  I 
sent  another  officer  to  inform  him  that  the  enemy  were  passing  my 
right  flank,  which  was  nearly  opposite  his  center,  and  requested 
him  to  refuse  his  left  immediately,  or  he  would  be  cut  off.  This 
officer  (Lieutenant  D.  Sheffly,  who  belonged  to  the  Signal  Corps, 
and  acted  as  my  aide  only  for  the  time  being)  found,  on  reaching 
Smith,  that  he  was  just  becoming  engaged;  that  he  had  received 
orders  to  hold  his  line,  with  a  promise  that  other  troops  would  be 
thrown  into  the  gap. 

My  second  messenger,  Lieutenant  Sheffly,  returning  over  the 
road  upon  which  MePherson  was  a  few  minutes  later  shot  dead. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA.  43 

met  the  General  on  the  road  with  a  very  IV w  attendants,  and  turned 
to  warn  him  of  his  dangerous  position,  assuring  him  that  the  enemy 
held  the  woods  and  \\cre  ad\ am-ing.  Tin1  General  paying  no  heed 
to  the  warning  and  moving  on,  my  aide  turned  and  followed  him. 
They  1  hid  proceeded  hut  a  short  distance  into  the  wood?  when  a 
sharp  command.  "I Fait."  was  heard  from  the  skirmish-line  of  the 
rebels.  Without  heeding  the  command,  General  McPherson  and  his 
party  wheeled  their  horses,  and  at  that  moment  a  heavy  volley  \vas 
jxnired  in,  killing  McPherson  and  so  frightening  the  horses  that 
they  became  unmanageable  and  plunged  into  the  underbrush  in  dif 
ferent  directions.  My  aide  became  separated  from  the  General  and 
the  rest  of  the  praty,  and  was  knocked  from  his  horse  by  coming  in 
contact  with  a  tree,  and  lay  for  some  time  in  an  unconscious  con 
dition  on  the  ground.  As  soon  as  he  was  sufficiently  recovered  he 
returned  on  foot  to  me,  having  lost  his  horse  and  equipments.  Of 
General  McPherson  he  saw  nothing  after  his  fall.  His  watch, 
crushed  by  contact  with  the  tree,  was  stopped  at  two  minutes  past 
2  o'clock,  which  fixed  the  time  of  General  McPherson's  death. 

General  McPherson  could  not  have  left  his  point  of  observa 
tion  more  than  a  few  minutes  when  I  detected  the  enemy's  advance 
in  the  woods  some  distance  to  my  right,  and  between  that  flank  and 
General  Blair's  rear.  Fuller  quickly  changed  front  with  a  portion 
of  his  brigade  to  confront  them,  and  pushing  promptly  to  the  attack 
captured  their  skirmish-line  and  drove  back  their  main  force.  Upon 
the  persons  of  some  of  these  prisoners  we  found  McPherson's  papers, 
field-glass,  etc.,  which  conveyed  to  me  the  first  knowledge  I  had  of 
his  death ;  or,  rather,  as  I  then  supposed,  of  his  capture  by  the 
enemy  :  and  seeing  that  the  papers  were  important  I  sent  them  by 
my  Chief  of  Staff  with  all  haste  to  General  Sherman. 

General  McPherson,  it  seems,  had  just  witnessed  the  decisive 
grapple  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  with  the  charging  columns  of  the 
enemy,  and,  as  probably  conveying  his  own  reflections  at  that 
moment.  I  quote  the  language  of  General  Strong,  the  only  staff 
officer  present  with  him  at  that  critical  time: 

The  General  and  myself,  accompanied  only  by  our  orderlies,  rode 
on  and  took  positions  on  the  right  of  Dodge's  line,  and  witnessed  the  des 
perate  assaults  of  Hood's  army. 

The  Divisions  of  Generals  Fuller  and  Sweeney  were  formed  in  a  sin 
gle  line  of  battle  in  the  open  fields,  without  cover  of  any  kind  (Fuller's 
Division  on  the  right,)  and  were  warmly  engaged.  The  enemy,  massed  in 
columns  three  or  four  lines  deep,  moved  out  of  the  dense  timber  several  hun 
dred  yards  from  General  Dodge's  position,  and  after  gaining  fairly  the  open 
fields,  halted  and  opened  a  rapid  fire  upon  the  Sixteenth  Corps.  They,  how- 


44  'I1  in-;    MATTU-:  OF   ATI. 


ever,  seemed  surprised  to  find  our  infantry  in  line  of  battle,  prepared  for 
attack,  and  after  facing  for  a  few  minutes  the  destructive  fire  from  the 
Divisions  of  Generals  Fuller  and  Sweeney,  fell  back  in  disorder  to  the 
cover  of  the  woods.  Here,  however,  their  lines  were  quickly  reformed,  and 
they  again  advanced,  evidently  determined  to  carry  the  position. 

The  scene  at  this  time  was  grand  and  impressive.  It  seemed  to  us 
that  every  mounted  officer  of  the  attacking  column  was  riding  at  the  front 
of,  or  on  the  right  or  left  of,  the  first  line  of  battle.  The  regimental  colors 
waved  and  fluttered  in  advance  of  the  lines,  and  not  a  shot  was  fired  by  the 
rebel  infantry,  although  the  movement  was  covered  by  a  heavy  and  well-di 
rected  fire  from  artillery,  which  was  posted  in  the  woods  and  on  higher 
ground,  and  which  enabled  the  guns  to  hear  upon  our  troops  with  solid  shot 
and  shell,  firing  over  the  attacking  column. 

It  seemed  impossible,  however,  for  the  enemy  to  face  the  sweeping, 
deadly  fire  from  Fuller's  and  Sweeney's  Divisions,  and  the  guns  of  the  Four 
teenth  Ohio  and  Welker's  Batteries  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  fairly  mowed 
great  swaths  in  the  advancing  columns.  They  showed  great  steadiness,  and 
closed  up  the  gaps  and  preserved  their  alignments  ;  but  the  iron  and  leaden 
hail  which  was  poured  upon  them  was  too  much  for  flesh  and  blood  to  stand, 
and,  before  reaching  the  center  of  the  open  field,  the  columns  were  broken  up 
and  thrown  into  great  confusion.  Taking  advantage  of  this,  General  Dodge, 
with  portions  of  General  Fuller's  and  General  Sweeney's  Divisions,  with 
bayonets  fixed,  charged  the  enemy  and  drove  them  back  to  the  woods,  taking 
many  prisoners. 

General  McPherson's  admiration  for  the  steadiness  and  determined 
bravery  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  was  unbounded.  General  Dodge  held  the 
key  to  the  position. 

Had  the  Sixteenth  Corps  given  way  the  rebel  army  would  have  been 
in  the  rear  of  the  Seventeenth  and  Fifteenth  Corps,  and  would  ha\-e  swept 
like  an  avalanche  over  our  supply  trains,  and  the  position  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  would  have  been  very  critical,  although,  without  doubt,  the 
result  of  the  battle  would  have  been  in  our  favor,  because  the  Armies  of  the 
Cumberland  and  the  Ohio  were  close  at  hand,  and  the  enemy  would  have  been 
checked  and  routed  further  on. 

General  Blair,  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle,  says : 

I  witnessed  the  first  furious  assault  upon  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps, 
and  its  prompt  and  gallant  repulse.  It  was  a  fortunate  circumstance  for 
that  whole  army  that  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps  occupied  the  position  I 
have  attempted  to  describe,  at  the  moment  of  the  attack;  and  although  it 
does  not  become  me  to  comment  upon  the  brave  conduct  of  the  officers  and 
men  of  that  Corps,  still  I  can  not  refrain  from  expressing  my  admiration  for 
the  manner  in  which  the  Sixteenth  Corps  met  and  repulsed  the  repeated 
and  persistent  attacks  of  the  enemy. 

The  Sixteenth  Corps  has  a  record  in  that  battle  which  we 
seldom  see  in  the  annals  of  war.  It  met  the  shock  of  battle  and 
fired  the  last  shot  late  that  night,  as  the  enemy  stubbornly  yielded 
its  grasp  on  Bald  Hill.  It  fought  on  four  parts  of  the  field,  and 
everywhere  with  equal  success.  It  lost  no  gun  that  it  took  into 
the  engagement,  and  its  losses  were  almost  entirely  in  killed  and 
wounded — the  missing  having  been-  captured  at  Deeatnr  through 
getting  mired  in  a  swamp. 

At  no  time  during  the  Atlanta  campaign  was  there  present  in 
the  Sixteenth  Corps  more  than  two  small  Divisions  of  three  Bri- 


'I1 1 IE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA.  45 

gades  each,  and  at  this  time  these  two  Divisions  were  widely  scat 
tered;  on  the  Atlanta  field  only  ten  Regiments  and  two  Batteries 
were  present,  three  entire  Brigades  being  absent  from  the  Corps. 
It  was  called  upon  to  meet  the  assault  of  at  least  three  Divisions 
or  nine  Brigades,  or  at  the  least  forty-nine  Regiments,  all  full  to 
the  utmost  that  a  desperate  emergency  could  swell  them,  impelled 
by  the  motive  of  the  preconcerted  surprise,  and  orders  from  their 
commander  at  all  hazards  to  sweep  over  any  and  all  obstructions; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  force  attacked  and  surprised  was 
fighting  without  orders,  guided  only  by  the  exigency  of  the  moment. 
Their  captures  represented  forty-nine  different  Eegiments  of  the 
enemy.  How  many  more  Regiments  were  included  in  those  nine 
Brigades  I  have  never  been  able  to  learn.  The  fact  that  this  small 
force,  technically,  if  not  actually,  in  march,  in  a  perfectly  open 
field,  with  this  enormously  superior  force  leaping  upon  them  from 
the  cover  of  dense  woods,  was  able  to  hold  its  ground  and  drive  its 
assailants,  pell-mell,  back  to  the  cover  of  the  woods  again,  proves 
that  wl ii-ii  a  great  battle  is  in  progress,  or  a  great  emergency  occurs, 
no  officer  can  tell  what  the  result  may  be  when  he  throws  in  his 
forces,* be  they  5,000  or  20,000  men;  and  it  seems  to  me  to  be 
impossible  to  draw  the  line  that  gives  the  right  to  a  subordinate 
officer  to  use  his  own  judgment  in  engaging  an  enemy  when  a  great 
battle  is  within  his  hearing. 

Suppose  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  with  less  than  5,000  men,  seeing 
at  least  three  times  their  number  in  their  front,  should  have  re 
treated,  instead  of  standing  and  fighting  as  it  did :  What  would 
have  been  the  result?  I  say  that  in  all  my  experience  in  life,  until 
the  two  forces  struck  and  the  Sixteenth  Cores  stood  firm,  I  never 
passed  more  anxious  moments. 

Sprague's  Brigade,  of  the  same  corps,  was  engaged  at  the  same 
time  within  hearing,  but  on  a  different  field, — at  Decatur, — fight 
ing  and  stubbornly  holding  that  place,  knowing  that  if  he  failed  the 
trains  massed  there  and  en  route  from  Roswell  would  be  captured. 
His  fight  was  a  gallant  and  sometimes  seemingly  almost  hopeless 
one — giving,  ground  inch  by  inch,  until,  finally,  he  obtained  a  posi 
tion  that  he  could  not  be  driven  from,  and  one  that  protected  the 
entire  trains  of  the  Army. 

As  Itardee's  attack  fell  upon  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  his 

left  Division   (Gleburn's)  lapped  over  and  beyond  Blair's  left,  and 

"swung1  around  his  left  front;  they  poured  down  through  the  gap 


46  THE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA. 

between  the  left  of  the  Seventeenth  and  the  right  of  the  Sixteenth 
Corps,  taking  Blair  in  front,  flank,  and  rear.  Cheatham's  Corps 
moved  out  of  Atlanta  and  attacked  in  Blair's  front.  General  Giles 
A.  Smith  commanded  Blair's  left  Division,  his  right  connecting 
with  Leggett  at  Bald  Hill,  where  Leggett's  Division  held  the  line 
until  they  connected  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  and  along  this  front 
the  battle  raged  with  great  fury. 

As  Cleburn  advanced  along  the  open  space  between  the  Six 
teenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps  they  cut  off  from  Blair's  left  and 
captured  a  portion  of  two  Regiments  of  his  command,  and  forced 
the  Seventeenth  Corps  to  form  new  lines,  utilizing  the  old  intrench- 
ments  thrown  up  by  the  enemy,  fighting  first  on  one  side  and  then 
on  the  other,  as  the  attack  would  come  from  Hardee  in  the  rear 
or  Cheatham  in  the  front,  until  about  3  :30  p.  m.,  when,  evidently 
after  a  lull,  an  extraordinary  effort  was  made  by  the  rebels  to  wipe 
out  Giles  A.  Smith's  Division  and  capture  Leggett's  Hill,  the 
enemy  approaching  under  cover  of  the  woods  until  they  were  within 
fifty  yards  of  Smith's  temporary  position,  when  they  pressed  for 
ward  until  the  fight  became  a  hand-to-hand  conflict  across  the 
trenches  occupied  by  Smith,  the  troops  using  bayonet  freely  and 
the  officers  their  swords.  This  attack  failed ;  it  was  no  doubt  timed 
to  occur  at  the  same  time  that  Cheatham's  Corps  attacked  from  the 
Atlanta  front,  which  Leggett  met,  The  brunt  of  Cheatham's  attack 
was  against  Leggett's  Hill,  the  key  to  the  position  of  that  portion 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  General  Giles  A.  Smith's  Division 
had  to  give  up  the  works  they  occupied  and  fall  into  line  at  right 
angles  with  Leggett's  Division,  Leggett's  Hill  being  the  apex  of 
the  formation;  and  around  this  position  for  three-quarters  of  an 
hour  more  desperate  fighting  was  clone  that  I  can  describe.  Up  to 
midnight  the  enemy  occupied  one  side  of  the  works  'while  we 
occupied  the  other,  neither  side  giving  way  until  Hood  saw  that 
the  whole  attack  was  a  failure,  when  those  who  were  on  the  outside 
of  the  works  finally  surrendered  to  us.  Their  attack  at  this  angle 
was  a  determined  and  resolute  one,  advancing  up  to  our  breast 
works  on  the  crest  of  the  hill,  planting  their  flag  side  by  side  with 
ours,  and  fighting  hand  to  hand  until  it  grew  so  dark  that  nothing 
could  be  seen  but  the  flash  of  guns  from  the  opposite  sides  of  the 
works.  The  ground  covered  by  these  attacks  was  literally  strewn 
with  the  dead  of  both  sides.  The  loss  of  Blair's  Corps  was  1,801 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  Blair's  left  struck  in  the  rear  flank. 


Tin-:  BATTIJ-:  OF  ATLANTA. 


and  the  front  gave  way  slowly,  gradually,  fighting  for  every  inch 
of  ground,  until  their  left  was  opposite  the  right  flank  of  the  Six 
teenth  Corps;  then  they  halted,  and  held  the  enemy,  refusing  to 
give  another  inch. 

It  would  be  difficult  in  all  the  annals  of  war  to  find  a  parallel 
to  the  fighting  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps;  first  from  one  side  of 
its  works  and  then  from  the  other,  one  incident  of  which  was  that 
of  Colonel  Belknap,  of  the  Umion  side,  who,  reaching  over  the 
works,  seized  the  Colonel  of  the  Fortv-fifth  Alabama,  and,  drawing 
him  over  the  breastworks,  made  him  a  prisoner  of  war. 

About  4  p.  in.  Cheatham's  Corps  was  ordered  by  Hood  to  again 
attack;  they  directed  their  assault  this  time  to  the  front  of  the 
Fifteenth  Corps,  using  the  Decatur  wagon-road  and  railway  as  a 
guide,  and  came  forward  in  solid  masses,  meeting  no  success  until 
they  slipped  through  to  the  rear  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  by  a  deep 
cut  used  by  the  railway  passing  through  our  intrenchments. 

As  soon  as  they  reached  our  rear,  Lightburn's  Division  of  the 
Fifteenth  Corps  became  partially  panic-stricken,  and  fell  back, 
giving  up  the  intrenchments  for  the  whole  front  of  this  Division, 
the  enemy  capturing  the  celebrated  Degress  Battery  of  20-pounders 
and  two  guns  in  advance  of  our  lines.  The  officers  of  Lightburn's 
Division  rallied  it  in  the  line  of  intrenchments,  just  in  the  rear 
of  the  position  they  had  in  the  morning. 

General  Logan  was  then  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee.  Hi1  rode  over  to  my  position,  and  I  sent  Mersey's  Brigade. 
of  the  Second  Division,  under  the  guidance  of  Major  Edward 
Jonas,  my  Aide-de-camp,  to  the  aid  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps.  Of  the 
performance  of  that  Brigade  on  that  occasion,  I  quote  the  words 
of  that  staff  officer,  Major  Jonas: 

I  conducted  Mersey's  Brigade  to  the  point  \vliere  needed;  arrived  at 
the  railroad,  he  at  once  deployed  and  charged,  all  men  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps 
at  hand  joining  with  him.  Mersey's  Brigade  recaptured  the  works  and  the 
gun.-.  Old  ('olonel  Mersey  was  slightly  wounded,  and  his  celebrated  horse. 
"Billy,"  killed.  By  your  direction  I  said  to  General  Morgan  L.  Smith  (tem 
porarily  in  command  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps)  :  "General  Dodge  requests 
that  you  return  this  Brigade  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment,  as  there 
is  every  indication  of  renewed  assault  on  our  own  line,"  and,  after  saying 
that  your  request  would  be  respected,  General  Smith  added  :  "Tell  Gen 
eral  Dodge  that  his  Brigade  (  Mersey's  I  has  done  magnificently,  and  that  it. 
shall  have  full  credit  in  my  report." 

Afterwards  one  of  Mersey's  officers  —  Captain  Boyd.  I  think  — 
in  trying  his  skill  as  an  artillerist,  cracked  one  of  the  recaptured 
guns.  At  the  same  moment  of  Mersey's  attack  in  front,  (Jeneral 


-iS  THE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA. 

Wood's  Division  of  the  Fifteenth  Army  Corps,  under  the  eye  of 
General  Sherman,  attacked  the  Confederates  occupying  our  in- 
treiu-lmients  in  flank,  and  Williamson's  Brigade  joined  MOSCY'S  in 
recapturing  our  line  and  the  batteries — the  Fourth  Iowa  Infantry 
taking  a  conspicuous  part. 

Colonel  Mersey  and  many  of  his  men  whom  he1  so  »-allantlv 
led  had  served  their  time  before  this  battle  occurred,  and  were 
awaiting  transportation  home.  Eloquent  words  have  been  written 
and  spoken  all  over  the  land  in  behalf  of  the  honor  and  the  bravery 
of  the  soldier;  but  where  is  the  word  spoken  or  written  that  can 
say  more  for  the  soldier  than  the  action  of  these  men  on  that  field  ? 
They  were  out  of  service;  they  had  written  that  they  were  coming 
home,  and  their  eyes  and  hearts  were  toward  the  North.  Many  an 
anxious  eye  was  looking  for  the  boy  who  voluntarily  laid  down  his 
life  that  day,  and  many  a  devoted  father,  mother  or  sister  has  had 
untold  trouble  to  obtain  recognition  in  the  War  Department  because 
the  soldier's  time  had  expired.  He  was  mustered  out;  waiting  to 
go  home;  and  was  not  known  on  the  records;  but  on  that  day  he 
fought  on  three  different  parts  of  the  field,  without  a  thought  except 
for  his  cause  and  his  country. 

The  continuous  attacks  of  Cheatham  made  no  other  impression 
on  the  line.  Our  men  were  behind  the  intrenchments  and  the 
slaughter  of  the  enemy  was  something  fearful.  General  J.  C.  Brown, 
who  commanded  the  Confederate  Division  that  broke  through  our 
line,  told  me  that  after  breaking  through  it  was  impossible  to  force 
his  men  forward;  the  fire  on  their  flanks  and  front  was  so  terrific 
that  when  driven  out  of  the  works  one-half  of  his  command  was 
killed,  wounded,  or  missing.  The  Confederate  records  sustain  this, 
and  it  is  a  wonder  that  they  could  force  their  line  so  often  up  to 
within  100  to  300  feet  of  us,  where  our  fire  would  drive  them  back 
in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  their  officers,  a  great  many  of  whom  fell 
in  these  attacks. 

I  could  see  the  terrific  fighting  at  Leggett's  Hill,  but  of  that 
along  the  line  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  I  can  only  speak  from  the 
records  and  as  told  me  by  General  John  C.  Brown,  of  the  Confed 
erate  Army.  The  stubbornness  and  coolness  with  which  they  con 
tested  every  inch  of  the  ground  won  his  admiration,  and  the  manner 
and  method  with  which  the  line  was  retaken  must  have  been  seen 
to  be  appreciated. 


Tin-:   BATTLK  OF  ATLANTA. 


When  darkness  fell  upon  us  the  enemy  had  retired,  except 
around  the  angle  in  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  known  as  Leggett's  or 
Bald  Hill.  Here  there  was  a  continuous  fire,  desultory  and  at  close 
quarters,  the  enemy  in  places  occupying  ground  close  up  to  our 
mtrenchments.  To  relieve  these  men  of  the  Seventeenth  Army 
Corps  holding  this  angle,  who  were  worn  out,  at  the  request  of 
General  Blair  I  sent  two  Regiments  of  Mersey's  Brigade.  They 
crawled  in  on  their  hands  and  knees,  and  swept  the  enemy  from 
that  front. 

The  whole  of  Hood's  Army,  except  Stewart's  Corps,  was  thrown 
into  our  rear,  upon  the  flank  and  the  front  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  and  after  fighting  from  mid-day  until  dark  were  re 
pulsed  and  driven  back.  That  Army  held  or  commanded  the  entire 
battle-field,  demonstrating  the  fact  that  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
alone  was  able  and  competent  to  meet  and  defeat  Hood's  entire 
Army.  The  battle  fell  almost  entirely  upon  the  Sixteenth  and 
Seventeenth  Corps  and  two  Divisions  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  three 
Brigades  of  the  Sixteenth  being  absent.  The  attack  of  the  enemy 
was  made  along  this  line  some  seven  times,  and  they  were  seven 
times  repulsed. 

We  captured  eighteen  stands  of  colors,  5,000  stands  of  arms, 
and  2,017  prisoners.  We  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  3,521  men  and 
ten  pieces  of  artillery,  and  over  1,800  men,  mostly  from  Blair's 
Corps,  wrere  taken  prisoners.  The  enemy's  dead  reported  as  buried 
in  front  of  the  different  Corps  was  over  2,000,  and  the  enemy's  total 
loss  in  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners  was  8,000. 

The  criticism  has  often  been  made  of  this  battle  that  with  two 
Armies  idle  that  day,  one  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  (two-thirds  as 
large  as  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee)  and  the  other  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  (the  largest  of  all  Sherman's  Armies),  why  we  did 
not  enter  Atlanta.  General  Sherman  urged  Thomas  to  make  the 
attack;  Thomas's  answer  was  thai  the  enemy  were  in  full  force 
behind  his  mtrenchments.  The  fact  was  that  Stewart's  Corps  was 
guarding  that  front,  but  General  Schofield  urged  Sherman  to  allow 
him  to  throw  his  Army  upon  Cheatham's  flank,  in  an  endeavor  to 
roll  up  the  Confederate  line  and  so  interpose  between  Atlanta  and 
Cheatham's  Corps,  which  was  so  persistently  attacking  the  Fif 
teenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps  from  the  Atlanta  front.  Sherman, 
whose  anxiety  had  been  very  great,  seeing  how  successfully  we  were 
meeting  the  attack,  his  face  relaxing  into  a  pleasant  smile,  said  to 


50  THE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA. 

Schofield,  "Let  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  fight  it  out  this  time." 
This  flank  attack  of  Schofield  on  Cheatham  would  have  no  doubt 
cleared  our  front  facing  the  Atlanta  intrenchments,  but  Stewart 
was  ready  with  his  three  Divisions  and  the  Militia  to  hold  them. 

General  Sherman,  in  speaking  of  this  battle,  always  regretted 
that  he  did  not  allow  Schofield  to  attack  as  he  suggested,  and  also 
force  the  fighting  on  Thomas's  front;  but  no  doubt  the  loss  of 
McPherson  really  took  his  attention  from  everything  except  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

At  about  10  o'clock  on  the  night  of  the  22d,  the  three  Corps 
commanders  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  (one  of  them  in  com 
mand  of  the  Army)  met  in  the  rear  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  on  the 
line  of  the  Decatur  road,  under  an  oak  tree,  and  there  discussed 
the  results  of  the  day.  Blair's  men  were  at  the  .time  in  the  trenches; 
in  some  places  the  enemy  held  one  side  and  they  the  other.  The 
men  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  were  still  in  their  own  line,  but  tired 
and  hungry,  and  those  of  the  Sixteenth  were,  after  their  hard  day's 
fight,  busy  throwing  up  intrenchments  on  the  field  they  had  held 
and  won.  It  was  thought  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  and 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  which  had  not  been  engaged  that  day,  should 
send  a  force  to  relieve  Blair,  and  Dodge,  being  the  junior  Corps 
commander,  was  dispatched  by  General  Logan,  at  the  requests  of 
Generals  Logan  and  Blair,  to  see  General  Sherman.  My  impres 
sion  is  that  I  met  him  in  a  tent ;  I  have  heard  it  said  that  he  had 
his  headquarters  in  a  house.  When  I  met  him  he  seemed  rather 
surprised  to  see  me,  but  greeted  me  cordially,  and  spoke  of  the  loss 
of  McPherson.  I  stated  to  him  my  errand.  He  turned  upon  me 
and  said,  "Dodge,  you  whipped  them  today,  didn't  you?"  I  said, 
"Yes,  sir."  Then  he  said :  "Can't  you  do  it  again  tomorrow  ?"  and 
I  said,  "Yes,  sir" ;  bade  him  good-night,  and  went  back  to  my  com 
mand,  determined  never  to  go  upon  another  such  errand.  As  he 
explained  it  afterward,  he  wanted  it  said  that  the  little  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  had  fought  the  great  battle  that  day,  needing  no 
help,  no  aid,  and  that  it  could  be  said  that  all  alone  it  had  whipped 
the  whole  of  Hood's  Army.  Therefore,  he  let  us  hold  our  position 
and  our  line,  knowing  that  Hood  would  not  dare  attack  us  after 
the  "thrashing"  he  had  already  received.  When  we  consider  that 
in  this,  the  greatest  battle  of  the  campaign,  the  little  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  met  the  entire  rebel  Army,  secretly  thrust  to  its  rear,  on 
its  flank,  and  upon  its  advance  center,  with  its  idolized  commander 


'I'll  !•:   HATTU:  OK  ATLANTA.  51 

killed  in  the  first  shock  of  battle,  and  at  nightfall  found  the  enemy's 
dead  and  wounded  on  its  front,  we  see  that  no  disaster — no  tem 
porary  rebuff — could  discourage  this  Army.  Every  man  was  at  his 
post;  every  man  doing  a  hero's  duty.  They  proved  they  might  be 
wiped  out  but  never  made  to  run.  They  were  invincible. 

Companions,,  regarding  so  great  a  battle,  against  such  odds, 
with  such  loss,  the  question  has  often  been  asked  me — and  I  know 
it  has  come  to  the  mind  of  all  of  us — why  it  was  that  this  battle 
was  never  put  forth  ahead  of  many  others  inferior  to  it,  but  better 
known  to  the  world  and  causing  much  greater  comment? 

The  answer  comes  to  all  of  us.  It  is  apparent  to  us  today,  as 
ii  \vns  that  night.  We  had  lost  our  best  friend, — that  superb  soldier, 
our  commander,  General  McPherson  ;  his  death  counted  so  much 
more  to  us  than  victory  that  we  spoke  of  our  battle,  our  great  suc 
cess,  with  our  loss  uppermost  in  our  minds. 


~  5 

Z  ~ 

-  a 

s  ± 

r~  ~ 

rV,  O 


X  C 


LETTER  TO  GENERAL  RAUM 


CORRECTING  SOME  STATEMENTS 

IN 

GENERAL  GREEN  B.  RAUM'S 
DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA 

PUBLISHED 

IN  THE  NATIONAL  TRIBUNE,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 
SEPTEMBER  25,  1902 

My  Dear  General  : 

Referring  to  my  conversation  with  you  in  Washington,  1  will 
endeavor  to  aid  you  in  getting  at  the  actual  facts  connected  with 
the  Battle  of  Atlanta,  as  it  has  never  yet  been  properly  written  up. 

I  delivered  an  address  on  September  25th,  1889,  to  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  on  that  battle,  copy  of  which  I  am  sending  to 
you,  and  from  which  I  think  you  can  get  a  good  deal  of  information. 

I  first  want  to  call  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  battle 
commenced  about  fifteen  minutes  after  12  o'clock,  and  that  the 
Sixteenth  Army  Corps  fought  a  long  time  before  the  Seventeenth 
Corps  was  attacked.  You  can  verify  this  statement  by  reading 
General  Strong's  account  of  the  battle,  which  is  given  in  our  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  records,  volume  11  to  13,  page  242. 

It  was  just  12  o'clock  exactly  when  I  reached  Fuller's  head 
quarters.  Having  gone  to  the  front  to  select  my  position,  Fuller 
asked  me  to  stop  and  take  luncheon,  and  I  got  down  from  my  horse 
and  went  into  his  tent.  I  had  sat  down  at  the  table  when  I  heard 
skirmish  firing  in  the  rear.  Fuller  said  it  was  a  lot  of  the  boys  out 
there  killing  hogs.  The  stillness  had  been  oppressive  as  we  went 
clear  to  the  left  and  front  of  Blair's  line  to  select  my  new  position. 
We  inquired  from  the  pickets  and  found  that  nobody  had  seen 
anything  of  the  enemy.  It  made  an  impression  on  us  all;  so  the 
moment  I  heard  this  firing  I  jumped  up,  as  if  by  instinct,  and  told 

— 53 — 


Tin:  BATTLK  OF  ATLANTA. 


Fuller  to  get  into  line,  and  sent  a  staff  officer  towards  Sweeney ;  but 
before  he  hardly  got  out  of  the  tent  Sweeney  was  in  line  and  fight 
ing,  so  you  can  see  how  sudden  the  attack  was. 

In  volume  11  to  13  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  records, 
page  243,  Strong,  in  his  address  on  the  Battle  of  Atlanta,  has  this 
to  say  fixing  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  battle,  speaking 
of  the  time  when  an  officer  was  sent  with  an  order  to  me  from 
McPherson : 

The  officer  had  hardly  disappeared  from  sight,  when  a  shot  was 
heard  to  the  left  and  rear  of  us.  then  another,  followed  quickly  by  a  rattling 
volley  of  small  arms,  and  at  almost  the  same  instant  a  shell  came  crashing 
through  the  tree-tops  near  us.  followed  by  a  rapid  and  incessant  firing  from 
Dodge's  Corps.  At  the  first  shots  every  officer  sprang  to  his  feet  and  called 
for  his  horse.  The  time,  I  should  think,  was  ten  or  fifteen  minutes  past 
12  o'clock. 

Then  after  speaking  of  the  fighting  of  this  Division,  comes 
this,  on  page  243  : 

After  the  two  attempts  to  break  the  Sixteenth  Corps  had  failed.  Gen 
eral  McPherson  sent  me  to  General  Blair  to  ascertain  the  condition  of 
affairs  along  his  line,  and  instructed  me  to  say  to  General  Giles  A.  Smith 
to  hold  his  position  ;  that  he  would  order  up  troops  to  occupy  the  gap  be 
tween  the  Seventeenth  and  Sixteenth  Corps  ;  and  also  saying  as  I  left  him 
that  he  wrould  remain  with  his  orderly  where  he  then  was  (a  commanding 
position  on  Dodge's  right)  until  I  returned.  I  rode  rapidly  through  the 
woods  towards  the  Seventeenth  Corps  and  found  General  Blair  with  Gen 
eral  Giles  A.  Smith  near  the  extreme  left  of  the  Fourth  Division  (Hall's 
Brigade). 

This  conclusively  shows  that  Blair  was  not  attacked  until  after 
two  attacks  had  been  made  upon  me,  although  Hair's  report  gives 
the  attack  upon  Blair  as  at  12  o'clock,  that  time  being  before  the 
Sixteenth  Corps  was  attacked.  Fuller  gives  the  time  of  attack 
upon  him  as  12  :30.  By  reading  all  of  page  243  you  will  get  a 
full  and  clear  idea  of  time  and  everything.  The  time  was  also 
taken  by  my  staff  and  record  made  of  it,  and  that  agrees  with 
Strong.  This  only  shows  how  far  apart  officers  can  get  as  to  time 
in  a  great  battle,  and  on  many  things,  unless  correct  data  is  made 
of  record  on  the  spot. 

On  page  484,  of  volume  14  to  1G  of  Society  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  records,  General  Leggett  says : 

Both  divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps  immediately  became  hotly 

engaged Just    at    this    time    I    espied    General    McPherson    upon    the 

high  ground  in  the  immediate  rear  of  General  Fuller's  command,  and  sent 
Captain  John  B.  Raymond  of  my  staff  to  inquire  of  General  McPherson  the 
expediency  of  having  General  Giles  A.  Smith  and  myself  change  our  line 
so  as  to  face  south,  and  at  the  same  time  I  sent  Captain  Goorgo  W.  Porter 
to  ascertain  whether  or  not  the  left  of  General  Smith  and  the  right  of  Gen 
eral  Fuller  were  sufficiently  near  together  to  antagonize  any  force  seeking 


LKTTKK  TO  (JKNKKAL  RAUM. 


entrance  there The  enemy  in  front  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  rallied 

in  the  woods   (this  is  after  the  first  attack)   and  renewed  their  attack  with 

increased  vigor  and  bitterness The  conflict  continued  for  some  time, 

with  no  appearance  on  either  side  of  any  disposition  to  yield  the  ground, 
when   the   enemy    gave   way,    and    foil    back    in   confusion,    followed    by    the 

Sixteenth   Corps The  second  assault    (upon  the   Sixteenth   Corps) 

was  simultaneous  with  the  attack  upon  General  Giles  A.  Smith's  Division, 
which  was  the  left  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps. 

You  will  note  from  my  address  that  the  moment  I  was  at 
tacked  I  sent  an  aide,  and  afterwards  a  signal  officer  named  Sheffly 
(I  think),  who  was  detailed  with  me  that  day,  or  happened  to  be 
with  me.  These  officers  had  gone  to  General  Giles  A.  Smith,  who 
commanded  Blair's  left,  Fourth  Division,  Seventeenth  Corps,  to 
get  him  to  refuse  his  left  and  join  my  right.  I  think  the  first  officer 
I  sent  was  Captain  Jonas  of  my  staff,  who  returned  immediately 
to  me,  and  General  Giles  A.  Smith  sent  me  word  that  he  would 
refuse.  That  was  a  long  time  before  Cleburn's  Division  got  between 
us;  but,  as  my  paper  and  your  article  show,  McPherson  had  sent 
word  to  Giles  A.  Smith  without  knowing  the  condition  in  his  front, 
to  hold  his  position,  stating  that  he  would  send  reinforcements  to 
fill  the  gap  between  Fuller  and  himself.  Of  course,  had  McPherson 
been  there  earlier  and  seen  what  I  saw,  he  would  have  had  Smith's 
left  join  my  right  immediately,  which  would  have  put  Cleburn  in 
front  of  us  instead  of  between  us.  That  is  one  of  the  things  that 
occur  in  battle  that  the  person  on  the  ground  knows  better  than 
the  one  distant.  It  was  on  the  third  attack  on  my  line  that  the 
enemy  struck  Blair,  as  Strong  did  not  go  to  Blair  until  after  the 
repulse  of  the  second  attack.  Cleburn's  force  got  right  in  behind 
Blair's  left  and  picked  up  that  portion  of  his  line  that  was  refused, 
and  SAvept  back  his  force  so  that  Blair's  left,  even  before  Waglin 
of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  got  there,  was  pretty  nearly  an  extension  of 
but  a  quarter  of  a  mile  away  from  Fuller's  right,  and  after  I  got 
through  fighting  I  had  to  withdraw  my  entire  right  quite  a  dis 
tance  to  connect  with  Waglin  and  Blair,  as  Cleburn's  force  had 
pressed  clear  beyond  me  and  before  he  was  halted  was  way  in  the 
rear  of  my  right. 

After  the  second  attack,  Cleburn,  as  lie  pressed  through  the 
gap  between  Fuller  and  Smith,  forced  Fuller  to  change  front  and 
use  part  of  his  force  to  protect  his  flank,  and  the  Sixty-fourth 
Illinois  in  this  movement  captured  the  skirmish-line  that  killed 
McPherson,  taking  from  them  his  field-glass,  orders,  and  other 
papers  that  they  had  taken  from  McPherson's  body  ;  and  later  in  the 


50  Tin-:  BATTLI:  OF  ATLANTA. 

day  I  sent  these  to  General  Sherman.  See  report  Sixty-fourth  Illi 
nois,  volume  38,  part  3,  War  Records,  page  494.  Fuller's  maps, 
page  480,  volume  38,  pail  3,  War  Records,  show  where  Fuller 
fought,  and  where  we  had  to  intrench. 

Where  I  stood  in  my  line  I  could  see  the  entire  Confederate 
force,  and  all  of  my  own,  something  that  very  seldom  occurs,  and, 
of  course,  the  scene,  as  Blair  states,  was  a  magnificent  one.  I  saw 
Fuller  do  a  most  gallant  act.  I  sent  an  aide  to  him  with  instruc 
tions  to  charge,  but  before  he  got  there  Walker's  division  broke  the 
center  of  Fuller's  Brigade,  his  own  regiment,  the  Twenty-seventh 
Ohio,  falling  back.  I  saw  Fuller  get  down  off  his  horse,  grab  the 
colors  of  the  Twenty-seventh,  rush  to  the  front  with  them  in  his 
hands,  and  call  upon  his  regiment  to  come  to  the  colors;  and  they 
rallied  and  saved  his  front.  It  was  but  a  moment  later  that  I  saw 
Walker,  who  commanded  the  division  that  was  attacking  Fuller,  fall 
from  his  horse,  and  the  division  broke  and  went  into  the  woods. 
The  action  of  Fuller  was  very  gallant,  and  has  been  painted,  and  I 
have  a  copy  of  the  painting  in  my  room. 

Blair  in  his  report  has  this  to  say  of  the  fighting,  which 
shows  that  he  watched  us  a  long  time  before  he  was  attacked ;  and 
if  you  will  read  his  report  carefully,  you  will  see  that  it  bears  out 
my  statements  in  full : 

I  started  to  go  back  to  my  command  and  witnessed  the  fearful  assault 
made  on  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  and  its  prompt  and  gallant  repulse  by 
that  command.  It  was  a  most  fortunate  circumstance  for  the  whole  army 
that  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps  occupied  the  position  I  have  attempted  to 
describe  at  the  moment  of  attack,  and  although  it  does  not  belong  to  me 
to  report  upon  the  bearing  and  conduct  of  the  officers  and  men  of  that 
Corps,  still  I  cannot  withhold  my  expression  of  admiration  for  the  manner 
in  which  this  command  met  and  repulsed  the  repeated  and  persistent  at 
tacks  of  the  enemy.  The  attack  upon  our  flank  was  made  by  the  whole  of 
Hardee's  Corps. 

I  speak  in  my  address  of  Mercer's  Brigade  fighting  on  three 
parts  of  ihe  field.  Mercer,  after  helping  to  retake  the  Decatur-road 
line,  camped  right  in  the  rear  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  and  did  not 
come  back  to  me.  When  Logan,  Blair  and  myself  met  that  even 
ing,  Blair  asked  Logan  for  some  help  to  go  up  to  relieve  troops  at 
Bald  Hill.  Logan,  seeing  Mercer's  Brigade  there,  ordered  me  to 
send  it  up.  They  went  up  there  and  crawled  in  and  relieved  the 
iv en  on  Bald  Hill.  This  was  very  late  in  the  night,  and  even  then 
fresh  men  coming  in  drove  out  or  captured  what  men  there  were 
still  lying  on  the  enemy's  side  of  the  intrenchments.  Mercer  never 
made  a  report  of  this  battle.  You  will  see  by  my  paper  that  he 


LETTER  TO  GENERAL  RAUM.  57 

was  virtually  out  of  the  service,  awaiting  transportation  home ;  but 
he  went  in  with  his  regiment  the  same  as  though  they  were  still  in 
the  service.  He  was  a  German,  and  I  do  not  suppose  he  knew  the 
importance  of  reporting;  and  as  it  wras  only  a  short  time  later  that 
I  had  to  leave  that  army,  I  therefore  did  not  follow  it  up,  and  I 
find  no  report  of  Mercer  or  of  the  Ninth  Illinois;  but  I  think  the 
iv-iinontal  reports  of  the  Eighty-first  Ohio  give  all  these  facts.  See 
War  Records,  volume  38,  part  3,  page  463,  and  report  Second  Bri- 
gjidc.  Second  Division  Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  volume  38,  part  3, 
page  450. 

In  my  address  I  did  not  go  much  into  detail,  but  I  have  all  the 
data  of  this  battle  compiled,  and  intend  some  day  to  put  it  in 
shape;  but  I  give  you  enough  so  you  can,  after  examining  the  re 
ports  of  Blair  and  the  others,  make  your  article  historically  correct. 
Most  of  it  is  correct  and  well-stated,  but  I  know  you  want  to  get 
the  dates  and  movements  at  the  left  on  such  an  occasion  so  full  that 
they  will  stand  criticism,  as  the  Battle  of  Atlanta  was  the  great  bat- 

•/  o 

tie  of  that  campaign. 

Your  article  and  many  others  that  I  have  seen  assumes  that 
it  was  a  part  of  Hardee's  Corps  that  struck  Blair's  front — that  is, 
his  front  that  was  towards  Atlanta;  but  that  is  not  so.  Cleburn's 
Division  was  the  left  Division  of  Hardee's  Corps.  There  were  three 
other  Divisions.  Maney's  (Cheatham's  old  Division),  Bate's,  and 
Walker's.  Walker  was  the  next  to  Cleburn  and  attacked  Fuller. 
Bate  and  Maney  struck  Sweeney.  Cleburn's  Division  was  in  front 
of  Blair  after  Cleburn  had  driven  back  his  left  and  he  had  refused 
it  from  Leggetfs  Hill  towards  my  right.  What  saved  Blair  was 
that  Cheatham,  who  commanded  Hood's  old  Corps,  whose  orders 
were  to  attack  Blair's  front  at  the  same  time  Hardee  struck  his 
rear,  in  accordance  with  the  plans  of  both  Hood  and  Hardee,  did 
not  attack  because  Hardee  struck  me,  which  was  a  surprise  to  them 
as  well  as  to  me,  and  when  Cheatham  got  ready  to  attack  Blair's 
front,  hitting  Leggett's  Division,  and  on  down  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
two  Divisions,  Bate's  and  Walker's,  had  been  whipped,  and  were 
virtually  out  of  the  fight,  because  after  the  third  attack  upon  me, 
and  my  breaking  up  of  one  of  their  columns  so  badly,  they  did  not 
come  again  in  any  force.  They  went  back  to  the  road  on  the 
ridge,  just  south  of  and  parallel  to  my  line.  I  forget  the  name  of 
the  road,  but  it  was  the  one  that  led  off  to  Decatur,  and  there  they 
intrenched,  and  when  I  pushed  forward  my  skirmishers  I  found 


58  THE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA. 

them  in  force.  Between  3  and  4  o'clock  Maney's  Division  left  my 
front  and  went  around  to  help  Cleburn. 

There  have  also  been  many  statements  that  in  the  first  attack 
two  Divisions  of  Harclee's  Corps  struck  the  Sixteenth  Corps  and 
two  the  Seventeenth.  Blair's.  This  is  not  correct.  Three  Divisions 
struck  my  Corps,  and  one  Division,  Cleburn's,  struck  Blair's  Corps, 
and  caught  his  left  and  rear;  but  after  the  third  attack  on  my  front 
Maney's  Division  was  sent  around  to  join  Cleburn,  and  joined  in 
the  fiercest  attack  of  the  day,  about  4  p,  in.,  upon  Leggett's  and 
Smith's  Divisions  after  their  line  had  been  refused  and  formed  al 
most  at  right  angles  at  Leggetfs  Hill,  and  reaching  out  towards 
me,  with  Waglin's  Brigade  on  their  left.  From  all  accounts  this 
attack  was  a  fearful  one,  Maney's  men  reaching  and  holding  the 
outside  of  the  intrenchments  that  were  occupied  by  Blair's  men. 
This  line  faced  almost  due  south,  and  both  forces  fought  there  off 
and  on  until  about  7  p.  m.,  some  of  the  enemy  remaining  in  the 
outside  intrenchments  until  Mercer's  Brigade  of  the  Sixteenth 
Corps  went  in  at  near  midnight  to  support  that  line. 

Again,  many  records  have  it  that  Blair  was  forced  back  early 
in  the  battle.  This  is  a  mistake,  as  his  Fourth  Division,  command 
ed  by  General  Giles  A.  Smith,  which  was  on  the  extreme  left,  held 
most  of  his  original  intrenched  line  until  between  3  and  -I  o'clock, 
when  the  attack  of  Cheatham  from  the  Atlanta  side  forced  them  to 
take  a  new  position  to  keep  them  from  being  crushed  by  Cleburn  in 
the  rear  and  Cheatham's  attack  from  the  Atlanta  front. 

There  is  another  thing  that  does  not  seem  to  be  fully  under 
stood,  and  that  is  that  when  Blair  got  his  left  refused  so  as  to  face 
Maney  and  Cleburn  in  his  front  they  were  unable  to  gain  any  head 
way  on  him  in  their  attacks.  In  fact,  they  suffered  great  loss,  and 
they  only  damaged  Blair  when  the}'  got  in  behind  his  left.  Blair 
had  three  Eegiments  there  refused  at  right  angles  to  his  front, 
and  it  was  a  portion  of  two  of  these  Regiments  that  Cleburn  picked 
up.  Blair  lost  nearly  all  his  prisoners  from  Giles  A.  Smith's  Divi 
sion,  when  Cleburn  swept  down  through  the  gap  and  got  right  in 
behind  them  before  they  knew  anybody  was  on  them.  In  fact, 
Blair's  men  had  to  turn  around  and  fight  towards  their  rear,  and, 
as  I  have  stated,  Cleburn  got  past  Fuller's  right  and  commenced 
shooting  into  his  flank.  Just  after  Walker  was  killed  there  was  a 
lull,  and  Fuller  turned  two  regiments  right  into  Cleburn's  main 
line,  and,  as  Captain  Allen  of  the  Signal  Corps,  says,  and  my  rec- 


LKTTEK  TO  GENKKAL  K'AUM. 


ords  show,  captured  that  skirmish-line  that  killed  McPherson,  and 
brought  it  in. 

To  show  McPherson's  feeling  about  Blair's  left  flank,  1  sent 
Fuller's  command  to  that  flank  the  night  before  on  a  request  from 
McPherson,  who  felt  anxious  about  Blair's  position,  that  flank  being 
in  the  air;  but  Blair  camped  Fuller  near  where  lie  opened  the  bat 
tle  in  the  rear  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  instead  of  connecting  his 
left  with  it.  They  camped  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  to  his  rear  and 
a  little  back  from  his  extreme  left.  Blair,  no  doubt,  thought  that 
would  protect  him,  as  well  as  put  them  in  line,  but  he  took  one 
of  my  batteries  (Murray's)  and  put  it  in  his  front  line.  Xow  this 
battery  was  on  the  way  from  Blair  to  report  to  me,  coming  down 
just  as  McPherson  was  going  up  the  road,  and  the  same  skirmish- 
line  that  killed  McPherson  killed  the  horses  of  that  battery  and 
captured  a  portion  of  the  men,  and  McPherson  really  almost  fell 
upon  the  limber  of  one  of  the  guns.  This  was  Murray's  United 
States  Battery  of  four  pieces.  I  do  not  know  as  I  have  seen  this 
mentioned  in  any  of  the  reports,  unless  it  is  in  mine;  but  these 
are  the  facts  of  the  matter.  That  is  the  way  a  batten'  of  my  Corps 
was  reported  lost  or  captured  by  the  enemy.  It  was  passing  from 
Blair  to  myself,  and  not  captured  in  line  of  battle  or  fighting,  as  a 
great  many  have  stated  and  supposed  to  be  the  case. 

In  your  article  you  speak  of  Logan  taking  a  part  of  the  Six 
teenth  Corps  and  leading  it,  as  though  it  was  right  on  my  front, 
and  then  speak  of  him  as  leading  a  portion  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps 
that  had  been  broken  through  on  the  Decatur  road  back  into  posi 
tion.  The  facts  are  that  it  was  about  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
when  Logan  came  to  me  and  asked  me  to  send  any  force  I  had 
free  to  help  retake  the  line  that  General  John  C.  Brown's  Division 
had  broken  through  the  Fifteenth  Corps.  I  sent  Mercer's  Brigade 
of  the  Second  Division,  and  with  it  sent  Captain  Jonas  of  my  staff. 
(See  his  statement  copied  in  my  address.)  Logan  followed  with 
the  command,  and  it  double-quicked  the  whole  distance  without 
stopping.  As  soon  as  it  got  there  it  found  Lightburn's  Division 
drifted  back,  but  holding  their  line  behind  the  trees,  and  the  enemy 
in  possession  of  DeGresse's  Battery;  and  as  Mercer's  Brigade  went 
in  on  the  front,  Williamson's  Brigade  of  Wood's  Division,  which 
Sherman  had  directed  to  make  a  flank  charge,  was  moving,  and 
they  both  reached  the  works  together.  The  men  of  Mercer's  Bri 
gade  got  hold  of  DoGresse's  guns  (see  report  of  Eighty-first  Illi- 


60  THE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA. 


nois)  and  turned  them  on  the  enemy.  There  has  always  been  a  con 
test  between  these  two  Brigades  as  to  which  got  there  first,  but  that 
does  not  matter,  for  they  got  in  together  and  retook  the  line.  Gen 
eral  J.  C.  Brown,  who  commanded  the  Confederate  Division,  was 
with  me  afterwards  for  many  years  on  the  Texas  and  Pacific  Rail 
way,  and  has  given  me  a  full  account  of  his  attack,  and  the  fury 
with  which  he  was  forced  out  by  this  movement  from  the  flank  by 
Wood  and  the  direct  assault  by  Mercer.  Mercer  in  going  in  had 
his  horse  killed  under  him. 

Fighting  along  the  Fifteenth  Corps  came  late,  and  was  all 
pretty  much  after  the  fighting  on  my  front  was  over,  because  when 
General  Logan  came  to  me  for  aid  I  was  intrenching  the  new  line 
made  by  the  refusal  of  Blair's  left,  and  took  Mercer's  Brigade  right 
out  of  my  front  to  go  with  him.  The  fact  is  I  did  not  happen  to 
have  a  single  man  in  reserve.  Every  man  I  had  on  the  field  was  in 
line  from  the  commencement  of  the  fighting.  Sweeney's  Division 
stood  right  up  in  the  road  it  was  marching  on,  and  the  two  bat 
teries  were  in  the  center  of  his  division;  the  position  was  a  very 
strong  one.  If  I  had  had  plenty  of  time  to  select  a  position  I  could 
not  have  found  a  stronger  one.  It  was  the  first  time  I  ever  saw 
such  execution  done  by  artillery.  They  used  canister  against  those 
columns  with  terrible  effect. 

To  show  you  how  small  a  thing  will  sometimes  change  the 
prospects  in  a  battle,  one  of  Hardee's  Divisions  coming  towards  me 
got  entangled  in  something — at  that  time  I  could  not  tell  what,  but 
on  going  to  the  ground  afterwards  I  found  that  it  was  a  mill-pond — 
that  exposed  the  flank  of  Maney's  Division  that  was  next  to  Walk 
er's.  Seeing  this,  I  rode  down  to  Mercer  and  told  him  to  take  his 
Brigade  and  charge  right  into  it,  which  he  did.  It  was  quite  a 
time  before  I  could  tell  what  the  result  was,  but  I  soon  saw  pris 
oners  coming  back  and  knew  then  that  Mercer  had  them.  He  had 
that  Division  at  a  great  disadvantage,  and  captured  a  great  many 
prisoners  out  of  it  and  several  battle-flags.  See  report  Second 
Brigade,  Second  Division  Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  volume  38,  part  3, 
page  450,  Army  Records.  That  charge,  no  doubt,  saved  my  line, 
because  I  had  a  very  thin  line,  and  with  the  most  of  Hardee's 
Corps  coming  at  me  in  double  column,  as  it  was,  I  have  no  doubt 
that  if  it  had  reached  me  it  would  have  given  me  trouble:  but  they 
never  got  to  me  on  any  of  their  attacks.  We  were  fortunate  enough 


LETTER  TO  GENERAL  RAUM.  (11 

to  break  them  before  the)'  could  reach  the  line,  though  on  Fuller's 
front  they  were  right  up  to  it  when  Walker  fell. 

There  was  a  great  dispute  between  Hood  and  Hardee  about 
this  movement  to  the  rear.,  Hood  claiming  that  Hardee  should  have 
reached  there  early  in  the  morning,  while  Hardee  claimed  he  did 
not  receive  the  order  in  time  to  get  there  before  he  did — a  very  for 
tunate  fact  for  us,  for  if  he  had  reached  the  rear  of  the  Seventeenth 
and  Fifteenth  Corps,  and  Cheatham  and  Stewart  had  attacked  in 
the  front,  it  would  have  been  rough  times  for  the  old  Army  of 
the  Tennessee;  but  no  doubt  they  would  have  come  out  of  it  with 
honor  in  some  way. 

I  think  there  is  no  doubt  about  the  time  McPherson  was  killed 
—it  was  just  about  two  hours  after  the  battle  had  opened.  Of 
course  there  are  all  kinds  of  time  given,  but  the  fact  of  the  stopping 
of  the  watch  of  the  signal  officer,  Sheffly,  when  he  fell  against  the 
tree  at  two  minutes  past  two,  is  almost  conclusive  evidence.  See 
his  statement,  volume  11-13,  page  242,  records  Society  Army  of 
the  Tennessee.  You  can  judge  of  that  yourself,  because  even  before 
McPherson  got  up  to  my  right,  where  he  stood,  as  Strong  says, 
watching  me,  I  had  been  fighting  some  time,  for  he  had  to  ride 
from  near  Sherman's  headquarters  up  there,  a  distance  of  two  to 
three  miles.  If  you  will  read  carefully  the  address  I  am  sending 
you,  and  the  report  Blair  made — also  the  address  of  Strong — I 
think  you  will  come  to  the  same  conclusions  I  give  you.  An  article 
on  the  death  of  General  McPherson,  by  W.  W.  Allen,  of  San  Diego, 
California,  Signal  Officer  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  appeared 
in  an  issue  of  the  National  Tribune  some  time  this  year,  but  of 
what  date  1  do  not  know.  It  goes  to  prove  the  time  and  the  hour 
McPherson  was  killed,  and  the  capture  of  the  skirmish-line  that 
killed  him.  Of  course  a  great  many  of  the  official  reports  are  mis 
leading  as  to  time,  and  it  is  only  by  these  circumstances  that  we  can 
judge  definitely.  1  notice  it  was  12  :20  o'clock,  according  to  Allen, 
when  they  first  heard  the  rattle  of  musketry  and  artillery. 

When  you  have  read  Allen's  article  please  return  it  to  me.  I 
will  be  very  glad  to  give  you  any  further  information  you  may  need 
if  it  is  possible  for  me  to  do  so. 

Truly  and  cordially  yours, 

GENERAL  GREEN  B.  EAUM.  GRENVILLE  M.  DODGE. 

Chicago,  III. 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGNS 
1864  AND  1865 


WRITTEN  IN  1874 

BY  MAJOR-GENERAL  GRENVILLE  M.  DODGE 
AND  READ  TO  THE 

COLORADO  COMMANDERY  OF  THE  LOYAL  LEGION 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  AT  DENVER 

APRIL  21,  1907. 

In  December,  1864,  I  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
Department  of  the  Missouri.  In  January,  1865,  I  received  a  dis 
patch  from  General  Grant  asking  if  a  campaign  on  the  plains  could 
be  made  in  the  winter.  I  answered,  "Yes,  if  the  proper  preparation 
was  made  to  clothe  and  bivouac  the  troops."  A  few  days  after  I 
received  a  dispatch  from  General  Grant  ordering  me  to  Fort  Leaven- 
worth.  In  the  meantime  the  Department  of  Kansas  was  merged 
into  the  Department  of  the  Missouri,  placing  under  my  command 
Missouri,  the  Indian  Territory,  Kansas,  Colorado,  Utah,  Wyoming, 
and  all  the  country  south  of  the  Yellowstone  Eiver,  and  embracing 
all  the  overland  mail-routes  and  telegraph-lines  to  the  Pacific. 

On  reaching  Fort  Leavenworth  I  found  that  General  Curtis, 
the  former  commander  of  that  department,  had  reported  against 
any  campaign  during  the  winter;  that  the  Indians  had  possession 
of  the  entire  country  crossed  by  the  stage-lines,  having  destroyed 
the  telegraph-lines;  and  that  the  people  living  in  Colorado,  Utah, 
California,  Western  Nebraska  and  Western  Kansas  were  without 
mails,  and  in  a  state  of  panic ;  that  the  troops  distributed  along  the 
routes  of  travel  were  inside  their  stockades,  the  Indians  having  in 
nearly  every  fight  defeated  them.  This  success  had  brought  into 
hostility  with  the  United  States  nearly  every  tribe  of  Indians  from 
Texas  on  the  south  to  the  Yellowstone  on  the  north.  It  was  a  for 
midable  combination,  and  the  friendly  Indians  were  daily  leaving 
the  reservations  to  join  their  hostile  brethren.  Two  thousand  In- 

—63— 


64:  THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 

dians  had  destroyed  over  one  hundred  miles  of  telegraph,  and  were 
in  possession  of  the  country  between  the  Arkansas  and  the  North 
Platte  Eivers. 

The  opinion  at  Fort  Leavenworth  before  I  arrived  was  that 
it  was  impossible  to  make  a  successful  campaign  against  these 
Indians  during  the  winter  and  successfully  open  these  lines  of  com 
munication.  There  were  two  Regiments  of  Cavalry  in  Kansas, 
mostly  idle.  There  was  no  communication  with  any  of  the  posts 
except  by  messenger.  A  dispatch  from  Colorado  showed  a  panic 
there,  and  the  people  demanded  that  troops  of  the  Department  be 
stationed  there  to  protect  the  citizens,  instead  of  their  organizing 
and  fighting  the  Indians,  and  that  martial  law  had  been  declared. 

I  saw,  after  spending  a  day  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  that  it  was 
necessary  to  change  the  depressed  feeling  and  temper  existing 
among  the  troops  and  the  citizens  throughout  the  department.  I 
sent  for  Bela  M.  Hughes,  agent  of  the  overland  stages,  and  Edward 
Craighten,  general  manager  and  superintendent  of  the  overland 
telegraph,  and  consulted  fully  with  them.  I  selected  from  my  old 
guides  some  of  the  most  trusted  men,  and  some  of  the  trusted 
Indians  that  I  had  known,  and  sent  by  them  to  each  district  com 
mander  who  could  be  reached,  these  two  short  dispatches : 

1.  What  measures  are  you  taking  to  keep  open  the  route  and  protect 
it?    What  Indians  are  engaged  in  the  struggle?    Where  are  their  villages? 
Do  their  families  travel  with  them?     Have  you  spies  in  their  camps?     What 
action  have  you  taken  to  repair  telegraph-lines?     Give  me  all  particulars. 

2.  Place  every  mounted  man  in  your  command  on  the  South  Platte 
Route.    Repair  telegraphs  ;    attack  any  body  of  Indians  you  meet,  large  or 
small.    Stay  with  them  and  pound  them  until  they  move  north  of  the  Platte 
or  south  of  the  Arkansas.    I  am  coming  with  two  Regiments  of  cavalry  to 
the  Platte  line  and  will  open  and  protect  it,  and  whip  all  the  Indians  in 
the  way. 

I  also  found  that  the  plains  were  covered  with  Indian  traders 
who  had  permits,  under  the  guise  of  which  they  were  stealing  from 
the  Indians,  both  friendly  and  hostile,  and  were  selling  them  arms 
and  ammunition.  I  immediately  revoked  all  these  permits,  and 
ordered  the  arrest  of  all  traders  who  had  in  their  possession  Indian 
or  Government  stock.  I  also  immediately  wired  to  Major  Frank 
North,  who  was  the  interpreter  of  the  Pawnee  Indians,  and  also 
to  the  Chief  of  the  Omaha  Indians,  both  of  whom  had  been  with 
me  on  the  plains,  and  instructed  them  to  select  their  most  trusted 
men  and  send  them  on  the  plains  to  ascertain  for  me  the  purpose 
of  the  hostile  Indians,  and  whether  they  would  head  towards  the 


'I1 1  IK  INDIAN  CAM  I'.MCX.  •'.;> 


settlements,  or  if  their  movem/nts  indicated  they  would  attack 
only  the  lines  of  communication  and  the  trains  crossing  the  plains. 
At  the  same  time  we  stopped  all  trains  on  the  plains  and  ordered 
them  to  the  nearest  military  post,  instructing  the  otlicers  to  arm 
and  organize  them  in  companies,  and  place  a  United  States  ollicer 
over  them,  and  have  them  move  with  the  army  trains. 

Having  perfected  the  preliminary  organization  for  moving 
upon  the  stage-  and  telegraph-lines,  we  saw  it  was  necessary  to 
concentrate  on  one  line.  At  this  time  the  stage-  and  telegraph-lines 
on  the  north  ran  from  Fort  Leavenworth  to  Fort  Kearney,  and 
from  Omaha  to  Fort  Kearney,  where  they  were  consolidated,  run 
ning  up  the  Platte  Valley  to  the  mouth  of  the  Lodge  Pole,  the  stage- 
station  at  that  point  hcing  known  as  Julesburg.  The  lines  here 
separated  again,  the  main  telegraph-line  running  to  old  Fort  Lara- 
mie.  thence  up  the  Sweetwater  through  South  Pass  and  thence  to 
Utah.  The  stage-line  ran  up  the  South  Platte  to  Denver,  then  by 
the  Cache  La  Poudre  to  Laramie  Plains,  over  them  to  Fort  Halleck 
and  Bridger,  and  on  to  Utah.  I  concluded  to  concentrate  all  our 
efforts  to  open  the  line  from  Fort  Leavenworth  and  Omaha  to 
Kearney,  thence  to  Denver  and  on  to  Utah,  known  as  the  South 
Platte  Route. 

The  overland  route  from  Fort  Leavenworth  and  Omaha  cross 
ing  the  continent  had  a  stage-station  about  every  twelve  miles. 
The  troops  along  the  lines  were  posted  at  the  forts  and  stockades 
about  even  hundred  miles,  with  a  few  soldiers  distributed  at  each 
stage-station.  Then  scattered  along  the  road  were  ranches,  and 
relay-  and  feeding-stations  for  the  regular  commercial  and  supply- 
trains  that  were  continually  on  the  road.  The  great  mining-camps, 
and  all  the  inhabitants  of  Colorado,  Utah,  Wyoming,  and  Idaho, 
were  dependent  upon  these  trains  for  their  supplies.  In  winter 
these  trains  were  generally  mule-trains  of  twenty  wagons  each,  and 
during  the  summer  were  generally  ox-trains  of  fifty  to  a  hundred 
wagons  each.  They  were  in  the  habit  of  straggling  along  through 
the  country,  taking  care  of  themselves.  Their  stock  had  to  be  herd 
ed  at  night,  and  it  was  a  great  temptation  to  the  Indians  to  steal, 
and  a  great  deal  of  this  had  been  done,  but  no  actual  fighting  or 
attacking  of  trains  or  troops  occurred  until  the  winter  of  1864-65. 
The  stopping  of  these  trains,  mail,  and  supplies,  and  the  destruction 
of  the  telegraph  wrires,  caused  great  consternation  in  that  country 


Tin;  INDIAN  CAM  I>AK;N. 


and  on  the  Pacific-  Coast,  and  the  demands  upon  the  Government  to 
open  and  maintain  these  lines  were  persistent. 

At  Fort  Leavenworth  there  appeared  to  have  been  no  systematic 
effort  to  reopen  these  lines.  It  seemed  that  the  troops  were  taking 
care  of  the  posts  and  resisting  attacks.  They  did  not  seem  to  appre 
ciate  the  Indian  character;  that  the  only  way  to  strengthen  and 
protect  the  lines  of  communication  was  to  go  for  the  Indians. 
What  troops  had  been  sent  against  the  Indians  were  small  and  weak- 
parties,  and  had  evidently  gone  out  with  the  intention  of  locating 
the  Indians  and  avoiding  them. 

Along  the  south  emigrant  line  from  Kansas  City,  following 
the  Arkansas  River  to  New  Mexico,  was  the  line  of  supplies  for  all 
of  New  Mexico  and  Southern  Colorado.  The  Indians  here  were  in 
possession.  The  travel  and  traffic  along  it  were  not  to  be  compared 
with  that  along  the  northern  lines.  Then  again  the  citizens  of 
Kansas  and  Nebraska  had  settled  along  these  routes  as  far  west  as 
the  100th  Meridian,  obtaining  their  living  from  this  great  traffic, 
and  the  Indians  in  their  raids  had  picked  them  np,  a  family  at  a 
time,  until  they  had  a  great  many  prisoners,  mostly  women  and 
children,  the  men  being  generally  massacred  when  captured. 

I  found  the  Eleventh  Kansas  Cavalry  at  Fort  Rilev,  and  the 
Sixteenth  Kansas  Cavalry  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  and  immediately 
placed  them  en  mute  for  Fort  Kearney.  All  the  posts  were,  unfor 
tunately,  short  of  subsistence,  forage,  and  ammunition.  The  three- 
months'  Regiments  enlisted  in  Colorado  for  the  Indian  service  had 
been  discharged,  their  time  having  expired,  and  there  had  been  no 
troops  sent  to  take  their  places.  My  only  resource  was  to  utilize  the 
Colorado  Militia  until  I  could  send  troops  GOO  miles  to  take  their 
places. 

I  immediately  started  for  Fort  Kearney,  taking  with  me  a 
few  soldiers  in  the  stage  and  one  of  my  staff.  It  was  the  opinion 
of  all  the  officers  at  Fort  Leavenworth  that  it  would  be  impossible 
for  me  1o  make  the  trip,  hut  I  knew  it  required  personal  presence 
among  the  troops  to  bring  about  quick  results.  The  troops  that  1 
had  ordered  to  march  from  Fort  Kiley  refused  1o  march  in  the 
winter.  I  answered  to  place  under  arrest  all  officers  of  the  com 
panies  and  Uegimeiiis  that  refused  to  obey  the  order,  and  have  them 
report  to  Fort  Leavenworth.  intending  to  replace  them  with  vet 
eran  officers  of  ihe  department  whom  I  knew  would  move,  no  matter 
what  the  hardship.  The  next  morning  I  received  a  report  from 


'I'm-;  INDIAN  CAM  PAIGN.  67 


Fort  Riley  that  the  troops  would  move.  The  Regiment  Hint  marched 
from  Fort  Riley  to  Fort  Kearney  lost  thirteen  men  from  free/ing, 
as  the  weather  was  very  severe,  and  while  they  were  properly  clothed, 
tliev  did  not  know  how  to  protect  themselves  from  the  weather. 

On  my  arrival  at  Fort  Kearney  I  immediately  notified  Mr. 
Hughes,  agent  of  the  stage-lines,  that  1  was  prepared  to  protect 
his  stages,  and  called  upon  him  to  replace  his  stock  immediately, 
ready  to  start  out  his  stages.  1  also  notified  Mr.  Craighten,  super 
intendent  of  the  telegraph-lines,  to  replace  his  operators,  for  I  would 
have  his  lines  open  in  a  few  days.  Both  of  these  orders  were  made 
known  to  the  public.  I  also  notified  the  "press"  at  Omaha  and  Fort 
Lcaveinvorth  that  all  trains  which  were  tied  up  on  the  plains  would 
be  moved  to  their  destinations  during  that  month.  We  found  it 
necessary  to  inspire  energy  and  confidence  in  these  three  great 
interests,  as  not  one  of  them  even  thought  we  would  succeed,  and,  in 
fact,  the  "press''  comments  on  our  orders  showed  that  they  had  no 
faith  in  them.  I  found  on  the  line  of  the  Platte  the  Seventh  Iowa 
Cavalry,  and  at  Fort  Laramic  and  on  the  Sweet  water  the  Eleventh 
Ohio  Cavalry. 

When  we  arrived  in  sight  of  Fort  Kearney  the  troops  were 
prepared  to  light  us,  thinking  it  was  a  band  of  Indians.  We  dis 
covered  that  the  troops  were  depressed  from  the  success  of  the 
Indians  and  the  murder  and  mutilation  of  their  comrades,  and 
that  they  hardly  stuck  their  heads  out  of  the  stockade.  Having  had 
experience  with  Indians,  I  called  the  troops  together  and  instructed 
them  how  to  handle  and  to  fight  Indians,  telling  them  that  an  ag 
gressive  war  would  be  made  against  the  Indians,  and  no  matter  how 
large  the  Indian  bands  were,  or  how  small  the  troop,  that  hereafter 
they  must  stand  and  fight;  that  if  they  did  the  Indians  would  run. 
If  they  did  not.  the  Indians  would  catch  and  scalp  them,  and  even 
if  they  had  to  retreat,  they  must  do  so  with  their  faces  to  the  enemy. 

The  Indians,  after  the  Chivington  fight  on  Big  Sandy,  had 
concentrated  upon  the  South  Platte  and  on  the  Sweetwater.  The 
reports  showed  that  they  held  possession  from  Julesburg  to  Valley 
Junction  and  to  Mud  Springs,  and  held  the  telegraph-line  west 
of  Fort  Laramie.  They  had  with  them  2,000  head  of  captured 
stock  and  had  captured  all  the  stage-stations  and  many  trains, 
devastated  the  ranches,  butchered  many  men,  women,  and  children, 
and  destroyed  100  miles  of  telegraph. 


08  THE  IXDIAX  CAMPAIGN. 


To  show  more  plainly  than  I  can  describe  the  condition  of 
the  country,  I  give  the  reports  of  the  three  commanding  officers 
along  the  South  Platte  Route,  in  answer  to  the  dispatches  which 
I  sent  by  messenger  to  all  commanders  the  day  I  arrived  at  Fort 
Leavenworth.  These  answers  met  me  at  Fort  Kearney. 

General  Robert  Mitchell,  who  commanded  the  territory  from 
Omaha  to  Lodge  Pole,  replied  as  follows : 

The  telegraph  from  Lodge  Pole  Creek,  twenty-five  miles  west  to  Jules- 
burg,  on  Laramie  Route,  is  destroyed  for  fifteen  miles.  Poles  cut  down  and 
destroyed  on  the  Denver  line  beyond  Julesburg  for  the  first  fifty  miles.  The 
telegraph  is  destroyed  about  ten  miles  north.  We  are  compelled  to  haul 
poles  from  130  to  140  miles.  Every  means  in  my  power  is  used  to  have  the 
lines  fixed.  All  the  available  troops  I  have  at  my  disposal  are  in  the  vicinity 
of  Julesburg,  except  some  small  garrisons  at  posts  required  to  be  kept  up 
on  the  Denver  route.  My  district  only  extends  to  Julesburg.  I  have  sent 
some  troops,  however,  up  that  route  fifty  miles  since  the  outbreaks  and  find 
everything  destroyed.  We  have  no  communication  with  Denver,  and  have 
not  had  since  the  last  outbreak.  Neither  can  I  communicate  with  Fort 
Laramie  in  consequence  of  the  lines  being  down.  I  have  been  traversing  the 
country  constantly  on  and  adjacent  to  the  mail-  and  telegraph-lines  during 
the  past  four  months,  sending  guards  on  the  stages,  and,  when  deemed  neces 
sary,  mounted  guards  and  patrols  on  all  dangerous  portions  of  the  road 
through  ray  district. 

This  plan  succeeded  until  an  overpowering  force  attacked  Julesburg 
and  drove  the  troops  inside  of  their  works  and  burned  the  stage-  and  tele 
graph-station,  destroying  a  large  amount  of  stores  for  both  companies.  The 
overland  stage  cannot  run  through  until  they  can  provide  for  supplies  for 
stock  from  Julesburg  to  the  Junction,  where  overland  stage  leaves  Denver 
route,  everything  belonging  to  the  stage  company,  citizens  and  government 
being  entirely  destroyed.  The  Indian  villages  are  unknown  to  us.  From  the 
best  information  I  have  I  believe  them  to  be  on  the  Powder  River.  I  know 
certainly  there  is  a  large  village  there.  There  have  been  no  squaws  in  the 
country,  to  my  knowledge,  since  last  fall.  The  tribes  engaged  are  the  Chey- 
ennes,  Arapahoes,  Kiowas,  Brule,  Ogallala  Sioux,  a  portion  of  the  Black- 
feet,  and  a  large  portion  of  what  is  known  as  the  Missouri  River  Sioux, 
the  same  Indians  General  Sully  made  the  campaign  against  last  summer. 
From  3,000  to  5,000  additional  troops  will  be  needed  to  punish  the  Indians. 
One  column  will  never  be  able  to  overtake  them,  unless  they  are  willing  to 
give  battle.  I  think  three  columns  of  men,  1,000  strong  each,  with  ample 
garrison  on  the  overland-mail  and  telegraph  lines,  well  mounted  and  sup 
plied,  can  clear  out  the  country  of  all  hostile  Indians,  if  done  before  grass 
comes.  After  that  time,  in  my  judgment,  it  will  take  twice  that  number 
of  men. 

In  addition  to  the  troubles  west,  I  would  not  be  surprised  any  day 
to  hear  of  an  outbreak  in  the  northern  part  of  my  district.  I  am  informed 
by  Indian  scouts  that  there  is  a  large  encampment  of  Indians  on  the  Run 
ning  Water  that  are  ready  to  engage  in  the  war  against  the  whites.  Among 
them  are  some  of  the  Yanktonais  Sioux. 

Colonel  R.  R.  Livingston  reported  as  follows : 

In  reply  to  your  inquiries  I  would  respectfully  state  that  in  the  early 
part  of  January  last,  indications  of  large  parties  of  Indians  moving  west 
ward  on  Republican  were  reported  by  the  scouts  sent  to  gain  information 
of  their  movements.  On  January  7th  they  had  crossed  South  Fork  of  1'latto 
River,  twenty-three  miles  west  of  this  post,  camped  with  their  families,  form 
ing  a  camp  of  400  lodges,  containing  <iigln  warriors  each,  many  lodges  being 


'I1! IK  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 


thirty  robes  in  si/c.  They  commenced  the  work  of  destruction  along  the 
ro;i<l  west  as  far  as  Junctio.i  Station,  100  miles  from  here.  Their  forces  in 
this  fight  were  not  Jess  than  2.00O.  well  armed  witli  breech-loading  carbines 
and  rifles.  A  desperate  attempt  on  their  part  to  burn  the  overland-stage 
station  near  this  post  was  made  at  this  time,  but  was  frustrated  by  the 
gallantry  of  Captain  N.  J.  O'Brien.  Company  F.  Seventh  Iowa  Cavalry. 
Every  ranch  and  stage-station  from  Junction  Station  to  this  post  is  burned, 
and  the  charred  remains  of  every  inmate  who  failed  to  escape  tells  of  the 
brutality  they  were  subjected  to.  I  telegraphed  lion.  Sam  II.  Klbert.  acting 
Governor  of  Colorado,  early  in  January  of  the  state  oL'  things.  The  troops 
of  Colorado  have  been  withdrawn  from  Valley,  fifty  miles  west  of  here,  I 
surmise,  to  concentrate  around  Denver.  The  telegraph-lines  to  Salt  Lake 
and  the  Denver  branch  lines  are  destroyed  for  a  distance  of  nearly  ten  miles 
on  the  northern  route,  and  in  different;  points  throughout  KM)  miles  along 
the  Denver  route. 

I  have  but  .'>()(>  troops,  but  so  long  as  human  endurance  holds  out  we 
will  work  night  and  day  to  get  the  communication  perfect  with  the  west. 

The  Indians  engaged  in  this  war  are  the  Cheyennes.  Ogallalas,  and 
Brule  Sioux.  They  have  gone  northward  towards  Horse  Creek  and  Fort 
La  ramie.  Their  trail  leads  in  that  direction,  but  they  are  slow  in  marching, 
feeling  audacious  and  indifferent  to  any  effort  from  the  small  body  of  troops 
in  this  district.  I  saw  their  signals  today,  probably  those  of  small  war 
parties,  on  the  North  Platte.  You  will  hear  of  continued  murders  and  rob 
beries  as  long  as  the  road  is  so  poorly  protected  by  troops.  No  spies  can  be 
used  now,  owing  to  numerous  small  war  parties  being  met  everywhere  in 
this  country.  I  predict  that  if  more  troops  are  not  sent  into  this  district 
immediately,  this  road  will  be  stripped  of  every  ranch  and  white  man  on  it. 
Should  these  Indians  swing  around  by  Niobrara  River  and  take  the  Omaha 
road  below  Kearney,  where  settlements  are  numerous,  infinite  mischief  will 
result  to  the  settlers.  What  we  need  are  troops,  supplies  for  them,  and  a 
vigorous  campaign  against  these  hostile  Indians.  They  must  be  put  on  the 
defensive  instead  of  us.  No  difficulty  can  arise  in  finding  them.  Over  2.000 
cattle  accompany  them. 

HEADQUARTERS,   DISTB:CT  COLORADO. 

DENVER,   COLORADO  TERRITORY.   Feb.   2,   1805. 

The  Indians  are  bold  in  the  extreme.  They  have  burned  every  ranch 
between  Julesburg  and  Valley  Station,  and  nearly  all  the  property  at  latter 
place;  driven  off  all  stock,  both  public  and  private.  These  Indians  are  led 
by  white  men.  and  have  complete  control  of  all  the  country  outside  my  dis 
trict,  so  that  I  am  hemmed  in. 

The  weather  has  been  very  severe  here  for  nearly  three  weeks  ;  the 
thermometer  30  degrees  below  zero,  with  quite  a  fall  of  snow  on  the  ground. 
I  have  tried  every  means  in  my  power  to  raise  volunteers  for  three  months' 
State  service,  but  as  yet  have  not  succeeded,  owing  to  the  factional  spirit 
existing  in  the  community. 

The  Legislature  took  the  matter  in  hand  at  my  suggestion,  appropriat 
ing  so  much  money,  Territorial  bonds,  to  give  the  men  a  bounty  and  pur 
chase  horses  to  mount  them  on,  as  I  have  none  ;  but  the  members  cannot 
agree  on  the  spoil  likely  in  their  estimation  to  accrue  from  such  a  proceed 
ing,  so  the  bill  has  not  yet  passed.  I  addressed  the  Speaker  of  the  House 
yesterday,  informing  him  that  unless  something  was  done  within  forty-eight 
hours  I  would  be  compelled,  much  against  my  will,  to  proclaim  martial  law 
and  stop  all  business,  forcing  every  man  to  enter  the  ranks  and  open  the 
line  of  communication.  I  have  now  a  city  organization  of  about  100  men 
organized  into  companies,  so  that  in  case  of  an  attack  here  I  would  have 
something  tangible  to  lay  hold  of  and  make  a  fight.  I  have  had  a  great  deal 
of  trouble  in  this  matter,  as  there  is  no  concert  of  action,  every  man  sus 
pecting  his  fellow  of  some  chicanery. 


Til  I!    I  NDIAN    ('A.Ml'AKiX. 


Fort  Lyon  is  being  rapidly  fortified,  so  that  200  men  can  defend  it 
against  L'.OOO  Indians.  Militia  companies  are  being  organized  all  over  tin- 
settled  parts  of  the  country  I  under  penalty  of  being  pressed  into  service) 
to  defend  the  frontier  settlements  southward,  and  could  I  but  get  a  Keui- 
ment  here  now  I  could  keep  things  in  a  running  trim  until  the  arrival  of 
a  sufficient  force  to  make  a  campaign.  The  Indians  are  now  determined  to 
make  it  a  war  of  extermination,  and  nothing  short  of  5,000  men  can  make 
it  extermination  for  them. 

Major  AVynkoop  informed  me  from  Fort  Lyon  that  many  warriors 
were  on  the  headwaters  of  the  Smoky  Hill  and  intended  attacking  all  the 
settlements  as  well  as  Denver.  Provisions,  owing  to  the  transportation-line 
being  cut  off,  are  at  an  exorbitant  price,  as  well  as  labor  and  forage. 

Cannot  troops  be  sent  out  here  immediately,  or  authority  to  raise 
companies,  which  could  be  easily  done,  for  one  year? 

The  Santa   Fe  line  has   threatened   to  stop   running  on  account  of  the 
Indians.     Should   such   be  the  case,   then   all   is  cut  off. 
Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant. 

THOMAS  MOO.XLIGHT, 
Colonel  J-Jleri'nth  Kansas   Cavalry.   Commanding. 

Colonel   Chivington,  from  Fort  liankin,  reported: 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Collins,  with  200  men  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio,  and 
Company  I).  Seventh  Iowa  Cavalry,  fought  Indians  from  the  4th  to  the 
!>th  inst.,  at  Mud  Springs.  The  Indians  at  one  time  charged  our  forces  in 
the  face  of  artillery  and  were  nearly  successful.  Two  thousand  warriors 
\verc  engaged  in  the  fight.  It  is  supposed  forty  Indians  were  killed.  Beaure's 
avd  Craightcn's  herds  were  driven  off.  The  Indians  crossed  at  Rush  Creek. 
going  north.  The  telegraph  poles  were  gone  and  wires  so  inextricably  tan 
gled  as  to  be  useless.  Seven  hundred  lodges  crossed  Pole  Creek,  six  miles 
below  Pole  Creek  crossing. 

These  Indians  \vere  not  driven  oil'  and  the  telegraph-lines  re 
taken  witl-oiit  severe  lighting  and  loss  of  many  soldiers.  \Viihin  two 
weeks  the  troops  drove  the^e  Indians  north,  where  a  detachment  of 
troops  from  Fort  Laramio  attacked  them  and  drove  them  across 
tl'e  Platle.  Finally  the  Indians  saw  that  a  different  warfare  was 
being  made  against  them,  and  they  lied  to  their  villages  on  the 
Powder  IJiver  and  in  the  Black  Hills  country. 

There  was  sneh  energy  and  such  spirit  displayed  hv  the  troops. 
that  after  two  weeks'  work  they  had  the  telegraph-lines  replaced 
between  Omaha  and  I-enver,  a  distance  of  (500  miles,  and  this  with 
out  any  additional  force  to  aid  them.  The  progress  made  in  putting 
up  tlie  wires  is  shown  by  this  report: 

My  troop  is  at  Moore's  ranch:  passed  there  at  '2  o'clock.  We  ran 
twelve  miles  of  wire  and  set  eight  miles  of  poles,  had  two  severe  fights,  and 
marched  fifty-live  miles  in  fifty-two  hours.  Operators  furnished  valuable 
service.  K  H  Mri!IMIV. 


Captain   Xi'rcnth    Iowa  Cavalry. 

The   thermometers   all    this   time   were   from    5   to   10   degrees 
below    zero.     On    February    loth    telegraphic    communication    was 


I!    I  NDIAN    (  '\  A I  I'AKiN.  71 


through  to  ( 'ali forma,  and  Mr.  Cniighten  notified  the 
Government  of  the  fact. 

An  inquiry  made  of  ( 'raighten  by  General  Grant,  as  to  wliere 
I  was  located  (Craighten  being  a  personal  friend  of  mine  who  was 
most  skeptical  at  the  start  of  my  accomplishing  anything  with  the 
material  I  had,  was  overjoyed  at  our  success),  was  answered,  "No 
body  knows  wliere  he  is,  but  everybody  knows  where  he  has  been/' 

From  the  ~>th  to  the  13th  of  February  every  mounted  man  on 
that  line  was  in  the  saddle,  cither  assisting  the  operators  or  chasing 
real  or  imaginary  Indians.  'The  moment  a  scout  came  in,  instruc 
tions  were  given  to  the  officers  to  send  them  out  and  not  allow 
any  mounted  troops  in  the  stockade  until  the  lines  were  opened 
and  the  Indians  driven  at  least  100  miles  away  from  the  line  of 
telegraph,  and  the  only  dashes  the  Indians  made  after  we  got  fairly 
at  them  was  to  cut  off!  a  part  of  an  unguarded  train,  and  at  un 
guarded  ranches,  and  at  those,  stage-stations  where  only  a  few 
soldiers  were  located;  but  in  every  attack  the  soldiers  stood  their 
ground  and  fought,  and  when  driven  they  only  backed  far  enough 
to  get  a  secure  place.  The  troops  knew  better  than  to  go  back  to  the 
fortified  posts,  as  they  had  instructions  to  keep  to  the  hills,  but  in 
nearly  every  case  they  were  successful,  and  the  daring  that  some  of 
the  troops  showed  in  these  fights  was  remarkable. 

Great  atrocities  were  committed  by  the  Indians,  scalping  the 
men  alive  and  abusing  the  women.  This  caused  the  troops  to  stand 
and  tight,  preferring  to  die  rather  than  to  fall  into  their  hands. 
Wherever  a  light  was  successfully  made,  no  matter  whether  com 
missioned  or  non-commissioned  officers  commanded,  I  telegraphed 
him  in  person  thanking  him,  and  to  the  commanding  officer  of  his 
Hegiment.  requesting  that  he  be  given  the  first  promotion,  and  wrote 
to  the  Governor  of  his  State. 

As  soon  as  this  stage-line  was  opened  we  concentrated  about 
.")00  mounted  men,  intending  to  catch  the  Indians  before  they  left 
the  N'orth  Platte;  but  the  Indians  fled  as  soon  as  they  heard  of  this, 
and  did  not  stop  until  they  reached  Powder  "River,  too  far  north  for 
us  in  follow  until  arrangements  were  made  for  supplies  for  troops 
and  stock,  as  everything  had  to  be  teamed  from  Fort  Leavenworth. 

The  storms  during  March  were  very  severe.  Snow  lav  two  feet 
on  the  level  and  was  crusted  so  hard  that  for  weeks  if  was  almost 
impossible  to  force  animals  through  it.  A.s  soon  as  we  heard  from 
my  scouts  of  the  departure  of  the  Indians  and  found  they  had  no 


Tin-:  INDIAN  CAM  I>AK;N. 


intention  of  molesting  the  citizens  of  Nebraska,  and  had  placed 
themselves  on  Powder  River  too  far  north  to  return  until  the  return 
of  the  grass  in  May,  I  distributed  the  troops  along  the  stage-  and 
telegraph-lines  to  Salt  Lake,  and  returned  to  open  the  South  Route 
to  New  Mexico. 

My  experience  on  the  North  Route,  \vitli  the  reports  from  the 
troops  and  from  my  Indians,  soon  satisfied  me  that  every  Indian 
tribe  of  any  importance  from  the  British  Possessions  in  the  north 
to  the  Red  River  in  the  south,  were  preparing  to  engage  in  open 
hostilities.  These  tribes  often  pretended  to  be  friendly,  deceiving 
the  Government  and  the  Indian  agent,  a  crafty  trick  that  was 
impossible  to  make  the  Government  understand.  For  instance,  they 
would  go  to  the  Indian  agent  for  provisions,  and  would  make  him 
believe  that  they  were  for  peace,  and  would  promise  to  bring  to 
the  agency  their  tribe.  Probably  by  the  time  the  report  of  the  Indian 
agent  reached  the  Government,  this  same  tribe  would  be  off  on  the 
warpath  and  have  captured  a  train  or  murdered  some  settlers,  and 
the  troops  in  return  had  attacked  and  destroyed  them,  and  we  were 
called  to  account  for  it,  as  it  was  claimed  by  the  agents  we  were 
attacking  peaceable  Indians.  This  went  so  far  that  it  prevented 
me  from  opening  the  southern  emigrant  trail  several  weeks.  Finally 
I  took  the  matter  in  my  own  hands,  regardless  of  the  action  or 
report  of  the  agents. 

While  these  parleys  were  going  on  the  Indians  suddenly  ap 
peared  all  along  the  southern  emigrant  trail  in  the  Arkansas  River 
Valley,  attacking  trains,  posts,  and  escorts.  I  threw  my  troops 
against  the  bands  of  Southern  Arapahoes,  Cheyennes,  Comanches, 
and  Kiowas  that  were  in  the  vicinity  of  the  trail.  The  troops  had 
caught  on  to  the  severe  fighting  on  the  Platte,  had  heard  of  the 
new  methods  of  warfare  and  victories,  and  they  in  all  cases  stood 
their  ground  and  defeated  the  Indians,  although  they  suffered 
severely  in  some  instances.  This  was  a  reception  that  the  Indians 
did  not  expect  and  they  fled  to  the  Wichita  Mountains,  suing  for 
peace,  which  I  knew  was  simply  to  prevent  us  attacking  them  there, 
but  accomplished  its  purpose  with  the  Government  and  finally 
brought  about  the  treaties  that  were  not  worth  the  paper  they  were 
written  on,  and  later  on  forced  the  campaigns  that  Sheridan  after 
wards  made,  while  if  we  had  been  allowed  to  have  followed  them 
up  and  punish  them  as  we  did  the  northern  tribes,  we  would  have 
conquered  a  peace  that  would  have  been  a  lasting  one. 


'I'm-:  INDIAN  (  'AM  PAIGN. 


The  Indians  of  the  plains  an-  the  best  skirmishers  in  the  world. 
In  rapidity  of  movements,  in  perfect  horsemanship,  sudden  whirl 
ing,  protecting  the  body  by  clinging  to  the  side  of  the  horse,  and 
rapid  movements  in  open  and  difficult  ground,  no  trained  cavalry 
in  the  world  can  equal  them.  On  foot  their  ability  to  hide  behind 
any  obstruction,  in  ravine,  along  creeks,  and  under  creek  and  river 
banks,  and  in  fighting  in  the  open  plains  or  level  ground,  the 
faculty  to  disappear  is  beyond  one's  belief  except  he  has  experienced 
it.  In  skulking  and  snapshooting  they  are  adepts,  but  troops  prop 
erly  instructed  are  a  match  for  them  on  foot,  and  never  fail  to 
drive  and  route  them,  if  they  will  stand  and  fight  and  never  re 
treat  except  slowly  with  their  faces  to  them.  I  have  seen 
several  times,  when  caught  in  a  tight  place,  bands  of  Indians 
held  by  a  few  men  by  holding  to  ridges  and  slowly  retreating,  always 
using  our  rifles  at  every  opportunity  when  an  Indian  was  in  range, 
never  wasting  a  shot  on  them  unless  there  was  a  probability  of 
hitting  them.  The  Indians  have  a  mortal  fear  of  such  tactics. 

In  a  fight  the  Indians  will  select  the  positions  and  pick  out 
quickly  any  vantage  ground,  and  sometimes  as  high  as  200  will 
concentrate  at  such  a  point  where  we  could  not  concentrate  twenty 
men  without  exposing  them,  and  from  this  vantage  ground  they 
will  pour  a  deadly  fire  on  the  troops,  and  we  cannot  see  an  Indian- 
only  puffs  of  smoke.  By  such  tactics  as  this  they  harass  and  defeat 
our  troops.  Many  a  fight  occurred  between  Indians  and  soldiers 
both  watching  the  smoke  to  show  each  other's  position.  You  can 
watch  this  kind  of  a  fight  and  never  see  a  person  unless  some  one 
is  hit  and  exposes  himself,  when  it  is  nearly  always  a  sure  death. 
The  Indian  character  is  such  that  he  will  not  stand  continual  fol 
lowing,  pounding,  and  attacking.  Their  life  and  methods  are  not 
accustomed  to  it,  and  the  Indians  can  be  driven  by  very  inferior 
forces  by  continually  watching,  attacking,  and  following.  None 
of  our  campaigns  have  been  successful  that  have  not  been  prepared 
to  follow  the  Indians  day  and  night,  attacking  them  at  every  oppor- 
t unity  until  they  are  worn  out,  disbanded,  or  forced  to  surrender, 
which  is  the  sure  result  of  such  a  campaign. 

The  Indians  during  the  months  they  had  been  hostile,  and 
especially  in  their  attacks  on  the  stage-stations  and  ranches,  had 
captured  a  large  number  of  men,  women,  and  children.  These 
prisoners  had  made  known  to  the  troops,  by  dropping  notes  along 
the  trail  and  through  the  reports  of  friendly  Indians,  their  terrible 


THK  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 


condition  and  the  usage  thai   was  being  made  of  them.    Their  ap 
peals  to  us  to   rescue  them  were  pitiful. 

I' knew  the  prisoners  would  be  sent  far  north  to  the  villages, 
and  their  winter  quarters  out  of  our  reach;  that  these  villages  were 
mi  protected  because  every  brave  and  dog-soldier  had  his  warpaint 
on  and  was  joining  the  hostile  forces  attacking  along  our  lines, 
which  were  increasing  every  day.  I  also  knew  it  would  be  impossible 
for  any  of  our  troops  to  reach  them  or  to  rescue  them  by  following 
them,  and  as  soon  as  1  arrived  at  Fort  Kearney  I  asked  authority 
of  tl-e  Government  to  enlist  and  muster  into  service  two  companies 
of  Pawnee  Indians,  to  be  under  the  command  of  their  old  inter 
preter.  Major  North,  who  I  knew  to  be  a  brave,  level-headed  leader. 
This  authority  was  immediately  given  me,  and  Major  Xorth  was 
given  confidential  instructions  to  proceed  to  the  Sioux  country, 
apparently  on  scout  duty,  but  to  watch  his  opportunity  and  rescue 
these  prisoners,  while  their  braves  were  down  fighting  us.  He 
started,  but  storms  of  snow  came  down  so  heavy  that  his  ponies 
could  get  nothing  to  eat,  and  during  the  latter  part  of  February 
and  all  of  March  these  storms  were  continuous,  the  snow  falling 
to  the  depth  of  two  feet  over  the  entire  plains.  Major  Xorth  was 
compelled  to  seek  shelter  in  the  river  bottoms,  and  browsed  his 
stock  on  cottonwood  limbs  to  save  them.  In  the  campaign  of  the 
summer  and  winter  of  lS(;r>  and  18(>(J  Major  Xorth.  with  his  two 
enlisted  companies,  to  which  J  added  two  more,  made  some  won 
derful  marches,  scouts,  battles,  and  captures,  and  during  that 
campaign  we  recaptured  and  had  surrendered  to  us  many  of  these 
women  and  children  prisoners. 

After  the  war  Major  Xorth  became  manager  of  the  Indians 
in  Buffalo  Bill's  Wild  West  Show,  and  died  in  that  service.  He  was 
a  noted  man  on  the  plains.  My  acquaintance  with  him  commenced 
in  lS.r)(),  and  together  we  had  seen  and  endured  many  hardships. 
It  was  seldom  one  met  his  equal  in  any  of  the  different  phases  of 
plains  life.  Although  he  had  led  an  eventful  career,  still  I  never 
heard  him  refer  to  what  he  had  done  or  accomplished,  or  the  part 
he  had  taken  in  battles,  and  probably  no  man  was  ever  more  wor 
shiped  than  he  was  bv  the  two  tribes  of  Pawnee  Indians;  and  his 
death  was  virtual!;  their  destruction,  for  during  his  life  anionir 
them  he  held  them  under  good  discipline  and  kept  them  away  from 
vice,  diseases,  and  war. 


Till;    I  MHAN    ('AMI'AKiX. 


A  great  many  amusing  reports  came  to  me  from  mv  scouts  and 
the  captured  Indians.  When  on  the  plains  in  the  50's  I  was  known 
among  the  Indians  by  the  name,  in  tlieir  language,  thai  signified 
"Long  Lye."  "Sharp  Lye,"  and  "Hawk  Eye."  'Phis  came  from 
the  fact  that  when  I  first  went  among  them  it  was  as  an  engineer 
making  surveys  through  their  country.  With  my  engineering  in 
struments  I  could  set  a  head-flag  two  or  three  miles  away,  eyen 
further  than  an  Indian  could  see,  and  it  is  their  custom  to  giye  a 
practical  name  to  everything.  Of  course  I  was  not  many  da\s  on 
the  plains  until  it  reached  the  Indians  that  "Long  Eye"  was  there, 
and  in  every  fight  that  occurred  they  had  me  present.  They  said 
I  could  shoot  as  far  as  I  could  see.  The  scouts  said  the  Indian 
chiefs  laid  their  defeats  to  that  fact.  Then  again  they  were  very 
superstitious  about  my  power  in  other  matters.  When  the  overland 
telegraph  was  built  they  were  taught  to  respect  it  and  not  destroy  it. 
They  were  made  to  believe  that  it  was  a  Great  Medicine.  This  was 
done  after  the  line  was  opened  to  Fort  Laramie  by  stationing  several 
of  tlieir  most  intelligent  chiefs  at  Lorf  Laramie  and  others  at  Fort 
Kearney,  the  two  posts  being  ;]()()  miles  apart,  and  then  having 
them  talk  to  eacli  other  over  the  wire  and  note  the  time  sent  and 
received.  Then  we  had  them  mount  their  fleetest  horses  and  ride 
as  fast  as  they  could  until  they  met  at  Old  JulcV  ranch,  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Lodge  Pole,  this  being  about  half  wa\  between  Kear 
ney  and  Laramie.  Of  course  this  was  astonishing  and  mysterious  to 
the  Indians.  Thereafter  you  could  often  see  Indians  with  their  heads 
against  the  telegraph  poles,  listening  to  the  peculiar  sound  the 
wind  makes  as  if  runs  along  the  wires  and  through  the  insuhtors. 
It  is  a  soughing,  singing  sound.  They  thought  and  said  it  was 
"I>ig  Medicine"  talking.  I  never  could  convince  them  that  I  could 
not  go  to  the  telegraph  poles  the  same  as  they  did  and  tell  them 
what  was  said,  or  send  a  message  for  them  to  some  chief  far  away. 
as  they  bad  often  seen  me  use  my  traveling-instrument  and  cut  into 
the  line,  sending  and  receiving  messages.  Then  again,  most  of  the 
noted  scouts  of  the  plains  who  had  married  into  the  dill'crent  tribes 
had  been  guides  for  me.  and  many  of  these  men  were  half-breeds, 
and  were  with  these  hostile  Indians.  "Some  of  them  took  part  with 
them,  but  more  of  them  had  tried  to  pacify  and  bring  them  to 
terms,  and  they  gave  me  information  about  those  who  were  not 
1'ii^au'ed  in  the  depredations. 


?(>  THE  INDIAX  CAMPAKSX. 

1  was  supposed  to  be,  by  the  Indians  of  the  plains,  a  person 
of  great  power  and  great  moment.  These  lialf-breeds  worked  upon 
their  superstitions,  endeavoring  to  convince  them  it  was  useless  to 
fight  "Long  Eye."  No  doubt  my  appearing  on  the  plains  the  time 
I  did,  and  the  fact  that  from  the  time  I  appeared  until  the  time 
I  left,  the  troops  had  nothing  but  success,  carried  great  weight  with 
them,  and  seemed  to  confirm  what  the  old  voyageurs  and  guides 
told  them,  and  had  much  influence  in  causing  their  abandonment 
of  the  Platte  country  and  returning  to  their  villages. 

My  own  experience  on  the  plains  led  me  to  be  just  as  watch 
ful  and  just  as  vigilant  when  I  knew  the  Indians  were  not  near 
me  as  I  was  when  they  were  in  sight.  In  all  my  travels  I  never 
allowed  them  to  camp  near  or  occupy  my  camps  even  in  the  time  of 
peace,  when  they  were  friendly,  and  I  never  allowed  myself  to 
knowingly  do  them  an  injustice,  making  it  a  point  never  to 
lie  to  them  in  any  of  my  councils  and  treaties,  or  never 
allow,  if  I  knew  it,  the  interpreter  to  deceive  them.  That 
brought  me  respect  in  all  my  dealings  with  them,  and  I  treated 
them  with  respect,  courtesy,  and  consideration,  and  demanded  the 
same  from  them.  This,  no  doubt,  was  one  of  the  principal  reasons 
that  in  fifteen  years,  more  or  less,  of  intercourse  with  them,  trav 
eling  through  their  country  both  during  the  times  they  were  hostile 
and  at  peace,  that  I  escaped  many  of  the  misfortunes  that  befell 
others. 

Although  this  short  campaign  was  not  remarkable  for  great 
battles  or  large  loss  by  killed  and  wounded,  still  it  required  great 
fortitude  from  the  troops,  and  often  great  personal  courage,  and 
its  success  wras  of  great  moment  to  the  Government  and  to  the 
people  of  the  plains  and  the  Pacific  Coast,  for  over  these  three 
great  overland  routes  were  carried  the  mails,  telegrams,  and  traffic 
during  the  entire  war  of  the  rebellion,  which  did  much  to  hold 
these  people  loyal  to  our  Government.  A  long  stoppage  was  a 
destruction  to  business,  and  would  bring  starvation  and  untold 
misery;  and  when,  with  only  thirteen  days  and  nights  of  untiring 
energy  on  the  part  of  the  troops  in  a  winter  of  unheard-of  severity, 
California,  Utah  and  Colorado  were  put  in  communication  with 
the  rest  of  the  world,  there  was  great  rejoicing.  In  seventeen  days 
the  stages  were  started  and  overland  travel  was  again  safe,  after 
being  interrupted  for  two  months,  and  bv  March  1st  the  commercial 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  77 

trains  were  all  en  route  to  their  destinations  and  1  had  returned  to 
my  duties  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Department,  in  St.  Louis. 

It  was  with  no  little  satisfaction  that  I  answered  a  personal 
letter  General  Grant  had  written  inc.  when  lie  assigned  me  to  this 
duty,  and  which  I  found  awaiting  me  on  my  return  to  Fort  Leaven- 
worth.  In  his  letter  he  outlined  what  it  was  necessary  to  do  and 
why  lie  had  asked  me  to  take  the  field.  He  judged  rightly  of  the 
condition  of  affairs  and  the  necessity  of  immediate  action.  I  wrote 
him  how  promptly  the  troops  responded  to  my  call.  They  had 
opened  the  overland  routes;  they  had  made  them  secure  and  were 
then  guarding  them,  and  they  would  be  kept  open.  But  after  grass 
came,  unless  these  hostile  Indians  were  thoroughly  chastised,  they 
would  certainly  and  successfully  attack  them  and  prevent  safe 
travel  overland,  and  from  my  letter  the  order  soon  came  for  me  to 
prepare  for  the  extensive  campaign  of  the  next  summer  and  winter 
that  followed  these  Indians  to  the  Yellowstone  on  the  north  and  the 
Cimarron  on  the  south,  and  conquered  a  peace  with  every  hostile 
tribe. 


JAMES  HHIDGEli 

Chief  Guide  to  Indian  Cninpai.un.  1X<  ; 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGNS 
1865  AND  1866 

.During  the-  Indian  campaigns  of  the  winter  and  spring  of 
1864-65,  against  the  Indians  that  were  holding  all  the  overland 
roads,  stations,  telegraph  and  emigrant  routes  over  the  plains,  my 
command  reopened  them  in  a  short  campaign  of  sixty  days  in  which 
many  fights  occurred  in  which  the  troops  were  uniformly  successful. 
The  telegraph-lines  were  rebuilt,  the  stages  re-established,  the  mails 
transported  regularly,  and  protection  given.  Although  we  were  able 
to  drive  the  Indians  off  of  all  of  these  routes  and  open  them  suc 
cessfully  and  hold  them  open,  my  experience  convinced  me  that 
as. soon  as  grass  started  on  the  plains  these  Indians  would  again 
come  down  on  the  routes,  and  that  the  only  possible  way  of  set 
tling  the  Indian  question  was  to  make  a  well-planned  and  continu 
ous  campaign  against  them  on  the  Arkansas,  the  Smoky  Hill,  the 
Republican,  and  the  North  and  South  Platte  Valley  routes,  and  to 
keep  them  off  the  traveled  roads.  To  do  this  we  would  be  obliged 
to  get  our  troops  into  their  country  as  soon  as  possible  and  go  for 
their  villages. 

In  my  report  to  the  Government,  in  April,  1865,  I  set  forth 
the  necessity  for  this  and  outlined  the  plans.  TTpon  the  receipt  of 
that  report  I  received  authority  from  General  Grant  and  General 
Pope  to  go  forward  and  carry  out  the  plans  that  I  had  suggested. 
This  plan  contemplated  placing  upon  the  plains  about  5,000  men 
to  protect  the  stations  and  telegraph-lines,  furnish  escort  to  emi 
grants  and  Government  trains  of  supplies  that  wore  necessary  to 
supply  the  wants  of  that  vast  country  with  provisions  and  outfit 
live  movable  columns  of  soldiers,  a  total  of  (i, (><)()  or  7,000  men. 
Contracts  were  immediately  made  for  the  supplies  for  this  number 
of  men;  for  horses  for  the  cavalry,  and  for  (he  supplying  of  the 
posts  on  the  plains  with  a  surplus  at  each,  so  that  if  the  campaign 
extended  into  the  winter  it  would  not  have  to  stop  for  want  of  provi 
sions.  The  campaign  in  the  spring  had  to  he  made  on  supplies 
moved  there  in  the  middle  of  winter,  at  great  cost  and 

—79— 


80  THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 

The  Quartermaster  and  Commissary  at  Fort  Leavenworth  made 
contracts  for  supplies  to  be  delivered  in  June,  and  General  Grant 
sent  to  Fort  Leavenworth  something  like  10,000  troops,  very  few 
of  whom  got  into  the  campaigns  from  the  fact  that  the  troops 
would  no  sooner  reach  Fort  Leavonworth  than  they  would  protest, 
claiming  that  the  Civil  War  was  ended  and  saying  they  had  not 
enlisted  to  fight  Indians.  The  Governors  of  their  States,  Congress 
men,  and  other  influential  men,  would  bring  such  pressure  to 
bear  that  the  War  Department  would  order  them  mustered  out. 
While  the  Government  was  at  great  expense  in  moving  these  troops 
to  the  plains,  some  even  reaching  as  far  as  Julesburg,  we  never 
got  any  service  from  them ;  they  were  a  great  detriment,  and  caused 
much  delay  in  our  plans,  so  that  the  overland  routes  had  to  be 
protected  by  about  one-half  of  the  troops  that  it  was  at  first  thought 
necessary  to  accomplish  the  work.  Three  Regiments  of  infantry, 
eleven  Regiments  of  cavalry,  and  three  Batteries  of  artillery,  that 
reported  to  me  under  the  order  of  General  Grant,  were  mustered  out 
on  the  march  between  Fort  Leavenworth  and  Julesburg. 

There  was  enlisted  for  the  Indian  campaign,  five  Regiments 
of  United  States  volunteers,  recruited  from  the  rebel  prisoners, 
who,  desiring  to  be  at  liberty,  were  willing  to  enlist  under  the 
United  States  flag  to  fight  Indians,  and  these  five  Regiments  had 
to  be  depended  upon  mostly  for  taking  care  of  all  the  country  west 
of  the  Lakes, — the  overland  routes  on  the  plains,  to  man  the  posts 
on  the  upper  Missouri  and  Mississippi  Rivers,  and  for  escorts  for 
surveying  parties,  etc.  So  when  I  was  ready  to  move  all  live  col 
umns  I  had  less  than  7,000  officers  and  men  in  my  department. 
The  Indians  commenced  their  depredations  on  all  the  routes  in 
April,  especially  on  the  Arkansas  route,  where  we  had  to  contend 
with  the  South  Cheyennes,  Comanches,  Apaches,  Kiowas.  and  Arap- 
ahoe  tribes.  This  district  was  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Ford,  a  very  efficient  officer,  and  it  was  planned  that  lie  should 
make  a  campaign  in  May  and  June  into  the  Indian  country,  cross 
ing  the  Arkansas  and  moving  south  for  their  villages,  which  we 
knew  were  situated  in  the  Wichita  Mountains.  General  Ford  had 
a  compact  veteran  command,  and  fought  one  or  two  battles  before 
crossing  the  Arkansas.  Just  about  the  time  he  was  ready  to  cross 
the  Arkansas  the  Government  sent  west  a  peace  commission  com 
posed  of  Senator  Doolittle,  General  Alex  McD.  McCook,  and  others. 
The  Indian  agent  for  these  tribes  was  Colonel  J.  H.  Leavenworth. 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  si 


They  no  sooner  reached  the  Indian  country  than  they  protested 
against  the  movement  of  any  troops  into  the  territory  south  of 
the  Arkansas  Eiver.  In  fact,  General  McCook  issued  an  order, 
using  General  Pope's  name  as  authority,  stopping  General  Ford's 
movement,  lie  had  no  authority  to  do  this,  but  General  Ford 
obeyed,  as  the  information  came  to  him  that  these  chiefs  were 
assembling  at  the  mouth  of  the  Little  Arkansas  to  make  peace. 
After  parleying  with  the  Indians,  the  commission  accomplished 
nothing,  and  the  Indians  all  the  time  were  committing  their  depre 
dations  on  the  emigrant  trains  that  were  passing  up  the  Arkansas 
Valley  to  Xew  Mexico  and  Colorado.  All  the  protests  and  appeals 
of  General  Pope,  General  Ford  and  myself  to  the  Government  in 
relation  to  this  matter  seemed  to  have  no  effect.  These  Indians 
had  murdered  the  settlers,  wiped  out  their  ranches,  and  stolen  their 
property  and  their  stock,  and  our  scouts  who  went  among  them 
saw  their  captures  in  plenty.  As  soon  as  we  would  start  out  to 
punish  them,  even  those  that  had  crossed  north  of  the  Arkansas 
River,  protests  were  sent  to  Washington  and  came  back  to  us,  so 
that  we  virtually  accomplished  nothing.  The  condition  of  matters 
became  so  complicated  that  on  June  6,  1865,  I  stated  my  views  of 
the  question  to  Major-General  John  Pope,  commanding  the  Mil 
itary  Division  of  the  Missouri,  as  follows: 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. 

PORT  LEAVENWORTH,  June  6,  1865. 

Mdjor-dcncral  John  Pope,  Commanding  Military  Division  of  the  Missouri: 
GENERAL  :  You  have  been  notified  of  the  action  of  Major-General 
McCook,  under  the  orders  of  the  Congressional  Committee,  in  stopping  the 
expedition  of  General  Ford  south  of  the  Arkansas,  that  they  might  confer, 
and,  if  possible,  make  peace  with  the  Arapahoes,  Cheyennes,  Comanches, 
Kiowas,  etc.  Colonel  Leavenworth  started  south  a  week  ago  to  bring  the 
chiefs  up  to  the  mouth  of  Cow  Creek,  and  while  wo  aro  ondoavnring  to  make 
terms  with  them,  their  warriors  are  strung  along  the  route  from  Zarah  to 
Lyon,  dashing  in  on  any  train  that  they  find  off  its  guard.  They  are  in 
parties  of  from  fifteen  to  fifty,  and  hide  in  the  valleys  and  ravines.  These 
Indians  now  have  their  villages  at  Fort  Cobb,  and  have  driven  out  all 
friendly  Indians  and  traders,  declaring  that  they  mean  war  and  nothing 
else.  They  are  composed  of  one  baud  of  Arapahoes,  led  by  Little  Rover  : 
one  small  band  of  Cheyennes,  three  bands  of  Apaches,  a  large  body  of 
Comanches,  also  the  Southern  Comanches,  and  all  the  Kiowas,  and  they 
have  no  respect  for  our  authority  or  power,  and  I  have  no  faith  in  any 
peace  made  by  them  until  they  are  made  to  feel  our  strength.  I  do  not 
believe  it  will  be  a  month  before  wo  hoar  of  large  trains  being  captured  or 
attacked  by  them  in  force.  They  notified  Jesus,  the  Mexican  trader  sent 
in  by  General  Carleton,  to  leave,  and  it  is  said  they  murdered  Major  Mor 
rison,  a  trader  permitted  to  go  in  by  General  Carleton.  It  appeared  to  me 
bad  policy  to  give  permits  to  any  of  the  traders  to  go  among  them  to  trade. 
Not  one  of  them  will  act  as  guide  to  take  a  force  toward  them. 


'I'm-:  INDIAN  (IAMI'.U<;N. 


Colonel  Leavenwortl)  satisfied  Ilie  committee,  and  I  think  General 
McCook  also,  that  the  Comanches  and  others  had  not  committed  any  depre 
dations.  There  is  not  an  officer  or  trader  who  has  been  on  the  plains  but 
knows  they  have  been  in  all  or  nearly  all  the  outrages  committed.  I  desire 
very  much  to  have  peace  with  the  Indians,  but  I  do  think  we  should  punish 
them  for  what  they  have  done,  and  that  they  should  feel  our  power  and 
have  respect  for  us.  My  plan  to  reach  them  is  to  start  in  three  columns  for 
Fort  Cobb ;  viz..  First,  by  Major  Merrill's  route ;  second,  by  Captain 
Booner's  route  ;  third,  from  the  mouth  of  Mulberry  Creek,  on  the  Arkansas. 
Make  the  parties  about  400  or  500  strong,  and  march  direct  for  their  vil 
lages.  This  will  draw  every  warrior  after  us  and  leave  the  Santa  Fe  route 
free.  When  we  get  down  there  if  the  Indians  are  so  anxious  for  peace,  they 
will  have  an  opportunity  to  show  it,  and  we  can  make  an  agreement  with 
them  that  will  stop  hostilities  until  the  properly  authorized  authorities 
conclude  a  lasting  peace.  I  have  attempted  to  get  these  expeditions  off 
twice.  The  first  time  they  were  stopped  by  General  Halleck,  on  Colonel 
Leavenworth's  representations.  He  started  to  make  peace ;  the  Indians 
stole  all  his  stock,  and  very  nearly  got  his  scalp.  He  came  back  for  fight 
and  wished  to  whip  them,  but  has  now  changed  again,  and  it  is  possible 
he  may  get  the  chiefs  together,  but  I  very  much  doubt  it;  and,  even  if  he 
does,  they  will  only  represent  a  portion  of  each  tribe.  I  have  concluded,  by 
representations  of  the  Congressional  Committee  made  to  General  Ford,  to 
wait  and  see  the  effects  of  Colonel  Leavenworth's  mission.  I  will  have  my 
troops  at  the  designated  points.  If  he  should  fail  I  will  go  forward  and 
make  the  campaign  as  originally  ordered.  I  desire  to  add  that  there  is  not 
a  leading  officer  on  the  plains  who  has  had  any  experience  with  Indians 
who  has  faith  in  peace  made  with  any  of  these  Indians  unless  they  are 
punished  for  the  murders,  robberies  and  outrages  they  have  committed  for 
over  a  year ;  and  unless  we  have  a  settled  policy,  either  fight  and  allow 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  department  to  dictate  terms  of  peace  to  them, 
or  else  it  be  decided  that  we  are  not  to  fight,  but  make  some  kind  of  peace 
at  all  hazards,  we  will  squander  the  summer  without  result.  Indians  will 
rob  and  murder,  and  some  Indian  agents  will  defend  them,  and  when  fall 
comes  I  will  be  held  responsible  for  not  having  protected  the  route  or  pun 
ished  them  for  what  they  may  have  done.  It  must  be  evident  to  the  Gov 
ernment  that  I  cannot  be  making  war  on  the  Indians  while  other  parties 
are  at  the  same  time  making  peace,  as  has  been  the  case  so  far.  Whatever 
may  be  the  desire  of  the  Government.  I  will  lend  all  my  energies  to  carry 
it  out  and  make  every  officer  and  man  under  me  do  the  same.  I  cannot 
approve  the  manner  in  which  the  Indians  have  been  treated,  and  have  no 
faith  in  them,  nor  will  I  allow  such  treatment  as  shown  at  the  Big  Sandy 
fight.  If  peace  is  concluded  I  trust  that  their  reservations  may  be  made 
at  safe  distances  from  overland  routes  so  far  as  possible,  and  that  they  be 
made  to  keep  away  from  them. 

I    am,    very    respectfully,    your    obedient    servant, 

G.  M.  DODGE. 

Major-General. 

The  Government,  after  receiving  General  Pope's  and  my  own 
views,  si'iit  out  Inspector-General  D.  B.  Sackett.  of  the  "Regular 
Army,  to  investigate  the  conditions  in  that  country  and  to  report 
to  the  Government  the  actual  facts.  In  the  meantime  the  peace 
commission  that  had  been  endeavoring  to  negotiate  with  these 
Indians  had  gone  on  to  Denver,  still  protesting  against  any  move 
ment  against  the  Indians,  believing  that  peace  could  be  brought 
about.  General  Sackett,  upon  reaching  the  Indian  country,  sent 


TIM-:  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  83 

the  following  dispatch,  on  June  14,  1865,  to  the  commanding  officer 
at  Fort  Larned,  Kas. : 

For  the  last  few  days  the  Indians  along  the  route  have  been  very 
active  and  hostile;  many  men  have  been  murdered,  hundreds  of  animals 
have  been  stolen,  Fort  Dodge  has  lost  every  animal.  The  force  can  now 
do  nothing  with  the  Indians.  A  large  and  effective  cavalry  force  under  a 
good  commander  must;  be  sent  here  without  delay,  or  the  large  number  of 
trains  now  on  the  plains  will  be  destroyed  or  captured. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  this  dispatcli  I  immediately  gave  orders 
to  the  commanding  olliccr  to  go  out  and  concentrate  our  forces 
north  of  the  Arkansas,  and  to  protect  the  trains,  hut  not  io  go 
south  of  the  river.  This  they  accomplished  very  effectively,  and 
drove  all  the  Indians  south  of  the  Arkansas,  killing  and  capturing 
a  good  many.  On  June  14th,  (General  Pope  wrote  a  long  letter 
to  General  U.  S.  Grant,  enclosing  my  letter  to  him,  reiterating 
what  I  had  said,  and  insisting  for  very  strong  reasons  that  the 
Indians  should  be  left  entirely  to  the  military;  that  there  should 
be  no  peace  commission  sent  until  the  military  had  met  these 
Indians  and  brought  them  to  terms,  either  by  fighting  or  negotia 
tions;  and  afterwards  for  the  commission  to  go  there  and  make 
such  arrangements  as  they  saw  proper.  In  the  mustering  out  of 
troops  General  Ford  was  relieved  of  the  command  and  Major- 
General  John  B.  Sanborn,  a  very  efficient  officer,  was  sent  to  take 
his  place.  It  was  now  agreed  that  after  the  failure  of  the  peace 
commission  to  accomplish  anything  with  these  Indians  that  1 
should  make  the  campaigns  south  of  the  Arkansas,  and  General 
Sanborn  concentrated  his  troops  and  moved  to  the  Arkansas.  Be 
fore  I  reached  there  I  received  a  communication  from  Colonel 
Leavenworth  stating  that  all  the  chiefs  of  the  Indians  were  then 
on  Cow  Creek,  anxious  to  meet  him.  At  the  same  time,  a  dispatch 
came  from  Washington  to  General  Pope,  stopping  Sanborn's  move 
ment.  General  Pope  immediately  arranged  to  have  an  interview 
with  these  Indians,  and  General  Sanborn  went  there  with  instruc 
tions  to  make  an  agreement  with  them  that  they  should  keep  off 
of  the  overland  trails,  and  to  arrange  a  time  for  a  commission  to 
meet  them,  later  in  the  year.  On  August  5th  Sanborn  agreed  with 
the  chiefs  of  the  Iviowas,  Apaches,  Comanches,  and  Arapahoes,  on 
the  part  of  the  Government,  to  suspend  all  actions  of  hostility  to 
wards  any  of  the  tribes  above  mentioned  and  to  remain  at  peace 
until  the  fourth  day  of  October,  1865,  when  they  were  to  meet  the 
Government  commissioners  at  Bluffs  Creek  about  fortv  miles  soulh 


84  'I'll  K    I  \1)  IAN    (  'A.MI'AKiN. 


of  the  Little  Arkansas.  This  agreement  did  not  take  in  the  South 
Che\ennes.  who  had  hern  more  mischievous  than  any  of  the  tribes, 
but  this  tribe  kept  south  of  the  Arkansas,  retaining  all  the  stock 
they  captured,  and  none  of  them  were  punished  for  the  murders 
they  committed.  It  was  a  business  matter  on  their  part  to  remain 
at  peace  only  until  the  troops  moved  out  of  that  country  and  to 
prevent  Sanborn  with  his  organized  forces  from  going  south  to 
their  villages  and  punishing  them.  The  effect  of  this  agreement 
was  that  the  Indians  continued  their  depredations  through  the  fol 
lowing  years,  —  not  so  imu-h  by  killing  but  by  stealing,  —  until  finally 
they  became  so  hostile  that  in  the  campaign  against  them  by  Gen 
eral  Sheridan,  in  1868,  an  agreement  was  made  with  them  forcing 
all  the  tribes  to  move  into  the  Indian  Territory.  If  General  Ford 
or  General  Sanborn  had  been  allowed  to  go  forward  and  punish 
these  Indians  as  they  deserved,  they  would  have  been  able  to  make 
not  only  a  peace,  but  could  have  forced  them  to  go  on  the  reserva 
tion  in  the  Indian  territories,  and  thus  have  saved  the  murders 
and  crimes  that  they  committed  for  so  many  years  afterwards; 
however,  this  agreement  of  Sanborn's  allowed  the  emigration  to  go 
forward  over  the  Arkansas,  properly  organized  and  guarded,  and 
it  was  not  molested  during  the  rest  of  that  year. 

To  show  the  conditions  on  the  overland  routes  up  the  two  forks 
of  the  Platte  River  at  the  time,  I  sent  this  dispatch  : 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. 

ST.  Louis,  Mo.,  June  17,  1865. 
Major-General  John  Pope,   Commanding  Military  Division  of  the  Missouri, 

St*   Lo  it  is  : 

GENERAL  :  There  is  no  doubt  but  that  all,  or  nearly  all,  the  tribes  of 
Indians  east  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  from  the  British  Possessions  on  the 
north  to  the  Red  River  on  the  south  are  engaged  in  open  hostilities  against 
the  Government.  It  is  possible  that  in  a  few  of  the  tribes  there  are  some 
chiefs  and  warriors  who  desire  to  be  friendly,  but  each  day  reduces  the 
number  of  these,  and  they  even  are  used  by  the  hostile  tribes  to  deceive  us 
as  to  their  intentions  and  keep  us  quiet.  The  Crows  and  Snakes  appear 
to  be  friendly,  but  everything  indicates  that  they  too  are  ready  to  join  in 
the  hostilities,  and  the  latter  (the  Snakes)  are  accused  of  being  concerned 
in  the  depredations  west  of  the  mountains.  In  my  opinion  there  is  but  one 
way  to  effectually  terminate  these  Indian  troubles  ;  viz.,  to  push  our  cav 
alry  into  the  heart  of  their  country  from  all  directions,  to  punish  them 
whenever  and  wherever  we  find  them,  and  force  them  to  respect  our  power 
and  to  sue  for  peace.  Then  let  the  military  authorities  make  informal 
treaties  with  them  for  a  cessation  of  hostilities.  This  we  can  accomplish 
successfully,  for  the  Indians  will  treat  with  soldiers,  as  they  fear  them  and 
have  confidence  in  their  word.  Any  treaty  made  now  by  civilians,  Indian 
agents,  or  others,  will,  in  my  opinion,  amount  to  nothing,  as  the  Indians 
in  all  the  tribes  openly  express  dissatisfaction  with  them  and  contempt  for 
them.  The  friendly  Indians  say  that  whenever  -the  hostile  bands  are  made 


TII  !•;  I  NDIAN  CAM  I-AKIX.  S.~> 

aware  of  our  ability  and  determination  to  whip  them,  they  will  readily  and 
in  jiood  faith  treat  with  our  officers  and  comply  with  any  demands  we  may 
make.  It'  we  can  keep  citizen  agents  and  traders  from  among  them  we  can, 
I  am  confident,  settle  the  matter  this  season,  and  when  settled  I  am  clearly 
of  the  opinion  that  these  Indians  should  be  dealt  with  entirely  by  com 
petent  commissioned  officers  of  the  Army,  whom  they  will  respect  and  who 
will  not  only  have  the  power  to  make  them  comply  with  the  terms  of  the 
agreements  made,  but  will  also  have  the  power  and  authority  to  compel 
troops,  citizens  and  others  to  respect  implicitly  and  to  comply  strictly  with 
the  obligations  assumed  on  our  part.  The  cavalry  now  moving  into  the 
Indian  country  will,  I  doubt  not,  if  allowed  to  proceed  and  carry  out  the 
instructions  given  them,  accomplish  the  object  designed  by  bringing  about 
an  effectual  peace  and  permanent  settlement  of  our  Indian  difficulties. 
I  am.  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant. 

<J.   M.    DOIX.K. 

Major-General. 

The  campaign  to  the  north  was  planned  with  a  view  of  going 
after  all  the  northern  Indians  then  at  war — the  Arapahoes,  Xorth 
Cheyennes,  and  the  different  bands  of  the  Sioux.  Their  depreda 
tions  had  extended  east  to  the  Missouri  Eiver,  and  General  Pope 
sent  General  Sully  with  a  force  up  that  river  to  take  care  of  the 
hostile  Sioux  that  had  gathered  and  had  been  fighting  the  troops 
at  Forts  Rice,  Berthoud,  and  other  points.  Before  reaching  these 
posts  his  column  was  turned  and  sent  to  Devil's  Lake  after  the 
Santee  Sioux,  who  had  been  committing  depredations  in  Minne 
sota,  but  after  reaching  the  lake  he  failed  to  find  any  Indians,  they 
having  fled  to  the  British  Possessions.  He  returned  to  the  Mis 
souri  River  and  endeavored  to  make  terms  with  the  tribes  concen 
trated  on  it,  but  only  partially  succeeded.  We  knew  that  there  were 
from  two  to  three  thousand  of  the  Sioux,  Cheyennes  and  Arapa 
hoes  concentrated  at  or  near  Bear  Butte,  near  the  north  end  of  the 
Black  Hills,  and  it  was  the  intention  of  General  Sully  with  his 
force  to  go  after  this  band,  but,  being  turned  to  the  east,  I  organ 
ized  a  force  about  1,000  strong  under  Colonel  Nelson  Cole,  who 
went  up  the  Missouri  Kiver  in  boats  to  Omaha  and  whose  orders 
were  to  move  from  Omaha  to  Columbus  up  the  Loup  Fork  to  its 
head  and  thence  across  the  Xiobrara  to  the  White  Earth  River 
and  then  to  Bear  Butte.  Failing  to  find  the  Indians  there,  he  was 
to  push  on  to  Powder  and  Tongue  Rivers,  where  he  was  to  join 
Brigadier-General  P.  E.  Connor,  who  was  in  command  of  this 
district.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Samuel  Walker's  column  of  about 
500  men  of  the  Sixteenth  Kansas  Cavalry  was  to  go  north  from 
Fort  Laramie  along  the  west  base  of  the  Black  Hills  and  join 
Colonel  Colo,  and  later  join  General  Connor  on  the  Tongue  River; 
while  General  Connor,  with  a  small  command  of  about  500  men, 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 


was  moving  north  along  the  Platte  to  the  head  of  Salt  Creek  down 
the  Salt  to  Powder  River,  where  he  was  to  establish  a  fort  and 
supply  station;  from  thence  he  was  to  move  along  the  east  base 
of  the  Big  Horn  Mountains  until  he  struck  the  hostile  Indians  in 
that  vicinity.  These  columns  should  have  moved  in  May  or  June, 
but  it  was  July  and  August  before  they  got  started,  on  account  of 
the  failure  of  the  contractors  to  deliver  the  supplies  to  them  on 
the  plains  at  the  different  supply-depots;  but  when  they  started 
they  moved  with  alacrity,  and  would,  no  doubt,  have  accomplished 
the  purpose  of  the  campaign  had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  they 
were  stopped  by  an  order  from  Washington  to  return  to  Fort  Lara- 
mie  by  October  15th. 

During  May,  June,  and  July  the  Indians  were  very  aggressive 
all  along  the  South  Platte  and  North  Platte  routes.  Every  Gov 
ernment  train  had  to  go  guarded;  every  emigrant  train  had  to  be 
organized  into  trains  of  50  or  100  wagons,  with  the  teamsters 
armed  and  placed  under  an  officer,  and  even  then  a  great  many  of 
their  people  were  killed  and  a  great  deal  of  stock  run  off.  The  com 
manding  officer  at  Fort  Laramie,  during  June,  had  concentrated 
at  his  post  about  2,000  of  what  was  considered  friendly  Indians. 
Most  of  these  Indians  had  been  captured  during  the  spring  cam 
paign.  They  had  brought  in  with  them  most  of  the  prisoners  that 
had  been  captured  on  their  raids  upon  the  stage-lines  and  the 
ranches.  General  Connor,  desiring  to  get  these  Indians  removed 
as  far  as  possible  from  the  hostile  Indians,  under  my  order  moved 
them  south  toward  the  Republican  River,  in  charge  of  two  com 
panies  of  the  Seventh  Iowa  Cavalry,  commanded  by  Captain  Fouts. 
These  Indians  did  not  take  kindly  to  this  movement,  and  the  escort 
sent  with  them  was  not  as  large  as  it  ought  to  have  been.  When 
they  were  sixty  miles  south  of  Fort  Laramie  they  were  communicat 
ed  with  by  a  band  of  hostile  Indians  who  followed  down  the  opposite 
side  of  the  Platte  River,  and  early  in  the  morning  they  attacked 
their  escort,  killing  Captain  Fouts  and  four  soldiers,  and  wounding 
seven  others.  In  the  fight  there  were  a  great  many  Indians  killed 
and  wounded,  but  these  Indians  were  allowed  to  go  south  with 
their  arms,  to  convince  them  that  we  put  confidence  in  them  and 
aid  not  treat  them  as  prisoners.  With  the  aid  of  the  other  Indian? 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Platte,  they  forced  the  escort  to  intrench 
itself,  by  doing  which  the  train  and  the  women  and  others  who  had 
been  rescued  from  the  Sioux  Indians  were  saved,  as  word  was 


87 


gotten  to  Kort  Laramie  and  relief  was  sent.  The  Indians  after 
tliis  light  crossed  the  North  Platte  l\iver  and  moved  north  toward 
the  mack  Hills. 

Colonel  Moonlight,  in  command  of  Korl  Laramie,  as  soon  as 
he  heard  of  this  revolt,  went  to  relieve  the  intrenched  party.  The 
Indians,  however,  had  crossed  the  Platte  River.  He  followed 
them.  When  within  ten  or  fifteen  miles  of  the  hand,  through  care 
lessness  in  taking  care  of  his  horses,  the  Indians  turned  upon  him, 
stampeded  his  stock,  and,  in  fact,  drove  oil'  '300  or  MOO  head  of  it, 
leaving  his  command  on  foot.  The  attack  of  the  hostiles  fright 
ened  the  horses  so  that  they  could  not  he  controlled,  and  they  ran 
towards  the  Indians.  Moonlight  and  his  command  had  to  march 
back  to  Laramie,  a  long  distance,  without  food  or  transportation, 
as  they  had  started  out  with  only  one  or  two  days'  rations.  Colonel 
Moonlight  was  immediately  relieved  of  his  command,  but  the  dam 
age  had  been  done,  which  gave  the  hostile  Indians  great  encourage 
ment.  General  Connor  sent  this  dispatch: 

.TULESBURG,  .Time  15,  ISO."). 

(Received  9:50  p.  m.) 
Major-General  Dodge: 

I  ordered  the  Indians  who  surrendered  at  Laramie  to  be  sent  to  Kear 
ney.  Colonel  Moonlight  sent  them  without  first  dismounting  them,  under 
charge  of  two  companies  of  Seventh  Iowa  Cavalry.  They  revolted  sixty 
miles  this  side  of  Laramie,  killing  Captain  Fonts,  who  was  in  command, 
and  four  soldiers,  and  wounding  seven  ;  also  killed  four  of  their  own  chiefs 
who  refused  to  join  them ;  fifteen  Indians  were  killed ;  the  Indians  fled 
north  with  their  ponies,  women,  and  children,  leaving  all  their  camp 
equipage.  Troops  are  in  pursuit.  Mail-stages  have  stopped  west  of  Camp 
Collins.  Everything  appears  to  work  unfavorably  owing  to  failure  of  corn 
contractors  and  incompetency  of  some  of  my  subordinates.  I  will  overcome 
nil  obstacles,  however,  in  a  short  time.  Have  you  sent  me  cavalry  yet? 
.T.  D.  Doty.  Governor  of  Utah,  was  buried  at  Camp  Douglas  Cemetery  this 
morning.  Died  of  heart  disease.  P.  E.  CONNOR, 

Brigadier-General. 

During  July,  a  band  of  the  Arapahoes  raided  the  South  Platte 
"River  stage-line  between  Fort  Collins  and  Fort  Halleck,  drove  off 
most  of  the  stock  from  the  stations,  and  committed  other  depreda 
tions.  Colonel  Porter,  who  was  in  command  of  that  district,  con 
centrated  his  force  and  went  after  the  Indians,  and  in  a  very  few 
days  restored  the  stage  stations  and  gave  the  Indians  sound  whip 
pings,  which  kept  that  line  clear  nearly  all  summer.  The  Indians 
that  had  done  this  work  had  gone  into  Fort  Collins  claiming  to 
be  friendly  and  wishing  to  make  a  treaty,  and  after  being  fed  there 
for  some  time,  left  one  night  and  committed  the  depredations  be 
fore  troops  could  stop  them.  From  here  they  moved  immediately 


•s<s  THE  IXDIAX  CAMPAIGN. 


nortli  to  join  the  hostile  Indians  north  of  the  Xorth  Platte.  I 
had  received  notice  from  Washington  that  the  Interior  Department 
had  information  that  these  Indians  were  peaceable  and  would  not 
join  in  the  campaigns;  but.  being  on  the  ground,  I  knew  better, 
because  we  were  capturing  them  in  nearly  all  of  the  attacks  that 
they  made.  With  them  was  a  portion  of  one  of  the  bands  of  the 
Sioux. 

On  July  27,  ten  miles  west  of  the  Xorth  Platte  Bridge  station, 
a  Mormon  train  coming  cast  was  attacked  by  the  Indians  and  Lieu 
tenant  Casper  W.  Collins,  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio,  and  twenty-five 
men  of  the  Eleventh  Kansas,  went  out  to  relieve  it,  when  about 
one  thousand  Indians  attacked  him.  While  he  saved  the  train  he 
lost  his  own  life,  and  twenty-five  of  his  men  were  scalped  and  their 
bodies  horribly  mutilated;  but  while  the  Indians  had  heavy  losses 
in  the  fight,  they  were  able  to  divide  up  and  scatter  before  any  of 
the  troops  sent  to  attack  them  could  reach  them.  I  named  the 
post  at  Platte  Bridge  Fort  Casper,  and  it  is  now  known  as  the  town 
of  Casper,  on  the  North-Western  railroad. 

On  August  16th  a  large  band  of  Sioux  Indians  attacked  a  mil 
itary  station  on  the  South  Platte  route.  They  were  overtaken  bv 
the  Pawnee  Indian  Battalion  of  our  forces,  who  gave  them  a  good 
whipping.  They  killed  a  large  number  and  took  their  stock  and 
scattered  them.  This  was  a  band  of  Sioux  Indians  that  had  been 
lying  on  the  Xorth  Platte  and  made  this  dash  to  the  South  Platte 
stage-line,  thinking  we  had  withdrawn  the  troops  from  it  to  the 
northern  expedition.  Very  few  of  them  ever  got  back  to  their 
tribes. 

The  battalion  of  Pawnees  with  General  Conner  had  made  a 
great  capture  of  a  band  of  Chcyennes  who  had  been  down  on  the 
Fort  Halleck  route.  The  latter  had  there  captured  a  part  of  a 
company  of  a  Michigan  Regiment  who  were  escorting  a  few  wagons, 
the  captives  having  been  tied  to  the  wagons  and  burned.  By  some 
means,  General  Conner  got  word  of  this,  and  knew  the  trail  they 
would  take  to  get  back  to  the  main  command,  and  on  this  trail 
he  placed  Major  Xorth  and  his  battalion  of  Pawnees.  Major 
Xorth,  in  describing  to  me  what  followed,  said  that  when  the  In 
dians  came  back  and  discovered  that  they  were  surrounded,  one,  an 
old  man,  moved  up  towards  him  and  placed  his  hand  up  to  his 
mouth,  telling  him  to  come  on;  that  they  were  ready  to  die:  that 
they  were  full  of  white  men  up  to  that, — moaning  up  to  his  mouth. 


TIN-:  INDIAN  CAM  I-AIC.N.  89 

The  Pawnees  killed  every  one  of  this  band  and  scalped  them.  On 
one  of  them  was  found  a  diary  of  one  of  the  Michigan  soldiers  who 
had  been  killed,  and  one  of  the  Cheyennes  had  used  the  book  to 
give  an  account  of  their  travels,  their  camps  and  fights,  and  what 
they  had  done  on  this  raid.  From  this  diary  our  guides  could  tell 
just  exactly  where  the  party  had  been,  where  they  had  camped, 
where  they  had  captured  the  Michigan  soldiers,  and  their  route  on 
their  return.  A  half-breed  had  written  in  the  book  a  defiance  of 
the  troops,  telling  what  the  Indians  demanded.  Among  other 
things  they  demanded  that  before  they  would  make  peace  we  should 
give  up  all  their  prisoners;  that  we?  should  abandon  the  country 
north  of  the  Platte  River,  etc. 

As  soon  as  General  Connor  reached  Powder  River  he  estab 
lished  his  post  and  named  it  Fort  Connor.  (It  was  afterward 
named  Fort  Reno  by  me.)  Connor  immediately  pushed  on  to  the 
Crazy  Woman  Mountain  fork  of  Powder  River  and  then  to  the 
east  base  of  the  Big  Horn  Mountains,  following  that  to  the  Tongue 
River  and  down  the  Tongue  until  James  Bridger,  the  chief  scout 
and  guide  of  the  expedition,  claimed  to  have  seen  the  smoke 
a  long  distance  away,  of  an  Indian  camp.  No  one  else  could 
see  it,  but,  as  a  precaution,  Connor  sent  out  the  Pawnee 
scouts,  and  on  August  27th  they  discovered  about  2,000  Indians 
camped  on  the  Tongue  River,  near  the  mouth  of  Wolf  Creek.  It 
is  a  singular  fact  that  in  this  vicinity  General  Crook  fought  his 
great  battle  on  the  Rosebud,  the  Custer  massacre  occurred,  and  it 
was  not  very  far  away  that  the  Phil  Kearney  disaster  occurred, 
when  Lieutenant  Fetlerman  and  his  whole  command  was  slauo-h- 

o 

tered.  General  Connor  immediately  corralled  the  trains  and  took 
his  available  forces,  about  250  men,  and  marched  all  night  and 
struck  this  band  at  daylight,  giving  thorn  a  complete  surprise. 
They  were  Arapahoes  under  Black  Bear  and  Old  David,  with  sev 
eral  other  noted  chiefs.  The  band  was  just  breaking  up  their 
camp,  but  the  Indian  soldiers  rallied  and  fought  desperately.  Cap 
tain  II.  K.  Palmer.  A.  A.  G.,  with  General  Connor,  gives  this  de 
scription  of  the  attack : 

The  word  was  passed  back  for  the  men  to  close  up  and  follow  the 
General  and  not  to  fire  a  shot  until  he  fired  in  advance.  General  Conner 
then  took  the  lead,  riding  his  horse  up  the  steep  bank  of  the  ravine  and 
dashing  out  across  the  mesa  as  if  there  were  no  Indians  just  to  his  left. 
Every  man  followed  as  close  as  possible.  At  the  first  sight  of  the  General 
the  Indian  ponies  grazing  on  the  table-land  in  front  of  us  sent  up  a  tre 
mendous  whinnying,  and  galloped  down  toward  the  Indian  village.  More 


90  'I'll  I]    I  MM  AN    ('AM  I'AKiN. 


than  1.000  doss  began  to  bark,  and  more  than  700  Indians  made  the  air 
ring  with  their  fearful  yelling.  It  appeared  that  the  Indians  were  in  the 
act  of  breaking  camp.  The  most  of  their  tepees  were  down  and  packed  for 
the  march.  The  ponies,  more  than  3,000,  had  been  gathered  in  and  most 
of  the  squaws  and  children  were  mounted,  some  of  them  having  taken  the 
line  of  march  up  the  stream  to  the  new  camp.  The  General  watched  the 
movements  of  his  men  until  he  saw  the  last  man  emerge  from  the  ravine. 
when  he  wheeled  on  the  left  into  line.  The  whole  line  then  fired  a  volley 
into  the  village  without  stopping  their  horses,  and  the  bugles  sounded  a 
charge.  Not  a  man  but  realized  that  the  charge  into  the  village  without 
a  moment's  hesitation  was  our  only  salvation.  We  already  saw  that  we 
were  greatly  outnumbered,  and  that  only  desperate  fighting  would  save  our 
scalps.  We  were  in  the  village  in  the  midst  of  a  hand-to-hand  fight  with 
the  warriors  and  squaws,  for  many  of  the  squaws  did  as  brave  fighting 
as  their  savage  lords.  Unfortunately  for  the  squaws  and  children,  our  men 
had  no  time  to  direct  their  aim.  and  bullets  from  both  sides  and  murderous 
arrows  filled  the  air.  Women  and  children  fell  among  the  killed  and 
wounded.  The  scene  was  indescribable.  Each  man  seemed  an  army  by 
himself.  Near  the  sweathouse  I  emptied  my  revolver  into  the  can-asses  of 
three  warriors.  One  of  our  men.  a  member  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio  Cavalry, 
a  fine-looking  soldier  with  as  handsome  a  face  as  I  ever  saw  on  a  man, 
grabbed  me  by  the  shoulder  and  turned  me  about  that  I  might  assist  him  in 
drawing  an  arrow  from  his  mouth.  Having  no  surgeon  of  a  higher  grade 
than  a  hospital  steward,  it  was  decided  that  in  order  to  get  the  arrow  out 
of  his  mouth  the  tongue  would  have  to  be  cut  out,  which  was  done.  The 
Indians  made  a  brave  stand  trying  to  save  their  families,  and  succeeded  in 
getting  away  with  a  large  majority  of  their  women  and  children,  leaving 
behind  nearly  all  of  their  plunder. 

We  now  went  up  a  stream  called  Wolf  Creek.  General  Connor  in  close 
pursuit.  Soon  after  we  left  the  village  General  Connor  advised  me  to  in 
struct  Captain  North  to  take  his  battalion  of  Indians  and  get  all  the  stock 
he  could  possibly  gather.  (Jeneral  Connor  pursued  the  savages  fully  ten 
miles  from  camp,  when  he  found  himself  accompanied  by  only  fourteen  men. 
Our  horses  were  so  worn  out  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  men  to  keep  up. 
The  Indians  noticed  his  movements  and  turned  upon  him  and  his  soldiers. 
They  fell  back  as  fast  as  possible.  Captain  North  and  myself  had  succeed 
ed  in  coralling  about  a  thousand  ponies.  Scores  of  buffalo-robes,  blankets, 
and  furs  were  heaped  up  on  lodge-poles,  and  on  these  we  placed  our  dead, 
and  burned  their  bodies  to  keep  the  Indians  from  mutilating  them.  Our 
attack  on  the  village  began  at  9  a.  m.  AVe  remained  until  2  :30  and  had 
destroyed  a  great  deal  of  Indian  property.  At  2  :30  we  took  up  the  line  of 
march  for  the  corralled  train.  Captain  North  with  his  eighty  Indians 
undertook  to  drive  the  captured  stock.  They  were  soon  a  great  ways 
ahead,  while  the  rest  of  the  force  was  engaged  in  beating  back  the  Indians. 
The  Indians  pressed  on  every  side.  They  seemed  to  have  plenty  of  am 
munition,  but  they  did  most  of  their  fighting  with  arrows.  Before  dark  we 
were  reduced  to  forty  men,  and  had  only  a  little  ammunition.  The  Indians 
showed  no  signs  of  stopping  the  fight,  but  kept  on  charging  on  us.  dashing 
away  at  the  stock,  and  keeping  us  constantly  on  the  move  until  fifteen 
minutes  of  twelve,  when  the  last  shot  was  fired  by  our  pursuers.  The  in 
cidents  of  this  fight  would  make  very  interesting  reading.  Every  man  was 
a  general.  Not  a  man  in  the  company  but  realized  that  his  life  was  in 
the  balance.  We  must  either  whip  the  Indians  and  whip  them  badly  or  be 
whipped  ourselves.  We  could  see  that  the  Indians  ^really  outnumbered 
us.  but  we  were  better  armed  than  they.  As  for  fighting  qualities  the 
savages  proved  themselves  as  brave  as  any  of  our  men.  We  had  accom 
plished  a  great  deal;  250  Indian  lodges  and  their  contents  had  been  burned, 
with  the  entire  winter's  supplies;  the  son  of  Black  Bear  was  killed:  sixty- 
three  Indians  were  killed.  1,100  ponies  were  raptured,  and  a  lot  of  women 
and  children  were  taken  prisoners. 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  91 


General  Connor's  report  of  tins  battle  was  burned  in  rtah,  and 
consequently  was  never  forwarded  to  me  or  to  the  Government,  so 
we  do  not  know  what  the  loss  on  his  part  was;  hut  it  was  severe. 

General  Connor  now  moved  down  the  Tongue  "Hivor  to  make 
a  connection  with  Colonel  Walker  and  Colonel  Colo,  at  the  appoint 
ed  ivnde/vous.  His  scouts  discovered  that  Colonel  Cole  in  moving 
north  had  endeavored  to  reach  the  month  of  Powder  River  and  had 
failed,  and  after  six  days"  lighting  had  inarched  south,  expecting 
to  go  to  Fort  Laramie,  not  knowing  that  then1  were  supplies  at 
Fort  Connor. 

Colonel  Cole,  who  with  his  column  had  started  from  Omaha, 
had  made  reasonable  progress,  following  out  the  routes  laid  down, 
and  did  not  discover  any  Indians  until  he  reached  the  Little  Mis 
souri  River,  on  a  branch  of  the  Piney  that  he  was  coming  down. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Walker,  of  the  center  column,  visited  his  camp 
and  was  two  days  behind  him.  He  should  have  immediately  joined 
him,  to  carry  out  his  instructions.  Cole  was  headed  toward  the 
Tongue  River,  near  the  Wolf  Mountains.  When  lie  got  into  the 
brakes  of  the  Powder  River,  he  discovered  many  signs  of  Indians. 
This  is  a  very  rough  country,  and  he  had  great  difficulty  in  getting 
his  long  trains  through  it;  however,  he  dropped  into  the  valley  about 
fifty  miles  above  the  mouth  of  Powder  River  and  sent  a  detachment 
with  his  best  guide  fifty  miles  across  to  Tongue  River  and  Panther 
Mountains  and  discovered  nothing  of  Connor.  In  Cole's  instruc 
tions  he  was  told  that  there  would  be  a  supply-depot  at  Panther  or 
Wolf  Mountains,  but  General  Connor  had  changed  this  and  made 
the  supply-depot  at  what  was  known  as  Camp  Connor,  on  Powder 
River,  and  he  did  not  notify  either  Cole  or  Walker  of  this  change, 
which  lie  should  have  done,  as  had  he  done  so  it  would  have  avoid 
ed  all  the  trouble  that  these  two  columns  encountered.  Cole's  de 
tachment  of  cavalry  discovered  no  signs  of  Connor  on  Tongue  River 
and  so  followed  down  the  river,  while  they  should  have  gone  up; 
and  failing  to  find  any  sign  of  any  depot  at  Panther  Mountains,  re 
ported  back  to  Cole.  Cole's  rations  were  now  exhausted,  or  nearly 
so,  as  he  had  not  been  as  careful  of  them  as  he  should  have  been, 
expecting  as  he  did  to  find  a  depot  where  he  could  get  plenty  at 
the  end  of  his  sixty  days'  march.  It  shows  that  he  was  not  up  to 
the  woodcraft  o.f  the  country.  In  examining  Powder  River  to 
wards  its  mouth  he  found  it  destitute  of  grass  and  full  of  can 
yons.  He,  therefore,  made  up  his  mind  to  move  south  up  the  Pow- 


der  River  valley.,  with  a  view  to  either  meeting  Connor  or  making 
for  Fort  Laramie.  The  Indians,  seeing  this  retreat,  became  very 
bold.  There  were  at  least  2,000  of  them,  Cheyennes  and  Sioux, 
and  without  making  an  attack  they  simply  harassed  him,  some 
times  forcing  a  fight ;  but  very  few  were  hurt.  Colonel  Cole  should 
have  parked  his  train,  placed  it  in  a  defensive  position  under  a 
good  guard,  and  then  mobilized  the  rest  of  his  force,  and,  with  what 
rations  he  had,  gone  after  the  Indians,  giving  them  battle  and 
forcing  the  fight  with  them.  He  had  plenty  of  men. 

Cole  had  not  advanced  very  far  towards  Fort  Connor  when, 
on  September  6th,  Colonel  Walker  and  his  command  joined  him. 
Then  he  had  plenty  of  men  to  meet  all  the  Indians  in  the  country, 
if  his  force  was  properly  handled.  When  this  fighting  commenced 
he  was  not  over  thirty  miles  from  where  Connor  fought  his  battle, 
and  Captain  Palmer  states  that  they  heard  a  cannon,  but  could 
not  tell  which  direction  the  noise  came  from.  Connor,  hearing 
nothing  from  Cole,  sent  out  Major  North  with  a  couple  of  Indian 
scouts  and  with  Bridger  as  guide.  They  got  over  into  the  Powder 
River  country  and  discovered  Cole's  trail.  During  Cole's  retreat 
up  the  Powder  there  came  a  fearful  snow-storm.  The  animals  hav 
ing  marched  so  far  without  grain,  were  already  very  much  exhaust 
ed,  and  the  storm  lasting  three  days,  they  became  so  weak  that  they 
were  not  fit  to  use,  and  they  were  therefore  shot,  just  as  they 
stood  at  the  picket-line,  to  prevent  them  from  falling  into  the 
Indians'  hands.  This  destruction  of  the  animals  and  the  burning 
of  all  their  equipment  was  about  the  first  thing  that  Major  North 
struck,  and  of  course  he  experienced  a  great  anxiety,  fearing  that 
Cole  had  met  with  great  disaster,  and  immediately  reported  to  Gen 
eral  Connor,  who  at  once  sent  Sergeant  C.  L.  Thomas  with  two 
Pawnees  with  dispatches  to  Colonel  Cole  to  march  on  up  Powder 
River  to  Fort  Connor,  where  he  would  find  supplies.  Cole's  troops 
seem  to  have  started  out  not  fulty  prepared  for  such  a  trip,  especial 
ly  in  the  line  of  shoes  and  leggings,  although  they  were  carefully 
instructed  by  me  to  be  sure  to  take  a  surplus,  as  I  knew  the  coun 
try.  Cole's  excuse  is  that  while  he  made  ample  requisition,  the  Quar 
termaster  never  shipped  them,  and  so  when  he  reached  Omaha  he 
had  to  buy  such  as  he  could  find.  Colonel  Cole's  troops  seem  to  have 
kept  up  their  organization  and  their  fighting  qualities,  for  whenever 
they  met  the  Indians  they  always  whipped  them ;  but  they  were  on 
the  retreat,  which  gave  everv  advantage  to  the  Indians.  When 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 


Cole's  troops  reached  Fort  Connor  they  were  in  a  deplorable  con 
dition  —  ragged,  barefooted,  and  almost  without  rations  and  am 
munition. 

The  Indians  surrounding  Fort  Connor  at  this  time  had 
become  so  numerous  that  the  commanding  officer  thought  it  pru 
dent  to  intrench  the  post,  which  shows  good  judgment;  but  Colonel 
Cole  complains  in  his  report  that  the  troops  were  made  to  help 
do  this  intrenching.  Speaking  of  this  he  says  : 

While  camped  here  (Fort  Connor)  an  occurrence  took  place,  strange 
but  most  true,  which  as  an  integral  part  of  the  closing  history  of  the  com 
mand  must  have  full  relation.  Some  thirty-six  hours  after  reaching  this 
post,  a  fatigued  detail  of  400  men  was  ordered  from  the  Second  Missouri 
Light  Artillery  to  work  on  the  earthworks  being  thrown  up  around  the 
place.  If  the  spirit  that  prompted  the  detail  expected  to  force  its  principles 
through  insubordination  or  rebellion,  it  was  disappointed.  What  a  sight  was 
here  !  Four  hundred  ragged,  bare-footed  men,  emaciated  with  fatigue,  who 
had  met  and  worsted  the  enemy  on  three  several  occasions,  marched  up  in 
the  face  of  a  garrison  of  2,000  or  more. 

I  don't  know  where  he  got  the  2,000  troops,  as  all  the  troops 
when  he  reached  Fort  Connor  were  two  companies  of  Michigan  cav 
alry,  General  Connor  then  not  having  reached  that  post;  and  when 
he  did,  all  told  there  were  not  2,000  troops  there.  Cole's  loss  was 
very  light,  —  nine  killed,  —  while  he  claims  to  have  killed  from  200 
to  500  of  the  Indians. 

It  was  very  evident  to  me  that  there  was  no  very  severe  fight 
ing  here;  it  was  simply  a  skirmish  on  a  retreat. 

Lieutenant-  Colonel  Walker's  column,  which  started  from  Fort 
Laramie  on  August  2d,  moved  up  the  west  base  of  the  Black  Hills, 
and  struck  Cole's  column  on  August  20th  on  what  was  known  as 
Piney  Creek.  After  striking  Cole's  trail  he  followed  it  a  short 
distance,  and  then  left  it  and  struck  Powder  River,  much  farther 
south  than  Cole  had,  and  on  reaching  the  river  lie  fell  right  into 
the  same  band  of  Indians  that  were  gathered  along  the  Powder 
River  to  harass  Cole.  He,  too,  was  short  of  provisions,  although 
he  was  equipped  to  travel  very  rapidly,  having  all  his  supplies  on 
pack-mules.  As  soon  as  he  got  in  touch  with  Cole  he  joined  him 
and  followed  him  to  Fort  Connor.  General  Connor's  idea  was  to 
make  up  a  rapid-moving  column  of  about  1,000  men,  using  the 
pack-mules  of  Walker,  and  then  combine  his  and  Cole's  troops  to 
move  on  a  line  farther  to  the  west  and  follow  these  Indians  to  the 
British  Possessions  if  necessary.  He  had  the  ammunition,  equip 
ment  and  everything  at  Fort  Connor  to  fit  out  these  columns  with. 


TIIK  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  95 


As  near  as  they  could  estimate  there  were  about  (1,000  Indians  all 
told. 

The  wagon-road  train  that  started  from  Sioux  City  under 
Colonel  Sawyer's  engineering  party,  with  two  companies  of  the 
Fifth  United  States  Volunteer  Infantry  under  the  command  of 
Captain  George  N.  Williford,  that  were  to  open  a  wagon-road  from 
Sioux  City  up  the  Niobrara  River  by  a  short  route  to  the  north  end 
of  the  Black  Hills,  intended  to  cross  to  Powder  River  and  then 
to  the  south  end  of  the  Big  Horn  Mountains,  making  a  direct  emi 
grant  route  into  Montana.  As  soon  as  I  heard  of  the  instructions 
given  this  expedition  I  got  word  to  Colonel  Sawyer  that  it  was 
impossible  for  him  to  travel  on  that  route;  that  lie  must  keep  to 
the  south  end  of  the  Black  Hills  and  follow  up  the  North  Platte 
until  he  struck  what  was  known  as  the  Bozeman  trail,  that  was  laid 
out  in  1864  by  some  emigrants  going  into  Montana,  This  was  the 
trail  that  Connor  had  taken  on  his  route  to  Tongue  River.  It  was 
feasible  all  the  way  from  the  Platte  to  Montana,  Colonel  Sawyer 
paid  no  attention  to  this  information,  but  kept  on  his  original 
route  until  he  got  into  the  brakes  of  the  Powder  River,  not  very 
far  from  where  Cole  struck  them.  When  within  twenty  miles  of 
the  River,  he  ascertained  by  his  own  guide  that  it  was  impossible 
to  advance  any  farther  in  that  direction;  consequently,  he  had  to 
retrace  his  steps.  On  the  second  day  they  were  attacked  by  a  large 
band  of  Indians;  evidently  the  Cheyennes  and  Sioux  that  after 
wards  attacked  Colonels  Cole  and  Walker.  These  Indians  kept  them 
corralled  nearly  four  days  and  nights,  fighting  through  the  day  and 
withdrawing  at  night,  only  to  begin  their  hostilities  at  dawn;  but 
finding  that  their  efforts  only  resulted  in  many  being  killed,  thev 
abandoned  the  siege  and  left,  going  south,  striking  Cole's  trail  on 
August  22d,  which  they  followed,  and  on  the  23d  Colonel  Sawver 
marched  into  Fort  Connor.  While  Captain  Williford  does  not  say 
that  he  took  charge  of  this  train,  that  is  a  fact.  He  took  charge  of 
it  and  kept  it  until  he  got  to  Fort  Connor.  He  was  a  splendid 
officer  and  it  was  through  his  good  judgment  and  his  ability  as  a 
soldier  that  he  saved  the  whole  outfit.  The  Bent  Boys,  who  were 
at  the  head  of  the  Cheyennes,  would  communicate  with  Sawyer  and 
get  him  to  send  out  persons  for  the  purpose  of  trading  with  them, 
and  whoever  was  sent  inside  their  lines  was  held  prisoner,  the  idea 
being  to  wear  Sawyer's  force  out  by  this  means.  But  they  struck 
the  wrong  man  in  Captain  Williford,  who,  comprehending  the  sit- 


9G  Tin:  LXDIAX  CAMPAIGN. 

nation,  attacked  the  Indians.  1  knew  Williford  in  tlie  Civil  War, 
and  he  was  a  very  efficient  officer.  At  Fort  Connor  I  relieved  Willi 
ford.,  his  men  being  mostly  barefooted,  and  put  Colonel  Kidd  of 
the  Michigan  Cavalry,  in  command,  with  a  suitable  escort,  and  in 
structed  him  to  followr  the  Connor  trail  until  thev  struck  Tongue 

.  O 

River,,  and  then  to  swing  towards  the  Yellowstone  and  strike  the 
trail  up  that  river  to  Bozeman.  This  train,  when  they  got  nearly 
opposite  to  where  General  Connor  fought,  was  again  attacked  by 
the  Indians ;  but  Colonel  Kidd  managed  to  get  news  to  General 
Connor  and  he  sent  two  or  three  companies  of  his  command  to  the 
rescue.  They  were  absent  while  he  fought  his  battle  on  Tongue 
River.  They  drove  off  the  Indians,  and  relieved  the  train,  which 
reached  Montana  in  safety. 

Early  in  September  I  reached  Fort  Connor — before  General 
Cole  and  Colonel  Walker  had  concentrated  there — and  gave  instruc 
tions  under  the  direction  of  the  authorities  at  Washington,  forward 
ed  to  me  by  General  Pope,  to  withdraw  all  the  troops  to  Fort  Lara- 
mie,  and  stop  all  their  operations  against  the  Indians,  and  endeavor 
to  bring  them  in  for  a  consultation,  and,  if  possible,  to  make  an 
agreement  as  to  the  cessation  of  all  hostilities.  This  was  a  fatal 
mistake.  When  I  received  this  dispatch  from  General  Pope,  on 
August  31st,  I  sent  the  following  message  to  him: 

HEADQUARTERS  U.  S.  FORCES. 

FORT  LARAMIE.  DAKOTA  TERRITORY.  August  31,  18G5. 
Major-General  John  Pope,  St.  Louis,  Mo.: 

I  consider  the  Indian  matters  here  of  so  much  importance,  and  know 
ing  no  one  can  judge  of  them  so  well  as  when  he  is  on  the  ground,  that  I 
desire  to  make  a  proposition  to  the  Government.  If  the  Government  will 
allow  me  to  keep  General  Connor  in  the  field  with  not  to  exceed  2,000  men 
of  his  present  force,  leaving  the  forces  you  have  designated  to  garrison 
posts  on  the  plains.  I  will  settle  these  Indian  difficulties  before  spring  sat 
isfactorily  to  the  Government,  and  bring  about  a  peace  that  will  be  lasting. 
I  may  do  it  in  a  month  or  two  :  or  it  may  be  longer.  The  additional  ex 
pense  to  the  Government  will  be  the  pay  of  that  number  of  troops  for  the 
time  detained.  All  the  stores,  forage,  etc.,  to  support  them  are  here  and 
en  route.  As  soon  as  we  settle  with  them  we  can  send  these  troops  in  and 
take  2,000  more  from  our  posts  in  addition  and  muster  them  out.  General 
Connor  left  Powder  River  with  sixty  days'  supplies,  and  I  am  satisfied  if 
we  will  allow  him  he  will  settle  the  matter  before  he  returns.  Should  he 
come  back  by  our  orders  without  settling  the  matter,  the  entire  Indian 
tribes  will  be  down  on  our  lines,  and  we  will  have  our  hands  full,  and  more 
too.  The  forces  for  Utah  I  will  soon  have  on  the  road,  and  when  Connor 
gets  back  he  can  go  right  there.  G.  M.  DODGE, 

Major-Gen  end. 

General  Connor,  after  getting  news  of  the  position  of  Cole's 
and  Walker's  forces,  moved  back  with  his  forces  to  Fort  Connor, 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  97 

with  a  view  of  taking  command  of  Cole's  and  Walker's  forces  and 
organizing  them  into  two  columns — one  a  light  column  with  pack- 
mules,  and  the  other  with  the  trains, — and  then  to  follow  and  at 
tack  the  Indians  that  had  been  fighting  Cole  and  Walker.  When 
he  arrived  at  Fort  Connor  he  found  my  dispatches,  which,  of  course, 
changed  his  whole  policy.  He  knew  then  where  all  the  Indians 
were  located.  They  had  all  been  forced  away  from  the  traveled 
lines  to  protect  their  villages,  and  it  was  only  a  question  of  time — . 
weeks  or  months — before  we  would  have  conquered  a  peace  that 
the  Indians  would  have  recognized. 

The  dispatches  which  I  sent  from  Fort  Laramie  brought  an  an 
swer  from  General  Grant  to  the  effect  that  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington  were  determined  to  stop  all  campaigns  against  the  Indians. 
They  had  been  made  to  believe  by  the  Interior  Department  that 
all  they  had  to  do  was  to  withdraw  the  troops  and  the  Indians 
would  come  in  and  make  peace.  On  my  return  from  Fort  Connor, 
when  I  reached  the  North  Platte  I  sent  this  dispatch : 

Major-General  John  Pope,  St.  Louis:      HORSESHOE,  September  15,  1803. 

Arrived  here  today  on  my  return  from  Powder  River.  That  post  is 
well  located,  right  in  heart  of  Indian  country,  and  is  an  important  post, 
The  Indians'  trails  all  cross  at  or  near  it,  and  it  will  have  good  effect  here 
after  in  holding  in  check  Indians.  Have  not  heard  from  General  Connor 
since  August  24.  We  cannot  reach  him  now.  They  have  done  a  good  deal 
of  work  on  Powder  River ;  got  up  stockade  and  commenced  Quartermaster 
buildings ;  well  under  way.  Great  lack  of  Quartermaster's  stores  up  there, 
the  Powder  River  stores  not  having  reached  Laramie  yet.  From  Laramie 
to  Powder  River,  then  to  Virginia  City,  is  an  excellent  wagon-road ;  good 
grass,  water,  and  wood  all  the  way,  and  the  most  direct  road  that  can 
be  got.  The  travel  over  it  in  another  season  will  be  immense ;  it  saves 
at  least  450  miles  in  distance.  After  the  Indians  attacked  Colonel  Sawyer's 
wagon-road  party  and  failed  in  their  attempt,  they  held  a  parley.  Colonel 
Bent's  sons,  George  and  Charles  Bent,  appeared  on  part  of  Indians,  and 
Colonel  Sawyer  gave  them  a  wagon-load  of  goods  to  let  him  go  undisturbed, 
Captain  Williford,  commanding  escort,  not  agreeing  to  it.  The  Indians 
accepted  proposition  and  agreed  to  it,  but  after  receiving  the  goods  they 
attacked  party  ;  killed  three  men.  Bent  said  that  there  was  one  condition 
on  which  the  Cheyennes  would  treat ;  viz.,  the  hanging  by  Government  of 
Colonel  Chivington.  He  also  said  that  the  Indians  considered  that  they 
were  strong  enough  to  fight  the  Government ;  preferred  to  do  it ;  that  they 
knew  the  Government  would  withdraw  troops  in  fall ;  then  they  would 
have  it  all  their  own  way  again.  Expressed  great  fear  about  Connor,  and 
said  they  were  concentrating  everything  to  meet  him,  which  is  true.  Since 
he  left  no  Indians  have  troubled  the  mail-  or  telegraph-lines,  but  are  all 
moving  north,  stragglers  and  all.  At  Fort  Connor  they  kill  a  few  of  them 
as  they  pass  every  few  days.  There  is  one  band  of  Arapahoes  in  Medicine 
Bow  Mountains,  who  are  committing  depredations  around  Denver,  on  Cache 
La  Poudre  and  Big  Thompson  Creeks.  They  belong  to  the  band  that  was 
at  Cow  Creek  treaty.  I  shall  be  in  Laramie  tomorrow ;  see  General  Whea- 
ton ;  thence  to  Denver.  Bent  also  said  that  some  of  tribes  had  agreed  to 
make  peace  on  Missouri  River,  but  they  were  doing  this  to  keep  us  from 


98  THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 


sending  a  force  that  way.  These  Bent  boys  were  educated  in  St.  Louis.  One 
has  been  with  Price  in  the  rebel  Army ;  was  captured.  His  father  got 
him  released  and  took  him  to  his  ranch  on  the  Arkansas  River,  when  he 
joined  the  Cheyennes,  of  which  he  is  a  half-breed.  He  was  dressed  in  one 
of  our  staff  officer's  uniforms.  G.  M.  DODGE, 

Major-General. 

On  General  Connor's  arrival  at  Fort  Connor  he  wired  me  the 
results  of  the  campaign  and  protested  strenuously  against  the  order 
stopping  it,  saying  he  was  then  in  condition  and  position  to  close 
it,  conquer  the  Indians,  and  force  a  lasting  peace.  On  receipt  of 
his  report  I  sent  this  dispatch : 

CENTRAL  CITY,  COLO.,  September  27,  1805. 
Major-General  John  Pope,  St.  Louis,  Mo.: 

On  August  28th,  General  Connor  surprised  Medicine  Man's  band  of 
Indians  on  Tongue  River  ;  killed  fifty ;  captured  village,  all  winter  provi 
sions,  and  600  horses — all  the  stock  they  had.  On  the  1st  of  September 
the  right  column,  under  Colonel  Cole,  had  a  fight  with  the  Sioux,  Chey 
ennes,  and  Arapahoes,  on  Powder  River,  and  whipped  them.  On  the  even 
ing  of  the  3d  of  September  attacked  them  again,  driving  them  down  Powder 
River  ten  miles.  Next  morning  at  daylight  attacked  again,  fight  lasting 
until  10  a.  m.,  when  Indians  were  defeated  with  loss  of  200  killed.  They 
fled  in  every  direction,  losing  large  number  of  horses,  camp  equipage,  provi 
sions,  etc.  On  8th  instant,  Colonel  Walker,  commanding  center  column, 
who  was  in  advance  of  Colonel  Cole,  met  Indians  in  large  force.  Colonel 
Cole  came  up  and  after  a  short  but  spirited  engagement  they  totally  routed 
Indians,  driving  them  in  every  direction  with  great  loss,  several  of  prin 
cipal  chiefs  being  killed  in  this  fight.  On  the  night  of  the  9th  of  September 
a  severe  snow-storm  raged,  n  which  400  of  Colonel  Cole's  horses  perished. 
I  was  in  that  storm  on  Powder  River.  It  was  very  severe,  and  I  lost  several 
animals.  Our  total  loss  in  all  the  engagements  not  more  than  fifty  killed  and 
wounded,  including  one  officer.  Colonel  Cole  or  Colonel  Walker  had  not 
communicated  with  General  Connor  and  were  on  Powder  River,  but  by  this 
time  they  have  communicated,  as  they  had  ascertained  where  General  Con 
nor's  column  was.  G.  M.  DODGE, 

Major-General. 

General  Connor,  in  compliance  with  his  orders,  moved  south 
from  Fort  Connor  to  distribute  at  the  different  posts  where  thev  had 
been  assigned,  the  forces  not  ordered  to  be  mustered  out.  As  soon 
as  he  started  south  to  Fort  Laramie  the  Indians  followed  him  and 
swarmed  immediately  on  the  overland  routes,  both  the  North  and 
South  Platte,  reaching  even  as  far  as  the  Arkansas,  and  committed 
great  depredations.  The  troops  along  those  lines  had  been  mus 
tered  out,  and  the  regular-army  force  that  was  to  take  their  places 
had  not  arrived.  It  was  a  harvest  for  the  Indians.  In  my  absence 
General  Pope  had  assigned  to  the  different  districts  regular-army 
officers  for  permanent  command.  They  were  to  take  the  places  of 
the  volunteers.  Under  my  instructions  I  immediately  sent  word 
to  the  Indians  to  come  to  Fort  Laramie  for  the  purpose  of  a  consul- 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 


tation.  To  accomplish  this  I  sent  out  the  best-posted  guides  (using 
chiefs,  sub-chiefs,  half-breeds  of  friendly  Indians)  that  I  knew  on 
the  plains,  to  each  of  the  hostile  tribes  asking  them  to  come  into 
Fort  Laramie.  I  instructed  the  messengers  to  tell  them  that  if  any 
of  their  people  had  gone  to  the  Missouri  Eiver  for  peaceable  pur 
poses  to  let  them  go,  but  to  bring  in  all  that  were  left,  providing 
they  felt  disposed  to  settle  without  delay.  I  sent  them  word  that 
if  they  did  not  come  in  and  settle  they  would  find  that  our  summer 
campaign  was  only  a  taste  of  what  they  would  get  this  winter,  for 
we  would  give  them  no  rest.  I  posted  the  district  commanders  thor 
oughly,  telling  them  what  we  wanted  was  to  settle  with  the  Indians 
before  they  discovered  the  smallness  of  our  forces  on  the  plains.  I 
told  them  they  might  say,  also,  that  all  of  the  Indians  south  of  the 
Arkansas  had  made  peace,  and  gave  instructions  that  they  be  told 
about  the  battle  with  the  Arapahoes  and  Cheyennes  on  Powder 
and  Tongue  Eivers.  I  sent  the  district  commanders  word  to  show 
Big  Ribs,  one  of  my  messengers,  the  forces  at  their  posts,  and  to 
impress  upon  him  our  power.  The  effect  of  this  appeal  to  the  dif 
ferent  tribes  was  that  early  in  the  spring  of  1866  we  got  together 
at  Fort  Laramie  the  principal  chiefs  and  the  head  men  of  the  North 
Cheyennes,  Arapahoes,  and  the  different  tribes  of  the  Sioux,  when 
a  council  was  held. 

I  had  instructed  General  Frank  Wheaton,  who  commanded 
at  Fort  Laramie,  that  we  would  agree  to  almost  anything  to  bring 
a  permanent  peace  except  to  allow  the  Indians  to  come  down  to 
the  North  Platte  and  occupy  the  country  through  which  the  new 
military  road  was  laid  out  to  Bozeman,  Mont.  Our  troops,  in  passing 
up  the  east  base  of  the  Black  Hills,  had  discovered  gold.  There 
were  Colorado  and  California  Regiments  in  the  commands,  and 
I  knew,  and  so  did  General  Connor,  that  many  were  preparing, 
as  soon  as  a  treaty  was  made,  to  go  back  into  that  country  and 
prospect  it,  and  I  gave  that  reason  to  the  Indians  for  holding  them 
north  of  the  Belle  Fourche  Fork  of  the  Che}^enne  River;  but  that 
country  was  their  best  hunting-ground.  They  were  perfectly  willing 
to  give  up  all  the  country  south  of  the  Platte  River,  and  not  to 
interfere  with  the  building  of  the  Union  Pacific  road  or  with  any 
of  the  overland  routes  up  the  North  or  South  Platte;  but  they 
would  not  consent  to  give  up  the  Black  Hills  north  of  the  North 
Platte.  Finally  we  made  an  agreement  with  them  that  they  should 
occupy  the  country  north  of  the  North  Platte  River  until  such  time 


100  THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 

as  the  Government  should  see  proper  to  send  a  commission  out  to 
negotiate  a  permanent  peace  with  them.  I  gave  instructions  to 
tell  them  that  if  the  white  men  went  into  their  territory  and  we 
did  not  keep  them  out,  they  were  at  liberty  to  do  so.  I  knew  that 
would  deter  any  white  man  going  in  there,  and  as  long  as  they  kept 
the  peace,  we  would.  Eed  Cloud,  who  had  then  come  to  the  head 
of  the  Ogalalla  band  of  the  Sioux  Indians,  took  a  prominent  part 
in  this  conference,  and  was  backed  by  such  chiefs  as  Spotted  Tail, 
Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses,  Big  Eibs,  and  the  Bent  boys  on  behalf 
of  the  Cheyennes.  He  declared  that  they  would  never  give  up  their 
country  north  of  the  Platte.  "You  may  take  my  country/7  said 
Red  Cloud,  "but  I  will  mark  every  mile  of  that  Bozeman  trail 
from  the  North  Platte  to  Yellowstone  with  the  bodies  of  your 
soldiers;'7  and  this  he  pretty  nearly  accomplished.  This  agreement, 
made  at  Fort  Laramie,  accomplished  nothing.  During  the  years 
1866,  1867  and  1868  the  Indians  swarmed  across  the  lines  agreed 
upon  and  occupied  the  country,  especially  along  the  Union  Pacific, 
which  was  then  being  constructed  through  that  country.  The  Gov 
ernment  had  to  send  in  additional  troops,  and  all  the  military  posts 
over  the  country  had  to  be  re-occupied  the  same  as  they  had  been 
before.  The  Government  endeavored  to  again  reach  these  Indians 
through  a  peace  commission  in  1868.  General  W.  T.  Sherman  was 
at  the  head  of  it,  and  it  was  composed  of  General  Harney  and 
others.  They  visited  me  at  Fort  Sanders,  Wyo.,  before  they  went 
to  make  a  treaty  with  the  Indians,  and  wished  to  know  niv  reasons 
for  the  position  I  took  in  the  consultation  of  1866.  I  then  told 
General  Sherman  that  my  soldiers  had  found  gold  in  all  the  streams 
heading  in  the  Black  Hills  north  of  the  North  Platte,  and  that 
as  soon  as  he  allowed  those  Indians  to  come  to  the  North  Platte 
under  a  treaty  of  peace,  he  would  not  be  across  the  Missouri  Eiver 
on  his  return  before  that  countr}7  would  be  covered  by  prospectors 
from  California  and  Colorado.  General  Sherman  answered  that 
their  instructions  were  to  make  such  a  peace  and  they  were  sent 
there  to  do  it,  and,  sure  enough,  they  did ;  and  as  soon  as  the  treaty 
was  made  the  miners  poured  into  the  country.  One  of  the  first 
mines  that  was  discovered  was  the  Homestake  or  Homestead.  Sit 
ting  Bull,  who  had  taken  part  in  this  treaty  and  whose  country 
was  the  Black  Hills,  sent  in  protest  after  protest,  demanding  that 
the  Government  live  up  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  and  drive 
the  miners  out,  but  no  attention  was  paid  to  them.  The  miners  and 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  101 

settlers  poured  into  the  Black  Hills  country  and  drove  the  Indians 
out,  and  Sitting  Bull  said  in  a  conference  he  had  with  some  of  the 
Army  officers  in  the  707s  that  if  the  Government  did  not  protect 
their  territory  as  provided  in  the  treaty,  they  would  themselves; 
and  they  started  to  do  it.  The  massacres  of  that  year  came  from 
his  band,  the  troubles  finally  ending  with  the  sacrifice  of  the  Custer 
Regiment  in  187G.  While  this  was  a  horrible  event,  the  Indians, 
under  the  treaty,  were  fully  justified  in  it.  During  this  same  time 
Red  Cloud  occupied  the  Bozeinan  trail.  He  killed  emigrants,  be 
sides  murdering  Captain  Fetterman  and  his  company  at  Fort  Phil 
Kearney,  and  other  troops  located  at  the  posts  that  we  established 
along  there  in  I860,  such  as  Forts  Reno,  McKinney,  Phil  Kearney, 
and  C.  F.  Smith.  It  was  not  until  after  the  Custer  massacre  that 
these  Indians  were  brought  to  time  and  put  on  reservations;  since 
then  peace  has  prevailed. 

The  Government  had  the  same  difficulty  on  the  Arkansas 
River  route  that  we  had  on  the  Platte  routes  in  the  summer  of 
1866,  1867,  and  1868.  The  Indians  that  had  made  the  agreement 
with  Colonel  Leavenworth  were  all  committing  depredations  until 
finally  the  Government  sent  General  Sheridan  there  with  instruc 
tions  to  punish  them.  They  tried  to  play  the  same  game  with 
Sheridan  that  they  had  played  with  us,  but  he  would  have  none 
of  it.  There  was  no  one  in  Washington  who  would  force  him  to 
listen  to  the  appeals  of  the  peace  commission.  His  troops,  under 
Colonels  Custer,  Evans,  and  others,  fought  three  battles  south  of 
the  Arkansas,  noticeably  wiping  out  some  bands,  and  making  them 
give  up  their  prisoners,  stop  their  murders,  and  go  on  reservations 
in  the  Indians'  territory.  From  that  time  on  they  have  been  peace 
able. 

We  were  much  better  prepared,  in  the  fall  of  1865,  both  on 
the  Arkansas  and  on  the  Yellowstone,  to  conquer  these  Indians. 
We  had  got  up  to  their  villages  and  had  plenty  of  troops,  plenty 
of  provisions,  and  plenty  of  clothing,  and  could  carry  on  the  cam 
paign  through  the  winter,  if  necessary;  and  so,  if  we  had  allowed 
General  Ford  or  General  Sanborn  to  have  gone  forward  with  the 
columns  and  punish  those  southern  Indians,  they  would  have  made 
a  permanent  peace.  But  the  fact  is  the  Indians  did  not  give  up 
until  they  were  thoroughly  thrashed  and  made  to  recognize  the 
power  and  authority  of  the  Government. 


102  TILE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  in  dealing  with  the  Indian 
problem  is  beyond  the  comprehension  of  any  sensible  man.  They 
were  treated  the  same  as  foreign  nations;  and  while  they  made 
treaties  they  never  carried  out  their  part  of  them,  breaking  them 
whenever  the  trend  of  civilization  westward  interfered  with  them 
in  any  way.  The  Government  attempted  to  deal  with  and  govern 
the  Indians  with  civil  agents  and  at  the  same  time  tried  to  enforce 
peace  through  the  military  authorities.  This  caused  friction :  and 
deception  and  cheating  in  the  supplying  of  them  through  their  con 
tractors  and  civil  agents  brought  untold  complaints.  If  the  Gov 
ernment  had  treated  the  Indians  as  a  ward  that  they  were  bound 
to  protect,  as  the  English  did,  they  would  have  had  very  little 
trouble  in  handling  them.  The  military  force  would  have  held  all 
conferences  with  them;  fed  them  when  they  needed  it;  located 
them  in  an  early  day  on  unoccupied  good  hunting-grounds;  and 
finally,  as  civilization  moved  into  their  territories  and  as  their 
tribes  wasted  away,  would  have  given  them  reservations  where  the 
Government  from  the  money  they  received  from  the  lands  the 
Indians  claimed,  could  have  kept  and  fed  them  without  any  great 
burden  or  cost.  In  all  the  days  of  Indian  warfare  and  treaties, 
there  never  was  such  a  farce,  or  failure  to  comprehend  the  frontier 
situation,  as  in  the  years  1865  and  1866,  and  the  failure  of  the 
Government  to  take  advantage  of  the  comprehensive  plans  instituted 
by  the  military  authorities,  as  well  as  of  the  great  expenditures 
made,  and  to  punish  the  Indians  as  they  deserved,  brought,  in  after 
years,  greater  expenditures  and  more  disturbances  than  ever. 

Early  in  the  campaign,  after  General  Pope  had  made  known 
his  views  to  the  Government,  he  requested  me  to  write  fully  mine 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  who  had  charge  of  Indian  affairs, 
and  who  was  from  my  state,  and  I  sent  him  this  letter: 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI. 

ST.  Lou:s.  Mo.,  June  22.  1805. 
Hon.  James  Ha,rlan,  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  Washington,  D.  C.: 

MY  DEAR  SIR  :  Copies  of  Senator  Doolittle's  and  Commissioner  Dole's 
letters  to  you  of  dates  May  31  and  June  12  have  been  furnished  me.  My 
acquaintance  with  you  leads  me  to  believe  that  you  are  endeavoring  to  get 
at  the  real  facts  of  our  Indian  difficulties  and  the  best  methods  for  putting 
an  end  to  them.  So  far  as  Senator  Doolittle's  letter  refers  to  "some  general 
getting  up  of  an  Indian  war  on  his  own  hook"  and  for  his  own  purposes, 
I  shall  indulge  no  reply.  You  know  me,  and  if  it  was  intended  in  any  way 
to  apply  to  me  I  leave  you  to  judge  of  how  much  credence  should  be  at 
tached  to  it.  My  sincere  desire  is  to  terminate  these  Indian  troubles,  and 
I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  if  I  am  allowed  to  carry  out  the  policy 


Tin-:  INDIAN  CAM I'AKiN.  103 


now  being  pursued  toward  them  I  will  have  peace  with  them  before  another 
emigration  crosses  the  plains.  When  I  assumed  command  of  the  former 
Department  of  Kansas  I  found  all  the  important  Indian  tribes  on  the  plains 
in  open  hostility  against  us.  Whether  it  was  the  fault  of  the  white  man  or 
the  Indian,  the  fact  was  patent.  They  were  holding  the  entire  overland 
route  from  Julesburg  to  Junction  Station,  had  destroyed  the  telegraph-lines, 
captured  trains,  burned  ranches,  and  murdered  men,  women,  and  children 
indiscriminately.  I  soon  stopped  these  proceedings,  opened  our  broken 
lines  of  communication ;  repaired,  so  far  as  possible,  the  injury  done ; 
pushed  troops  out  there,  and  then  tried  to  effect  a  settlement  with  the 
Indians.  On  the  southern  route  I  found  a  similar  state  of  affairs  existing. 
The  Indians  were  on  the  warpath,  and  I  at  once  started  expeditions  against 
them,  learning  of  which  Colonel  Leavenworth,  Indian  Agent,  informed  me 
that  he  could  make  peace  with  them  ;  that  we  were  nt  fault,  etc.  I  stopped 
my  expeditions  on  the  southern  route  to  give  him  an  opportunity  to  accom 
plish  this  object.  He  started  for  their  camps ;  they  robbed  him,  stole  his 
mules,  and  he  hardly  escaped  with  his  scalp ;  and  on  his  return  stated  that 
it  was  useless  to  attempt  to  make  peace  with  them.  I  then,  in  accordance 
with  the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  started  for  the  Indians  again,  and 
had  just  got  my  forces  under  way  when  the  committee,  of  which  Senator 
Doolittle  is  a  member,  reached  Fort  Lamed,  and  after  an  interview  with 
Colonel  Leavenworth, 'gave  orders  for  the  expeditionary  movements  to  stop. 
The  grounds  for  this  action  the  Senator  gives  in  his  letter.  I  was  then 
aware  that  the  Indians  were  moving  north  to  attack  that  line,  and  was 
moving  two  columns  in  concert  with  General  Ford  to  intercept  and  punish 
them;  and  I  at  that  time  telegraphed  that  the  tribes  spoken  of  by  Senator 
Doolittle  were  on  their  way  north  to  attack  our  trains.  They  had  then 
driven  out  all  traders,  made  a  treaty  with  the  southern  Indians  and  Texans, 
and  sent  me  word  that  they  wanted  no  peace. 

Within  ten  days  from  the  time  Senator  Doolittle  and  his  party  left 
Fort  Larned,  and  before  I  had  time  to  countermand  their  orders  and  get  my 
troops  disposed,  the  Indians  attacked  the  posts  and  trains  all  along  the 
line,  running  off  stock,  capturing  trains,  etc.,  murdering  men,  and  showing 
conclusively  that  they  were  determined  on  war  at  all  hazards.  Our  over 
tures  to  them,  as  well  as  those  of  the  agents  sent  out  by  General  Carle- 
ton,  were  treated  with  disdain.  From  Fort  Laramie  I  sent  word  to  the 
Sioux,  Cheyennes,  etc.,  that  if  they  wanted  peace  to  come  in  and  stop  their 
hostilities.  A  few  of  each  tribe  responded  by  coming  in ;  the  rest  refused, 
and  indicated  their  purposes  and  feelings  by  attacking  the  posts  west  of 
Fort  Laramie,  and  on  Laramie  Plains,  murdering,  stealing,  etc.  I  under 
took  to  remove  the  friendly  Indians  from  Fort  Laramie  to  Fort  Kearney,  in 
order  to  get  them  away  from  the  troubles.  When  about  sixty  miles  south 
of  Fort  Laramie  they  attacked  their  guard,  killed  a  captain  and  four  pri 
vates,  turned  upon  five  of  their  chiefs  who  were  disposed  to  be  friendly, 
killed  them,  and  then  escaped,  leaving  their  camps,  etc.,  in  our  hands  ;  so 
that  now  we  have  every  Indian  tribe  capable  of  mischief  from  the  British 
Possessions  on  the  north  to  the  Red  River  on  the  south,  at  war  with  us, 
while  the  whites  are  backing  them  up.  These  facts,  it  appears  to  me,  are 
a  sufficient  answer  to  the  letters  of  Senator  Doolittle  and  Commissioner 
Dole.  That  these  Indians  have  been  greatly  wronged  I  have  no  doubt,  and 
1  am  certain  that  the  agents  who  have  been  connected  with  them  are  as 
much  to  blame  as  any  one  else.  So  far  as  the  Chivington  fight  was 
concerned,  it  occurred  before  I  assumed  command.  I  condemned  it,  and  I 
have  issued  orders  that  no  such  acts  will  be  tolerated  or  allowed ;  that  the 
Indians  on  the  warpath  must  be  fought  wherever  and  whenever  found,  but 
no  outrages  or  barbarities  must  be  committed.  I  am  convinced  that  the 
only  way  to  effectually  settle  these  troubles  is  for  us  to  move  our  columns 
directly  into  their  country,  punish  them  when  we  find  them,  show  them  our 
power,  and  at  the  same  time  give  them  to  know  that  we  are  ready  to  make 


104  THE  IXDIAX  CAMPAIGN. 


peace  with  them — not,  however,  by  paying  them  for  murdering  our  people 
and  plundering  our  trains  and  posts,  but  by  informing  them  that  if  they  will 
refrain  from  further  hostilities  they  shall  not  be  molested ;  that  neither 
agents  nor  citizens  shall  be  allowed  to  go  among  them  to  swindle  them ; 
that  we  will  protect  them  in  their  rights  ;  that  we  will  enforce  compliance 
with  our  part  of  the  treaty,  and  will  require  them  to  do  the  same  on  their 
part.  Let  them  ask  for  peace.  We  should  keep  citizens  out  of  their 
country.  The  class  of  men  sent  among  them  as  agents  go  there  for  no  good 
purpose.  They  take  positions  for  the  sole  purpose  of  making  money  out 
of  the  Indians  by  swindling  them,  and  so  long  as  they  can  do  this  they 
shield  them  in  their  crimes. 

Colonel  Leavenworth,  who  stands  up  so  boldly  for  the  southern  In 
dians,  was  dismissed  from  the  United  States  service.  He  "blows  hot  and 
cold"  with  singular  grace.  To  my  officers  he  talks  war  to  the  knife;  to 
Senator  Doolittle  and  others  he  talks  peace.  Indeed,  he  is  all  things  to  all 
men.  When  officers  of  the  army  deal  with  these  Indians,  if  they  mistreat 
them,  we  have  a  certain  remedy  for  their  cases.  They  can  be  dismissed 
and  disgraced,  while  Indian  agents  can  only  be  displaced  by  others  perhaps 
no  better.  Now  I  am  confident  we  can  settle  these  Indian  difficulties  in 
the  manner  I  have  indicated.  The  Indians  say  to  me  that  they  will  treat 
with  an  officer  of  the  army  (a  brave),  in  all  of  whom  they  seem  to  have 
confidence,  while  they  despise  and  suspect  civilian  agents  and  citizens,  by 
whom  they  say  they  have  been  deceived  and  swindled  so  much  that  they 
put  no  trust  in  their  words.  I  have  given  orders  to  the  commanders  of  each 
of  my  columns  that  when  they  have  met  and  whipped  these  Indians,  or 
even  before,  if  they  have  an  opportunity,  to  arrange,  if  possible,  an  in 
formal  treaty  with  them  for  a  cessation  of  hostilities,  and  whatever  they 
agree  to  do,  to  live  to  strictly,  allowing  no  one,  either  citizen  or  soldier,  to 
break  it.  I  shall  myself  go  out  on  the  plains  in  a  few  weeks  and  try  to  get 
an  interview  with  the  chiefs  and  if  possible  effect  an  amicable  settlement  of 
affairs  ;  but  I  am  utterly  opposed  to  making  any  treaty  that  pays  them  for 
the  outrages  they  have  committed,  or  that  hires  them  to  keep  the  peace. 
Such  treaties  last  just  as  long  as  they  think  them  for  their  benefit,  and 
no  longer.  As  soon  as  the  sugar,  coffee,  powder,  lead,  etc.,  that  we  give 
them,  is  gone,  they  make  war  to  get  us  to  give  them  more.  We  must  first 
punish  them  until  we  make  them  fear  us  and  respect  our  power,  and  then 
we  must  ourselves  live  strictly  up  to  the  treaties  made.  No  one  desires 
more  than  I  do  to  effect  a  permanent  peace  with  these  Indians,  and  such  is 
the  desire  of  every  officer  under  me,  all  of  whom  agree  in  the  method  sug 
gested  for  bringing  it  about. 

Very  many  of  these  officers  on  the  plains  have  been  there  for  years, 
and  are  well  acquainted  with  these  Indians  and  their  character,  and  my  own 
opinions  in  this  matter  are  founded  not  alone  from  my  experience  and  ob 
servations  since  I  have  commanded  here,  but  also  with  intercourse  with 
them  on  the  plains  during  a  number  of  years  prior  to  the  war,  in  which 
time  I  met  and  had  dealings  with  nearly  every  tribe  east  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains.  Until  hostilities  cease  I  trust  that  you  will  keep  all  agents, 
citizens  and  traders  away  from  them.  When  peace  is  made  with  them,  if 
civilian  agents  and  citizens  are  sent  among  them,  send  those  who  you  know 
to  be  of  undoubted  integrity.  I  know  you  desire  to  do  so,  and  from  the 
appointments  you  have  already  made  I  believe  you  will  be  successful.  My 
plan,  however,  would  be  to  keep  these  Indians  under  the  care  of  officers  of 
the  army,  stationed  in  their  country ;  that  what  is  given  them  be  given  by 
these  officers,  and  that  all  citizens,  agents  and  traders  should,  while  among 
them,  be  subject  to  their  (the  officers')  supervision  and  police  regulations. 
In  this  way  I  have  no  doubt  these  Indians  can  be  kept  in  their  own  coun 
try,  their  outrages  stopped,  and  our  overland  routes  kept  safe.  Now,  not 
a  train  or  coach  of  any  kind  can  cross  the  plains  in  safety  without  being 
guarded,  and  I  have  over  3,000  miles  of  route  to  protect  and  guard.  The 


THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  105 


statement  that  the  Sand  Creek  affair  was  th<>  first  Indian  aggression  is  a 
mistake.  For  months  prior  to  that  affair  the  Indians  had  been  attacking 
our  trains,  posts,  and  ranches  ;  had  robbed  the  emigrants  and  murdered  any 
party  they  considered  too  weak  to  defend  themselves. 

The  theory  that  we  cannot  punish  these  Indians  effectually,  and  that 
we  must  make  or  accept  any  kind  of  a  peace  in  order  to  hold  our  overland 
routes,  is  not  sustained  by  the  facts,  is  singularly  erroneous,  and  I  cannot 
agree  to  it  by  any  means.  I  have  now  seven  different  columns  of  troops 
penetrating  their  country  in  all  directions,  while  at  the  same  time  I  am 
holding  the  overland  routes.  This  display  of  force  alone  will  alarm  and 
terrify  them  ;  will  show  them  that  we  are  in  earnest,  have  the  power,  and 
intend  at  all  hazards  to  make  them  behave  themselves.  After  we  have 
taught  them  this  they  will  sue  for  peace  ;  then  if  the  government  sees  fit 
to  indemnify  them  for  any  wrongs  inflicted  upon  them,  they  will  not  charge 
it  to  our  fears  or  inability  to  cope  with  them.  The  cost  of  carrying  on  this 
war  with  them  is.  to  be  sure,  considerable  ;  but  the  question  arises,  Had  we 
not  better  bear  this  cost  now  while  the  preparations  are  made  and  the 
force  on  hand  ready  to  be  thrown  in  such  strength  into  their  country  as 
to  make  quick,  effective,  and  final  work  of  it,  than  to  suffer  a  continuance 
of  their  outrages  for  a  long  time  and  finally  have  to  do  the  work  at  greater 
expense  of  blood  and  treasure?  I  have  written  you  this  frankly  and  truly, 
knowing  that  you  want  to  get  at  the  facts  and  do  that  which  is  for  the 
best,  and  I  am  convinced  that  when  you  fully  understand  these  matters  you 
will  agree  with  me.  I  shall  be  glad  at  any  and  all  times  to  furnish  you  any 
information  in  my  possession  that  you  may  desire,  and  I  assure  you  I  shall 
bend  all  my  energies  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  great  object  in  view  and 
so  much  desired — a  lasting  and  just  peace  with  these  Indians. 

I   have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant. 

G.  M.  DODGE, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

Since  writing  this  report  of  the  Indian  campaign  of  1865 
and  1866,  I  have  seen  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Gideon  Wells's  diary 
of  the  reconstruction  period,  from  which  the  following  extracts 

are  takcn  :  Tuesday,  August  8,  1865. 

Stanton  submitted  a  number  of  not  material  questions,  yet  possessed 
of  some  little  interest.  Before  the  meeting  closed  the  subject  of  army 
movements  on  the  plains  came  up,  and  Stanton  said  there  were  three  col 
umns  of  twenty-two  thousand  troops  moving  into  the  Indian  country,  with 
a  view  to  an  Indian  campaign.  Inquiry  as  to  the  origin  and  authority  of 
such  a  movement  elicited  nothing  from  the  War  Secretary.  He  said  he 
knew  nothing  on  the  subject.  He  had  been  told  there  was  such  a  move 
ment,  and  Meigs  had  informed  him  it  was  true.  Grant  had  been  written  to 
for  information,  but  Grant  was  away  and  he  knew  not  when  he  should  have 
a  reply.  The  expenses  of  this  movement  could  not,  he  said,  he  less  than 
.$50,000,000.  But  he  knew  nothing  about  it. 

Friday,  August  11,  1865. 

The  question  of  the  Indian  war  on  the  plains  was  again  brought  for 
ward.  No  one,  it  appears,  has  any  knowledge  on  the  question.  The  Secre 
tary  of  War  is  in  absolute  ignorance.  Says  he  has  telegraphed  to  General 
Grant,  and  General  Grant  says  he  has  not  ordered  it.  McCulloch  wanted  to 
know  the  probable  expense — the  numbers  engaged,  etc.  Stanton  thought 
McCulloch  had  better  state  how  many  should  be  engaged — said  General 
Pope  had  command.  Harlan  said  he  considered  Pope  an  improper  man — 
was  extravagant  and  wasteful.  Thought  twenty-two  hundred  instead  of 
twenty-two  thousand  men  was  a  better  and  sufficient  number. 

This  whole  thing  is  a  discredit  to  the  War  Department. 


10G  THE  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 


Tuesday,  August  15,  1865. 

Stanton  says  there  is  to  be  a  large  reduction  of  the  force  which  is 
moving  against  the  Indians.  That  by  the  1st  of  October  the  force  will  be 
about  6,000.  That  large  supplies  have  gone  on,  but  they  can  be  divided  or 
deflected  to  New  Mexico  and  other  points,  so  that  they  will  not  be  lost. 

Friday,  August  18,  1865. 

Senator  Doolittle  and  Mr.  Ford,  who  have  been  on  a  mission  to  the 
plains,  visiting  New  Mexico,  Colorado,  etc.,  had  an  interview  with  the 
President  and  Cabinet  of  an  hour  and  a  half.  Their  statement  in  relation 
to  the  Indians  and  Indian  affairs  exhibits  the  folly  and  wickedness  of  the 
expedition  which  has  been  gotten  up  by  somebody  without  authority  or  the 
knowledge  of  the  Government. 

Their  strong  protestations  against  an  Indian  war,  and  their  statement 
of  the  means  which  they  had  taken  to  prevent  it,  came  in  very  opportunely. 
Stanton  said  General  Grant  had  already  written  to  restrict  operations;  he 
had  also  sent  to  General  Meigs.  I  have  no  doubt  a  check  has  been  put  on  a 
very  extraordinary  and  unaccountable  proceeding,  but  I  doubt  if  an  active 
stop  is  yet  put  to  war  expenses. 

It  is  no  wonder  that  with  such  ignorance  in  the  Cabinet  as 
to  the  condition  of  the  country,  that  the  administration  at  Wash 
ington  was  so  incompetent  in  the  Civil  War.  Xo  person  can  read 
Secretary  Wells's  diary  of  the  daily  doings  at  Washington  of  the 
Cabinet  during  President  Lincoln's  administration  and  see  how 
little  appreciation  and  support  he  got  from  his  Cabinet.  Dissen 
sions  among  themselves  and  hardly  ever  agreeing  on  any  important 
question,  brings  to  view  the  great  responsibility  of  the  President  and 
the  fact  that  in  all  the  important  matters  he  was  dependent  upon 
his  own  judgment.  The  Cabinet  knew  nothing  of  the  Indian  depre 
dations  that  for  three  months  held  all  the  lines  of  travel,  mail,  and 
telegraph  crossing  the  plains  to  California,  with  every  State  and 
Territory  west  of  the  Missouri  River  appealing  for  protection, 
until  President  Lincoln  wrote  to  General  Grant  to  try  and  have 
something  done  to  protect  that  country.  General  Grant  instructed 
me  to  make  the  campaign  in  the  winter  of  1864-65,  which  was  ?o 
successful  that  in  forty  days  all  the  overland  routes  were  opened, 
and  the  stage,  telegraph,  and  mails  replaced,  as  shown  in  my  re 
ports,  though  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  every  tribe  of 
Indians  from  the  British  Possessions  to  the  Indian  Territory  was 
at  war,  with  captures  and  murders  of  settlers  along  all  the  overland 
routes,  in  all  the  frontier  States,  e  very-day  occurrences ;  with  women 
and  children  captured  and  outrages  committed  that  cannot  be  men 
tioned.  And  yet  this  Cabinet  had  no  knowledge  of  the  conditions, 
and  concluded  from  the  report  of  the  Doolittle  Peace  Commission 
that  the  Indian  expedition  was  a  complete  failure,  notwithstanding 
that  this  commission  failed  to  make  peace  with  a  single  tribe  of 


Tin-:  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  107 

Indians  and  failed  to  stop  the  depredations  of  any  hand  of 
Indians;  and,  upon  its  report,  declaring  that  the  Indian  expedi 
tions  were  a  folly  and  wickedness  gotten  up  by  some  one  without 
the  authority  or  knowledge  of  the  Government. 

There  never  were  2*2,000  troops  on  the  plains,  nor  one-half  of 
that  number.  The  War  Department  may  have  sent  that  number 
out,  but,  as  I  have  shown,  they  were  all  mustered  out  before  they 
reached  their  work;  and  the  cost  of  the  campaign  with  a  year's 
supplies  at  the  posts  for  all  the  troops  on  the  plains  or  engaged 
in  the  campaign  was  not  more  than  $10,000,000,  a  very  small 
amount  compared  with  the  trouble  and  cost  of  fighting  these 
Indians  for  ten  years  thereafter.  Secretary  Harlan  says  that  2,200 
troops  were  sufficient.  When  I  took  command,  in  January,  1865, 
there  were  not  to  exceed  5,000  troops  guarding  trains,  stages,  and 
telegraph-lines,  and  protecting  all  the  routes  of  travel  across  the 
plains,  and  they  had  utterly  failed.  All  travel  had  been  stopped 
and  no  expeditions  against  the  Indians  had  been  made.  The 
Indians  had  held  the  overland  routes  for  three  months  in  spite  of 
these  troops.  It  shows  how  little  knowledge  Secretary  Harlan  had 
of  the  condition  of  Indian  affairs  in  his  department.  From  the 
statements  of  Secretary  Wells  it  is  evident  where  the  order  came 
from  to  stop  all  operations  on  the  plains  and  withdraw  all  troops 
by  October  15th.  When  Secretary  Stanton  states  that  by  October 
1st  the  troops  on  the  plains  would  be  reduced  to  6,000,  it  shows 
how  little  knowledge  he  had  of  affairs  in  his  department,  for  at 
that  time  there  were  not  6,000  troops  on  the  plains  or  in  my  com 
mand. 

It  is  well  that  no  one  knew  the  condition  of  affairs;  that  no 
one  was  aware  of  the  ignorance  of  the  group  of  statesmen  at  Wash 
ington  who  were  supposed  to  be  responsible  for  our  nation  and  its 
preservation.  They  did  not  seem  to  know  where  to  ascertain  the 
facts.  It  would  seem  that  Secretary  Stanton  purposely  wished  to 
place  a  reflection  on  General  Grant,  for  he  must  have  known  that 
he  was  responsible  for  the  Army  and  for  all  of  its  movements.  It 
seems  that  General  Grant  was  away  at  the  time  the  dispatches  of 
General  Pope  and  myself  were  sent  showing  the  necessity  of  con 
tinuing  the  campaign  and  punishing  these  savages.  When  he  re 
turned  he  tried  to  stop  this  Cabinet  panic,  but  his  dispatches  in 
answer  to  those  from  Pope  and  myself  show  that  he  could  not  da 
it,  and  the  fatal  mistake  was  made  of  stopping  the  campaign  just 


108  Tin-:  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 

as  it  was  accomplishing-  and  successfully  ending  a  year's  work. 
It  seems  to  have  all  come  about  through  the  misrepresentation  of 
the  Doolittle  Peace  Commission  and  the  lack  of  proper  information 
on  the  part  of  the  Cabinet. 

In  the  years  1863,  1864  and  1865  the  Indians  deliberately 
made  war,  believing  that  the  Civil  War  had  so  crippled  us  that 
we  could  not  effectively  contend  with  them;  but  just  as  we  had 
spent  millions  of  dollars,  sent  thousands  of  troops  into  their  coun 
try,  and  commenced  fighting  and  capturing  them,  we  were  forced 
to  lay  down  our  arms  almost  in  sight  of  the  line  of  battle  and  beg 
for  peace,  and  the  Indians  believed  they  had  defeated  us  and  that 
we  could  not  conquer  them,  and  for  from  three  to  ten  years  after 
ward  we  had  to  spend  great  sums,  make  winter  campaigns,  and 
suffer  great  losses  of  life  and  property,  before  we  obtained  the  last 
ing  peace  which  was  in  sight  in  1865  and  1866  if  we  had  been 
allowed  to  carry  out  our  campaigns  and  plans  to  a  legitimate  end. 

Upon  the  close  of  my  campaigns  on  the  plains  the  Legisla 
ture  of  the  State  of  Iowa  passed  and  sent  me  these  commendations 
of  my  services : 

Resolved,  By  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  State 
of  Iowa,  That  the  thanks  of  the  people  of  this  State  are  due  and  are  hereby 
extended  to  Major-General  Grenville  M.  Dodge,  for  his  able  and  efficient 
management  of  Indian  affairs  on  the  plains,  in  protecting  the  Great  Over 
land  Routes,  and  our  western  borders  from  the  depredations  and  incursions 
of  hostile  Indians,  as  also  for  his  distinguished  services  as  a  commander  in 
the  field,  and  his  able  administration  of  the  Department  of  the  Missouri. 

During  this  campaigning  on  the  plains  I  had  as  my  escort 
Company  A,  Fourteenth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  They  belonged  to 
one  of  the  Eegiments  that  was  sent  from  the  East  to  take  part  in 
the  Indian  campaigns,  and  did  not  ask  to  be  mustered  out  until 
after  the  campaign.  I  was  greatly  indebted  to  this  company  for 
the  close  attention  they  gave  to  me  and  the  intelligence  they  showed 
during  the  whole  trip.  They  had  served  faithfully  in  the  Civil 
War,  and  their  veteran  experience  there  was  a  great  benefit  in 
the  work  they  had  to  do  on  the  plains,  often  in  taking  messages 
and  performing  other  duties  where  only  two  or  three  of  them 
could  be  detailed  at  a  time.  It  has  always  been  a  great  pleasure  to 
me  to  have  had  an  invitation,  ever  since  they  organized  their  soci 
ety,  to  attend  their  reunions,  but,  unfortunately,  I  have  been  so 
far  away  that  I  could  not  go ;  and  to  the  surviving  members  I  with 
great  pleasure  extend  my  thanks  for  their  good  services  to  me. 


3    O 

O) 


DS° 


P^          •-!       .     ft 

02       _•  P-i   * 


S       D  fl  | 


W  »— ^ 

2  II  * 

I  Slrf- 

<^  ^   <y  ^ 


H  •al.g 

O       'S   b*  G 


•5!  M          «S 

^C^  '      g      ^i 

^  .2.S  o^ 

<]j  *    P,     .«M 


g 

s 

<    -3 


ffl  IP! 

i,*5  3 


^  T3  C^ 

Q^hH- 


CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE 
RIVER  VALLEY 


GENERAL  DODGE 
IN  THE  REAR  OF  GENERAL  BRAGG'S  ARMY 

AND 

COLONEL  STREIGHT'S  RAID 
SPRING  OF  1863 

When  General  Grant  planned  the  second  campaign  against 
Vicksburg  he  notified  me,  then  in  command  of  the  District  of 
Corinth,  with  about  eight  thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand 
cavalry,  that  he  intended  to  take  my  command  with  him ;  but  a 
few  days  before  starting  he  sent  one  of  his  staff  officers  to  me  stating 
that  he  had  concluded  to  leave  me  with  my  command  and  some 
additional  troops  to  hold  that  flank  while  he  moved  on  Vicksburg. 
This  dispatch  was  a  great  disappointment  to  myself  and  my  com 
mand.  When  the  officer  returned  to  General  Grant  he  no  doubt  told 
him  of  our  disappointment,  as  General  Grant  wrote  me  a  letter 
stating  that  my  command  was  of  much  more  importance  than  a 
command  directly  under  him,  and  said  he  had  fears  that  General 
Bragg,  who  was  then  facing  General  Rosecrans  in  Middle  Ten 
nessee,  might  detach  a  portion  of  his  force,  cross  the  Tennessee 
River,  and  endeavor  to  make  a  lodgment  on  the  Mississippi  River  at 
some  point  and  break  up  his  communications  with  the  North, 
with  a  view  of  forcing  him  to  abandon  the  campaign.  He  said  he 
had  left  me  to  take  care  of  that  flank,  as  he  knew  I  would  stay 
there.  I  read  between  the  lines  and  learned  what  was  expected 
of  me. 

General  Grant,  in  discussing  this  order  of  his  afterwards,  said 
that  he  had  learned  from  my  services  under  him  that  I  was  pecu 
liarly  fitted  for  such  a  command,  where  I  had  to  rely  on  my  own 
judgment,  and  that  I  acted  promptly  without  waiting  for  orders, 
and  that  it  came,  he  thought,  from  my  experience  before  the  war, 

— 111 — 


112  CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE. 

when  I  was  always  in  charge  of  engineering  parties  in  the  field 
and  often  in  a  hostile  Indian  country  where  I  had  to  act  promptly 
in  any  emergency.  There  was,  at  that  'time,  quite  a  large  force  in 
my  front  and  between  me  and  General  Bragg,  commanded  by 
General  Earl  Van  Dorn,  General  X.  B.  Forrest,  and  General  P.  D. 
Eoddey.  This  force  was  collecting  supplies  and  storing  them  along 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  from  Bear  River  to  Decatur, 
Ala.  The  Tennessee  Valley  in  this  territory  was  twenty  miles  wide, 
and  full  of  all  kinds  of  supplies.  I  wrote  to  General  Grant  about 
this  storage  of  supplies  for  General  Bragg's  Army,  and  suggested 
that  I  move  up  the  Tennessee  Valley  with  my  force  to  destroy 
these  stores  and  whatever  there  was  in  the  valley  that  Bragg's  Army 
could  utilize ;  but  General  Grant  made  no  response  then  to  my  sug 
gestion.  In  February  I  discovered  a  movement  of  the  force  in  my 
front  towards  General  Rosecrans's  Army  and  notified  him  in  the 
following  dispatch : 
Major-General  Rosecrans:  CORINTH,  Miss.,  February  10,  1863. 

One  of  my  scouts  left  Van  Dorn  Sunday  night.  He  then  had  two 
regiments  and  one  battery  across  the  Tombigbee,  at  Cotton-Gin  Port ;  was 
crossing  slowly,  and  all  his  forces  had  not  got  to  him.  His  men  and  officers 
said  he  was  going  to  Bragg.  His  stock  is  not  in  good  condition.  He 
appears  to  be  going  the  Pikevill  and  Russellville  road.  Streams  are  high, 
and  roads  bad.  We  captured  mail  from  Bragg's  Army  yesterday.  All  the 
officers'  and  privates'  letters  express  a  belief  that  Bragg  is  fixing  to  fall 
back ;  some  say  to  Huntsville,  some  to  Bridgeport.  You  can  judge  how  re 
liable  such  suspicions  are.  I  have  endeavored  to  get  a  gunboat  up  to  Flor 
ence,  and  if  one  could  go  there  it  could  destroy  all  the  forces,  and  check  Van 
Dorn  materially.  I  will  co-operate  with  it  in  any  way  to  benefit  the  service. 

G.  M.  DODGE, 

Brigadier-General. 

On  February  16th  General  Van  Dorn's  command  commenced 
crossing  the  Tennessee  to  join  General  Bragg's  Army.  I  sent  my 
cavalry  to  attack  him.  I  wired  General  Rosecrans  that  we  had 
attacked  Van  Dorn's  rear  guard  and  took  some  fifty  prisoners  from 
him.  He  had  with  him  General  Roddey,  commander  of  some 
fifteen  hundred  men,  of  which  we  captured  about  two  hundred. 
These  prisoners  said  they  were  ordered  to  join  General  Bragg's 
Army.  General  Rosecrans,  in  answer  to  my  dispatch,  sent  me  this 

MURFREESBOROUGH.  February  16,  1863. 
Brigadier-General  Dodge,  Corinth,  Miss.: 

Hurlbut's  request  and  my  own  coincide.  Hope  you  will  be  able  to 
cut  off  some  of  Van  Dorn's  command.  Will  give  you  all  our  news  in  your 
direction.  Accept  my  thanks  for  your  promptness  and  energy. 

W.  S.  ROSECRANS, 

Major-GeneraL 


N    fl>   TILE    Tl-XX  KSSEK.  113 


Soon  at'tiT  this  (Ji-iu-ral  Hosccrans  cmu-rivi'd  the  idea  of  send 
ing  Colonel  A.  D.  Stivight  with  two  thousand  mounted  cavalry 
and  infantry  from  Nashville  by  boat  to  Eastport,  Miss.,  to  go  from 
there  east  to  Georgia,  destroying  the  railroads  and  supplies  Bragg'  s 
annv  was  depending  on,  and  then  move  south  and  west,  finally  land 
ing  in  Corinth,  Miss.  General  Rosecrans  proposed  that  I  should 
send  two  brigades  to  luka  in  support  of  this  movement,  which 
General  Grant  acceded  to,  and  said  in  making  this  movement  for 
me  to  go  on  and  carry  out  the  plan  I  had  suggested  in  destroying 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Eailroad  and  the  supplies  gathered 
along  it.  I  sent  this  dispatch,  giving  my  plan  of  the  movement: 

HDQRS.  DIST.  OF  CORIXTTI.  DEPKT.  OF  THE  TENNESSEE. 

CORINTH,  April  4>  1863. 
Henry  Btnmore,  Assistant  Adjutant-General: 

CAPTAIN:  —  In  accordance  with  Major-General  Hurlbut's  dispatch,  I 
submit  the  plan  of  operations  east  of  here.  General  Rosecrans  proposes  to 
land  a  force  at  Florence,  attack  and  take  that  place,  while,  with  a  heavy  body 
of  cavalry,  he  penetrates  Alabama  north  of  Tennessee  River,  and  gets  into 
Johnson's  rear.  At  the  same  time  I  am  to  strike  and  take  Tuscumbia,  and, 
if  practicable,  push  my  cavalry  to  Decatur,  destroy  tho  saltpeter  works, 
and  the  Tuscumbia  and  Decatur  Railroad,  which  they  have  just  finished, 
and  take  all  the  horses  and  mules  in  that  country,  to  prevent  them  from 
raising  any  large  crops.  To  do  this,  I  propose  to  move  simultaneously 
with  General  Rosecrans,  throw  all  my  cavalry  suddenly  across  Bear  Creek, 
capture  the  ferries,  and  hold  them  until  my  infantry  and  artillery  arrive, 
and  then  immediately  force  my  cavalry  as  far  toward  Tuscumbia  as  pos 
sible,  and  secure  the  crossings  of  Little  Bear,  on  which  creek  the  enemy 
will  concentrate.  To  accomplish  this  I  shall  move  light,  taking  nothing  but 
ammunition  and  provisions,  and  march  twenty  miles  per  day,  with  infantry 
and  artillery.  I  shall  take  such  a  force  as  to  render  certain  the  success 
of  the  expedition,  and  propose  to  take  command  in  person.  The  movement 
is  to  be  made  next  week,  or  as  soon  as  General  Rosecrans  notifies  me  he 
is  ready.  I  trust  this  will  meet  the  view  of  the  General  commanding. 

I   am,   very   respectfully,   your  obedient  servant. 

G.   M.   DODGE, 
Brigadier-General  Commanding. 

To  ascertain  what  enemy  I  would  have  to  meet,  I  sent  my  chief 
of  staff,  Captain  George  E.  Spencer,  a  very  competent  officer  who 
was  a  genius  in  getting  inside  of  the  enemy's  lines,  with  a  communi 
cation  to  General  P.  D.  Roddey,  who  had  returned  to  Tuscumbia, 
and  was  in  command  of  the  rebel  forces  south  of  the  Tennessee 
River.  I  told  Captain  Spencer  that  the  communication  was  an 
important  one  and  he  must  not  deliver  it  to  any  one  except  General 
Roddey;  that  he  must  impress  upon  the  officer  on  the  enemy's 
picket-line  that  he  must  take  him  to  General  Roddey  and  in  that 
way  he  would  be  able  to  determine  very  closely  what  forces  I  would 
have  to  meet.  Captain  Spencer  went  prepared  to  do  this.  He  met 


114  CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE. 

the  picket  officer;  they  became  very  chummy,  and  the  officer  took 
Captain  Spencer  right  through  all  of  the  enemy's  forces  between 
Bear  River  and  Tuscimibia,  and  he  delivered  the  message  to  General 
Roddey,  who  was  in  great  anger  at  his  officer;  but  they  made  the 
best  of  it.  After  the  war,  Captain  Spencer  and  General  Roddey 
were  great  friends  and  I  believe  partners  in  some  business.  The 
result  of  Captain  Spencer's  trip  I  set  forth  in  the  following  dis 
patch  to  General  Oglesby : 
Major-General  Oglesty,  Jackson:  CORINTH.  April  17,  1863. 

My  A.  A.  G.,  Captain  George  E.  Spencer,  has  just  returned  from 
Tuscumbia  ;  succeeded  in  getting  through  all  the  enemy's  camps  and  obtain 
ing  valuable  information.  The  forces  are  posted  as  follows :  Colonel 
Uibrell,  900  men,  at  Tuscumbia  Landing ;  Colonel  Josiah  Patterson,  1,000, 
at  Florence ;  Colonel  M.  W.  Hannon,  1,800,  at  Tuscumbia ;  Colonel  Rod- 
dey's  old  regiment,  800,  at  Tuscumbia  Landing ;  Baxter  Smith,  350,  ten 
miles  this  side ;  Colonel  Hampton,  300  at  same  place ;  W.  R.  Julian,  300, 
at  Grey's,  six  miles  this  side ;  and  Smith,  100,  at  Big  Bear.  The  above  all 
cavalry.  Between  Courtland  and  Tuscumbia,  one  brigade  of  infantry,  under 
Colonel  Wood,  as  follows :  Colonel  A.  H.  Helvenston,  300 ;  Colonel 
J.  B.  Bibb,  500;  Colonel  W.  B.  Wood,  Sixteenth  Alabama,  400.  The  last 
brigade,  and  one  brigade  of  cavalry,  under  General  Roddey,  arrived  at 
Tuscumbia  last  week.  This  more  than  doubles  their  force.  They  have  also 
five  pieces  of  artillery  at  Florence  and  six  pieces  at  Tuscumbia. 

G.  M.  DODGE, 

Brigadier-General. 

Upon  notification  of  General  Rosecrans  of  the  movement  of 
Colonel  Streight,  I  moved  out  to  carry  out  the  combined  plan, 
engaging  the  enemy  at  Little  Bear  and  Tuscumbia,  and  defeated 
them  as  my  report  shows.  Colonel  Streight  was  greatly  delayed 
in  starting  from  Nashville,  and  was  only  partially  mounted,  his 
intention  being  to  complete  the  mount  of  his  force  as  he  traveled 
through  the  enemy's  country — a  fatal  mistake.  His  delay  in  reach 
ing  me  and  my  movement  caused  Bragg  to  send  General  Forrest 
to  join  General  Roddey;  and  so  by  the  time  General  Streight 
reached  Eastport,  April  21st,  the  force  before  me  had  been  doubled 
and  the  best  cavalry  officer  in  the  rebel  force  had  arrived  to  take 
command  in  my  front. 

Colonel  Streight  lost  part  of  his  horses  and  mules  while  unload 
ing  at  Eastport,  and,  although  I  made  an  effort  to  mount  him, 
stripping  my  own  transportation  and  scouring  the  country  in  my 
vicinity,  still  he  left  us  after  I  captured  Tuscumbia  the  second 
time,  on  May  26th,  with  two  hundred  of  his  men  dismounted  and 
one-half  of  the  rest  on  mules,  illy  prepared  for  such  a  trip.  I  told 
Colonel  Streight  that  I  would  hold  the  enemy  in  my  front  as  long 


CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE.  115 

as  possible,  but  the  moment  Colonel  Forrest  got  word  of  his  move 
ment  he  would  go  after  him  and  follow  him  to  death.  His  only 
salvation  was  to  get  three  or  four  days'  start  by  long  marches 
before  Forrest  learned  of  his  movement.  Colonel  Straight  was  an 
officer  peculiarly  fitted  for  such  a  raid.  He  was  active,  clear 
headed,  determined,  and  of  excellent  judgment,  and  his  many 
fights  with  Forrest  showed  him  full  of  resources;  but  his  two- 
days'  halt  at  Moulton,  the  heavy  rains,  and  the  condition  of  his 
stock,  were  fatal  to  him. 

On  the  morning  of  May  27th  I  felt  carefully  of  the  enemy 
and  found  them  in  my  front,  and  commenced  immediately  to  force 
them  back,  trying  to  make  them  believe,  if  they  discovered  Colonel 
Straight,  that  it  was  only  a  side  movement  into  the  loyal  part  of 
Alabama,  where  we  had  many  friends  and  where  we  enlisted  a 
Regiment  of  loyal  Alabamians,  which  was  afterwards  known  as  the 
First  Alabama  Cavalry,  commanded  by  Colonel  George  E.  Spencer, 
whose  Regiment  became  noted  for  its  valuable  service  throughout 
the  war.  General  Sherman  selected  it  as  his  headquarters  escort 
in  his  march  to  the  sea. 

Generals  Forrest  and  Roddey,  on  May  28th,  made  a  determined 
stand  to  halt  my  advance  on  Town  Creek.  The  high  water  delayed 
my  crossing,  but  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  after  my  force  had 
crossed  and  driven  the  enemy  from  the  heights  beyond,  I  discovered 
that  I  had  only  General  Roddey  and  his  force  in  my  front  and  1 
forced  my  cavalry  out  towards  Decatur  until  the  enemy  disappeared 
from  the  front.  The  evening  of  the  28th  I  notified  Colonel  Streight 
that  Forrest  was  still  with  me,  and  I  was  greatly  alarmed  to  find 
that  Colonel  Streight  was  still  directly  south  of  me,  when  I  hoped 
he  would  be  well  on  the  road.  When  General  Bragg  found  that  I 
was  continuing  my  advance  up  the  Tennessee,  destroying  his  stores, 
he  despatched  General  Van  Dorn  with  his  cavalry  command  to  cross 
the  Tennessee  at  Florence  and  get  in  my  rear,  but  as  soon  as  the 
enemy  disappeared  in  my  front,  I  turned  immediately  and  marched 
rapidly  back  to  Bear  River,  so  that,  if  General  Van  Dorn  succeeded 
in  crossing  the  Tennessee  River,  I  would  have  him  in  my  front. 
My  troops  destroyed  all  the  supplies  in  the  whole  Valley  of  the 
Tennessee,  burnt  the  railroad  stations,  and  destroyed  the  railroad 
so  that  it  was  never  rebuilt  until  after  the  war.  There  followed 
me  back  to  Corinth  almost  the  entire  negro  population  of  that 
valley.  They  came  in  every  conceivable  conveyance  from  their 


110  CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE. 

masters'  private  carriage  to  a  wheelbarrow,  and  they  had  hitched 
to  the  conveyances  sometimes  a  cow  and  horse  and  sometimes  a 
fine  team  of  horses,  or  a  cow  and  an  ox.  Hundreds  were  on  foot, 
with  their  household  goods  packed  on  a  mule,  a  horse,  or  a  cow. 
They  made  a  picturesque  column,  much  longer  than  my  command. 
At  night  their  camps  spread  over  a  large  territory,  the  camp-fires 
surrounded  by  the  most  motley  and  poorly-dressed  crowd  I  ever 
saw,  and  it  was  a  problem  to  me  what  I  could  do  with  them  or  what 
would  become  of  them  if  the  enemy's  forces  should  happen  to  get 
into  my  rear.  However,  we  all  arrived  safely  at  Corinth,  where  I 
established  the  great  contraband  camp  and  guarded  it  by  two  com 
panies  of  Negro  soldiers  that  I  uniformed,  armed,  and  equipped 
without  any  authority,  and  which  came  near  giving  me  trouble. 
Many  of  the  Negro  men  afterwards  joined  the  First  Alabama  Col 
ored  Infantry  and  other  Negro  Regiments  that  I  raised  and  mus 
tered  into  the  service. 

In  my  advance  up  the  Valley  of  the  Tennessee,  after  I  had 
passed  Beaver  Creek  the  enemy  got  into  my  rear,  committing 
depredations  and  picking  up  stragglers,  and  all  kinds  of  reports 
went  back  to  Corinth  of  our  fighting,  capture,  and  other  calamities 
too  numerous  to  mention.  These  reports  were  all  repeated  to  Gen 
eral  Grant,  who  said,  after  being  surfeited  with  them,  "Well,  if 
Dodge  has  accomplished  what  he  started  out  to  do,  we  can  afford  to 
lose  him/'  General  Grant  said  afterwards  in  discussing  this  move 
ment  that  he  knew  they  could  not  capture  or  destroy  the  kind  of 
troops  I  had  with  me  without  my  being  heard  from ;  that  they 
might  defeat  me,  but  they  could  not  capture  me ;  and  the  boys  used 
to  use  this  saving  in  rounding  up  what  value  I  was  to  the  service. 
As  my  own  report  and  that  of  Colonel  Streight  gives  more  and 
better  detail  of  the  movements  of  both,  and  the  results  I  submit 
them  here: 

I  moved  from  Corinth  with  the  Second  Division,  Sixteenth  Army 
Corps,  Wednesday,  April  15.  Camped  at  Burnsville.  The  next  day  moved 
to  Cook's,  two  and  a  half  miles  west  of  Great  Bear  Creek,  and  made  my 
preparations  to  cross,  the  rebels  holding  the  opposite  side. 

Friday  morning,  April  17,  I  made  a  feint  at  Jackson  and  Bailings 
Fords,  and,  under  the  cover  of  my  artillery,  threw  the  most  of  my  force 
across  at  Steminine's  Ford. 

The  cavalry,  under  Colonel  Cornyn,  and  mounted  infantry,  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Phillips,  made  the  crossing  and  pushed  forward.  My 
instructions  were  for  them  to  go  forward  three  and  a  half  miles,  and  await 
my  coming.  Colonel  Cornyn,  meeting  the  enemy  about  a  mile  out,  com 
menced  fighting  them,  they  falling  back  rapidly.  Hearing  of  Colonel 
Roddey  commanding  a  force  of  the  enemy  on  my  left  flank,  I  sent  orders 


CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNKSSKI:.  11 


forward  for  the  command  to  halt ;  but  before  the  messenger  got  to  him 
Colonel  Itoddey  had  got  between  the  cavalry  and  infantry.  The  Third 
Brigade  was  in  advance,  commanded  by  Colonel  Bane,  who,  ascertaining 
this  fact,  pushed  1'onvnrd  and  fell  upon  their  rear,  but  not  until  Colonel 
Roddey  had  taken  two  pieces  of  artillery,  twenty-two  men,  and  one  com 
pany  of  mounted  infantry,  who  were  guarding  it,  which,  through  neglect, 
had  been  allowed  to  fall  three  miles  in  the  rear  of  the  advance. 

Colonel  Cornyn,  hearing  firing  in  the  rear,  Immediately  fell  back, 
and  with  the  First  Alabama  Cavalry  charged  the  rebels  and  retook  the 
artillery  and  caissons,  with  the  exception  of  one  gun,  which  the  enemy 
succeeded  in  getting  off  with. 

The  charge  of  the  Alabamians  with  muskets  only,  and  those  not 
loaded,  is  creditable,  especially  as  they  are  all  new  recruits  and  poorly 
drilled.  In  this  charge,  Captain  Cameron,  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
Alabama  Cavalry,  a  deserving  and  much-lamented  officer,  was  killed. 

Colonel  Bane,  on  his  arrival,  disposed  of  his  troops  admirably. 
Colonel  Cornyn  advanced  with  his  cavalry  as  a  feint,  and  the  rebels 
advanced  to  meet  him.  He  fell  back  to  the  rear  of  the  infantry,  which 
was  posted  under  cover  and  out  of  sight  on  both  flanks  of  the  cavalry. 
On  the  appearance  of  the  enemy,  the  infantry  opened  a  heavy  and  destruc 
tive  fire,  which  caused  the  rebels  to  fall  back  in  confusion,  utterly  routed. 
This  day's  work  brought  us  thirteen  miles  in  advance  of  the  main  force. 

Colonel  Streight  not  arriving,  I  fell  back  with  the  advance  to  Great 
Bear  Creek,  where  the  rest  of  the  command  was  posted,  to  await  his  coming. 

Sunday  afternoon,  Colonel  Streight  commenced  landing  his  force  at 
Eastport,  but  came  poorly  prepared  for  his  contemplated  movement.  He 
had  two  thousand  infantry  and  about  one  thousand  mules.  At  least  four 
hundred  of  them  were  unserviceable,  and  in  unloading  them,  through  the 
carelessness  of  one  of  his  officers,  two  hundred  strayed  away.  He  was 
under  the  impression  that  he  would  find  plenty  of  stock  in  the  valley  to 
mount  the  rest  and  replace  those  broken  down.  During  Monday  and  Tuesday 
we  scoured  the  country,  and  found  all  we  could. 

Tuesday  night  Colonel  Fuller's  Brigade,  from  Corinth,  joined  me. 

Wednesday  morning  I  advanced  with  all  the  force,  and  came  up  with 
the  enemy  at  Rock  Cut,  five  miles  west  of  Tuscumbia ;  planted  my  batteries, 
and  drove  them  out  of  it,  taking  the  line  of  Little  Bear  Creek  that  night. 
The  enemy's  position  was  a  very  strong  one,  and  there  was  but  one  way 
to  flank  it.  The  enemy  fell  back  as  soon  as  I  brought  the  infantry  to  bear 
upon  them. 

Thursday  we  moved,  crossing  at  three  places,  throwing  my  cavalry 
by  the  Frankfort  and  Tuscumbia  road,  into  the  enemy's  rear ;  but  during 
the  night,  anticipating  this  movement,  the  enemy  fell  back.  We  reached 
Tuscumbia  about  noon,  and  after  slight  skirmishing  took  possession  of  the 
city.  I  immediately  dispatched  Lieutenant-Colonel  Phillips,  with  two 
squadrons  of  mounted  infantry,  two  squadrons  of  the  Fifteenth  Illinois 
Cavalry,  and  a  section  of  Welker's  battery,  to  take  Florence.  They 
refused  to  surrender,  when  Colonel  Phillips  immediately  opened  on  the 
town.  A  few  shell  brought  them  to  terms,  and  we  occupied  the  place.  At 
the  same  time  I  ordered  Colonel  Cornyn  forward  toward  Courtland,  to  feel 
the  enemy.  He  came  up  with  their  rear  some  two  miles  beyond  Leighton. 
The  command  consisted  on  our  part  of  the  Tenth  Missouri  and  Seventh 
Kansas  Cavalry,  about  eight  hundred  in  all,  and  drove  the  enemy  eight 
miles.  The  rebel  force  was  thirty-five  hundred,  besides  one  battery.  The 
fighting  of  the  cavalry  against  such  odds  is  beyond  all  praise. 

The  next  morning  the  cavalry  fell  back  to  Tuscumbia,  to  await  the 
advance  of  the  main  column. 

Finding  it  impossible  to  obtain  stock  to  mount  Colonel  Streight's 
command,  I  took  horses  and  mules  from  my  teams  and  mounted  infantry, 
and  furnished  him  some  six  hundred  head,  mounting  all  but  two  hundred 


118  CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE. 


of  his  men.  I  also  turned  over  all  my  hard  bread,  some  ten  thousand 
rations,  and  he  left  me  at  midnight  on  the  2(>th  instant,  with  the  intention 
of  going  through  Russellville,  Moulton,  and  Blountsville,  to  Gadsden,  then 
divide,  one  force  to  strike  Rome  and  the  other  Etowah  Bridge. 

I  moved  forward  Monday  morning,  and  drove  the  enemy  across  Town 
Creek  that  night,  and  ascertained  that  they  were  in  force,  under  Forrest, 
on  the  opposite  bank.  That  night  I  communicated  with  Colonel  Streight, 
at  Mount  Hope,  and  ascertained  that  he  was  all  right. 

Tuesday  morning  the  creek  rose  ten  feet,  and  the  current  was  so 
swift  that  neither  horse  nor  man  could  cross.  I  immediately  made  dis 
position  to  cross  at  three  points,  to  cover  the  railroad  bridge  and  throw 
across  foot-bridges. 

The  resistance  of  the  enemy  was  very  strong,  and  their  sharp 
shooters  very  annoying.  The  artillery  duel  was  very  fine,  parts  of  Welker's. 
Tannrath's,  Richardson's,  and  Robinson's  batteries  taking  part  in  it.  The 
practice  on  both  sides  was  excellent.  The  Parrott  guns  drove  the  enemy 
away  from  their  pieces,  disabling  and  keeping  them  away  for  two  hours,  but 
the  fact  of  my  being  unable  to  cross  infantry  prevented  our  securing  them. 

About  noon  I  crossed  the  railroad  bridge  with  the  Eighty-first  Ohio 
and  Ninth  Illinois  Infantry,  and  soon  after  crossed  the  rest  of  my  force, 
except  the  artillery,  on  foot-bridges,  and  drove  the  enemy  within  three 
miles  of  Gourtland,  when  they,  hearing  of  the  force  at  Moulton,  fled  to 
Decatur.  I  followed  up,  and  then  returned  to  camp  at  Town  Creek  that 
night,  being  unable  to  cross  any  of  my  artillery. 

Colonel  Streight  reached  Moulton  Tuesday  night,  and  commenced 
crossing  the  mountains  Wednesday,  having  got  nearly  two  days'  start  of 
them.  They  supposed  he  was  making  for  Decatur,  and  only  discovered 
Wednesday  that  he  was  crossing  the  mountains  toward  Georgia. 

Having  accomplished  fully  the  object  of  the  expedition,  and  driving 
the  enemy,  which  was  5,500  strong,  to  Decatur,  and  having  been  on  half 
rations  for  a  week,  I  fell  back  to  Tuscumbia,  in  order  to  communicate 
with  transports,  to  obtain  rations  and  ammunition.  On  arriving  there  I 
received  information  that  the  gunboats  had  gone  down  the  river,  taking 
the  transports  with  them,  a  part  of  Van  Dorn's  force  having  made  their 
appearance  on  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee  River  and  shelled  South 
Florence  that  day  at  4  p.  m.  They  also  planted  a  battery  at  Savannah 
and  Duck  River ;  but  my  precaution  in  destroying  all  means  of  crossing 
the  river  on  my  advance,  prevented  him  getting  in  my  rear,  and  the  gun 
boats,  to  save  the  transports,  left  the  day  before,  having  a  short  engage 
ment  at  Savannah  and  Duck  River.  Van  Dorn's  force  then  moved  toward 
Decatur.  That  was  the  last  we  heard  of  them. 

On  my  return  I  burned  all  provisions,  produce,  and  forage,  all  mills 
and  tan-yards,  and  destroyed  everything  that  would  in  any  way  aid  the 
enemy.  I  took  stock  of  all  kinds  that  I  could  find,  and  rendered  the  valley 
so  destitute  that  it  cannot  be  occupied  by  the  Confederates,  except  pro 
visions  and  forage  are  transported  to  them.  I  also  destroyed  telegraph 
and  railroad  between  Tuscumbia  and  Decatur,  and  all  the  ferries  between 
Savannah  and  Courtland. 

I  have  no  doubt  but  that  Colonel  Streight  would  have  succeeded  had 
he  been  properly  equipped  and  joined  me  at  the  time  agreed  upon.  The 
great  delay  in  an  enemy's  country  necessary  to  fit  him  out  gave  them  time 
to  throw  a  large  force  in  our  front.  Although  Colonel  Streight  had  two 
days'  start,  they  can  harass  him,  and  perhaps  check  his  movements  long 
enough  for  them  to  secure  all  their  important  bridges.  If  he  could  have 
started  from  Bear  Creek  the  day  I  arrived  there,  then  my  movements  would 
have  been  so  quick  and  strong  that  the  enemy  could  not  have  got  their 
forces  together. 

The  animals  furnished  him  were  very  poor  at  the  start.  Four  hundred 
of  them  were  used  up  before  leaving  me,  and  those  furnished  him  by  me 


CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE.  119 


were   about    all    the    serviceable    stock    he    had,    though    I    hear    he    got    two 
hundred  good  mules  the  day  he  left  me,  in  Moulton  Valley. 

On  my  return.  I  sent  Colonel  Cornyn,  with  the  Tenth  Missouri,  Sev 
enth  Kansas,  Fifteenth  Illinois  Cavalry,  and  Ninth  Illinois  Mounted 
Infantry,  to  attack  the  force  congregated  at  Tupelo  and  Okolona.  He 
came  up  with  the  enemy  on  Wednesday,  and  immediately  attacked  them, 
they  being  some  three  thousand  strong,  under  Major-General  S.  .T.  Gholson 
and  Brigadier-General  Iluggles.  Brigadier-General  Chalmers,  with  thirty- 
five  hundred  men,  was  at  Pontotoc,  but  failed  to  come  to  Gholson's  aid, 
though  ordered  to. 

Colonel  Cornyn  fought  so  determinedly  and  so  fast  that  he  soon 
routed  the  force  in  his  front,  driving  them  in  all  directions,  killing  and 
wounding  a  large  number  and  taking  one  hundred  prisoners,  including  some 
seven  officers ;  also  a  large  number  of  arms  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  horses, 
saddles,  etc. 

The  enemy  fled  toward  Okolona  and  Pontotoc,  and  Colonel  Cornyn 
returned  to  Corinth. 

The  expedition  so  far  can  be  summed  up  as  having  accomplished  the 
object  for  which  it  started,  the  infantry  having  marched  two  hundred  and 
fifty  miles  and  the  cavalry  some  four  hundred,  and  fought  six  successful 
engagements,  driving  the  enemy,  three  thousand  strong,  from  Bear  Creek 
to  Decatur,  taking  the  towns  of  Tuscumbia  and  Florence,  with  a  loss  not 
to  exceed  one  hundred,  including  three  officers.  Destroyed  a  million  and  a 
half  bushels  of  corn,  besides  large  quantities  of  oats,  rye,  and  fodder,  and 
five  hundred  thousand  pounds  of  bacon.  Captured  one  hundred  and  fifty 
prisoners,  one  thousand  head  of  horses  and  mules,  and  an  equal  number  of 
cattle,  hogs,  and  sheep ;  also  one  hundred  bales  of  cotton,  besides  keeping 
the  whole  command  in  meat  for  three  weeks.  Destroyed  the  railroad  from 
Tuscumbia  to  Decatur ;  also  some  sixty  flat-boats  and  ferries  in  the  Ten 
nessee  River,  thereby  preventing  Van  Dorn,  in  his  move,  from  crossing  to 
my  rear ;  also  destroyed  five  tan-yards  and  six  flouring-mills. 

It  has  rendered  desolate  one  of  the  best  granaries  of  the  South,  pre 
venting  them  from  raising  another  crop  this  year,  and  taking  away  from 
them  some  fifteen  hundred  negroes. 

We  found  large  quantities  of  shelled  corn,  all  ready  for  shipment, 
also  bacon,  and  gave  it  to  the  flames. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant.  (J.   M.   DODGE, 

Brigadier-General  U.  S.  A. 

The  following  is  Colonel  A.  D.  Streight's  report : 

General  Dodge  informed  me  that  there  was  no  doubt  but  Forrest  had 
crossed  the  Tennessee  River,  and  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Town  Creek ; 
hence,  he  agreed  to  advance  as  far  as  Courtland,  on  the  Decatur  road,  and, 
if  possible,  drive  the  enemy  in  that  direction,  but  if  they  (the  enemy) 
turned  toward  Moulton,  our  cavalry,  under  General  Dodge,  was  to  be  sent 
in  pursuit. 

With  this  understanding,  I  marched  from  Tuscumbia  at  11  p.  m.  on 
the  night  of  the  2Gth  instant  in  the  direction  of  Moulton,  via  Russellville. 
It  was  raining  very  hard,  and  the  mud  and  darkness  of  the  night  made  our 
progress  very  slow.  One  hundred  and  fifty  of  my  men  had  neither  horses 
nor  mules,  and  fully  as  many  more  had  such  as  were  unable  to  carry  more 
than  the  saddles ;  hence  fully  three  hundred  of  the  men  were  on  foot. 

It  was  expected  when  I  left  General  Dodge  that  the  greater  part  of 
my  command  would  be  able  to  reach  Moulton,  some  forty  miles  distant, 
by  the  next  night,  but,  owing  to  the  heavy  rains  and  consequent  bad  condi 
tion  of  the  roads,  it  was  impossible ;  consequently  I  dispatched  a  messen 
ger  to  General  Dodge,  stating  that  I  would  halt  at  Mount  Hope  and  wait 
for  the  portion  of  my  command  who  were  on  foot  to  come  up. 


120  CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TEXXKSSKI-:. 


We  continued  to  scour  the  country  for  horses  and  mules,  but  so  many 
of  those  drawn  at  Nashville  were  continually  failing,  that,  although  we 
were  successful  in  collecting  a  large  number,  still,  many  of  the  men  were 
\vithout  anything  to  ride. 

On  the  night  of  the  27th.  at  Mount  Hope.  I  received  word  from 
General  Dodge,  stating  that  he  had  driven  the  enemy,  and  that  I  should 
push  on.  My  command  had  not  all  come  up  yet.  nor  did  they  until  about 
10  a.  m.  the  next  day,  when  we  proceeded  to  Moulton,  where  we  arrived 
about  dark.  Up  to  this  time  we  had  been  skirmishing  occasionally  with 
small  squads  of  the  enemy,  but  I  could  hear  of  no  force  of  consequence 
in  the  country.  All  of  the  command  but  about  fifty  men  were  now  mounted. 

We  started  from  Moulton,  in  the  direction  of  Blountsville.  via  Day's 
Gap,  about  midnight  on  April  28.  The  two  previous  days  it  had  been 
raining  most  of  the  time,  and  the  roads  were  terrible,  though  on  the  evening 
of  the  28th  it  bid  fair  for  dry  weather,  which  gave  us  strong  hopes  of 
better  times. 

We  marched  the  next  day  (the  29th)  to  Day's  Gap,  about  thirty- 
five  miles,  and  bivouacked  for  the  night.  Every  man  now  was  mounted, 
and  although  many  of  the  animals  were  very  poor,  nevertheless  we  had 
strong  hopes  that  we  could  easily  supply  all  future  demands.  We  destroyed 
during  the  day  a  large  number  of  wagons  belonging  to  the  enemy,  la'den 
with  provisions,  arms,  tents,  etc.,  which  had  been  sent  to  the  mountains 
to  avoid  us,  but,  luckily,  they  fell  into  our  hands.  We  were  now  in  the 
midst  of  devoted  Union  people.  Many  of  Captain  Smith's  men  (Ala- 
bamians)  were  recruited  near  this  place,  and  many  were  the  happy  greetings 
between  them  and  their  friends  and  relations.  I  could  learn  nothing  of  the 
enemy  in  the  country,  with  the  exception  of  small  squads  of  scouting-parties, 
who  were  hunting  conscripts.  We  moved  out  the  next  morning  before  day 
light.  I  will  here  remark  that  my  men  had  been  worked  very  hard  in 
scouring  so  much  of  the  country,  and,  unaccustomed  as  they  were  to  riding, 
made  it  still  worse;  consequently,  they  were  illy  prepared  for  the  trying 
ordeal  through  which  they  were  to  pass.  I  had  not  proceeded  more  than 
two  miles,  at  the  head  of  the  column,  before  I  was  informed  that  the  rear 
guard  had  been  attacked,  and  just  at  that  moment  I  heard  the  boom 
of  artillery  in  the  rear  of  the  column.  I  had  previously  learned  that  the  gap 
through  which  we  were  passing  was  easily  flanked  by  gaps  through  the 
mountains,  both  above  and  below ;  consequently,  I  sent  orders  to  the  rear  to 
hold  the  enemy  in  check  until  we  could  prepare  for  action.  The  head  of 
the  column  was  at  the  time  on  the  top  of  the  mountain.  The  column  was 
moving  through  the  gap  ;  consequently  the  enemy  was  easily  held  in  check. 

I  soon  learned  that  the  enemy  had  moved  through  the  gaps  on  my 
right  and  left,  and  were  endeavoring  to  form  a  junction  in  my  advance ; 
consequently  I  moved  ahead  rapidly  until  we  passed  the  intersecting  roads 
on  either  flank  with  the  one  we  occupied.  The  country  was  open  sand 
ridges,  very  thinly  wooded,  and  afforded  fine  defensive  positions.  As  soon 
as  we  passed  the  point  above  designated  (about  three  miles  from  the  top 
of  the  mountains),  we  dismounted  and  formed  a  line  of  battle  on  a  ridge 
circling  to  the  rear.  Our  right  rested  on  a  precipitous  ravine  and  the  left 
was  protected  by  a  marshy  run  that  was  easily  held  against  the  enemy. 
The  mules  were  sent  into  a  ravine  to  the  rear  of  our  right,  where  they 
were  protected  from  the  enemy's  bullets.  I  also  deployed  a  line  of  skirmish 
ers,  resting  on  our  right  and  left  flanks  encircling  our  rear,  in  order  to 
prevent  a  surprise  from  any  detached  force  of  the  enemy  that  might 
approach  us  from  that  direction  and  to  prevent  any  straggling  of  either 
stray  animals  or  cowardly  men. 

In  the  meantime  I  had  instructed  Captain  Smith,  who  had  command 
of  our  rear  guard  (now  changed  to  our  front),  to  hold  his  position  until 
the  enemy  pressed  him  closely,  when  he  should  retreat  rapidly,  and,  if  pos 
sible,  draw  them  onto  our  lines,  which  were  concealed  by  the  men  lying 


CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE. 


down  immediately  back  of  the  top  of  the  ridge.  The  lines  were  left  suffi 
ciently  open  to  permit  Captain  Smith's  command  to  pass  through  near  the 
center.  I  had  two  twelve-pounder  mountain  howitzers,  which  were  stationed 
near  the  road  (the  center).  They  were  also  concealed.  We  had  hardly 
completed  our  arrangements  when  the  enemy  charged  Captain  Smith  in 
large  force,  following  him  closely,  and  no  sooner  had  he  passed  our  lines  than 
our  whole  line  rose  up  and  delivered  a  volley  at  short  range.  We  continued 
to  pour  a  rapid  fire  into  their  ranks,  which  soon  caused  them  to  give  way 
in  confusion  ;  but  their  re-inforcements  soon  came  up,  when  they  dismounted, 
formed,  and  made  a  determined  and  vigorous  attack.  Our  skirmishers  were 
soon  driven  in.  and  about  the  same  time  the  enemy  opened  upon  us  with  a 
battery  of  artillery. 

The  enemy  soon  attempted  to  carry  our  lines,  but  were  handsomely 
repulsed.  During  their  advance  they  had  run  their  artillery  to  within  three 
hundred  yards  of  our  lines,  and  as  soon  as  they  began  to  waver  I  prepared 
for  a  charge.  I  ordered  Colonel  Hathaway,  Seventy-third  Indiana,  and 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Sheets,  Fifty-first  Indiana,  on  the  left,  to  make  a  charge, 
in  order  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  battery,  and  immediately  threw  the 
Third  Ohio,  Colonel  Lawson,  and  the  Eightieth  Illinois,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Rodgers,  forward  rapidly,  hoping  to  capture  the  battery.  The  enemy,  after 
a  short  but  stubborn  resistance,  fled  in  confusion,  leaving  two  pieces  of 
artillery,  two  caissons,  ana  about  forty  prisoners,  representing  seven 
different  regiments,  a  larger  number  of  wounded,  and  about  thirty  dead  on 
the  field.  Among  the  former  was  Captain  William  H.  Forrest,  a  brother 
of  General  Forrest.  Our  loss  was  about  thirty  killed  and  wounded,  among 
the  latter  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sheets,  Fifty-first  Indiana  (mortally),  a  brave 
and  gallant  officer  and  one  that  we  were  illy  prepared  to  lose,  and  Lieuten 
ant  Pavey,  Eightieth  Illinois  (on  my  staff),  severely. 

It  was  now  about  31  o'clock,  fighting  having  continued  since  about  6 
o'clock  in  the  morning.  I  had  learned,  in  the  meantime,  that  the  enemy 
were  in  heavy  force,  fully  three  times  our  number,  with  twelve  pieces  of 
artillery,  under  General  Forrest  in  person  ;  consequently  I  was  fearful 
that  they  were  making  an  effort  to  get  around  us  and  attack  in  the  rear 
of  our  position ;  hence  I  decided  to  resume  the  march.  Everything  was 
soon  in  readiness,  and  we  moved  out,  leaving  a  strong  guard  (dismounted) 
in  the  rear,  to  check  any  immediate  advance  the  enemy  might  make  previous 
to  the  column  getting  in  motion.  We  were  not  too  soon  in  our  movements, 
for  the  column  had  hardly  passed  a  cross-road  some  six  miles  from  our  first 
battle-ground  when  the  enemy  were  discovered  advancing  on  our  left. 
Sharp  skirmishing  commenced  at  Crooked  Creek,  which  is  about  ten  miles 
south  of  Day's  Gap,  anu  finally  the  enemy  pressed  our  rear  so  hard  that  I 
was  compelled  to  prepare  for  battle.  I  selected  a  strong  position  about  a 
mile  south  of  the  crossing  of  the  creek,  on  a  ridge  called  Hog  Mountain. 
The  whole  force  soon  became  engaged  (about  one  hour  before  dark).  The 
enemy  strove  first  to  carry  our  right ;  then  charged  the  left ;  but  with  the 
help  of  the  two  pieces  of  artillery  captured  in  the  morning  and  the  two 
mountain  howitzers,  all  of  which  were  handled  with  good  effect  by  Major 
Vananda,  of  the  Third  Ohio,  we  were  able  to  repulse  them. 

Fighting  continued  until  about  10  p.  m.  when  the  enemy  were  driven 
from  our  front,  leaving  a  large  number  of  killed  and  wounded  on  the  field. 
I  determined  at  once  to  resume  our  march,  and  as  soon  as  possible  we  moved 
out.  The  ammunition  which  we  had  captured  with  the  two  guns  was 
exhausted,  and  being  very  short  of  horses,  I  ordered  the  guns  spiked  and  the 
carriages  destroyed.  I  had  ordered  the  Seventy-third  Indiana  (Colonel 
Hathaway)  to  act  as  rear  guard,  and  I  remained  in  the  rear  in  person, 
for  the  purpose  of  being  at  hand  in  case  the  enemy  should  attempt  to  press 
us  as  we  were  moving  out.  We  had  but  fairly  got  under  way  when  I 
received  information  of  the  enemy's  advance. 

The   moon  shone  very   brightly,   and   the  country  was  an  open   wood- 


122  CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE. 


land,  with  an  occasional  spot  of  thick  undergrowth.  In  one.  of  these  thickets 
I  placed  the  Seventy-third  Indiana,  lying  down,  and  not  more  than  twenty 
paces  from  the  road,  which  was  in  plain  view.  The  enemy  approached. 
The  head  of  his  column  passed  without  discovering  our  position.  At  this 
moment  the  whole  regiment  opened  a  most  destructive  fire,  causing  a  com 
plete  stampede  of  the  enemy.  I  will  here  remark  that  the  country  from 
Day's  Gap  to  Blountsville  (about  forty  miles)  is  mostly  uninhabited; 
consequently  there  is  nothing  in  the  country  for  man  or  beast.  I  had  hopes 
that  by  pushing  ahead  we  could  reach  a  place  where  we  could  feed  before 
the  enemy  would  come  up  with  us,  and,  by  holding  him  back  where  there 
was  no  feed,  compel  him  to  lay  over  a  day  at  least  to  recuperate.  I  had 
learned  that  they  had  been  on  a  forced  march  from  Town  Creek,  Ala.,  a 
day  and  two  nights  previous  to  their  attacking  us.  We  were  not  again 
disturbed  until  we  had  marched  several  miles,  when  they  attacked  our 
rear  guard  vigorously.  I  again  succeeded  in  ambuscading  them,  which 
caused  them  to  give  up  the  pursuit  for  the  night.  We  continued  our  march, 
and  reached  Blountsville  about  10  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Many  of  our 
mules  had  given  out,  leaving  their  riders  on  foot,  but  there  was  very  little 
straggling  behind  the  rear  guard. 

At  Blountsville  we  found  sufficient  corn  to  feed  our  tired  and  hungry 
animals.  Ammunition  and  rations  were  hastily  distributed  to  the  men, 
and  the  remaining  ammunition  was  put  on  pack-mules  and  the  wagons 
burned,  as  it  was  now  understood  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  take  them 
over  the  roads  before  us.  After  resting  about  two  hours,  we  resumed  our 
march  in  the  direction  of  Gadsden. 

The  column  had  not  got  fairly  under  motion  before  our  pickets  were 
driven  in,  and  a  sharp  skirmish  ensued  between  Forrest's  advance  and  our 
rear  guard,  under  Captain  Smith,  in  the  town  of  Blountsville.  The 
enemy  followed  closely  for  several  miles,  continually  skirmishing  with  the 
rear  guard,  but  were  badly  handled  by  small  parties  of  our  men  stopping 
in  the  thick  bushes  by  the  side  of  the  road  and  firing  at  them  at  short 
range,  and  when  we  reached  the  East  Branch  of  the  Black  Warrior  River 
the  ford  was  very  deep  and  the  enemy  pressed  so  closely  that  I  was  com 
pelled  to  halt  and  offer  him  battle  before  we  could  cross.  After  some 
maneuvering,  I  advanced  a  heavy  line  of  skirmishers,  who  drove  the  enemy 
out  of  sight  of  my  main  line,  when  I  ordered  the  troops,  except  the 
skirmishers,  to  cross  the  river  as  rapidly  as  possible.  After  all  had  crossed 
except  the  skirmishers,  they  were  rapidly  withdrawn,  under  cover  of  our 
artillery,  and  a  heavy  line  of  skirmishers  thrown  out  on  the  opposite  bank 
for  that  purpose.  It  was  about  5  p.  m.  when  the  last  of  the  command 
crossed  the  East  Branch  of  the  Black  Warrior.  We  proceeded  in  the 
direction  of  Gadsden  without  further  interruption,  with  the  exception  of 
small  parties  who  were  continually  harassing  the  rear  of  the  column,  until 
about  9  o'clock  the  next  morning,  May  2,  when  the  rear  guard  was  fiercely 
attacked  at  the  crossing  of  Black  Creek,  near  Gadsden.  After  a  sharp 
fight  the  enemy  was  repulsed. 

I  had  learned  in  the  meantime,  through  my  scouts,  that  a  large 
column  of  the  enemy  was  moving  on  our  left,  parallel  with  our  route, 
evidently  with  the  intention  of  getting  in  our  front,  which  made  it  necessary 
for  us  to  march  all  night,  though  the  command  was  in  no  condition  to  do 
so,  and,  to  add  still  more  to  my  embarrassment,  a  portion  of  our  ammuni 
tion  had  become  damaged  in  crossing  Will's  Creek,  which,  at  the  time,  was 
very  deep  fording.  I  only  halted  at  Gadsden  sufficiently  long  to  destroy  a 
quantity  of  arms  and  commissary  stores  found  there,  and  proceeded  on. 
Many  of  our  animals  and  men  were  entirely  worn  out  and  unable  to  keep 
up  with  the  column  ;  consequently  they  fell  behind  the  rear  guard  and  were 
captured. 

It  now  became  evident  to  me  that  our  only  hope  was  in  crossing  the 
river  at  Rome  and  destroying  the  bridge,  which  would  delay  Forrest  a  day 


CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TKNNKSSKI;.  123 


or  two  and  give  us  time  to  collect  horses  and  mules,  and  allow  the  command 
a  little  time  to  sleep,  without  which  it  was  impossible  to  proceed. 

The  enemy  followed  closely,  and  kept  up  a  continuous  skirmish  with 
the  rear  of  the  column  until  about  4  p.  m.,  at  which  time  we  reached  Blount's 
plantation,  about  fifteen  miles  from  Gadsden,  where  we  could  procure  forage 
for  our  animals.  Here  I  decided  to  halt,  as  it  was  impossible  to  continue 
the  march  through  the  night  without  feeding  and  resting,  although  to  do 
so  was  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement.  Accordingly,  the  command  was 
dismounted,  and  a  detail  made  to  feed  the  horses  and  mules,  while  the 
balance  of  the  command  formed  in  line  of  battle  on  a  ridge  southwest  of  the 
plantation. 

Meanwhile  the  rear  guard,  in  holding  the  enemy  in  check,  had  become 
severely  engaged  and  was  driven  in.  The  enemy  at  once  attacked  our  main 
line,  and  tried  hard  to  carry  the  center,  but  were  gallantly  met  and  repulsed 
by  the  Fifty-first  and  Seventy-third  Indiana,  assisted  by  Major  Vananda, 
with  two  mountain  howitzers.  They  then  made  a  determined  effort  to  turn 
our  right,  but  were  met  by  the  gallant  Eightieth  Illinois,  assisted  by  two 
companies  of  the  Third  Ohio. 

The  enemy,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  skirmishers,  then  fell  back 
to  a  ridge  some  half  a  mile  distant,  and  commenced  massing  his  force,  as  if 
preparing  for  a  more  determined  attack.  It  was  becoming  dark,  and  I 
decided  to  withdraw  unobserved,  if  possible,  and  conceal  my  command  in 
a  thicket  some  half  a  mile  to  our  rear,  there  to  lie  in  ambush  and  await 
his  advance.  In  the  meantime  I  had  ordered  Captain  Milton  Russell  (Fifty- 
first  Indiana)  to  take  two  hundred  of  the  best-mounted  men,  selected  from 
the  whole  command,  and  proceed  to  Rome,  and  hold  the  bridge  until  the 
main  command  could  come  up. 

The  engagement  at  Blount's  plantation  revealed  the  fact  that  nearly 
all  of  our  remaining  ammunition  was  worthless,  on  account  of  having  been 
wet.  Much  of  that  carried  by  the  men  had  become  useless  by  the  paper 
wearing  out  and  the  powder  sifting  away.  It  was  in  this  engagement  that 
the  gallant  Colonel  Hathaway  (Seventy-third  Indiana)  fell,  mortally 
wounded,  and  in  a  few  moments  expired.  Our  country  has  seldom  been 
called  upon  to  mourn  the  loss  of  so  brave  and  valuable  an  officer.  His 
loss  to  me  was  irreparable.  His  men  had  almost  worshiped  him,  and  when 
he  fell  it  cast  a  deep  gloom  of  despondency  over  his  regiment  which  was 
hard  to  overcome. 

We  remained  in  ambush  but  a  short  time  when  the  enemy,  who  by 
some  means  had  learned  of  our  whereabouts,  commenced  a  flank  movement, 
which  we  discovered  in  time  to  check.  I  then  decided  to  withdraw  as 
silently  as  possible,  and  push  on  in  the  direction  of  Rome,  but  as  a  large 
number  of  the  men  were  dismounted,  their  animals  having  given  out,  and 
the  remainder  of  the  stock  was  so  jaded,  tender-footed,  and  worn  down, 
our  progress  was  necessarily  slow  ;  yet,  as  everything  depended  on  our  reach 
ing  Rome  before  the  enemy  could  throw  a  sufficient  force  there  to  prevent 
our  crossing  the  bridge,  every  possible  effort  was  made  to  urge  the  command 
forward.  We  proceeded  without  interruption  until  we  reached  the  vicinity 
of  Centre,  when  one  of  my  scouts  informed  me  that  a  force  of  the  enemy 
was  posted  in  ambush  but  a  short  distance  in  our  front.  I  immediately 
threw  forward  a  line  of  skirmishers,  with  orders  to  proceed  until  they 
were  fired  upon,  when  they  should  open  a  brisk  fire  on  the  enemy,  and  hold 
their  position  until  the  command  had  time  to  pass. 

The  plan  worked  admirably,  for,  while  my  skirmishers  were  amusing 
the  enemy,  the  main  column  made  a  detour  to  the  right,  and  struck  the 
main  road  some  three  miles  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  our  main 
force  had  passed,  the  skirmishers  withdrew  and  fell  in  the  rear  of  the 
column.  I  was  then  hopeful  that  we  could  reach  Rome  before  the  enemy 
could  overtake  us.  My  principal  guide  had  thus  far  proved  reliable,  and 
I  had  made  particular  inquiries  of  him  as  to  the  character  of  the  road 


124  CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TEXM->> !•:::. 


and  the  country  the  evening  before,  and  he  assured  me  that  there  \ve.o  \.n 
difficult  streams  to  cross  and  that  the  road  was  good ;  hence  we  approached 
the  Chattanooga  River  at  the  ferry  without  any  information  as  to  the 
real  condition  of  things.  Captain  Russell  had  managed  to  ferry  the  last  of 
his  command  across  about  one  hour  previous  to  my  arrival,  but  the  enemy 
had  seized  and  run  off  the  boat  before  we  reached  there. 

I  then  ascertained  that  there  was  a  bridge  some  seven  or  eight  miles 
up  the  river,  near  Gaylesville.  and  procured  new  guides  and  pushed  on  as 
rapidly  as  possible  in  order  to  reach  the  bridge  before  the  enemy  should 
take  possession  of  it.  We  had  to  pass  over  an  old  coal-chopping  for  several 
miles,  where  the  timber  had  been  cut  and  hauled  off  for  charcoal,  leaving 
innumerable  wagon-roads  running  in  every  direction,  and  the  command  was 
so  worn  out  and  exhausted  that  many  were  asleep,  and  in  spite  of  every 
exertion  I  could  make,  with  the  aid  of  such  of  my  officers  as  were  able 
for  duty,  the  command  became  separated  and  scattered  into  several  squads, 
traveling  in  different  directions,  and  it  was  not  until  near  daylight  that  the 
last  of  the  command  had  crossed  the  river.  The  bridge  was  burned,  and  we 
proceeded  on  and  passed  Cedar  Bluff  just  after  daylight.  It  now  became 
evident  that  the  horses  and  mules  could  not  reach  Rome  without  halting  to 
rest  and  feed.  Large  numbers  of  the  mules  were  continually  giving  out. 
In  fact,  I  do  not  think  that  at  that  time  we  had  a  score  of  the  mules  drawn 
at  Nashville  left,  and  nearly  all  of  those  taken  in  the  country  were  bare 
footed,  and  many  of  them  had  such  sore  backs  and  tender  feet  that  it  was 
impossible  to  ride  them ;  but,  in  order  to  get  as  near  as  possible  to  the 
force  I  had  sent  ahead,  we  struggled  on  until  about  9  a.  m.  when  we  halted 
and  fed  our  animals.  The  men,  being  unaccustomed  to  riding,  had  become 
so  exhausted  from  fatigue  and  loss  of  sleep  that  it  was  almost  impossible 
to  keep  them  awake  long  enough  to  feed.  We  had  halted  but  a  short  time, 
when  I  was  informed  that  a  heavy  force  of  the  enemy  was  moving  on  our 
left,  on  a  route  parallel  with  the  one  we  were  marching  on,  and  was  then 
nearer  Rome  than  we  were.  About  the  same  time  I  received  this  informa 
tion  our  pickets  were  driven  in.  The  command  was  immediately  ordered 
into  line,  and  every  effort  made  to  rally  the  men  for  action,  but  nature  was 
exhausted,  and  a  large  portion  of  my  best  troops  actually  went  to  sleep 
while  lying  in  line  of  battle  under  a  severe  skirmish-fire.  After  some 
maneuvering,  Forrest  sent  in  a  flag  of  truce,  demanding  the  surrender  of 
my  forces.  Most  of  my  regimental  commanders  had  already  expressed  the 
opinion  that,  unless  we  could  reach  Rome  and  cross  the  river  before  the 
enemy  came  up  with  us  again,  we  should  be  compelled  to  surrender.  Con 
sequently,  I  called  a  council  of  war.  I  had  learned,  however,  in  the  mean 
time  that  Captain  Russell  had  been  unable  to  take  the  bridge  at  Rome.  Our 
condition  was  fully  canvassed.  As  I  have  remarked  before,  our  ammunition 
was  worthless,  our  horses  and  mules  in  a  desperate  condition,  the  men  were 
overcome  with  fatigue  and  loss  of  sleep,  and  we  were  confronted  by  fully 
three  times  our  number,  in  the  heart  of  the  enemy's  country,  and,  although 
personally  opposed  to  surrender,  and  so  expressed  myself  at  the  time,  yet 
I  yielded  to  the  unanimous  voice  of  my  regimental  commanders,  and  at  once 
entered  into  negotiations  with  Forrest  to  obtain  the  best  possible  terms 
I  could  for  my  command,  and  at  about  noon.  May  3.  we  surrendered  as 
prisoners  of  war. 

We  were  taken  to  Richmond,  Va.  The  men  were  soon  sent  through 
the  lines  and  exchanged.  My  officers  and  myself  were  confined  in  Libby 
Prison,  where  we  remained  until  the  night  of  February  9  last,  when  four  of 
my  officers  and  myself,  together  with  several  other  prisoners,  succeeded  in 
making  our  escape,  and  reached  Washington  in  safety  abouth  March  1. 
The  balance  of  my  officers,  or  nearly  all  of  them,  are  still  confined  as  pris 
oners  or  have  died  of  disease  the  result  of  long  confinement,  insufficient 
food,  and  cruel  treatment  at  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

I  am  unable  to  report  the  exact  number  of  casualties  in  the  command. 


CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE.  125 


but  from  the  best  information  I  have  been  able  to  obtain  there  were  fifteen 
officers  and  about  one  hundred  and  thirty  enlisted  men  killed  and  wounded. 
It  was  a  matter  of  astonishment  to  all  that  so  much  fighting  should  occur 
with  so  few  casualties  on  our  side ;  but  we  acted  purely  on  the  defensive, 
and  took  advantage  of  the  nature  of  the  country  as  best  we  could.  From 
actual  personal  observation  where  we  had  driven  the  enemy  from  the  field, 
and  from  what  my  surgeons,  left  with  our  wounded,  learned  in  relation 
to  the  loss  of  the  enemy,  I  am  convinced  that  we  killed  more  of  his  men  than 
we  lost  in  both  killed  and  wounded. 

Previous  to  the  surrender,  we  had  captured  and  paroled  about  two 
hundred  prisoners,  and  had  lost  about  the  same  number  in  consequence  of  the 
animals  giving  out,  and  the  men,  unable  to  keep  up,  broke  down  from 
exhaustion,  and  were  necessarily  picked  up  by  the  enemy  ;  but  in  no  case 
was  the  enemy  able  to  capture  a  single  man  in  any  skirmish  or  battle  within 
my  knowledge. 

I  deem  it  proper  to  mention  the  barbarous  treatment  my  wounded 
received  at  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Owing  to  the  nature  of  the  service 
we  were  performing,  we  were  compelled  to  leave  our  wounded  behind.  I 
provided  for  them  as  best  I  could  by  leaving  them  blankets  and  such  rations 
as  we  had,  and  two  of  my  surgeons  remained  behind  to  attend  them ;  but 
no  sooner  did  the  enemy  get  possession  of  our  hospitals  than  they  robbed 
both  officers  and  men  of  their  blankets,  coats,  hats,  boots,  shoes,  rations, 
and  money.  The  medical  stores  and  instruments  were  taken  from  the  sur 
geons,  and  my  wounded  left  in  a  semi-naked  and  starving  condition,  in  some 
instances  many  miles  from  any  inhabitants,  to  perish. 

Many  thanks  to  the  Union  ladies  of  that  country,  for  they  saved 
many  a  brave  soldier  from  a  horrible  death. 

In  reviewing  the  history  of  this  ill-fated  expedition,  I  am  convinced 
that  had  we  been  furnished  at  Nashville  with  800  good  horses,  instead  of 
poor,  young  mules,  we  would  have  been  successful,  in  spite  of  all  other 
drawbacks ;  or  if  General  Dodge  had  succeeded  in  detaining  Forrest  one 
day  longer,  we  would  have  been  successful  even  with  our  poor  outfit. 

A.  D.  STREIGHT, 
Colonel  Fifty-first  Indiana  Veteran  Volunteer  Infantry. 

On  my  return,  I  dispatched  Colonel  Corny n  with  his  Brigade 
to  the  attack  of  the  force  of  the  enemy  that  I  had  located  near 
Tupelo,  Miss.  He  tells  the  story  of  his  battle  better  than  I  can,  in 
his  official  report,  which  follows  : 

We  arrived  at  Tupelo  on  Tuesday,  May  5,  and  here  we  fought  the 
best-contested  fight  of  the  whole  expedition.  Just  before  entering  the  town 
of  Tupelo,  and  to  the  east  of  the  railroad,  it  is  necessary  to  cross  a  dense 
and  almost  impassable  swamp,  on  the  western  edge  of  which  runs  Old  Town 
Creek.  We  had  almost  reached  the  western  edge,  and  were  approaching, 
as  well  as  the  nature  of  the  swamp  would  permit,  the  bridge  over  this 
creek,  when  the  enemy,  entirely  unseen  by  us,  opened  upon  us  with  mus 
ketry.  I  immediately  threw  out  to  my  right  and  left  several  squadrons  of 
the  Tenth  Missouri,  who  succeeded  in  dislodging  the  enemy,  and  securing 
an  easy  passage  of  the  bridge  for  the  balance  of  the  command.  Still  keeping 
my  skirmishers  out  to  my  right  and  left,  and  an  advance  guard  in  front,  I 
moved  down  a  lane  to  the  left  and  south  of  the  town  and  massed  my 
command  in  an  open  field,  about  six  hundred  yards  from  the  southern  border 
of  Tupelo.  Here  word  was  brought  me  from  one  of  my  skirmishing  squad 
rons  that  the  enemy  were  drawn  up  in  line  on  their  front,  to  the  number  of 
six  hundred.  I  ordered  two  squadrons  of  the  Seventh  Kansas,  that  were 
armed  with  Colt's  revolving  rifles,  to  dismount  and  attack  them  on  foot, 
supporting  them  with  two  squadrons  of  the  Tenth  Missouri  (mounted). 


126  CAMPAIGN  UP  THE  TENNESSEE. 


under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bowen,  with  orders  to  charge  with  the  saber  as 
soon  as  the  enemy's  line  should  break.  This  order,  I  am  proud  to  say,  was 
well  obeyed  and  gallantly  executed  by  both  the  mounted  and  dismounted 
soldiers,  for  the  enemy  retired,  and  for  a  few  minutes  all  was  silent  along 
the  lines.  In  about  half  an  hour  from  the  first  attack,  sharp  firing  was 
heard  on  my  front,  and  the  enemy  was  advancing  toward  us  with  yells. 
I  immediately  moved  my  whole  force  to  the  rear  and  west  of  the  village, 
and,  placing  my  mountain  howitzers  upon  the  brow  of  a  hill,  I  sent  forward 
all  the  cavalry  except  one  squadron  of  the  Fifteenth  Illinois,  which  I 
ordered  to  dismount  and  support  the  battery.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Phillips, 
commanding  the  Ninth  Illinois  Mounted  Infantry,  having  been  detailed  for 
that  purpose  early  in  the  morning,  acted  as  the  rear  guard  and  guard  for  the 
train,  and,  knowing  that  the  rear  was  in  such  good  hands,  I  felt  no 
anxiety  on  that  account ;  and  this  important  trust  was  well  sustained.  As 
soon  as  my  front  had  become  fully  engaged  with  the  enemy,  who  fought 
with  considerable"  determination,  I  ordered  the  battery  to  shell  the  woods 
from  which  the  enemy  was  emerging.  This  fire  was  effective,  and  from 
that  moment  the  battle  became  general.  At  one  time  two  regiments  of 
mounted  infantry,  commanded  by  the  rebel  General  Ruggles,  forced  their 
way  between  my  fighting  column  and  my  reserve,  but  were  suddenly  induced 
to  retire  much  more  rapidly  than  they  came.  My  left  at  one  time  fell 
back  toward  the  battery,  which  then  poured  charge  after  charge  of  canister 
into  the  rebel  ranks,  with  considerable  effect,  forcing  them  to  retreat, 
rapidly  followed  by  the  cavalry.  The  enemy  had  scarcely  begun  to  waver 
when  his  whole  force  fled  in  dismay,  throwing  away  their  arms,  coats,  and 
hats.  We  took  from  the  enemy  eighty-one  prisoners,  including  three  com 
missioned  officers.  On  the  field,  the  scene  of  the  battle,  immense  quantities 
of  arms,  coats,  and  blankets  were  found  and  destroyed  by  us.  I  had  no 
means  of  ascertaining  the  enemy's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  but  from  the 
evidence  of  the  battle-field  it  must  have  been  heavy. 

FLORENCE  M.  CORNYN, 
Colonel  Tenth  Missouri  Cavalry,  Commanding  Cavalry  Brigade. 

Colonel  Cornyn  was  a  very  efficient  cavalry  officer  and  always 
accomplished  whatever  he  was  sent  to  do.  He  was  an  aggressive 
fighter,  always  attacking,  no  matter  what  the  force  before  him, 
and  had  won  a  deserved  standing  as  a  Brigade  commander.  When 
he  was  killed,  by  his  Lieutenant-Colonel,  Bowen,  during  the  latter's 
trial  before  a  court-martial  on  charges  preferred  by  Colonel  Cornyn, 
there  was  a  bitter  personal  dispute  and  enmity  between  them 
which  came  to  this  sad  ending. 


FV  :~    *~ I      * 

§  i-^K 

^  ^   C   <u 

:'  v  gc 

§  .^^ 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE 


ADDRESS  TO  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE 

DELIVERED  AT  THE  NATIONAL  ENCAMPMENT,  G.  A.  R. 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  OCTOBER,  1902 

BY  MAJOR-GENERAL  GRENVILLE  M.  DODGE 

Comrades  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee: 

On  the  28th  of  August,  1861,  General  U.  S.  Grant  was  as 
signed  to  duty  in  command  of  the  District  of  Southeast  Missouri, 
with  headquarters  at  Cairo,  111.,  and  here  commenced  the  organiza 
tion  and  growth  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  It  remained  under 
his  personal  command,  or  as  a  unit  of  his  great  Army,  from  the 
beginning  until  the  end  of  the  war,  except  for  two  short  intervals, 
one  after  the  great  Battle  of  Donelson,  and  the  other  after  the  great 
er  Battle  of  Shiloh,  both  of  which  he  won,  and  gave  the  first  great 
light  and  hope  to  our  country;  and  it  is  hard  now,  after  reading 
all  the  records,  to  understand  the  reasons  for  his  being  relieved.  It 
appears  to  have  been  done  through  a  misunderstanding,  and  with  no 
intention  of  doing  injustice  to  General  Grant. 

Following  General  Grant  as  commander  came  General  Sher 
man,  a  member  of  the  Army  almost  as  long  as  General  Grant.  Gen 
eral  Sherman  was  in  direct  command,  or  the  Army  served  under 
him  as  a  unit  of  his  greater  Army,  from  the  time  he  assumed  com- 
niMiid  until  the  end  of  the  war. 

After  General  Sherman  came  General  McPherson,  that  ideal 
soldier,  who  commanded  the  Army  until  he  fell  in  the  great  Battle 
of  Atlanta,  on  the  22d  of  July.  Upon  his  death,  General  Logan 
took  command  of  the  Army,  as  the  senior  officer  present,  and  at  the 
end  of  the  battle  of  July  22d  he  could  say  that  he  had  met  and  de 
feated  Hood's  whole  Army  in  the  greatest  battle  of  that  campaign. 

Following  General  Logan  came  General  0.  0.  Howard,  the 
only  General  taken  from  another  Army  to  command  it  in  all  the 
history  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  or  even  any  of  its  Corps. 

—129— 


130  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE. 

The  next  day  after  assuming  command  General  Howard  led  the 
Army  into  the  great  battle  of  the  28th  of  July,  which  the  Confed 
erates  said  was  not  a  battle,  but  a  simple  killing  and  slaughtering 
of  their  forces.  He  remained  in  command  until  the  end  of  the  Re 
bellion,  and  at  the  end  of  the  war  generously  gave  way  to  General 
Logan,  so  that  one  of  its  original  members  might  command  it  at 
the  great  review  here  in  Washington — an  act  that  could  come  only 
from  such  a  just  and  thoughtful  soldier  as  Howard. 

I  speak  of  our  Army's  commanders  first,  as  an  Army  takes  its 
habits  and  character  from  its  head ;  and  probably  no  other  Army  in 
the  world  was  so  fortunate  as  to  have  always  at  its  head  great  sol 
diers  and  great  commanders,  recognized  as  such  the  world  over — 
two  of  them  the  peers  of  any  commander  that  ever  stood  up  in  a 
great  conflict. 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  covered  more  ground  in  its  cam 
paigns  than  all  the  other  Armies  combined,  and  all  its  campaigns 
wrere  marked  by  some  great  struggle,  battle,  or  movement  that  chal 
lenged  the  admiration  of  the  world.  First  came  Fort  Donelson, 
next  Vicksburg,  and  following  that  Chattanooga,  where  it  fought  on 
both  flanks  in  that  great  battle,  one  Division  taking  the  point  of 
Lookout  Mountain  above  the  clouds.  Then  came  the  Atlanta  cam 
paign  ;  following  that  the  strategical  march  to  the  sea ;  and,  finally, 
that  bold  movement  from  Savannah  to  Goldsboro,  which  is  consid 
ered  by  the  best  critics  as  one  of  the  boldest  and  best-planned  cam 
paigns  of  history — one  in  which  every  chance  was  taken,  and  every 
opportunity  given  the  enemy  to  concentrate  upon  an  inferior  force. 

The  record  of  this  Army  is  probably  the  most  satisfactory  of 
any  that  ever  existed,  as  it  was  harmonious  in  all  its  parts  and  had 
no  jealousies,  each  of  its  units  to  the  best  of  its  ability  helping  the 
others.  Again,  it  was  modest;  it  struck  blow  after  blow,  and  let 
the  world  sing  its  praises.  All  its  campaigns  were  great  successes, 
and  it  never  lost  a  battle.  All  its  Army,  Corps,  Division,  and  Bri 
gade  commanders  were  exceptionally  able  men,  and  were  seldom 
relieved  except  to  assume  more  important  commands.  Its  experi 
ences  were  more  varied  than  any  other  Army,  for  in  its  campaigns, 
battles,  and  marches,  reaching  from  the  Missouri  River  to  the  At 
lantic,  at  Washington,  over  a  territory  two  thousand  miles  long  and 
five  hundred  miles  wide,  it  opened  the  Mississippi,  it  forced  its  way 
to  the  sea,  it  was  reviewed  by  the  Government  of  the  nation  here 
in  this  city,  and  it  disbanded  and  the  men  went  to  their  homes 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE.  131 

without  causing  an  unpleasant  comment  or  a  painful  thought  in 
all  this  broad  land. 

The  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  is  endeavoring  to 
perpetuate  its  history  and  memories  by  erecting  here  in  this  capital 
of  our  great  nation  monuments  to  the  memory  of  its  dead  com 
manders  which  will  place  before  the  world  not  only  their  deeds,  but 
the  great  events  in  which  our  Army  took  so  important  a  part. 
First  came  General  McPherson,  as  he  was  the  first  to  fall,  in  the 
great  Battle  of  Atlanta.  He  fell  just  after  watching  the  attack 
in  the  rear  on  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  which  held  the  key  to  the 
situation.  He  was  a  dear  friend  of  mine;  and  the  last  words  he 
spoke  were  in  praise  of  the  fighting  of  that  Corps.  General  Sher 
man,  in  reporting  his  death,  spoke  of  him  as  follows: 

General  McPherson  fell  in  battle,  booted  and  spurred,  as  the  gallant 
and  heroic  gentleman  should  wish.  Not  his  the  loss,  but  the  country's,  and 
the  army  will  mourn  his  death  and  cherish  his  memory  as  that  of  one 
who,  though  comparatively  young,  had  risen  by  his  merit  and  ability  to 
the  command  of  one  of  the  best  armies  which  the  nation  had  called  into 
existence  to  vindicate  her  honor  and  integrity.  History  tells  of  but  few 
who  so  blended  the  grace  and  the  gentleness  of  the  friend  with  the  dignity, 
courage,  faith  and  manliness  of  the  soldier.  His  public  enemies,  even  the 
men  who  directed  the  fatal  shot,  never  spoke  or  wrote  of  him  without  ex 
pressions  of  marked  respect.  Those  whom  he  commanded  loved  him  even 
to  idolatry,  and  I,  his  associate  and  commander,  fail  in  words  adequate  to 
express  my  opinion  of  his  great  worth. 

General  McPherson  was  so  dear  to  our  old  Army  that  the 
great  victory  at  the  Battle  of  Atlanta  was  never  spoken  of  by  our 
Army  except  to  express  our  great  grief  at  the  loss  of  our  com 
mander.  His  faith  in  what  he  could  accomplish  with  our  Army  was 
unbounded.  He  spoke  of  us  on  July  4,  1863,  as  follows: 

With  tireless  energy,  with  sleepless  vigilance,  by  night  and  by  day, 
with  battery  and  with  rifle-pits,  with  trench  and  mine,  you  made  your  sure 
approaches,  until,  overcome  by  fatigue  and  driven  to  despair  in  the  attempt 
to  oppose  your  irresistible  progress,  the  whole  garrison  of  over  30,000  men, 
with  all  their  arms  and  munitions  of  war,  have,  on  this,  the  anniversary  of 
our  National  Independence,  surrendered  to  the  invincible  troops  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee.  The  achievements  of  this  hour  will  give  a  new 
meaning  to  this  memorable  day,  and  Vicksburg  will  brighten  the  glow  of  the 
patriot's  heart  which  kindles  at  the  mention  of  Bunker  Hill  and  Yorktown. 
This  is  indeed  an  auspicious  day  for  you.  The  God  of  Battle  is  with  yon. 
The  dawn  of  a  conquered  peace  is  breaking  upon  you.  The  plaudits  of  an 
admiring  world  will  hail  you  wherever  you  go,  and  it  will  be  an  ennobling 
heritage,  surpassing  "all  riches,  to  have  been  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
on  the  Fourth  of  July,  1863. 

Next  we  erected  the  statue,  facing  Pennsylvania  Avenue,  of 
General  John  A.  Eawlins,  who,  above  all,  represented  the  organiza 
tion  and  spirit  of  our  great  Army,  and  who  shared  its  fortunes 


132  Tin-;  AHMY  <>K  TIN-:  TI;N  NKSSKK. 


from  beginning  to  end  as  Chief  of  Staff  of  its  first  and  greatest 
commander.  In  1873,  upon  the  death  of  General  Rawlins,  General 
John  A.  Logan  spoke  of  him  thus : 

But  there  is  one  whose  tongue  is  now  still  in  death  whose  name  I 
cannot  forbear  to  mention  ;  one  who.  though  gone  from  our  midst,  is  with 
us  in  memory:  for  who  can  forget  John  A.  Kawlins?  Faithful  in  every 
duty,  true  in  every  trust,  though  dead  he  is  not  forgotten ;  though  gone 
forever,  yet  he  will  ever  live  in  affectionate  remembrance  in  the  hearts  of 
all  who  knew  him.  His  name  is  woven  in  indelible  colors  in  the  history 
of  our  country,  and  is  linked  with  a  fame  that  is  undying. 

General  Rawlins,  in  giving  a  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee,  paid  this  tribute  to  it: 

In  no  army  did  the  soldier  enjoy  greater  liberty,  consistent  with  mili 
tary  discipline,  than  in  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  in  none  were  his 
rights  and  his  life  more  carefully  guarded. 

The  subordination  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  to  the  policies  and 
acts  of  the  Government  affecting  the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  prosecution 
of  the  war.  is  worthy  of  the  highest  commendation.  It  had  no  policy  of  its 
own  to  propose,  but  went  forth,  as  expressed  by  the  legislative  branch  of 
the  Government,  to  do  battle  in  no  spirit  of  oppression,  or  for  any  purpose 
of  conquest  or  subjugation,  or  purpose  of  overthrowing  or  interfering  with 
the  rights  or  established  institutions  of  the  States  in  rebellion  ;  but  to  defend 
and  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  constitution,  and  to  preserve  the  Union 
with  all  the  dignity,  equality  and  rights  of  the  several  States  unimpaired. 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  did  great  deeds  in  all  the  departments  of 
the  States'  service,  and  individually  and  collectively  illustrated  in  a  peculiar 
manner  the  qualities  of  noble  American  character  which  gained  success  in 
the  field,  preserved  its  fruits  by  subsequent  statesmanship,  and  by  exalted 
virtue  crowned  victory  with  the  attributes  of  peace  and  justice. 

In  April,  1900,  we  unveiled  the  beautiful  and  life-like  monu 
ment  to  General  John  A.  Logan,  that  brilliant,  magnetic  soldier, 
our  comrade  from  Cairo  to  Louisville.  Of  him,  at  the  unveiling, 
President  McKinley  spoke  as  follow? : 

Logan's  career  was  unique.  His  distinction  does  not  rest  upon  his 
military  achievements  alone.  His  services  in  the  Legislature  of  his  own 
State,  in  the  National  House  of  Representatives,  and  in  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States,  would  have  given  him  an  equally  conspicuous  place  in  the 
annals  of  the  country.  He  was  great  in  the  forum  and  in  the  field. 

He  came  out  of  the  war  with  the  highest  military  honors  of  the  volun 
teer  soldier.  Brilliant  in  battle  and  strong  in  military  council,  his  was  also 
the  true  American  spirit,  for  when  the  war  was  ended  he  was  quick  and 
eager  to  return  to  the  peaceful  pursuits  of  civil  life. 

General  Logan's  love  and  devotion  to  us  only  ended  with  his 
life,  and  at  one  of  our  reunions  he  characterized  our  work  thus: 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  not  limited  in  its  scope  ;  the  theater 
of  its  operations  and  the  extent  of  its  inarches,  comprehending  within  their 
hounds  an  area  greater  than  Greece  and  Macedonia  in  their  palmiest  days, 
and  greater  than  most  of  the  leading  kingdoms  of  Europe  at  the  present  day. 
reached  from  the  Missouri  River  on  the  north  nearly  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
on  the  south,  and  from  the  Red  River  of  Louisiana  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean. 


'I'm-:  AKALY  OF  THK  TKXXKSSKK.  133 


The  friendship  and  loyalty  of  Sherman  to  Grant  was  the  first 
-Teat  cause  of  the  success  of  both,  and  for  the  harmony  that  exist 
ed  in  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  Sherman  fell  under  the  com 
mand  of  Grant  at  Paducah,  in  the  spring  of  1862,  holding  a  small 
command.  He  was  the  ideal  soldier,  as  he  dropped  from  a  Depart 
ment  and  Army  commander  to  that  of  a  post,  and  later  a  Division, 
without  a  murmur.  Sherman's  first  words  to  Grant,  on  February 
15,  1862,  were  these: 

I  should  like  to  hoar  from  you,  and  will  do  everything  in  my  power 
to  hurry  forward  to  you  reinforcements  and  supplies,  and  if  I  could  be  of 
service  myself  would  gladly  come  without  making  any  question  of  rank  with 
you  or  General  Smith,  whose  commissions  are  of  the  same  dale. 

On  the  same  date  he  wrote  again : 

Command  me  in  any  way.  I  feel  anxious  about  you,  as  I  know  the 
great  facilities  they  [the  enemy]  have  of  concentration,  by  means  of  the 
river  and  railroads,  but  have  faith  in  you. 

The  monument  to  our  old  commander,  General  Sherman,  is 
nearly  complete.  It  is  upon  these  grounds  we  expect  to  unveil 
it  next  October,  and,  as  President  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  and  as  President  of  the  Commission  which  has  in 
charge  the  erection  of  the  monument,  I  give  you  a  cordial  invita 
tion  to  be  present.  You  will  receive  due  notice,  and  proper  arrange 
ments  will  be  made  for  the  occasion,  and  you  will  meet  here  your 
comrades  of  the  Armies  of  the  Cumberland,  the  Potomac,  and  the 
Ohio,  who  have  already  signified  their  intention  of  being  present  to 
honor  the  memory  of  our  old  commander. 

And  now,  my  comrades,  it  is  with  the  greatest  satisfaction  that 
I  say  to  you  that  after  seven  years'  continued  effort,  this  year  we 
obtained  an  appropriation  from  Congress  of  $250,000  to  be  used 
in  the  erection  of  a  monument  upon  these  grounds  to  General  U.  S. 
Grant,  (and  the  model  for  it  will  soon  be  selected,)  to  this  modest, 
charitable,  and  just  soldier  and  statesman.  The  whole  world  has 
given  its  tribute.  From  those  whom  we  fought  and  defeated  have 
come  the  most  gallant  words  of  praise  and  touching  sympathy. 
President  Lincoln,  above  all  others,  recogni/ed  his  power  and  ability 
when  he  handed  him  his  commission  and  gave  him  command  of  all 
the  Armies,  and  assured  him  that  lie  should  not  in  any  way  inter 
fere  with  him, — armed  him  with  all  the  powers  of  the  President, 
with  riirlc  blanch <>  to  use  them  as  he  saw  fit.  Grant  made  his  an 
swer  at  Appomattox.  bringing  peace  to  our  nation  and  gratitude  to 
the  conquered.  General  Grant  was  a  man  of  few  words,  and  when 


134  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE. 

called  upon  to  speak  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  paid  it  this 
tribute : 

As  an  Army,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  never  sustained  a  single  de 
feat  during  four  years  of  war.  Every  fortification  which  it  assailed  sur 
rendered.  Every  force  arrayed  against  it  was  either  defeated,  captured,  or 
destroyed.  No  officer  was  ever  assigned  to  the  command  of  that  Army  who 
had  afterwards  to  be  relieved  from  it,  or  to  be  reduced  to  another  command. 
Such  a  history  is  not  accident. 

And  now,  my  comrades,  one  of  our  number  who  has  left  us  by 
an  assassin's  hand,  whose  heart,  words  and  acts  were  ever  for  us, 
who  from  a  Major  in  our  Army  became  the  best-loved  President 
of  our  nation,  Comrade  William  McKinley,  at  one  of  our  gather 
ings  paid  this  tribute  to  you : 

It  is  recorded  that  in  eighteen  months'  service  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  captured  80,000  men,  with  flags  and  arms,  including  600  guns — a 
greater  force  than  was  engaged  on  either  side  in  the  terrible  battle  of  Chick- 
amauga.  From  the  fields  of  triumph  in  the  Mississippi  Valley  it  turned  its 
footsteps  towards  the  eastern  seaboard,  brought  relief  to  the  forces  at  Chat 
tanooga  and  Nashville,  pursued  that  peerless  campaign  from  Atlanta  to  the 
seaboard  under  the  leadership  of  the  glorious  Sherman,  and  planted  the 
banners  of  final  victory  on  the  parapets  of  Fort  McAllister. 

It  is  said  that  the  old  Army  of  the  Tennessee  never  lost  a  battle  and 
never  surrendered  a  flag.  Its  Corps  badges — '"forty  rounds"  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps ;  the  fleeting  arrow  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps ;  the  disc,  from  which 
four  bullets  have  been  cut,  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps — are  all  significant  of 
the  awful  business  of  cruel  war,  all  of  them  suggestive  of  the  missiles  of 
death. 

It  gave  the  Federal  Army  Grant,  Sherman,  and  Sheridan  ;  McPherson, 
Howard,  Blair,  Logan,  Hazen,  John  E.  Smith,  C.  F.  Smith,  Halleck,  Raw- 
lins,  Prentiss,  Wallace,  Porter,  Force,  Leggett,  Noyes,  Hickenlooper,  C. 
C.  Walcutt,  and  your  distinguished  President,  who  flamed  out  the  very 
incarnation  of  soldierly  valor  before  the  eyes  of  the  American  people  ;  all 
have  a  secure  place  in  history  and  a  secure  one  in  the  hearts  of  their  coun 
trymen. 

On  this  anniversary,  as  my  closing  words  to  you,  two  verses  of 
General  John  Tilson's  tribute  are  most  appropriate : 

Ho !  comrades  of  the  brave  old  band,  we  gather  here  once  more, 
With  smiling  eye  and  clasping  hand,  to  fight  our  battles  o'er. 
To  quaff  from  out  the  brimming  cup  of  old-time  memory, 
And  bright  relight  the  pathway  of  our  old  Tennessee. 
As  myriad  sparks  of  war's  romance  our  meetings  warm  inspire ; 
The  heady  fight,  the  anxious  march,  the  jolly  bivouac  fire ; 
The  days  of  doubt,  of  hope,  of  care,  of  danger,  and  of  glee  ; 
Oh,  what  a  world  of  racy  thought  illumines  Tennessee ! 

Our  roster  thins ;  as  years  pass  on  we  drop  off  one  by  one ; 
Ere  long,  too  soon,  to  yearly  call,  there  will  be  answer — none ; 
Then  as  along  the  record  page  these  mourning  columns  creep, 
The  whisper  comes  to  closer  still  our  living  friendships  keep. 
Another  thought  we  forward  cast  to  that  not  distant  day, 
When  left  of  all  our  gallant  band  will  be  one  veteran  gray, 
And  here's  to  him  who  meets  alone — wherever  he  may  be, 
The  last,  the  lone  survivor  of  the  grand  old  Tennessee. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WEST 


ADDRESS  TO  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  SOUTH- WEST 

AT  NATIONAL  ENCAMPMENT,  G.  A.  R. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

OCTOBER,  1902 

My  connection  with  the  United  States  forces  west  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  Eiver  commenced  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  when  I  took 
my  Regiment,  the  Fourth  Iowa,  to  St.  Louis,  and  fell  under  the 
command  of  Fremont.  I  took  part  in  the  campaigns  of  that 
Department  until  after  the  Battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  when  I  left  the 
command  and  went  to  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  After  the  At 
lanta  campaign,  in  November,  1S64,  I  returned  to  Missouri  as 
commander  of  that  Department  and  Army. 

Of  the  transactions  of  the  troops  south  of  Missouri  I  have 
very  little  knowledge;  but  I  know  that  the  troops  which  served 
west  of  the  Mississippi  never  had  credit  for  the  amount  of  work, 
hardships  and  exposures  they  endured.  Owing  to  the  fact  of  there 
having  been  fought  there  but  two  great  battles,  Wilson's  Creek  and 
Pea  Ridge,  and  two  minor  ones,  what  they  did  was  swallowed  up 
in  the  great  events  that  occurred  east  of  the  Mississippi.  Even 
Pope's  campaign  opening  up  a  portion  of  the  Mississippi  is  hardly 
ever  spoken  of. 

The  Battle  of  Wilson's  Creek,  the  first  signal  contest  west  of 
the  Mississippi,  was  fought  before  my  command  reached  St.  Louis. 
The  history  of  that  battle,  and  the  credit  that  is  due  to  the  com 
mander  of  that  Army,  General  Lyon,  and  his  men,  are  well  known. 
There  participated  in  the  battle  many  officers  who  were  afterwards 
greatly  distinguished;  among  them  Schofield,  Sturgis,  Hunter,  and 
others.  It  was  the  first  battle  that  called  attention  to  the  West, 
and  to  the  troops  west  of  the  Mississippi.  That  battle  was  lost  be 
cause  a  portion  of  the  command  did  not  comprehend  and  fulfill 
General  Lynn's  orders.  This  mistake  would  have  been  overcome  if 

—137— 


138  Tin;  CAMPAIGN  IN  THK  WKST. 

it  had  not  been  for  the  loss  in  the  battle  of  its  commander,  Gen 
eral  Lyon.  But  the  fighting  of  the  troops  and  the  boldness  of  the 
movement  immediately  attracted  the  attention  of  the  country,  and 
held  it  until  after  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge. 

The  Army  of  the  Southwest,  which  General  Curtis  command 
ed,  and  which  traveled  three  hundred  miles  from  its  base  without 
water  or  rail  communication,  and  lived  off  a  barren  country,  and 
which  fought  that  decisive  Battle  of  Pea  Ridge  and  cleared  the 
country  until  nearly  the  end  of  the  war  of  any  organized  force  of 
the  enemy,  had  more  marching  and  endured  more  suffering  than 
the  great  Armies  I  was  connected  with  east  of  the  Mississippi,  and 
its  three  days'  fighting  at  Pea  Ridge  compared  favorably  with  any 
of  our  battles,  when  the  numbers  engaged  are  considered. 

Then  again,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  the  sufferings  of  the  troops 
that  I  took  onto  the  plains  in  the  Indian  campaigns  in  the  win 
ters  of  1864-5,  1865-6,  were  far  beyond  any  of  the  sufferings  of  any 
of  our  Armies  during  the  Civil  War.  Their  exposures  through  the 
cold  weather,  and  the  brutalities  and  butcheries  of  the  Indians, 
which  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  avenge  or  retaliate,  were  be 
yond  description. 

Our  early  campaign  in  Missouri  was  without  previous  experi 
ence.  It  was  simply  one  soldier  standing  up  against  another  in 
battle,  and  we  had  to  learn  all  the  tricks  of  camp  life,  and  from  ex 
perience  how  to  take  care  of  our  soldiers. 

There  were  a  great  many  funny  incidents  in  the  Pea  Ridge 
campaign.  The  Southwestern  Army  was  organized  at  Rolla,  Mis 
souri,  of  which  post  I  was  in  command.  My  quartermaster  was 
Captain  Philip  H.  Sheridan,  and  my  commissary,  Captain  M.  P. 
Small.  No  one  who  knew  or  saw  Sheridan  then  thought  of  the 
great  position  he  was  to  occupy  in  our  Army,  but  when  he  took 
hold  of  that  Army  and  stripped  it  and  fed  it,  three  hundred  miles 
away  from  rail  or  water  communication,  we  all  knew  that  his  was  a 
master-mind.  When  he  came  to  me  at  Rolla,  the  first  order  he 
gave  was  to  take  away  about  three-quarters  of  our  transportation. 
I  think  we  had  about  two  wagons  to  the  company,  and  he  brought 
us  down  to  about  four  to  a  regiment.  You  can  all  appreciate  the 
rebellion  I  had  on  my  hands  when  I  undertook  to  enforce  his  order. 
I  know  lie  stood  by  and  watched  to  see  what  I  was  going  to  do. 
Every  Regiment  and  Command  entered  a  protest,  and  said  some 
very  unkind  things  of  him,  denouncing  him  as  a  regular  officer  who 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WKST.  139 

had  no  mercy  upon  a  volunteer;  but  I  had  then  had  experience 
enough  to  appreciate  our  necessities,  and  started  in  by  stripping  my 
own  Regiment,  and  then  enforcing  the  orders  upon  the  others.  We 
were  not  long  on  that  march  before  they  appreciated  the  foresight 
of  Sheridan.  He  had  great  energy  and  great  resources.  He  had 
to  run  all  the  mills  along  our  line  of  march;  he  had  to  forage  in 
every  direction,  and  the  punishment  that  he  gave  to  some  of  the 
people  to  make  them  tell  where  their  horses,  forage  and  sweet  pota 
toes  were  hidden  would  astonish  those  of  our  people  who  have  been 
so  horrified  at  the  mild  persuasions  used  for  similar  purposes  in 
the  Philippines. 

To  show  you  how  little  we  knew  of  war  on  our  first  march,  in 
January,  1862,  from  Rolla  to  Springfield,  Missouri,  all  the  reports 
we  had  obtained  were  that  Price  and  his  Army  were  in  Springfield. 
The  troops  of  our  Army  were  divided  into  two  commands,  those 
under  Siegel,  composed  of  two  Divisions,  commanded  by  Osterhaus 
and  Asboth,  mostly  Germans,  and  two  Divisions  of  Americans  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Jeff  C.  Davis  and  Colonel  E.  A.  Carr.  I  com 
manded  a  Brigade  on  the  extreme  left  in  Carr's  Division,  and,  in 
accordance  with  instructions,  put  out  a  company  in  front  of  me 
as  skirmishers.  It  was  dark,  and  impossible  for  us  to  see  much, 
and  the  first  thing  I  knew  I  had  lost  my  skirmishers,  and  was  in 
great  distress  until  about  daylight  in  the  morning,  when,  while 
Sieger's  guns  and  our  own  were  booming  away  at  Springfield,  my 
company  came  back  mounted  on  Confederate  horses  and  mules — old 
hacks  that  the  enemy  had  left  behind  them — and  brought  us  news 
that  there  was  no  enemy  in  Springfield,  and  had  not  been  for  two  or 
three  days. 

As  we  marched  along  towards  Pea  Ridge  through  the  country, 
Price's  Army  faced  us  with  a  rear  guard  only,  his  main  body  keep 
ing  a  long  distance  ahead  of  us.  At  every  stream  they  would  halt 
our  advance,  and  move  out  a  couple  of  pieces  of  their  artillery,  and 
put  out  a  strong  skirmish-line,  which  would  force  our  Army  into 
line,  thinking  we  were  going  to  have  a  battle.  My  Brigade  led  the 
advance  most  of  the  time  on  that  march,  and  as  soon  as  they 
would  line  up  the  officers  would  have  the  boys  strip.  They  would 
throw  down  their  chickens,  sweet  potatoes,  and  everything  they  had 
gathered,  and  by  the  time  they  had  gone  forward,  and  the  enemy 
had  run,  the  Thirty-sixth  Illinois,  or  some  other  Regiment,  would 
come  up  and  gobble  what  they  had  left.  About  the  third  time  we 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WEST.  141 

lined  up  1  discovered  that  every  boy  was  hanging  on  to  his  chickens, 
sweet  potatoes,  and  provender,  and  when  I  gave  orders  to  the  Col 
onels  to  have  them  throw  them  aside,  the  boys  made  answer:  "No 
you  don't,  Colonel !  You  can't  fool  us  any  more ;  we  have  fed  those 
Thirty-sixth  Illinois  fellows  as  long  as  we  propose  to." 

At  Pea  Ridge  we  were  surrounded  by  Van  Dorn,  who  placed 
Price's  two  Divisions  in  our  rear,  and  he  himself  on  our  right  flank 
with  McCullough  and  Mclntosh's  Divisions.  The  great  Pea  Ridge 
divided  his  Army,  so  it  was  impossible  for  one  part  to  support  the 
other.  His  Army  was  twice  as  large  as  that  of  Curtis,  and  the 
fact  that  it  was  divided  enabled  Curtis  to  whip  his  Army  in  detail, 
so  that  Van  Dorn's  Army  was  virtually  whipped  before  Curtis  got 
his  entire  force  into  the  field,  Siegel  only  coming  into  battle  after 
Van  Dorn's  Arkansas  force  had  left  for  the  South,  Jeff  C.  Davis's 
Division  having  killed  its  two  Division  commanders,  and  Van  Dorn 
had  given  Price  orders  to  get  out  the  best  way  he  could,  which 
forced  him  to  retreat  to  the  east  towards  White  River. 

After  the  Pea  Ridge  campaign  the  Battle  of  Prairie  Grove  was 
fought,  under  the  command  of  General  F.  C.  Herring,  who  was 
Lieutenant-Colonel  of  the  Ninth  Iowa  Infantry  in  the  Battle  of 
Pea  Ridge.  As  it  was  not  in  my  command  I  have  no  knowledge  of 
the  detail  of  it;  but  from  the  reports  it  evidently  was  a  sharp  fight. 

In  the  spring  of  18G5  Jeff  C.  Thompson  and  his  command  sur 
rendered  to  me  on  the  Arkansas  line.  His  command  consisted  of 
six  thousand  men,  but  he  found  lie  could  not  gather  them,  and 
claimed  that  not  half  of  his  command  was  present.  When  I  asked 
him  how  it  was  possible  to  get  them  all  together,  he  suggested  that 
I  should  send  them  rations.  I  therefore  loaded  two  steamers  from 
St.  Louis,  and  sent  them  around  by  the  White  River,  and  Thomp 
son  issued  his  celebrated  order  bringing  the  men  all  in,  and  there 
was  gathered  about  twice  the  number  he  had  present  when  he  sur 
rendered  to  my  forces.  When  asked  for  his  transportation  he  said 
that  he  would  show  it  to  me,  and  out  of  the  rivers  and  bayous  he 
run  down  about  one  hundred  canoes  and  flats,  as  the  transportation 
he  had  to  move  his  army  with.  It  was  at  tin's  time  that  he  made 
that  celebrated  speech.  When  his  soldiers  came  in  without  bring 
ing  their  guns,  as  he  had  instructed  them  to  do,  bringing  along  old 
shot-guns  and  muskets  that  were  of  no  use,  he  said  if  they  were  not 
satisfied  with  the  generosity  of  this  Government  they  should  emi 
grate  to  Mexico,  and  he  denounced  more  than  half  of  them  as  being 


142  THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WEST. 

soldiers  whom  he  had  never  seen,  stating  that  they  had  stayed  in 
the  brush  and  along  the  river-banks  in  Arkansas  until  the  moss 
had  grown  upon  their  heads  and  backs.  From  this  speech  of  his 
came  the  celebrated  saying  of  "moss-backs." 

A  part  of  my  Corps  fought  under  that  gallant  General,  A.  J. 
Smith,  in  the  Banks  campaign  up  the  Red  River,  and  there  is  no 
doubt  but  that  his  generalship  and  the  fighting  of  the  two  Divi 
sions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  saved  that  Army  from  a  great  defeat. 
The  commander  of  one  of  his  Divisions,  General  T.  E.  G.  Ransom, 
was  a  school-mate  of  mine,  and  afterwards  came  to  me  in  the  Atlan 
ta  campaign  and  commanded  a  Division  under  me  in  the  Sixteenth 
Corps. 

When  I  look  at  the  history  of  all  of  the  operations  west  of  the 
Mississippi  River,  and  see  their  results,  it  is  a  great  gratification 
to  me  to  know  that  all  the  campaigns,  except  possibly  the  one  of 
Banks,  were  victories  for  our  side. 

WHien  I  returned  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of  the 
Missouri,  in  November,  1864,  I  found  all  the  Indian  tribes  on  the 
plains  at  war,  occupying  all  the  lines  of  communication  through  to 
the  Pacific,  and  there  was  a  great  demand  from  the  people  upon 
the  Government  that  those  lines  should  be  opened.  General  Grant 
sent  a  dispatch,  asking  if  a  campaign  upon  the  plains  could  be  made 
in  the  winter.  Having  spent  eight  or  ten  years  of  my  life  upon  the 
plains  before  the  war,  I  answered  that  it  could,  if  the  troops  were 
properly  fed  and  clothed.  His  answer  to  that  was  to  place  all  the 
plains  and  Indian  tribes  within  my  command,  instructing  me  to 
make  an  immediate  campaign  against  them,  and  I  had,  therefore, 
to  move  the  troops  that  were  at  Leaven  worth,  Fort  Riley,  and  other 
points,  onto  the  plains  in  mid-winter,  and  I  think  it  was  the  Eleventh 
Kansas  that  had  thirteen  men  frozen  to  death  on  the  march 
to  Fort  Kearney.  Those  troops  on  that  winter  march  up  and  down 
those  stage-  and  telegraph-lines,  in  forty  days  opened  them  up,  re 
paired  the  telegraph,  and  had  the  stages  running.  Then  came  the 
longer  campaign  of  the  next  summer  and  next  fall,  where  Gen 
eral  Cole's  command  suffered  so  much,  and  also  where  General  Con 
ner  fought  the  Battle  of  Tongue  River.  I  remember  of  the  Indians 
capturing  a  company  of  Michigan  troops  that  were  guarding  a 
train  that  was  going  to  Fort  Halleck,  loaded  with  rations  and  bacon. 
They  tied  some  of  the  soldiers  to  the  wheels  of  the  wagons,  piled  the 
bacon  around  the  wragons,  and  burned  them  up.  A  band  of  this 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WEST.  143 

party  of  Indians  was  captured  by  a  battalion  of  Pawnees,  who  were 
far  north  of  them  and  got  on  their  trail  and  surrounded  the  band 
that  had  committed  these  atrocities.  The  chief  of  them,  an  old 
man,  came  forward  and  spoke  to  Major  North,  who  commanded 
the  Pawnees,  and  holding  his  hand  up  to  his  mouth  he  said  that  he 
was  full  of  white  men  up  to  here,  and  was  ready  to  die.  The  In 
dians  virtually  cleaned  out  the  white  people  along  the  stage-lines 
they  captured.  I  took  from  them  a  great  many  of  their  prisoners 
in  the  fall  of  1865,  when  they  came  into  Laramie  to  make  peace,  and 
the  stories  of  the  suffering  of  the  women  were  such  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  relate  them. 

In  connection  with  this  campaign  on  the  plains,  it  is  a  singular 
fact  that  nearly  three  thousand  Confederates  took  part.  When 
I  took  command  at  St.  Louis  I  found  the  prisons  full  of  Confederate 
prisoners.  The  war  was  then  virtually  at  its  end,  and  they  were 
very  anxious  to  be  relieved  from  prison  life,  and  as  we  needed  forces 
on  the  plains,  I  obtained  authority  from  the  War  Department  to 
organize  what  was  known  as  the  United  States  Volunteers,  and 
filled  the  regiments  with  these  Confederate  soldiers,  placing  over 
them  as  officers,  men  and  officers  selected  from  our  own  command, 
and  thus  organized  a  very  effective  force,  which  did  excellent  service 
on  the  plains,  three-quarters  of  which  remained  in  that  country 
after  the  war  was  over. 


-5 


o     .S  ^  2. 

3  ~~*    2    O> 

o>  f-r  ~ 
1-3       +3     --C 

^    «-s  ^ 


I  •?«•« 


^fe         -    ' 


• 


111 


• 


o    - 


A  TALK  TO  OLD  COMRADES 


ADDRESS  TO  SIXTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS 

DELIVERED  AT  THE  NATIONAL  ENCAMPMENT,  G.  A.  R. 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  OCTOBER,  1902 

BY  MAJOR-GENERAL  GRENVILLE  M.  DODGE 

Comrade*  of  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps: 

The  Sixteenth  Army  Corps  was  organized  December  18th, 
1862,  and  formed  into  two  wings.  General  A.  J.  Smith  command 
ed  the  right  wing,  and  General  G.  M.  Dodge  the  left  wing  of  the 
Corps.  The  left  wing  was  organized  with  the  Corps,  the  right 
wing  a  year  or  more  afterwards.  The  Corps,  as  a  body,  was  never 
together,  though  it  probably  took  part  in  more  widely  separated 
fields  than  any  other  Corps  in  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  The 
right  wing,  under  General  Smith,  was  in  the  Vicksburg  campaign, 
and  after  that  it  went  to  the  Department  of  the  Gulf,  and  was  with 
General  Banks  in  his  movement  up  Red  Eiver,  and  saved  that  Army 
from  defeat;  of  this  there  is  no  doubt.  After  that,  it  was  sent 
after  Forrest,  and  it  was  the  only  command  that  I  know  of  that 
caught  and  whipped  him.  The  left  wing  overtook  General  Forrest 
at  Town  Creek,  in  1863,  in  its  march  to  Decatur  in  the  rear  of 
Bragg' s  Army,  but  he  did  not  stay  long  enough  for  us  to  get  a  good 
fight  out  of  him. 

From  the  campaign  after  Forrest,  General  Smith's  command 
was  sent  to  the  Department  of  the  Missouri  to  drive  out  Price. 
There  I  found  them,  in  December,  1864,  when  I  took  command  of 
that  Department,  in  a  deplorable  condition, — without  clothing, 
shoes,  or  camp  equipage.  Under  an  order  from  General  Grant,  I 
sent  them  to  Xashvillc,  with  all  the  force  in  my  department,  some 
twenty  thousand  men  all  told,  to  help  General  Thomas,  and  I  sent 
them  everything  they  needed  to  clothe  and  equip  them.  You  all 
remember  how  you  were  frozen  in  on  the  Mississippi,  and  had  to 
take  the  cars.  One  of  the  pleasantest  recollections  of  my  life  is 

—145— 


146  A  TALK  TO  OLD  COMRADES. 

that  I  received  a  letter  from  General  Smith,  thanking  me  for  appre 
ciating  their  condition,  and  having  in  Nashville  when  they  arrived, 
everything  they  needed.  He  said  that  it  was  the  first  time  they 
had  been  treated  decently,  and  they  were  thankful  they  had  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  some  one  who  appreciated  them. 

At  the  Battle  of  Nashville  it  was  General  Smith,  with  the 
right  wing  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  and  the  troops  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Missouri,  that  turned  the  left  flank  of  Hood's  Army, 
and  was  practically  in  his  rear  when  stopped;  and  I  have  heard 
many  officers  who  were  there  say  that  if  he  had  been  let  alone  he 
would  have  captured  or  destroyed  that  wing  of  the  Army.  Thus 
ended  the  eventful  career  of  the  right  wing,  and  its  fortunes  were 
cast  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  in  its  chase  after  Hood. 

The  left  wing  was  organized  from  the  troops  I  commanded  in 
the  District  of  Corinth,  and  had  in  it  the  old  Second  Division  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  that  Grant  organized  at  Cairo,  that 
fought  at  Belmont,  Henry  and  Donelson,  Shiloh,  and  the  two 
Corinths.  It  had  on  its  banners,  "First  at  Donelson/'  I  took 
command  right  after  the  Battle  of  Corinth,  where  it  had  been  cen 
sured  by  Rosecrans  and  praised  by  Grant  for  the  part  it  took  in 
the  Battle  of  Corinth.  General  Grant  held  us  at  Corinth  as  a  pro 
tection  to  his  communications  while  the  campaign  against  Vicks- 
burg  was  going  on.  In  a  letter  to  me  he  said  he  had  left  us  there 
to  protect  that  flank,  for  he  knew  that  if  Bragg  endeavored  to  break 
that  line  we  would  stay;  so  you  see  he  still  had  faith  in  his  old 
Division.  From  Corinth  we  marched  with  Sherman  in  his  cele 
brated  trip  from  Memphis  to  Chattanooga.  We  wintered  on  the 
line,  and  rebuilt  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  Eoad,  and  in  his 
Memoirs  General  Grant,  after  describing  the  condition  of  the  Army, 
and  the  necessity  for  rebuilding  the  railway  from  Nashville  to  De 
catur,  speaks  thus  of  the  work  of  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps : 

General  Dodge  had  no  tools  to  work  with  except  those  of  the  pioneer — 
axes,  picks,  and  spades.  With  these  he  was  enabled  to  intrench  his  men, 
and  protect  them  against  surprise  from  small  parties  of  the  enemy,  and, 
as  he  had  no  base  of  supplies  until  the  road  could  be  completed  back  to 
Nashville,  the  first  matter  to  consider,  after  protecting  his  men,  was  the 
getting  in  of  food  and  forage  from  the  surrounding  country.  He  had  his 
men  and  teams  bring  in  all  the  grain  they  could  find,  or  all  they  needed, 
and  all  the  cattle  for  beef,  and  such  other  food  as  could  be  found.  Millers 
were  detailed  from  the  ranks  to  run  the  mills  along  the  line  of  the  army. 
Where  they  were  not  near  enough  to  the  troops  for  protection  they  were 
taken  down  and  moved  up  to  the  line  of  the  road.  Blacksmith  shops,  with 
all  the  iron  and  steel  found  in  them,  were  used  up  in  like  manner.  Black- 


A  TALK  TO  OLD  COMRADES.  147 

smiths  were  detailed  and  set  to  work  making  the  tools  necessary  in  railroad 
and  bridge  building.  Axonien  were  at  work  getting  out  timber  for  bridges, 
and  cutting  fuel  for  locomotives  and  cars.  Thus  every  branch  of  railroad 
building,  making  tools  to  work  with,  and  supplying  the  workmen  with  food, 
was  all  going  on  at  once,  and  without  the  aid  of  a  mechanic  or  workman 
except  what  the  command  itself  furnished.  General  Dodge  had  the  work 
assigned  to  him  finished  within  forty  days  after  receiving  his  orders.  The 
number  of  bridges  to  rebuild  was  182,  many  of  them  over  deep  and  wide 
chasms.  The  length  of  road  repaired  was  102  miles. 

I  only  quote  a  small  part  of  what  General  Grant  says  in  this 
connection.,  to  show  you  that  while  the  Sixteenth  Corps  had  its 
share  of  fighting,  and  praise  for  it,  still  it  was  a  Corps  that  Grant 
called  upon  in  an  emergency,  and  when  he  wanted  great  deeds  done ; 
and  proves  not  only  what  they  could  turn  their  hands  to  when 
necessary,  but  is  also  a  sample  of  what  our  great  army  was  made  of. 

In  the  spring  of  1864  we  became  a  part  of  the  great  Army  in 
the  Atlanta  campaign.  When  we  arrived  at  Chattanooga,  on  the 
5th  of  May,  I  called  at  General  Sherman's  headquarters.  General 
McPherson,  our  Army  Commander,  was  there.  Sherman  said  to 
him:  "You  had  better  send  Dodge  to  take  Ship's  Gap."  "Why, 
General/'  replied  McPherson,  "that  is  thirty  miles  away,  and 
Dodge's  troops  are  not  yet  unloaded,  and  he  has  no  transportation 
with  him."  Sherman  said :  "Let  him  try  it,  and  have  the  trans 
portation  follow."  We  struck  out,  and  that  night  at  midnight 
Sprague's  Brigade  of  the  Fourth  Division  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps 
had  gained  the  Gap.  The  enemy  appeared  the  next  morning. 
This  opened  the  way  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  planting  us  in 
the  rear  of  Johnston's  Army,  and  forcing  him  to  abandon  his 
impregnable  position  at  Dalton. 

Our  battles  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  were  those  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee.  The  left  wing  received  continual  commendation 
until  the  great  battle  of  the  22d,  when  it  happened  to  be  in  the 
rear  of  our  Army,  and  received  and  defeated  the  celebrated  move 
ment  of  Hood  to  our  rear.  Sprague's  Brigade  fought  all  day  at 
Decatur,  and  saved  our  trains.  In  the  battle  of  the  22d  of  July 
we  had  only  five  thousand  men  in  line,  but  met  and  repulsed  three 
Divisions  of  Hardee's  Corps,  and  McPherson,  who  stood  on  our 
right  and  witnessed  the  fight,  watching  the  charge  of  Fuller  and 
Mersey,  and  the  breaking  of  two  of  the  enemy's  columns,  spoke  of  us 
in  the  highest  terms,  and  five  minutes  later  was  dead.  Our  Army, 
who  knew  and  loved  him,  never  could  reconcile  ourselves  to  his 
great  loss. 


148  A  TALK  TO  OLD  COMUADKS. 

The  Battle  of  Atlanta  was  one  of  the  few  battles  of  the  war 
where  the  attack  on  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps  caught  it  on  the 
march  in  the  rear  of  the  Army,  without  intrenchments  or  protec 
tion  of  any  kind,  botli  sides  fighting  in  the  open. 

In  his  address  describing  the  battle  of  the  22 d  of  July,  Gen 
eral  Strong,  of  General  McPherson's  staff,  says: 

General  McPherson  and  myself,  accompanied  only  by  our  orderlies, 
rode  out  and  took  position  011  the  right  of  Dodge's  line,  and  witnessed  the 
desperate  assaults  of  Hood's  army.  General  McPherson's  admiration  for 
the  steadiness  and  bravery  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  was  unbounded.  Had  the 
Sixteenth  Corps  given  way  the  rebel  army  would  have  been  in  the  rear 
of  the  Seventeenth  and  Fifteenth  Corps,  and  would  have  swept  like  an 
avalanche  over  our  supply-trains,  and  the  position  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  would  have  been  very  critical. 

General  Frank  P.  Blair  pays  this  tribute  to  the  fighting  of  the 
Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  in  his  official  report  of  the  Battle  of  At 
lanta: 

I  started  to  go  back  to  my  command,  and  witnessed  the  fearful  assault 
made  on  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  and  its  prompt  and  gallant  repulse  by 
that  command.  It  was  a  most  fortunate  circumstance  for  the  whole  army 
that  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps  occupied  the  position  I  have  attempted  to 
describe  at  the  moment  of  attack ;  and,  although  it  does  not  belong  to  me  to 
report  upon  the  bearing  and  conduct  of  the  officers  and  men  of  that  Corps, 
still  I  cannot  withhold  my  expression  of  admiration  for  the  manner  in  which 
this  command  met  and  repulsed  the  repeated  and  persistent  attacks  of  the 
enemy.  The  attack  upon  our  (lank  and  rear  was  made  by  the  whole  of 
ITardee's  corps. 

Under  General  Howard,  a  part  of  the  left  wing  took  part  in 
the  battle  of  the  28th  of  July.  On  August  19th  I  was  given  a  Con 
federate  leave,  when  that  beau-ideal  of  a  soldier,  my  old  schoolmate 
and  comrade,  General  T.  E.  G.  Ransom,  took  command  of  the 
Corps.  The  right  wing  knew  him,  for  lie  was  with  you  in  the  Red 
River  campaign.  He  died  on  a  stretcher  in  command  of  the 
Corps  in  the  chase  after  Hood.  The  old  Second  Division  had  its 
innings  with  General  Corse,  at  Altoona,  where  the  fighting  has 
been  immortalized  in  verse  and  song.  My  fortunes  took  me  away 
to  the  command  of  the  Army  and  Department  of  the  Missouri,  and 
the  two  Divisions  of  the  left  wing  wrere  merged  one  into  the 
Fifteenth  and  the  other  into  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  and,  so  far  as 
the  campaigns  were  concerned,  the  Corps  fought  in  two  units, 
the  right  and  left  wings,  and  each  was  a  Corps  command. 

The  grave  of  that  remarkable  soldier,  General  A.  J.  Smith, 
whose  distinguished  services  were  so  often  recognized  by  Generals 
Grant  and  Sherman,  has  not  a  stone  to  designate  it.  The  Society 


A  TALK  TO  OLD  COMRADES.  149 

of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  is  aiding  in  raising  the  funds  to  com 
memorate  his  memory  and  deeds  by  erecting  a  monument  in  his 
home  in  St.  Louis. 

The  Sixteenth  Army  Corps  had  great  opportunities  in  the 
campaigns  it  took  part  in,  and  never  failed  to  make  the  most  of 
them.  They  went  cheerfully  to  any  work  assigned  to  them.  They 
have  left  in  the  war  records  a  history  that  they  may  well  be  proud 
of,  and  every  work  they  have  undertaken  has  received  the  strong 
commendation  of  their  superior  officers. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  G.  MEAD 

Commander 

Army  of  the  Potomac 

1864 


GENERAL  GRANT 


REMARKS  AT  ARMY  OF  POTOMAC  REUNION 
NIAGARA  FALLS,  N.  Y. 

When  you  consider  that  it  is  now  thirty-three  years  after  the 
war,  that  the  Government  has  published  every  report,  letter  and 
order  that  was  of  any  moment,  you  will  agree  with  me  that  it  is 
difficult  to  interest  an  Army  audience  in  talking  about  another 
Army,  and  I  shall  not  detain  you  long  on  that  subject.  There  are, 
however,  some  incidents  of  General  Grant's  first  visit  to  your 
Army,  his  return  to  ours,  and  the  planning  of  the  grand  campaign 
that  was  to  end  the  war,  that  may  interest  you. 

In  December,  1863,  after  the  Battle  of  Chattanooga,  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  camped  along  the  railway  from  Columbia,  Tenn., 
to  Decatur  and  Huntsville,  Ala.  After  the  Battle  of  Chattanooga 
General  Grant  returned  to  Nashville  and  called  there  to  meet 
him  several  Corps  Commanders  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee,  and  General  Sheridan  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
If  I  remember  rightly,  there  were  present  Generals  Grant,  Sherman, 
Sheridan,  Granger,  Logan,  Rawlins,  and  myself.  All  of  us  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  were  a  hard-looking  crowd.  None  of 
us  had  seen  Nashville  or  any  base  of  supplies  since  we  had  marched 
from  the  Mississippi  River  to  Chattanooga,  and  we  had  been  hard 
at  work  building  railways  and  foraging.  We  arrived  in  Nashville 
late  in  the  afternoon,  and  General  Sherman  took  us  to  General 
Grant's  headquarters.  General  Grant  suggested  that  we  should  call 
upon  the  Military  Governor  of  Tennessee,  Andrew  Johnson,  and  pay 
our  respects  to  him.  We,  of  course,  followed  General  Grant,  and 
were  introduced  to  Governor  Johnson.  I  remember  that  our  uni 
forms  were  greatly  worn,  one  or  two  of  us  wearing  blouses  with 
Army  overcoats,  and  he  looked  at  us  with  a  very  quizzical  eye,  until 
General  Grant  said  to  excuse  us  that  he  had  not  given  us  time  since 
we  reached  the  city  to  change  our  suits ;  but  Grant  knew  we  had  no 

— 151 — 


KEUNIOX  OF  ARMY  OF  POTOMAC. 


others.  Governor  Johnson  was  then  a  very  radical  man,  and  was 
very  emphatic  in  informing  us  that  while  he  was  Military  Governor 
of  Tennessee  no  rebel  would  receive  much  consideration  from  him, 
and  brought  his  fist  down  on  a  piano  in  the  room  with  such  force 
that  the  sound  from  it  startled  us  all,  and  we  left  there  with  the  idea 
that  rebels  in  Tennessee  had  better  get  out;  but  we  soon  found  that 
his  words  were  much  stronger  than  his  acts,  for  I  hardly  ever  got 
my  hands  on  rebel  stock  or  supplies  that  I  did  not  find  Johnson  try 
ing  to  pull  them  off. 

After  our  visit,  General  Sherman  suggested  that  we  should  all 
go  to  the  theater  that  evening,  and  under  his  lead  we  went  to  the 
principal  opera  house  to  hear  the  play  of  Hamlet.  We  were  all 
strangers  in  Xashville;  even  General  Grant  was  not  well  known. 
We  paid  our  way  in  and  found  the  theater  crowded  with  soldiers 
going  to  and  returning  from  veteran  furloughs.  General  Sherman, 
who  you  all  know  was  a  great  lover  of  the  theater,  sat  alongside  of 
me  and  soon  commenced  criticising  the  plav,  earnestly  protesting 
that  it  was  being  murdered.  I  had  to  check  him  several  times  and 
tell  him  unless  he  kept  quiet  the  soldiers  in  the  audience  would  rec 
ognize  him  and  there  would  be  a  scene.  We  had  entered  late,  and 
there  soon  came  on  the  scene  where  Hamlet  soliloquizes  over  the 
skull  of  Yorick.  The  audience  was  perfectly  still,  endeavoring  to 
comprehend  the  actor's  words,  when  a  soldier  far  back  in  the  aud 
ience  rose  up  and  in  a  clear  voice  called  out,  as  the  actor  held  up  the 
skull,  "Say,  pard,  what  is  it,  Yank  or  Reb?"  The  house  appre 
ciated  the  point  and  was  instantly  in  an  uproar,  and  General  Grant 
said  we  had  better  leave,  so  we  went  quietly  out,  no  one  discovering 
Grant's  or  Sherman's  presence.  Sherman  immediately  suggested 
that  we  should  find  an  oyster-house  and  get  something  to  eat,  and 
General  Eawlins  was  put  forward  as  guide  and  spokesman.  He 
led  us  to  a  very  inviting  place.  We  went  in  and  found  there  was 
but  one  large  table  in  the  place.  There  was  one  man  sitting  at  it, 
and  Rawlins,  in  his  modest  way,  without  informing  the  man  who 
his  party  was,  asked  him  if  he  would  change  to  a  smaller  table  and 
let  us  have  that  one.  The  man  said  the  table  was  good  enough  for 
him  and  kept  on  eating,  and  Rawlins  backed  out  into  the  street 
again.  Sherman  said  if  we  depended  on  Rawlins  we  would  get 
not li ing  to  eat,  and  said  he  would  sec  what  could  be  done.  He 
hailed  a  man  who  pointed  out  another  saloon  kept  by  a  woman, 
and  to  this  Sherman  took  us,  and  she  served  us  what  we  then  con- 


REUNION  OF  AKMY  OF  POTOMAC.  153 

sidered  a  very  nice  oyster  slew.  As  we  sat  around  the  table,  we 
talked  more  than  \ve  ate,  and  by  the  time  we  had  half  finished  our 
supper  the  woman  came  in  and  asked  for  the  |>a\  and  said  we  must 
leave,  as  under  the  military  rules  her  house  must  elose  at  12  mid 
night  and  it  was  then  a  few  minutes  after  that  hour;  so  out  we  got 
and  took  our  way  to  Grant's  headquarters,  where  we  bunked  down 
the  best  we  could  during  (he  night.  Some  of  the  staff  heard  of 
our  evening's  adventure  and  gave  the  news  to  the  press,  and  the 
next  morning  before  breakfast  all  the  parties  wrere  present  to  apolo 
gize  to  Grant  that  they  did  not  reeogni/e  him,  as  we  were  out  of 
our  own  jurisdiction  and  in  that  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  ; 
but  Grant  in  his  modest  way  satisfied  them  that  he  had  no  com 
plaint.  However,  there  poured  in  on  him  for  all  of  us  complimen 
tary  tickets  and  invitations  to  almost  everything  in  Nashville. 

After  breakfast  we  all  assembled  in  a  large  room  at  head 
quarters  to  hear  what  General  Grant  had  to  say  to  us.  He  took  up 
with  us  the  plan  for  a  winter  campaign.  He  proposed  himself  to 
take  about  30,000  of  the  troops  concentrated  at  Chattanooga  and 
transport  them  by  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Elvers  to  New  Orleans, 
and  there  take  with  him  the  troops  of  General  Canby  and  go  thence 
to  Mobile  and  attack  that  place.  General  Sherman  was  to  go  to 
Memphis,  gather  up  all  the  forces  along  the  Mississippi  Eiver,  in 
cluding  the  troops  at  Vicksburg  and  Natchez,  together  with  the 
Seventeenth  Corps,  and  march  from  Vicksburg  to  Meridian  and 
thence  join  Grant  at  Mobile.  I  was  to  take  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  which 
was  then  located  on  the  line  of  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  road, 
together  with  about  10,000  cavalry  that  General  William  Sooy 
Smith  had  concentrated  near  Nashville,  and  sweep  down  through 
Alabama,  Northern  Mississippi,  and  Western  Tennessee,  attacking 
any  forces  of  the  enemy  that  might  be  met,  and  destroying  all  the 
railroads  and  provisions  that  had  been  stored  in  that  country,  this 
with  a  view  of  making  it  difficult  for  any  of  the  confederate  armies 
to  again  occupy  the  territory,  so  as  to  enable  Sherman  and  Grant, 
when  the  spring  and  summer  campaign  came  on,  to  utilize  all  the 
Union  troops  that  had  been  occupying  that  country.  After  the 
plans  were  all  made  and  all  the  arrangements  agreed  upon,  Gen 
eral  Grant  reported  them  to  Washington,  but  President  Lincoln 
objected  because  he  was  afraid,  if  we  took  so  many  troops  from 
Chattanooga,  that  Longstreet,  who  was  occupying  Eastern  Tennes 
see  with  his  Army,  would  return  to  Chattanooga  or  Middle  Tennes- 


154  REUNION  OF  AKMY  OF  POTOMAC. 

see  and  undo  all  we  had  accomplished  in  the  Battle  of  Chattanooga. 
Grant  had  no  fear  of  this,  but  he  made  up  his  mind  to  go  imme 
diately  to  East  Tennessee  and  take  the  forces  there  under  General 
Foster,  attack  and  defeat  Longstreet,  and  then  come  back  and 
carry  out  his  plans.  He  found  after  reaching  Knoxville  that  Gen 
eral  Foster's  forces  could  not  be  used,  so  he  abandoned  the  cam 
paign,  only  sending  Sherman  to  Vicksburg,  who  marched  out  to 
Meridian  and  returned,  while  the  7.000  cavalry  under  General 
William  Sooy  Smith,  who  was  to  join  Sherman  overland,  moved 
south,  fighting  and  driving  the  enemy  until  he  reached  West  Point, 
where  he  met  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy  and  returned  to  Mem 
phis. 

In  March,  1864,  General  Grant  was  called  to  Washington  to 
be  given  his  commission  as  Lieutenant-General  of  the  Army  and 
command  of  all  the  forces.  On  his  return  to  Nashville,  on  March 
17th,  we  were  again  called  to  meet  him.  General  Grant  told  us  of 
his  visit  to  Washington,  his  reception  by  the  President,  and  all 
the  courtesies  that  had  been  paid  him.  He  told  us  that  he  accepted 
the  commission  of  Lieutenant-General  and  Commander  of  all  the 
Armies  on  condition  that  his  plans  should  not  be  interfered  with 
at  Washington  and  that  he  should  have  the  command  of  the  staff 
departments  of  the  armies.  Those  departments  had  always  consid 
ered  themselves  independent  of  the  Commander  in  the  field;  in 
fact,  in  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  officers  of  Commissary  Quar 
ter-Master  and  Ordnance  Departments  declined  to  obey  the  orders  of 
the  commanders  they  were  serving  under,  except  upon  the  order 
of  their  chief  in  Washington.  General  Grant  settled  this.  A  Com 
missary  of  Subsistence  declined  to  carry  out  one  of  his  orders,  and 
General  Grant  said  to  him  that  while  he  could  not  force  him  to 
obey  the  order,  he  could  relieve  him  and  put  in  his  place  one  of 
the  line  officers  who  would  obey  all  orders.  This  officer  reported 
this  to  Washington  and  it  changed  their  orders  so  that  they  were 
ordered  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  officer  in  the  field  and  to  report 
their  orders  to  their  chiefs  in  Washington.  General  Grant  said 
that  President  Lincoln  said  in  reply  to  his  request  for  the  command 
of  the  staff  departments  that  he  could  not  give  him  that  legally ;  but, 
he  said,  "There  is  no  one  but  myself  that  can  interfere  with  your 
orders;  and  you  can  rest  assured  that  I  will  not  do  it."  We  were 
all  anxious  to  hear  of  his  visit  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
his  opinion  of  it,  and  Sherman  soon  got  him  to  talking  about  it. 


REUNION  OF  ARMY  OF  POTOMAC. 


He  said  it  was  the  finest  Army  he  had  ever  seen;  far  superior  to  any 
of  ours  in  equipment,  supplies,  and  transportation.  He  said,  how 
ever,  that  the  officers  he  talked  with  considered  he  would  have  a 
much  more  difficult  problem  on  his  hands  than  he  had  had  in  the 
West,  and  he  said  to  Sherman  that  some  officer  who  both  of  them 
knew,  but  whose  name  I  have  forgotten,  told  him,  "You  have  not 
faced  Bobby  Lee  yet;"  and  as  he  said  it,  I  could  see  that  twinkle 
in  Grant' s  eye  that  we  often  saw  there  when  he  meant  mischief. 
Grant,  after  discussing  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  having  noth 
ing  but  praise  for  it,  informed  us  that  he  should  make  his  head 
quarters  with  that  Army  and  leave  Sherman  to  command  the 
Armies  of  the  West,  also  informing  us  that  he  proposed  to  take  sev 
eral  of  us  East  with  him.  Sherman  protested  strongly  against  this, 
and  it  was  finally  compromised  by  his  taking  Sheridan  and  leaving 
the  rest  of  us  with  Sherman.  During  the  two  or  three  days  we 
were  with  Grant  he  outlined  in  a  general  way  his  plan  of  campaign 
that  every  Army  should  move  as  early  as  possible  in  the  spring,  all 
on  the  same  day  against  the  enemy,  so  that  Lee  and  Johnston 
could  not  detach  any  of  their  commands  to  reinforce  the  others. 
He  said,  "I  will  try  to  keep  Lee  from  sending  any  force  to  John 
ston,  but,"  he  said  to  Sherman,  "if  he  does,  I  will  send  you  two  men 
where  he  sends  one."  He  also  informed  us  of  the  necessity  of  clos 
ing  the  war  with  this  campaign. 

Our  visit  with  Grant  ended,  he  took  Sherman  as  far  as  Cincin 
nati  with  him,  to  talk  over  and  complete  their  plans,  while  we  re 
turned  to  our  commands  to  fit  them  out  for  the  campaign.  Gen 
eral  Sherman  has  since  pointed  out  to  me  in  the  Burnett  House,  at 
Cincinnati,  the  room  they  occupied  the  night  before  they  parted, 
and  where  over  their  maps  the  final  orders  were  given  him  and  final 
arrangements  made  that  inaugurated  the  two  great  campaigns  of 
Richmond  and  Petersburg  in  the  East,  and  Atlanta  in  the  West. 
After  the  Atlanta  campaign  I  paid  General  Grant  a  visit  at  City 
Point.  I  reached  his  headquarters  in  October,  and  spent  two 
weeks  with  him,  and  saw  the  Armies  of  the  James  and  the  Potomac. 
Evenings  we  would  sit  around  his  camp-fire,  and  in  his  genial, 
comprehensive  way,  he  told  us  of  his  campaign  and  the  great  battles 
you  had  fought,  and  brought  out  fully  to  me  what  a  great  Army 
you  were.  I  asked  him  what  he  claimed  for  the  Battle  of  the  Wil 
derness.  There  had  been  great  discussion,  as  you  know,  about  it, 
and  Grant,  with  the  same  twinkle  of  the  eye  that  I  had  seen  at 


150  IvKUNioN  OF  ARMY  OF  POTOMAC. 


Xashville,  said,  "I  only  claim  that  after  that  battle,  (and  I  took 
i he  initiative  on  the  march  towards  Richmond,)  that  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  no  longer  afraid  of  Bobby  Lee."  He  had  not 
forgotten  his  talk  with  us  at  Nashville. 

Xow  you  have  had  Grant's  opinion  of  your  great  Army,  and  as 
my  toast  is  the  Arnix  of  the  Tennessee,  T  will  close  by  giving  you 
General  Grant's  description  of  that  Army  when  called  upon  to 
respond  to  the  sam;1  toast  at  one  of  our  reunions.  He  said,  "As  an 
Army,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  never  sustained  a  single  defeat 
during  four  years  of  war.  Every  fortification  which  it  assailed  sur 
rendered.  Every  force  arrayed  against  it  was  either  defeated, 
captured,  or  destroyed.  Xo  officer  was  ever  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  that  army  who  had  afterwards  to  be  relieved  from  it  or  to 
he  reduced  to  another  command.  Such  a  history  is  not  accident." 


USE  OF  BLOCK-HOUSES  DURING 
THE  CIVIL  WAR 


To  the  Editor  of  the  Army  and  Navy  Journal: 

I  was  greatly  interested  in  the  communication  of  Captain 
Joubert  Reitz,  published  in  your  journal  March  21,  1903,  giving  a 
description  of  the  block-house  system  inaugurated  by  General 
Kitchener  in  the  Transvaal  War.  It  was  a  continuous  line  of 
block-houses  connected  by  barbed  wire,  to  prevent  the  Boers  crossing 
the  railway  lines,  and  virtually  corralling  their  forces  in  certain 
districts  until  want  of  food  forced  them  to  surrender.  Captain 
Reitz  asserts  that  the  block-house  system  did  more  to  end  the  war 
than  the  whole  British  Army. 

In  the  Civil  War  our  block-house  system  was  just  as  effective, 
but  in  another  direction.  We  used  it  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
our  lines  of  communication,  not  as  a  trocha,  or  a  line  connected 
with  wire  fencing  and  other  obstructions,  as  used  by  the  British  and 
by  the  Spaniards  in  the  Cuban  War.  The  British  built  theirs  of 
bags  filled  with  earth.  The  Spaniards  erected  neat  structures 
of  two  stories,  built  of  concrete,  with  wooden  roofs  and  openings  for 
two  lines  of  fire,  one  above  the  other.  These  were  erected  not  more 
than  half  a  mile  apart.  In  the  Civil  War  our  block-houses  were 
usually  erected  of  logs,  one  and  two  stories  high.  The  face  of  the 
upper  story  had  an  angle  of  forty-five  degrees  to  the  face  of  the  first 
story,  thus  concentrating  a  direct  fire  upon  an  enemy  approaching 
from  any  point  of  the  compass.  The  first  block-houses  in  the  West 
that  I  know  of  were  built  by  my  command  in  July  and  August, 
1862,  when  it  rebuilt  the  Mobile  &  Ohio  Railroad  from  Columbus 
to  Humbolt.  There  were  many  important  bridges  on  this  line,  and 
we  built  block-houses  at  the  most  important  ones,  and  stockades  at 
the  others. 

In  the  fall  of  1862,  when  Forrest  and  Jackson  made  the  noted 
raids  into  West  Tennessee,  the  forces  at  all  these  structures  that 
my  command  had  erected  held  their  positions,  and  defeated  the 

—159— 


1()0  BLOCK  HOUSES  ix  THE  CIVIL  \Y.\u. 

enemy  when  attacked,  while  at  the  bridges  between  Jackson,  Tennes 
see,  and  Grand  Junction,,  where  they  had  only  earth  defenses,  the 
forces  were  driven  away  or  captured  and  the  bridges  destroyed.  The 
result  of  this  was  that  General  Grant  issued  an  order  commending 
the  action  of  the  detachments  that  were  successful.,  stating  that 
wherever  they  stood  success  followed,  and  the  enemy  suffered  a  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  greater  than  the  garrisons  of  the  block 
houses  and  stockades.  This  result  also  caused  General  Grant  to 
issue  an  order  to  build  block-houses  and  stockades  on  the  line  of  the 
Memphis  &  Charleston  Eailway  at  all  important  bridges  from  Mem 
phis  to  Corinth,  and  they  protected  this  line  of  communication  until 
it  was  abandoned. 

The  block-houses  held  about  a  company,  but  sometimes  stock 
ades  or  earth  intrenchments  were  added  to  hold  two  companies, 
and  our  orders  were  imperative  to  all  forces  occupying  them  never 
to  leave  them  or  surrender,  no  matter  how  large  the  attacking  force. 
My  first  order  stated  that  a  company  in  a  block-house  or  stockade 
was  equal  to  a  Regiment  attacking,  and  I  do  not  remember  the 
enemy,  in  their  numerous  raids,  ever  capturing  one  that  was  de 
fended,  up  to  the  time  I  left  Corinth  in  the  summer  of  1863.  After 
the  Battle  of  Chattanooga,  when  our  Armies  were  lying  along  the 
line  of  the  railway  from  Nashville  to  Decatur  and  Nashville  to 
Stevenson,  I  rebuilt  the  Nashville  &  Decatur  Railway,  on  which 
there  were  at  least  thirty  important  bridges,  at  each  of  which  we 
built  strong  block-houses  and  stockades^  and  the  enemy  never  cap 
tured  one  of  them,  though  in  two  instances  they  were  attacked 
with  a  brigade,  and  often  with  two  Regiments  and  batteries.  We 
protected  against  artillery  fire  by  throwing  up  earthworks  to  the 
height  of  the  first  line  of  fire,  taking  the  chance  of  any  damage  be 
ing  done  above  that.  Our  orders  here  were  when  Forest,  Roddy, 
and  Hiannan  attacked  this  line  to  hold  the  posts  under  any  and  all 
circumstances,  stating  that  if  they  stayed  in  the  block-houses  and 
stockades  nothing  could  defeat  them,  and  so  it  proved.  Where 
these  forces  struck  a  Regiment,  and  captured  it  in  earth-works, 
they  went  twelve  miles  north  to  the  Sulphur  Trestle,  a  bridge  one 
hundred  and  twenty-five  feet  high,  defended  by  two  companies  in  a 
block-house  and  stockade,  and  were  signally  defeated.  The  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  protected  the  line  from  Nashville  to  Stevenson, 
and  on  to  Chattanooga,  with  block-houses  at  all  bridges  and  impor 
tant  points,  and  when  on  the  5th  of  May,  1864,  General  Sherman 


BLOCK  HOUSES  IN  THE  CIVIL  WAI;.  161 

started  on  the  Atlanta  campaign,  General  Hooker  reports  on  April 
23,  1864,  that  he  detailed  1,460  men  to  occupy  block-houses  from 
Nashville  to  Chattanooga,  and  this  force  held  that  line  of  road 
throughout  the  campaign,  though  many  attempts  were  made  to  de 
stroy  it.  During  the  Atlanta  campaign  as  we  advanced  the  rail 
way  was  rebuilt,  and  all  bridges  and  stations  had  block-houses  or 
stockades  to  protect  them. 

General  Green  B.  Kaum's  Brigade  was  located  at  some  of  the 
most  important  structures.  General  Wheeler,  with  all  of  John 
ston's  Cavalry  force  and  several  batteries,  endeavored  to  destroy 
this,  our  only  line  of  communication  for  transporting  supplies. 
General  Eaum's  story  is  so  to  the  point  that  T  quote  it  almost 
entire.  He  says: 

My  experiences  with  block-houses  extended  from  May  to  November, 
1864,  on  the  Memphis  &  Charleston  railroad,  and  the  Chattanooga  &  Atlanta 
railroad.  Block-houses  were  built  along  these  railroads  exclusively  for  the 
protection  of  bridges.  They  were  built  of  heavy  square  timbers,  sometimes 
with  two  or  three  thicknesses  of  timber,  and  were  of  various  sixes.  I  had  a 
two-story  block-house  built  at  Mud  Creek,  east  of  Scottsboro,  Ala. ;  it  would 
easily  hold  100  men.  These  houses  were  carefully  pierced  with  loop-holes, 
so  that  the  garrison  could  cover  every  approach.  My  garrisons  were  usually 
too  large  for  the  block-houses.  In  these  cases  I  threw  up  an  earth-work, 
and  protected  it  with  abatis.  The  Confederate  forces  soon  learned  to  re 
spect  a  block-house.  I  found  it  to  be  an  absolute  defense  against  musketry. 

During  the  Atlanta  campaign  our  block-houses  were  constantly  at 
tacked  by  raiding  parties  ;  small  and  great  trains  would  be  thrown  from  the 
track  and  burned,  and  small  sections  of  the  track  destroyed.  About  July  5, 
1864,  an  enterprising  Confederate  cavalryman  with  about  ,'iOO  men  made  a 
rapid  march  up  Dirt  Town  Valley,  crossed  the  Chattanooga  range  by  a 
bridle-path,  threw  a  train  of  fifteen  loaded  cars  off  the  track,  burned  them, 
and  destroyed  a  small  section  of  the  track,  but  he  did  not  attempt  to  destroy 
the  bridge  near  by  at  Tilton — it  was  defended  by  a  block-house  with  a 
capacity  for  seventy  men. 

When  General  Wheeler  made  his  great  raid  north  in  August,  1864,  he 
struck  the  railroad  at  various  places.  He  destroyed  two  miles  of  track  im 
mediately  south  of  Tilton,  Ga.,  but  did  not  come  within  range  of  the  block 
house,  and  did  not  attempt  to  destroy  the  bridge  defended  by  the  block 
house.  During  this  raid  General  Wheeler,  without  hesitation,  attacked  and 
carried  a  part  of  the  works  at  Dalton.  During  the  Atlanta  campaign  there 
was  not  a  bridge  destroyed  by  the  Confederates  between  Nashville  and  At 
lanta  which  was  protected  by  a  block-house. 

After  the  fall  of  Atlanta.  General  Hood  moved  with  his  entire  army 
against  the  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta  railroad,  destroying  thirty-seven  miles 
of  track.  On  October  12  he  struck  the  railroad  at  Kesaca  and  Tilton.  Til- 
ton  was  garrisoned  by  the  Seventeenth  Iowa.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Archer 
commanding.  lie  had  about  .'>•"»<>  men — no  artillery.  An  Army  Corps  was  in 
his  front.  Colonel  Archer  held  the  enemy  off  seven  hours,  fighting  from  his 
rifle-pits  and  block-house.  At  last  the  Confederate  commander  placed  sev 
eral  batteries  in  position,  and  opened  upon  the  devoted  garrison.  In  a  short 
time  the  block-house  was  rendered  untenable,  and  Colonel  Archer  was  forced 
to  surrender.  This  was  the  first  and  only  success  against  our  block-house 
system.  On  December  4.  1S<'>4,  Hates's  division  of  Cheatham's  Corps  at 
tacked  the  block-house  at  the  railroad  crossing  of  Overall's  Creek,  five  miles 


162  BLOCK  HOUSES  IN  THE  CIVIL  WAK. 

north  of  Murfreesborough,  Tenn.  The  enemy  used  artillery  to  reduce  the 
block-house,  and  although  seventy-four  shots  were  fired  at  it,  no  material  in 
jury  was  done ;  the  garrison  held  out  until  relieved  by  General  Milroy  from 
Murfreesborough. 

After  the  Atlanta  campaign,  in  the  Department  of  the  Mis 
souri,  every  important  bridge  and  town  where  detachments  of 
troops  were  stationed  was  protected  by  block-houses  and  stockades, 
and  during  the  Indian  campaigns  of  1864-5-6  our  lines  of  com 
munication,  stage  and  telegraph,  were  all  held  successfully  by  small 
detachments  of  troops  in  block-houses  and  stockades,  and  were  never 
captured  unless  overwhelming  forces  of  the  Indians  attacked  them, 
and  only  then  when  the  defensive  works  were  inferior  or  not  prop 
erly  constructed;  and,  even  in  cases  where  detachments  left  their 
stations,  if  they  had  remained  they  would  have  successfully  held 
them.  After  I  took  command  on  the  plains  and  issued  positive  or 
ders  for  detachments  to  stay  by  their  posts  and  never  leave  them, 
not  a  single  detachment  that  I  remember  of  was  captured  in  its 
block-house  or  stockade.  With  the  small  force  we  had  it  would 
have  been  impossible  to  maintain  our  mail,  telegraph  and  overland 
routes  successfully,  if  it  had  not  been  for  our  system  of  block-houses 
and  stockades,  dotted  for  thousands  of  miles  over  each  of  the  over 
land  routes.  It  is  evident  from  our  experience  in  the  West  that  our 
block-house  and  stockade  system  of  defending  our  lines  of  commu 
nication  was  a  great  success,  not  only  as  against  raids  of  cavalry,  but 
from  attacks  of  infantry  and  artillery,  and  saved  to  us  a  very  large 
force  for  the  field.  I  left  on  the  line  of  the  railway  from  Nashville 
to  Athens  during  the  Atlanta  campaign  only  two  Regiments  of 
negroes,  taking  with  me  my  entire  Corps,  and  without  the  block 
houses  to  defend  the  lines  from  Nashville  to  Stevenson  and  Steven 
son  to  Atlanta,  it  would  have  taken  a  thousand  men  without 
block-house  protection  for  every  hundred  required  with  it. 

G-RENVILLE  M.  DODGE. 


TO  THE  MEMORY  OF  SAMUEL  DAVIS 

Monument  erected  in  Nashville,  Tenn.,  to  Samuel  Davis,  Confederate  Spy 
executed  by  order  of  General  Dodge,  at  Pulaski,  Tenn.,   in  1864. 


AN  INCIDENT  OF  THE  WAR 


EXECUTION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  SPY,  SAMUEL  DAVIS 
AT  PULASKI,  TENN.,  NOVEMBER,  1863 

NEW  YORK,  June  15th,  1897. 
To  the  Editor  of  The  Confederate  Veteran: 

In  fulfillment  of  my  promise  to  give  you  my  recollections  of 
Sam  Davis,  (who  was  hung  as  a  spy  in  November,  1863,  at  Pulas- 
ki,  Tenn.,)  I  desire  to  say  that  in  writing  of  matters  which  oc 
curred  thirty-four  years  ago  one  is  apt  to  make  mistakes  as  to 
minor  details;  hut  the  principal  facts  were  such  that  they  im 
pressed  themselves  upon  my  mind  so  that  I  can  speak  of  them  with 
some  certainty. 

When  General  Grant  ordered  General  Sherman  (whose  head 
of  column  was  near  Eastport,  on  the  Tennessee  River)  to  drop 
everything  and  bring  his  army  to  Chattanooga,  my  Corps  (the  Six 
teenth)  was  then  located  at  Corinth,  Miss.,  and  I  brought  up  the 
rear. 

General  Grant's  anxiety  to  attack  Bragg's  command  before 
Longstreet  could  return  from  East  Tennessee  brought  on  the  bat 
tle  before  I  could  reach  Chattanooga.  General  Grant,  therefore, 
instructed  General  Sherman  to  halt  my  command  in  Middle  Ten 
nessee  and  to  instruct  me  to  rebuild  the  railway  from  Nashville  to 
Decatur.  The  fulfilling  of  the  above  order  is  fully  set  forth  by 
General  Grant  in  his  Memoirs. 

When  I  reached  the  line  of  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  railroad, 
I  distributed  my  troops  from  Columbia  south  towards  Athens,  Ala 
bama.  I  had  about  10,000  men  and  8,000  animals,  and  was  with 
out  provisions,  with  no  railroad  or  water  communication  to  any 
base  of  supply,  and  was  obliged  to  draw  subsistence  for  my  com 
mand  from  ihe  adjacent  country  until  I  could  rebuild  the  railroad 
and  receive  my  supplies  from  Nashville. 

My  command  was  a  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  occu- 

— 165 — 


16G  AN  INCIDKNT  OF  TIIK  \V.\u. 

pying  temporarily  a  portion  of  tlio  territory  of  the  Department 
of  the  Cumberland,  but  not  reporting  or  subject  to  the  commander 
of  that  department. 

Upon  an  examination  of  the  country,  1  found  that  there  was 
an  abundance  of  even-thing  needed  to  supply  my  command,  except 
where  Sherman's  forces  had  swept  across  it  along  Elk  Eiver.  He 
wrote  me,  "I  do  not  think  that  my  forces  have  left  a  chicken  for 
you."  I  also  found  that  T  was  in  a  country  where  the  sentiment 
of  the  people  was  almost  unanimously  against  us.  I  had  very  lit 
tle  faith  in  converting  them  by  the  taking  of  the  oath  of  allegiance; 
I  therefore  issued  an  order  stating  that  I  required  the  products  of 
the  country  to  supply  my  command,  and  that  to  all  who  had  these 
products,  regardless  of  their  sentiments,  who  would  bring  them 
to  the  stations  where  my  troops  were  located,  I  would  pay  a  fair 
price  for  them;  but  that,  if  I  had  to  send  and  bring  the  supplies 
myself,  I  should  take  them  without  making  payment,  giving  them 
only  receipts ;  and  also  issued  instructions  that  every  train  going 
for  supplies  should  be  accompanied  by  an  officer  and  receipt  given 
for  what  he  took.  This  had  a  good  effect,  the  citizens  generally 
bringing  in  their  supplies  to  my  command  and  receiving  the  proper 
voucher;  but  it  also  gave  an  opportunity  for  straggling  bands  to  rob 
and  charge  up  their  depredations  to  my  command.  This  caused 
many  complaints  to  be  filed  with  the  military  governor  of  Tennes 
see  and  the  Department  Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land. 

Upon  investigation  I  found  most  of  those  depredations  were 
committed  by  irresponsible  parties  of  both  sides,  and  I  also  dis 
covered  that  there  was  a  well-organized  and  disciplined  Corps  of 
scouts  and  spies  within  my  lines,  one  force  operating  to  the  east  of 
the  line,  under  Captain  Coleman,  and  another  force  operating  to 
the  west,  having  its  headquarters  in  the  vicinity  of  Florence,  Ala 
bama.  I  issued  orders  to  my  oAvn  spies  to  locate  these  parties,  send 
ing  out  scouting  parties  to  wipe  them  out  or  drive  them  across  the 
Tennessee  River. 

My  cavalry  had  had  considerable  experience  in  this  work  in 
and  around  Corinth,  and  they  were  very  successful  and  brought  in 
many  prisoners,  most  of  whom  could  only  be  treated  as  prisoners  of 
war. 

The  Seventh  Kansas  Cavalry  was  very  efficient  in  this  service, 
and  they  captured  Samuel  Davis,  Joshua  Brown,  Smith,  and  Gen- 


AN  INCIDENT  OF  THE  WAR.  1G7 

eral  Bragg's  Chief  of  Scouts  and  Secret  Service  Colonel  S.  Shaw, 
all  about  the  panic  time.  We  did  not  know  of  the  importance  of 
the  capture  of  Shaw,  or  that  he  was  the  Captain  Coleman  com 
manding  Bragg's  secret-service  force.  Nothing  was  found  on  any 
of  the  prisoners  of  importance,  except  upon  Davis,  who  evidently 
had  been  selected  to  carry  the  information  they  had  all  obtained 
through  to  General  Bragg.  Upon  Davis  were  found  letters  from 
Captain  Coleman,  the  commander  of  the  scouts  to  the  east  of  us, 
and  many  others.  I  was  very  anxious  to  capture  Coleman  and 
break  up  his  command,  as  my  own  scouts  and  spies  within  the  Con 
federate  lines  were  continually  reporting  to  us  the  news  sent  south 
from  and  the  movements  of  Coleman  within  my  lines. 

Davis  was  brought  immediately  to  me,  as  his  captors  knew  his 
importance.  They  believed  he  was  an  officer  and  also  knew  he  was 
a  member  of  Coleman's  command. 

When  brought  to  my  office  I  met  him  pleasantly.  I  knew  what 
had  been  found  upon  him  and  I  desired  to  locate  Coleman  and  his 
command  and  ascertain,  if  possible,  who  was  furnishing  the  in 
formation,  which  I  saw  was  accurate  and  valuable,  to  General 
Bragg. 

Davis  met  me  modestly.  He  was  a  fine,  soldierly-looking 
voung  man,  dressed  in  a  faded  Federal  soldier's  coat,  one  of  our 
army  soft  hats,  and  top  boots.  He  had  a  frank,  open  face,  which 
was  inclined  to  brightness.  1  tried  to  impress  upon  him  the  dan 
ger  he  was  in,  and  that  I  knew  lie  was  only  a  messenger,  and  held 
out  to  him  the  hope  of  lenient  treatment  if  he  would  answer  truth 
fully,  as  far  as  he  could,  my  questions. 

He  listened  attentively  and  respectfully  to  me,  but,  as  I  recol 
lect,  made  no  definite  answer,  and  I  had  him  returned  to  the 
prison.  My  recollection  is  that  Captain  Armstrong,  my  Provost 
Marshal,  placed  in  the  prison  with  him  and  the  other  prisoners  one 
of  our  own  spies,  who  claimed  to  them  to  be  one  of  the  Confederate 
scouting  parties  operating  within  my  lines,  and  I  think  the  man 
More,  whom  the  other  prisoners  speak  of  as  having  been  captured 
with  them  and  escaping,  was  this  man.  However,  they  all  kept 
their  own  counsel  and  we  obtained  no  information  of  value  from 
them. 

The  reason  of  this  reticence  was  the  fact  that  they  all  knew 
Colonel  Shaw  was  one  of  our  captives,  and  that  if  his  importance 


168  AN  INCIDENT  OF  THE  WAR. 

was  made  known  to  us  he  would  certainly  be  hung;  and  they  did 
not  think  that  Davis  would  be  executed. 

Upon  Davis  was  found  a  large  mail  of  value.  Much  of  it  was 
letters  from  the  friends  and  relatives  of  soldiers  in  the  Confed 
erate  Army.  There  were  many  small  presents — one  or  two,  I  re 
member,  to  General  Bragg — and  much  accurate  information  of  my 
forces,  of  our  defenses,  our  intentions,  substance  of  my  orders,  criti 
cisms  as  to  my  treatment  of  the  citizens,  and  a  general  approval  of 
my  payment  for  supplies,  while  a  few  denounced  severely  some  of 
the  parties  who  had  hauled  in  supplies  under  the  orders.  Captain 
Coleman  mentioned  this  in  one  of  his  letters. 

There  were  also  intimations  of  the  endeavor  that  would  be 
made  to  interrupt  my  work,  and  plans  for  the  capture  of  single 
soldiers  and  small  parties  of  the  command  out  after  forage. 

I  had  Davis  brought  before  me  again,  after  my  Provost  Mar 
shal  had  reported  his  inability  to  obtain  anything  of  value  from 
him.  I  then  informed  him  that  lie  would  be  tried  as  a  spy;  that 
the  evidence  against  him  would  surely  convict  him;  and  made  a 
direct  appeal  to  him  to  give  me  the  information  I  knew  he  had.  He 
very  quietly,  but  firmly,  refused  to  do  it.  I  therefore  let  him  be 
tried  and  suffer  the  consequences.  Considerable  interest  was  taken 
in  young  Davis  by  the  Provost  Marshal  and  Chaplain  Young,  and 
considerable  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  upon  them  by  some  of 
the  citizens  of  Pulaski;  and  I  am  under  the  impression  that  some 
of  them  saw  Davis  and  endeavored  to  induce  him  to  save  himself, 
but  they  failed.  Mrs.  John  A.  Jackson,  I  remember,  made  a  per 
sonal  appeal  in  his  behalf  directly  to  me.  Davis  was  convicted 
upon  trial  and  sentenced.  Then  one  of  my  noted  scouts,  known  as 
"Chickasaw,"  believed  that  he  could  prevail  upon  Davis  to  give 
the  information  we  asked. 

He  took  him  in  hand  and  never  gave  it  up  until  the  last  mo 
ment,  going  to  the  scaffold  with  a  promise  of  pardon  a  few  moments 
before  his  execution. 

Davis  died  to  save  his  own  chief,  Colonel  Shaw,  who  was  in 
prison  with  him  and  was  captured  the  same  day. 

The  parties  who  were  prisoners  with  Davis  have  informed  me 
that  it  was  Shaw  who  had  selected  Davis  as  the  messenger  to  Gen 
eral  Bragg,  and  had  given  to  him  part  of  his  mail  and  papers. 

I  did  not  know  this  certainly  until  a  long  time  after  the  war. 
I  first  learned  of  it  by  rumor  and  what  some  of  my  own  scouts  have 


A\     1  NCIDKNT   OF   T1IK    \\'AK. 


told  mi-  since  the  war,  and  it  has  since  been  confirmed  confidentially 
to  me  by  one  of  the  prisoners  who  was  captured  ahout  the  same  time 
that  D;j\is  was  and  who  was  imprisoned  with  him  up  to  the  time 
he  was  convicted  and  sentenced,  and  knew  Colonel  Shaw,  as  well  as 
all  the  facts  in  the  case. 

The  statement  made  to  me  is,  that  Colonel  S.  Shaw  was  the 
chief  or  an  important  officer  in  General  Bragg's  Secret-  Service 
Corps:  that  Shaw  had  furnished  the  important  documents  to  Davis; 
and  that  their  captors  did  not  know  Shaw  and  his  importance. 

(  'olonel  Shaw  I  sent  with  the  other  prisoners  ISTorth,  as  prison 
ers  of  war.  1  also  learned  that  Shaw  was  greatly  alarmed  when  he 
was  informed  I  was  trying  to  induce  Davis  to  give  me  the  infor 
mation  he  had. 

This  is  where  Davis  showed  himself  a  true  soldier.  He  had 
been  entrusted  with  an  important  commission  by  an  important 
officer,  who  was  imprisoned  with  him,  and  died  rather  than  betray 
him.  He  knew  to  a  certainty,  if  he  informed  me  of  the  facts,  that 
Shaw  would  be  executed,  for  lie  was  a  far  more  important  person  to 
us  than  was  Davis. 

During  the  war  I  had  many  spies  captured;  some  executed 
who  were  captured  within  the  Confederate  lines  and  who  were 
equally  brave  in  meeting  their  fate. 

By  an  extraordinary  effort  I  saved  the  life  of  one  who  was 
captured  by  Forrest.  Through  my  efforts  this  man  escaped,  though 
General  Forrest  sized  him  up  correctly.  He  was  one  of  the  most 
important  men  we  ever  had  within  the  Confederate  lines. 

Forrest  was  determined  to  hang  him,  but  Major-General  Polk 
believed  him  innocent  and  desired  to  save  him. 

Great  interest  was  taken  in  Davis  at  the  time,  because  it  was 
known  by  all  of  the  command  that  I  desired  to  save  him. 

Your  publication  bears  many  evidences  of  this  fact.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  necessary  for  me  to  state  that  I  regretted  to  see  sen 
tence  executed  ;  but  it  was  one  of  the  fates  of  war,  which  is  cruelty 
itself,  and  there  is  no  refining  it. 

I  find  this  letter  bearing  upon  the  case;  it  may  he  of  interest. 
It  is  my  first  report  to  Major  B.  M.  Sawyer,  Assistant  Adjutant- 
General,  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  notifying  him  of  the  capture  of 
Davis.  It  is  dated,  Pulaski,  Tenn.,  November  20th,  18G3,  and  is  as 
follows  : 


170  Ax  INCIDKNT  OF  TIIK  \\.\\i. 

I  herewith  inclose  a  copy  of  dispatches  taken  from  one  of  Brau^'s 
spies.  lie  had  a  heavy  mail,  papers,  etc..  and  shows  Captain  Coleman  is 
pretty  well  posted. 

We  have  broken  up  several  bands  of  mounted  robbers  and  Confederate 
cavalry  in  the  last  week,  capturing  some  live  commissioned  officer*  and  one 
hundred  enlisted  men.  who  have  IMHMI  forwarded. 

I  also  forward  a  few  of  the  most  important  letters  found  in  the  mail. 
The  tooth-brushes  and  blank-books  I  was  » ready  in  need  of  and  therefore 
appropriated  them.  I  am. 

Very    respectfully,    your    obedient    servant. 

G.  M.  DODGE, 

Brigadier  General. 

The  severe  penaltv  of  death,  where  a  spy  is  captured,  is  not 
heeause  there  is  am  tiling  dishonorable  in  the  fact  of  the  person  bo- 
ing  a  spy,  as  only  men  of  peculiar  gifts  for  such  service,  men  of 
courage  and  cool  judgment  and  undoubted  patriotism,  are  selected. 
The  fact  that  the  information  they  obtain  is  found  within  their 
enemy's  lines,  and  the  probability  of  great  danger  to  an  Army,  is 
what  causes  the  penalty  to  be  so  very  severe.  A  soldier  caught  in 
the  uniform,  or  a  part  of  the  uniform,  of  his  enemy,  within  his 
enemy's  lines,  establishes  the  fact  that  be  is  a  spy  and  is  there  in 
violation  of  the  Articles  of  War  and  for  no  good  purpose.  This 
alone  will  prohibit  his  being  treated  as  a  prisoner  of  war.  when 
caught,  as  I)avis  was,  in  our  uniform,  with  valuable  documents  upon 
him.  and  seals  his  fate. 

I  appreciate  fully  that  the  people  of  Tennessee  and  Davis's 
comrades  understand  bis  soldierly  qualities  and  propose  to  honor  bis 
memory.  I  lake  pleasure  in  aiding  in  raising  the  monument  to 
bis  memory,  although  the  services  he  performed  were  for  the  pur 
pose  of  injuring  mv  command,  but  given  in  faithfully  performing 
the  duties  he  was  assigned  to.  T  am 

Truly  and  respectfully, 

(rRENVILLK   M.    DOD(iE, 

Major-General. 


8    °| 

00        ~- 


&:    "So 


- 


GEN.  G.  M.  DODGE  ON  THE 
"WATER  CURE" 


[The  following  is  a  reprint  of  an  article  that  appeared  originally  in 
the  New  York  Evening  Post.— G.  M.  D.] 

The  New  York  Evening  Post  has  thus  been  "called  down"  by 
General  Grenvillc  M.  Dodge,  who  is  well  known  throughout  Iowa 
and  the  Nation  as  one  of  the  leading  Corps  Commanders  of  the 
Union  Army  during  the  Civil  War : 

To  the  Editor  of  the  Evening  Post: 

As  one  who  has  had  some  experience  in  the  necessities,  usages,  and 
cruelties  of  war,  which  always  prevail  during  a  campaign  in  an  enemy's 
country,  I  am  surprised  at  the  position  of  your  journal,  and  its 
bitterness  against  the  alleged  action  of  Major  Glenn,  Lieutenant  Conger, 
and  Assistant  Surgeon  Lyon. 

The  testimony  of  Sergeant  Itiley,  upon  which  you  base  your  attack 
on  these  officers,  goes  to  prove  that  they  gave  the  water  cure  to  a  Filipino 
who  had  been  made  presidente  in  one  of  the  provinces  by  our  Government 
\vho  had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  our  country,  and  then  used  his 
official  position  to  cover  his  acts  as  captain  of  an  insurgent  company  which 
was  acting  in  arms  against  our  Army  and  within  our  lines.  Therefore,  he  was 
a  traitor  and  a  spy,  and  his  every  act  was  a  violation  of  the  laws  of  war.  and 
branded  him  an  outlaw  and  guerilla.  If  these  are  the  fads,  under  the  usages 
of  war  these  officers  were  justified  in  what  they  did ;  in  fact,  if  they  had 
shot  the  traitor  they  would  never  have  been  called  to  account,  and  in  all 
probability  this  is  what  would  have  happened  to  him  in  the  Civil  War. 

An  officer  has  great  latitude  under  such  circumstances,  and  it  is  not 
safe  or  fair  to  condemn  one  for  almost  any  act  that  detects  a  traitor  and 
spy  in  arms  against  the  Government  which  he  has  sworn  to  protect,  and 
which  has  put  him  in  a  position  of  trust.  You  ignore  entirely  this  side  of 
the  question,  and  only  treat  Major  Glenn's  acts  as  cruelties  to  peaceable 
Filipino  citizens.  I  can  remember  when  the  journals  of  this  country  upheld 
and  applauded  an  officer  who.  in  the  Civil  War,  ordered  a  man  shot  if  he 
attempted  to  haul  down  the  American  flag,  and  cannot  understand  the  pres 
ent  hysterics  of  some  journals  over  the  terrible  violation  of  the  laws  of  war 
in  punishing  a  traitor,  caught  in  the  act,  with  the  water  cure  only.  The 
treatment  may  have  been  severe,  but  it  is  not  permanently  harmful. 

I  am  astonished  that  these  fearfully  wrought-up  journals  have  no 
word  of  commendation  for  our  soldiers  in  the  Philippines,  who  have  suffered 
untold  cruelties,  assassinations,  burning  by  slow  fires,  burial  alive,  mutila 
tions,  and  atrocities:  who  have  submitted  to  every  indignity  without 
resentment  or  complaint:  and  I  have  been  greatly  gratified  over  their  excel 
lent  behavior  under  such  trying  circumstances.  In  their  comments  these 
journals  are  very  careful  not  to  say  why  these  punishments  are  given  to 
such  traitors,  knowing  well  if  they  did  our  people  would  look  upon  the  acts 
as  one  of  the  necessities  of  war.  and  would  wonder  at  the  leniency  of  Major 
Glenn  and  his  command.  GHKXVILLE  M.  DODGE. 

~.\cir    YorL'.    Aj>riJ    17. 

—173— 


GKXKKAL  .DOIHJK  ox  TIIK  WATER  CURE. 


There  can  In-  no  doubt  that  "war  is  hell,"  no  matter  whether 
it  he  on  the  Philippine  Islands  or  any  other  place  in  the  world. 
There  lias  been  much  howling  over  the  administration  of  "the  water 
cure"  in  the  Philippines,  but  every  man  who  lias  had  one  year's 
experience  in  real  war  will  admit  that  that  "cure''  is  not  so  severe 
as  killing  or  wounding  captured  enemies  \vho  have  knowledge  of 
hidden  arms  or  other  Army  supplies.  Every  one  of  the  "water- 
cured"  Filipinos  \vas  given  the  opportunity  to  escape  that  punish- 
ment  but  refused  to  tell  what  lie  knew  and  was  therefore  rightly 
punished  until  lie  was  willing  to  tell  the  truth.  General  Dodge's 
letter  proves  that  the  punishment  was  justified,  and  his  opinion  will 
be  sustained  by  every  person  who  has  knowledge  of  "the  necessities, 
usages,  and  cruelties  of  war."  which  "always  prevail  dimmr  a  cam 
paign  in  an  enemy's  country."  The  truth  is  that  the  armies  of  the 
T  nited  States  have  been  too  lenient  in  the  Philippines.  That  is 
the  reason  why  the  war  has  been  so  long  continued,  and  the  only 
reason  why  the  final  peace  will  be  still  further  delayed.  War  i> 
never  a  picnic,  but  should  at  all  times  be  made  terrible  in  order 
that  peace  and  safety  may  be  speedily  gained.  "The  water  cure" 
]S  inclined  to  be  slightly  irritating  to  the  throats  of  the  traitors  in 
the  Philippines,  it  is  true,  but  it  is  not  so  bad  or  so  cruel  as  maim 
ing  them  for  life,  or  killing  them.  The  yellow  journaN  may  con 
tinue  to  howl,  but  the  loyal  American  people  will  sustain  the  sol 
diers  of  the  Nation  in  every  effort  to  compel  peace  that  comes  within 
the  rules  of  war. 


MISPLACED  SYMPATHY 


ADDRESS  TO  THE 

NEW  YORK  COMMANDERY,  MILITARY  ORDER  OF  LOYAL 
LEGION,  ON  CRUELTIES  IN  THE  PHILIPPINES 

I  desire  to  cuter  my  protest  and  call  the  attention  of  the  com 
panions  to  the  position  of  a  portion  of  the  public  press,  and  some- 
people,  towards  our  Army  in  the  Philippines,  and  what  tlicv  assert 
arc  cruelties  perpetrated  there. 

There  is  a  certain  portion  of  the  press,  and  also  of  the  people, 
who  are  and  always  have  been  absolutely  opposed  to  the  operations 
of  our  army  in  the  Philippines.  They  were  very  anxious  to  push  us 
into  a  war  which  we  were  all  opposed  to.  but  after  getting  us  there 
they  refused  to  accept  the  results,  and  have  persistent  Iv  opposed 
everything  done  that  was  not  in  exact  accordance  with  their  views. 
In  order  to  work  upon  the  sympathies  of  the  people,  some  of  the 
papers  are  publishing  pictures  showing  our  soldiers  in  the  very  act 
of  committing  great  outrages;  the  pictures  were  manufactured  in 
their  own  offices,  as  were  also  most  of  the  outrages  complained  of. 
You  have  not,  however,  seen  in  these  papers  any  pictures  portraying 
the  cruelties  perpetrated  upon  our  soldiers,  which  have  been  worse 
than  any  acts  ever  committed  by  the  savages  in  our  wars  with  them; 
they  are.  in  fact,  too  revolting  to  relate.  I  have  had  much  to  do 
with  Indian  warfare,  but  have  never  seen  anv  cruelties  to  be  com 
pared  with  those  inllicied  upon  our  soldiers  bv  the  Filipino-,  and 
these  occurrences  were  not  rare,  but  general. — happening  all  the 
time.  Very  little  has  been  said  on  this  subject,  for  it  was  not  the 
policy  of  the  Government  to  have  the  stories  of  these  atrocities 
printed,  or  brought  before  the  people;  but  now  that  our  arinv  is 
being  so  bitterly  attacked,  it  is  time  that  the  soldiers'  side  of  the- 
ijuestion  should  be  presented,  and  we  are  learning  of  the  soldiers 
who  have  been  assassinated,  their  feet  burned,  buried  alive,  killed 
by  slow-burning  (ires,  their  bowels  cut  open  and  wound  around 


KS  M  I  SIM, AC  Kl)   SYMPATHY. 

trees.  The  Filipinos  indulged  in  every  torture  and  indignity  that 
\va>  possible,  and,  as  a  general  thing,  our  soldiers  did  not  retaliate. 
How  they  managed  to  refrain  from  taking  vengeance  is  beyond  my 
comprehension,  but  their  action  is  greatly  to  their  credit  and  honor. 
The  questions  I  wish  to  bring  before  you,  however,  are.  What 
are  the  rights  of  an  officer  in  such  matters?  What  are  his  duties 
and  privileges  in  war  in  an  enemy's  country  that  is  under  martial 
law?  Take,  for  instance,  General  Smith's  position  when  he  was 
sent  to  Samar,  with  instructions  to  wipe  out  the  insurrection  there. 
He  is  said  to  have  issued  instructions  to  kill  everybody  found  in 
arm-  that  was  over  ten  years  of  age,  and  to  burn  the  country,  if  it 
was  necessary  to  wipe  out  the  insurrection,  and  the  result  is  that  in 
ninety  days  or  less  he  did  wipe  out  the  insurrection,  and  without 
any  great  loss  on  our  side  or  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  Now  they 
are  denouncing  him  for  a  threat, — not  an  act.  The  temptation  to 
retaliate  must  have  been  very  great,  for  the  treatment  the  Xinth 
Infantry  received  from  those  savages  was  nothing  short  of  murder, 
followed  by  the  most  horrible  mutilation,  by  a  people  who  pretended 
to  be  their  friends  and  at  peace.  In  the  ninety  days  he  was  operat 
ing  there  General  Smith  brought  the  island  to  peace,  everybody  in 
it  had  surrendered,  and  it  is  quiet.  If  lie  had  made  war  under  the 
methods  advocated,  allowing  no  one  to  be  hurt,  in  all  probability 
the  subjugation  of  the  island  would  have  required  a  year's  time, 
and  there  would  have  been  ten  times  the  suffering  and  loss  of  life 
than  actually  occurred.  He  simply  followed  the  plan  of  war  that 
was  pin-sued  by  Grant,  Sherman,  and  other  commanders  in  the  Civil 
War;  that  is,  made  it  just  as  effective  and  short  as  possible.  You 
know  Sherman's  position  was  that  after  a  certain  length  of  time 
when  an  enemy  had  been  whipped,  it  was  their  duty  to  cease  making 
war,  and  if  they  did  not  do  so,  he  considered  that  any  means  were 
justifiable  in  order  to  bring  it  to  an  end.  He  stated  this  \er\  clear 
ly  in  nis  St.  Louis  speech.  He  stated  the  case  as  follows: 

I  claim  that  when  we  took  Vicksburg.  by  all  the  rules  of  civilized 
warfare  the  Confederates  should  have  surrendered,  and  allowed  us  to  restore 
peace  in  the  land.  I  claim  also  that  when  we  took  Atlanta  they  were  hound 
l).v  every  rule  of  civilized  warfare  to  surrender  their  cause,  which  was  then 
hopeless,  and  it  was  clear  as  daylight  that  they  were  hound  to  surrender 
and  return  to  civil  life:  hut  they  continued  the  war.  and  then  we  had  a 
right  under  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare  to  commence  a  system  thai  would 
make  them  feel  the  power  of  the  (iovernment.  and  make  them  succumb. 
1  had  to  go  through  (Jeorgia  to  let  them  see  what  war  meant.  I  had  a  right 
to  destroy,  which  I  did,  and  I  made  them  feel  the  consequences  of  war  so 
fully  they  will  never  again  invite  an  invading  Army. 


M  isi'LAcKD  SY.M  PATHY. 


You  nil  know  of  the  troubles  thai  occurred  in  the  hordcr  states 
•diiriiiu  ilie  Civil  \Var.  and  of  the  cruelties  to  the  families  of  I'nion 
men  who  entered  our  Army.  It  was  father  against  son,  brother 
against  brother,  and.  as  (Jeneral  Sherman  said.  "It  was  crueltv. 
and  there  was  no  refining  it."  We  know  what  severe  orders  were 
iriven  for  treatment  of  enemies  within  our  lines,  when  their  acts 
were  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  war.  In  one  case  torpedoes  were 
placed  under  a  road  over  which  our  troops  were  marching,  and 
several  soldiers  were  killed.  Sherman  happened  to  come  along  just 
at  that  time,  and  said  to  the  Colonel  of  the  First  Alabama  Cavalrv. 
which  was  his  escort.  'T>urn  the  country  within  fifteen  miles  sur 
rounding  this  spot."  You  all  know  what  that  meant  :  it  was  a 
license  under  which  other  things  besides  burning  was  done.  An 

eye-witness    describes    Sherman's    inarch    to    the    sea    and    through 

& 

ihe  Carolinas  as  a  "cloud  of  smoke  by  day  and  a  pillar  of  fire  by 
night."  \\ho  ever  made  the  surest  ion  that  Sherman's  uniform 
should  be  stripped  oil'  for  this,  or  that  he  should  be  shot,  as  some 
of  our  representatives  in  Congress  and  our  press  now  demand 
should  be  done  in  the  Philippines  for  making  war  in  earnest? 

Take  another  case,  where  Captain  Anderson  captured  a  train 
•of  convalescent  unarmed  I'nion  soldiers  in  North  .Missouri,  and 
placed  them  in  line  and  shot  every  one  of  them.  Shortlv  after 
ward-  Colonel  Johnson,  of  the  Missouri  State  Militia,  who  was  fol 
lowing  Anderson,  came  up.  Anderson  attacked  this  militia  com 
mand  of  1(50  men  and  killed  14:>,  only  seventeen  getting  away. 
Only  one  man  was  taken  alive,  and  he  saved  himself  by  giving  a 
Masonic  sign.  'The  war  records  are  full  of  cases  of  individual  acts, 
and  I  select  one  of  which  I  had  personal  knowledge.  It  is  found 
in  volume  :>S.  of  the  War  Records.  The  orders  in  Missouri  at  that 
time  were  that  any  person  who  harbored  a  guerilla,  and  did  not  re 
port  the  fact  to  the  nearest  commanding  I'liion  officer,  should  re- 
veive  the  same  treatment  as  the  guerilla.  A  man  bv  the  name  of 
McKVynolds  violated  these  orders,  and  harbored  Quant  rell,  the 
guerilla,  and  the  officer  who  detected  it.  after  stating  all  the  facts 
and  evidence,  reported  to  me  as  follows: 

On  consultation  \viih  th,.  squadron  commanders.  Captain  Ilamblin 
and  Lieutenant  drain.  it  \vas  decided  to  execute  Mclteynolds.  which  was 
carried  out  under  my  orders.  U.  M.  Box. 

('<i/>t(iin    (ItHniHimj    //.    Xrrr/////    rurulrif.    Mi*ximrl    Kttiti-    Militia. 


In   reporting  this  case  to  the  Adjutant  (Jeneral   in   Washington 
I  did  not  approve  it.  as  my  investigation  showed  that  the  statements 


180  Misi'LACKi)  SYMPATHY. 

of  M (.-Reynold s's  acts  were  true.  I  did  not  censure  the  officers,  but 
issued  an  order  that  officers  should  follow  more  closely  the  orders  of 
the  Department,  and  ended  that  order  as  follows:  "'Hereafter  men 
caught  in  arms  will  have  no  mercy  shown  them."  General  John 
McNeill,  of  Missouri,  took  twelve  citizens  out  and  shot  them,  it  be 
ing  claimed  they  were  connected  with  guerillas  that  shot  a  Union 
man.  In  some  histories  it  is  known  as  the  Palmyra  massacre.  It 
is  claimed  that  the  Union  man  turned  up  alive.  If  the  reports 
of  the  numbers  of  robbers,  guerillas  and  outlaws  who  were  shot  on 
sight  in  Kentucky,  Missouri,  Tennessee,  and  elsewhere,  by  both 
sides  in  1864  and  1865,  could  be  gathered  up  they  would  furnish 
retaliations  and  cruelties  enough  for  these  water-cure  journals  for 
years. 

Consider  this  matter  in  a  broader  sense.  Take  the  order  of 
General  Grant  to  General  Sheridan  to  make  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
a  barren  waste;  it  was  absolutely  destroyed  so  the  enemy  could  not 
again  occupy  it.  I  can  see  no  difference  between  an  order  to  make 
the  Shenandoah  Valley  a  barren  waste  and  Smith's  order  to  make 
Samar  a  "howling  wilderness."  Take  the  order  I  received  to  u<> 
to  the  rear  of  Bragg's  Army  and  destroy  the  Valley  of  the  Tennes 
see,  and  all  the  supplies  gathered  there  for  the  use  of  his  Army, 
which  valley  was  burned  from  Bear  River  to  Decatur.  These  were 
orders  from  principal  officers  in  our  Army,  and  I  only  quote  them 
to  show  the  contrast  between  that  time  and  the  present.  Senators 
in  the  halls  of  Congress  find  it  necessary  in  these  days  to  take  up  the 
question.  Senator  Rawlins,  of  Utah,  made  an  attack  upon  our 
officers,  and  especially  upon  General  Chaffee,  which  was  nothing 
short  of  disgraceful,  and  should  not  be  allowed  to  go  without  vigor 
ous  condemnation.  He  represents  a  state  and  people  under  whose 
orders  Lieutenant  Gunnison  and  his  party  were  massacred  by  Mor 
mons  disguised  as  Indians.  Some  one  should  get  up  in  the  Senate 
and  call  him  to  account  for  these  things,  and  ask  him,  in  considera 
tion  of  these  facts,  why  he  is  so  deeply  outraged  by  the  orders  of 
General  ( 'ha  (Tee.  a  gallant  soldier  and  gentleman,  a  humane  manr 
and  one  who.  in  my  opinion,  has  done  nothing  in  the  Philippines 
but  what  was  perfectly  justified,  and  will  in  time  be  considered 
to  have  been  humane. 

The  two  Senators  from  Colorado  have1  taken  it  upon  them 
selves  to  denounce  in  bitter  terms  what  they  call  unheard-of  acts 
and  cruelties  of  our  Army.  I  would  point  them  to  a  case  in  their 


MISPLACED  SYMPATHY.  181 

<>\vii  state,  which  was  more  severe  than  any  act  in  the  Philippines 
has  hem.  A  regiment  of  Colorado  cavalry  under  Colonel  .1.  M. 
Chivington.  a  minister  by  profession,  attacked  and  destroyed  a  hand 
of  Indians  encamped  on  the  Big  Sandy,  near  Camp  Lynn,  who 
claimed  to  be  under  the  protection  of  the  officers  at  Fort  Lyon. 
This  was  a  massacre  of  men,  women  and  children  of  a  friendly  band 
of  Indians,  and  was  one  of  the  main  causes  of  bringing  into  arms 
against  the  I'nitcd  States  every  tribe  of  Indians  south  of  the 
Yellowstone.  When  an  investigation  of  this  affair  was  ordered 
the  State  of  Colorado  almost  unanimously  protested  against  it, 
upholding  the  act,  and  quoted  that  old  saying,  "There  is  no  good 
Indian  except  a  dead  one/'  Think  of  our  wars  with  the  Indians 
in  which  whole  bands  were  wiped  out,  even  the  women  and  children 
being  destroyed;  think  of  the  wars  in  which  we  employed  Indians 
against  Indians;  they  not  only  killed  but  scalped.  I  do  not  know 
of  a  single  treaty  ever  made  with  the  Indians  that  the  I'nited  States 
has  not  violated,  and  when  an  Indian  had  the  hardihood  to  object 
the  Government  started  in  to  wipe  him  out.  This  has  been  the 
treatment  of  the  Indians  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  until  at 
the  present  time  there  is  not  a  wild  Indian  living  in  the  entire 
country;  yet  I  cannot  remember  that  this  press  has  ever  been 
aroused ;  it  was  too  near  home. 

Take  the  case  of  Major  Glenn,  who  is  about  to  be  courtmar- 
tialed  for  giving  the  water  cure  to  the  presidente  in  one  of  the 
Provinces  of  Luzon,  as  the  testimony  goes  to  show7.  This  presidente 
had  been  appointed  to  office  by  our  Government,  had  taken  the 
oath  of  allegiance,  and  was  there  to  represent  us.  While  he  was 
occupying  this  position,  it  was  discovered  that  he  was  the  captain 
of  an  insurgent  company,  giving  active  assistance  to  the  enemy, 
and  he  was,  therefore,  a  traitor  and  a  spy,  and  under  the  laws  of 
war  deserved  to  be  shot;  but  instead  they  proposed  to  courtmartial 
Glenn  for  simply  giving  him  the  water  cure1:  and  this,  in  my  opin 
ion,  is  a  great  wrong. 

Order  100,  which  is  often  quoted,  was  issued  in  the  Civil  War 
to  govern  officers.  It  was  prepared  by  Professor  Lieber.  and  was 
considered  and  adopted.  I  believe,  by  a  hoard  of  otlicers;  anyhow, 
it  was  very  carefully  drawn.  I  am  told  it  has  been  considered  and 
used  by  nearly  all  the  nations.  It  gives  an  officer  great  latitude, 
and  where  an  oHicer  meets  a  savage  enemy,  or  one  that  is  violating 
the  laws  of  war.  those  laws  are  suspended  and  it  virtually  is  left 


MISPLACED  SY AF PAT 1 1  v. 


to  his  own  judgment  as  to  ho\v  far  he  should  go  in  innictini:  pun 
ishment,  and  under  tliis  order  there  is  no  doubt  both  Smith  and 
Glenn  were  protected  in  their  actions.  It  may  seem  harsh,  but  von 
are  all  aware  ho\v  many  harsh  orders  were  given  in  the  Civil  War 
for  the  pin-pose  of  forcing  the  enemy  to  obey  our  orders,  and  how 
often  those  orders  and  threats  accomplished  the  purpose  without 
any  other  act.  When  the  colored  troops  were  first  organized,  on  sev 
eral  occasions  Confederate  officers  sent  in  demands  for  them  to  sur 
render,  coupled  with  the  threat  that  if  they  refused  the  place  would 
be  taken  and  no  quarter  granted.  I  know  of  one  instance  where 
an  officer  believed  this  threat  and  surrendered  a  Regiment  of  col 
ored  infantry  for  the  purpose  of  having  them  protected.  Then 
there  is  the  case  of  Fort  Pillow  :  whether  or  not  Forest  gave  the  or 
der  it  is  claimed  he  gave,  I  do  not  know  ;  but  the  fact  that  no  quarter 
was  shown  there  has  been  amply  verified. 

Within  the  past  week  there  has  been  appointed  a  committee 
of  distinguished  citizens,  most  of  whom  are  well-known  opponents 
of  our  Government  in  its  policies  and  acts  during  the  Spanish  War. 
They  propose  to  hunt  up  and  lay  before  Congress  all  cases  of  cruelty 
on  the  part  of  our  Army,  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  sustaining 
the  national  honor.  I  must  say  this  is  the  first  time  I  ever  heard 
of  national  honor  being  sustained  by  such  methods.  Have  you.  or 
any  one  else,  ever  heard  a  single  word  of  protest  from  these  people 
or  any  one  connected  with  them  against  the  revolting  cruelties 
of  the  enemy  in  the  Philippines?  They  evidently  have  no  desire 
to  learn  about  these  things,  but  want  some  excuse  for  attacking  our 
Army,  hoping  thereby  to  bring  dishonor  upon  our  country  before 
the  world.  The  national  honor  never  has.  never  can,  and  never 
will  be  protected  by  such  methods.  It  is  upheld  and  maintained 
today,  as  it  always  has  been,  by  the  patriotism  of  our  people  as 
represented  by  our  Army  in  the  Civil  War,  in  Cuba,  the  Philippines, 
and  China. 

These  attacks  upon  the  Army  are  for  a  double  purpose,  and 
you  should  not  forget  it.  Every  time  they  make  this  great  hub 
bub  about  cruelties  they  are  hitting  back  at  those  that  were  in 
the  Civil  War.  There  is  an  element  in  this  country  that  already 
has  no  use  for  the  soldier  of  the  Civil  War.  They  are  continually 
crying  about  the  pension  he  is  getting;  that  he  is  favored  in  the 
<  io\ eminent  service ;  etc..  etc.  They  do  not  dare  attack  him  openly. 
•is  yet.  but  do  it  covertly.  'There  is  no  officer  listening  to  me  who. 


SY: MI-ATI iv.  is:» 


.lid  not  see  cruelties  in  the  Civil  War.  Many  of  you  have  had  to 
order  them,  hut  YOU  know  YOU  \vriv  never  brought  to  account  for 
them  when  they  were  acts  of  necessity.  \Ve  were  always  careful 
that  no  cruelties  were  committed  hy  enlisted  men.  hut  whatevei 
was  dour  was  hv  the  order  of  an  oHicer.  It  was  the  practice  of  the 
\Var  Department  never  to  interfere  in  these  matters,  leaving  them 
to  the  officer  who  was  in  charge  of  the  forces  in  the  held.  None  oi" 
these  tilings  occurred  without  his  knowledge;  he  was  on  the  spot 
and  knew  the  necessity  for  them,  and  if  he  did  not  take  action  it 
was  considered  that  none  was  necessary,  and  they  were  seldom 
,-alled  to  account  for  it  afterwards :  but  in  the  Philippines  they 
are  bringing  officers  to  account  simply  because  of  the  outcry  of 
people  who  care  nothing  for  the  merits  of  the  case,  except  to  make 
capital  against  our  country's  policy  in  maintaining-  itself  in  the 
Philippines.  In  view  of  all  the  facts.  !  must  doubt  the  sincerity 
of  those  who  are  seeking  to  bring  discredit  upon  our  little  Army, 
the  marvellous  efficiency  of  which  has  won  the  admiration  of  the 
world,  Under  the  regulations,  it  is  impossible  for  the  Army  to 
defend  itself  and  make  answer  to  these  attacks,  except  through  their 
own  officers,  and  their  reports  do  not  reach  the  public,  for  the  press 
seems  to  use  only  that  which  reflects  upon  the  Army,  and  omit.- 
that  which  is  in  its  favor.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  companion  here. 
as  well  as  of  every  good  citizen,  to  enter  his  protest  against  these 
unjust  attacks.  The  right  side  is  beginning  to  get  a  hearing,  and 
when  the  facts  and  cause-  for  the  action  of  the  Army  are  gener 
ally  known,  it  will  he  found  that  our  Army  is  as  humane  and  well- 
behaved  a  bodv  of  troops  as  ever  went  into  a  foreign  country,  and  we 
must  all  assist  in  seeing  that,  it  receives  justice. 


m 


mm 


\pTK^»fb£ 

1&$$!f&l& 

?y$t|2* 


«B« 


